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30 April 2025

Terrorists Target Tourist Hotspot in India’s Jammu and Kashmir

Sudha Ramachandran

Terrorists opened fire at Pahalgam in India’s Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) on April 22, killing at least 26 tourists, including two foreign nationals and two locals, and injuring several others. The attack is being described as the deadliest terrorist attack in the Kashmir valley since the February 2019 suicide bombing by Jaish-e-Mohammed militants at Pulwama, which killed 40 paramilitary personnel.

“This attack is much larger than anything we’ve seen directed at civilians in recent years,” J&K Chief Minister Omar Abdullah said.

“Those behind this heinous act will be brought to justice…they will not be spared!” India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi posted on X.

A senior commander of the Indian Army’s Northern Command told The Diplomat that the “terrorists who slaughtered unarmed civilians at Pahalgam were either Pakistani nationals or backed by Pakistan.” India should not “shrink away from air strikes or even sending Special Forces across the border into Pakistan,” he said, stressing that “a forceful response” was necessary to show that “terrorism against the Indian people will not go unanswered.”



Trump pushing India into high-stakes, high-risk China clash

Bhim Bhurtel

US President Donald Trump’s tariff war has sent shockwaves across the global economy, but no leader has felt its sting more keenly than India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Caught in a high-stakes geopolitical bind, India is grappling with an existential dilemma: balancing its vital economic ties with China against the allure of the American market.

On April 2, 2025, the Trump administration slapped a 26% “reciprocal” tariff on Indian goods, forcing New Delhi into fraught negotiations to preserve access to the American market, its largest export destination.

Despite the Indian media’s portrayal of Modi as a “Vishwaguru” (world leader) and indomitable strongman, India’s response has betrayed a surprising deference, seen in fast and big import duty cuts on Harley-Davidson motorbikes and American-made bourbon whiskey amid a broad pledge to tear down trade barriers. New Delhi has also announced plans to buy more US energy and defense products in a bid to placate Trump.

Sensing the weakness, the Trump team has leveraged a 90-day reprieve on the tariffs to press India into a broader American strategy to isolate China economically and strategically. As part of this diplomatic offensive, US Vice President JD Vance arrived in Delhi on April 22 for a high-profile four-day visit.

What Causes Hindu Emigration From Pakistan’s Sindh Province?

Muhammad Murad

“Sindh is our mother. Who would want to leave their mother? Yet, we are being forced to leave it behind. We have to suppress our emotions to convince ourselves to abandon our birthplace – Sindh,” said a member of a small family from the Jacobabad district of Sindh who recently migrated to India while speaking in Sindhi to the local media.

This story is not just about one family; it reflects the experiences of many Hindus who have emigrated from Pakistan due to ongoing socio-political issues and security concerns in Sindh.

According to a Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) report – titled “Exodus: Is the Hindu Community Leaving Sindh?” – the 2023 national census revealed that Pakistani Hindus number 5.2 million, making them the largest religious minority in the country, followed by Christians, who total 3.3 million. The highest concentration of Hindus in Pakistan is in Sindh, where they constitute 8.8 percent of the province’s total population.

Unfortunately, the Hindu population in Sindh has been declining for decades. In 2014, Dr. Ramesh Kumar Vankwani informed the National Assembly that approximately 5,000 Hindus emigrate to India each year. The HRCP report outlined various factors contributing to this exodus, including religiously motivated violence, the overall law and order situation, and the erosion of Sindh’s sociocultural norms.


Myanmar’s Post-Earthquake Ceasefires: Empty Gestures or Prelude to Peace?

Naw Theresa

In the wake of the devastating earthquake that struck central Myanmar on March 28, multiple parties to the country’s civil war declared unilateral, conditional ceasefires. While commendable, these ceasefires have been marred by violations by the very groups who announced them. Despite these failings, they may still mark a narrow opening for conflict de-escalation.

Conditional Convergences

A day after the March 28 earthquake, the parallel National Unity Government (NUG) announced a “two-week pause in offensive military operations, except for defensive actions, in earthquake-affected areas.” This was extended for a week up to April 20, coinciding with the traditional Thingyan new year holiday.

On April 1, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA), comprising the Arakan Army (AA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), declared a month-long “unilateral humanitarian pause.” It stated that effective immediately in areas where fighting is ongoing between the 3BHA and the military, the groups “will not initiate offensive operations – except in cases of self-defense.”


BBC launches satellite news channel in Myanmar after Trump silences VOA

Michael Savage

The BBC has stepped in to launch a news service in Myanmar after the devastating earthquake in the country, replacing a US service that Donald Trump has ceased to fund.

A direct-to-home satellite video channel delivering BBC News Burmese content will be launched to cater for what the corporation sees as an urgent “audience in need”.


It will take over a satellite video channel formerly used by Voice of America (VOA), the most prominent global broadcaster targeted by Trump.

VOA, which was set up during the second world war to counter Nazi propaganda and provided independent news to many of the world’s most repressed regimes, has fallen silent since mid-March, when the Trump administration ordered an end to its funding and that of its parent body.

His White House has described VOA as peddling “radical propaganda” and of being opposed to his presidency. Although a federal judge this week ordered the Trump administration to restore more than 1,000 jobs and funding for VOA, its status remains unclear and a government appeal is expected.

Recent PLA Exercises Revealed China’s Operational Plan for a Taiwan Strait Conflict

Ying Yu Lin

On April 1, a spokesperson for the Eastern Theater Command of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) announced that the command had organized a joint military exercise around Taiwan, mobilizing land, sea, air, and rocket forces for integrated operations. It is worth noting that the scale of forces involved in this most recent exercise around Taiwan surpassed that of previous joint combat readiness patrols conducted over the past few years, with additional elements from the PLA Rocket Force and China Coast Guard. Although the exercise was not given the name “Joint Sword,” which has been specifically associated with joint operations drills around Taiwan since 2023, it did encompass cross-service training activities in terms of both scale and intensity.

On April 2, Shi Yi, spokesperson for the Eastern Theater Command, announced that the PLA Eastern Theater Command had carried out the “Strait Thunder 2025A” exercise in the central and southern areas of the Taiwan Strait.

A comprehensive analysis of the two-day military exercise conducted by the PLA reveals a three-phase operational plan that the PLA is likely to adopt for a campaign against Taiwan. Phase one involves joint combat readiness patrols, such as the one conducted in March, marking the stage for troop assembly. Phase two takes a step forward to operations, as demonstrated in the Joint Sword series of exercises, focusing on strikes against sea and land targets and achieving overall battlefield dominance. Finally, phase three involves maneuvers that simulate expelling, intercepting, and detaining ships bound for or departing Taiwan, as demonstrated in the inaugural Strait Thunder exercise.

This sequence highlights the strategic steps behind the PLA’s exercises, along with the underlying tactical considerations and objectives of its training activities.

Europe and China Must Unite Against Trump’s Trade Assault

MARCEL FRATZSCHER

US President Donald Trump’s misguided trade war against the rest of the world could mark the beginning of the end for both his political dominance and his “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) movement – but only if Germany and Europe can coordinate a powerful international response.

The European Commission and the outgoing German government’s biggest mistake was to signal a willingness to concede to Trump’s demands, potentially turning his economic blunder into a political victory. It should be clear by now that appeasing Trump will only hasten the collapse of the multilateral trading system and further undermine democratic governance worldwide.

The European Union’s response will be pivotal in determining whether the Trump administration (which is intent on dismantling the multilateral trading order) or China (which seeks to preserve it) will prevail. European leaders face a clear choice: stand for multilateralism and align with China or side with Trump’s MAGA-fied United States. There is no third option.

Germany and Europe cannot remain neutral in this conflict. Giving in to Trump’s demands by pursuing a bilateral trade agreement would be tantamount to endorsing the end of multilateralism.

Chinese no-first-use: a strategic signaling device, diplomatic tool, and dogmatic reality

Benjamin Hautecouverture

A founding argument of China’s nuclear policy, the No-First-Use (NFU) principle has been the subject of intense debate in the global strategic community and within the institutional framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review process in recent years. It has to be said that this historic pillar of Chinese nuclear thinking is still not well understood by the public in the West, or even in Russia. At the same time, there is a number of concordant indications that China’s arsenal is increasing, albeit in very opaque proportions. This article attempts to place NFU in the context of its doctrinal development to understand the role it has played in Chinese strategic nuclear thinking over the last sixty years and to assess the extent to which it is still a factor of strategic stability today.

Diplomatic tool and capacity scenarios

Chinese diplomacy’s renewed insistence on NFU of nuclear weapons has given rise to numerous arguments since the launch of the current review cycle of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT). A working paper entitled No-first-use of Nuclear Weapons Initiative was submitted by the Chinese delegation at the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the next NPT Review Conference, held in Geneva from 22 July to 2 August 2024. In this paper, China encouraged all the nuclear-weapon states (P5) to negotiate and conclude a treaty on “mutual no-first-use of nuclear weapons” or to issue a political declaration to that effect. This was nothing new. As early as 1994, the country – which had joined the NPT two years earlier – had submitted a Draft Treaty on No-First Use of Nuclear Weapons to the four other nuclear-weapon states.

The U.S. Can’t Avoid Decoupling from China

Elaine Dezenski and Damon Pitler

The United States has carried the load of global consumption for a long time. As the world’s largest importer, issuer of the world’s reserve currency, and market of last resort, the United States has absorbed the world’s excess capital for generations, boosting global growth, helping to lift 700 million Chinese citizens out of poverty, and taking on an astronomical amount of debt. What would life be like for America if it were not the leader of the free-market economy and the dominant player in the global monetary system?

The Trump administration’s tariff assault aims to wake Americans from decades of driving on economic autopilot. As we have slumbered, China has overtly orchestrated a systematic, multi-decade exchange rate devaluation to finance an unprofitable, forced, and militarized industrial boom. It is time to address this manipulation.

Their commission of such tactics has distorted global trade and capital imbalances at the expense and repression of Chinese households. For Americans, abundant capital inflows have inflated asset values for the wealthy while imposing financial repression on average workers, who struggle to keep up with the rising cost of living. We now find our national economic security in peril. If we do not address this disequilibrium, free market economies risk the very real prospect of flatlining and fading out.


Will Xi Jinping start a war over Trump’s China tariffs?

Grant Newsham

What will China and in particular the Chinese Communist Party do now that President Donald Trump has slapped 145% tariffs on them? Most of the commentariat seems to think they’ll match the United States tit for tat on tariffs, complain mightily and then quietly put out feelers to cut a deal. And Trump has suggested they already are doing that.

Maybe so. That’s what we would do if we were Xi Jinping. But don’t expect Xi to respond the way America would.

Xi Jinping will let his own people absorb any amount of hardship. And he’s been telling them for years to get ready to “eat bitterness.” He’s also been sanctions-proofing the Chinese economy for years. While he’s not there yet, he’s not helpless, either.

Economic retaliation and narrative warfare

China has banned certain rare earth mineral exports, ordered Chinese companies not to buy Boeing aircraft, and placed 125% tariffs on American imports.

It has also enlisted US proxies, of whom there’s no shortage, to make the case that the American republic will collapse if Walmart’s everyday low prices go up.

Beijing will also use the American trade pressure to rally the public.

Why Iran Is Talking – OpEd

Neville Teller

In a nutshell, the Iranian regime wants an end to the sanctions that have crippled its economy while keeping an eventual nuclear arsenal very much in view, while US President Donald Trump is seeking an agreement that would prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

To this end Iran and the US held talks in Oman on April 12. ​Afterwards Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, told state television they had taken place in a “productive, calm and positive atmosphere.” Both parties agreed that a second round would take place one week later, which indeed they did on April 19, in the Omani embassy in Rome. Araghchi told Iranian​ TV that the talks had been “constructive” – which probably means that Iran is getting its way on developing a civil nuclear power program while it waits for Trump to complete his term in the White House. Meanwhile the parties agreed to meet again in the coming week.

Trump would no doubt assert that the talks are going well because he ha​s warned Iran that the US would use military force if a deal was not reached. Moreover, despite Iran repeatedly saying it would not negotiate under pressure, even as preparations for the ​first meeting were in hand the US moved more warships and stealth bombers to the region and imposed more sanctions on individuals and companies supplying Iran with weaponry.

Grid-Scale Battery Storage Is Quietly Revolutionizing the Energy System

Umair Irfan

The tricky thing about generating electricity is that for the most part, you pretty much have to use it or lose it.

This fundamental fact has governed and constrained the development of the world’s largest machine: the $2 trillion US power grid. Massive generators send electrons along a continent-wide network of conductors, transformers, cables, and wires into millions of homes and businesses, delicately balancing supply and demand so that every light switch, computer, television, stove, and charging cable will turn on 99.95 percent of the time.

Making sure there are always enough generators spooled up to send electricity to every single power outlet in the country requires precise coordination. And while the amount of electricity actually used can swing drastically throughout the day and year, the grid is built to meet the brief periods of peak demand, like the hot summer days when air conditioning use can double average electricity consumption. Imagine building a 30-lane highway to make sure no driver ever has to tap their brakes. That’s effectively what those who design and run the grid have had to do.

But what if you could just hold onto electricity for a bit and save it for later? You wouldn’t have to overbuild the grid or spend so much effort keeping power generation in equilibrium with users. You could smooth over the drawbacks of intermittent power sources that don’t emit carbon dioxide, like wind and solar. You could have easy local backup power in emergencies when transmission lines are damaged. You may not even need a giant, centralized power grid at all.


Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, March 25, 2025, v. 23, no. 1

Brief: Security Services and ISWAP May Be Pushing Nigeria’s Shia Minority Toward Iran

How al-Sharaa’s New Syrian Regime Masks Its Islamism Behind Bureaucracy

Pakistan Bans Iran-Backed Zainebiyoun Brigade Amid Regional Turmoil

Interest in 3D-Printed Firearms Rising Among Islamist Militants

What Motivated Islamic State’s Mosque Attack in Muscat?

Jamestown FoundationChina Brief, April 11, 2025, v. 25, no. 7

The PRC’s ‘Window of Opportunity’ With Europe

He Weidong’s Possible Downfall and Xi’s Trust Deficit With the PLA

‘Strait Thunder-2025A’ Drill Implies Future Increase in PLA Pressure on Taiwan

PLA Perceptions of and Reactions to U.S. Military Activities in Low Earth Orbit

Behind the Fleet: The PLAN Reviews Logistics Development in the 13th Five-Year Plan


Strengthening Unity of Effort in the Atlantic: Lessons from Wargaming

Walter Berbrick and Terence Nicholas

Based on our experience designing and analyzing recent Naval War College wargames in the Euro-Atlantic theater, U.S. and NATO maritime forces face several challenges in maintaining readiness, enhancing lethality, and accelerating decision-making—core priorities underscored by U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. The North Atlantic and High North are increasingly contested, as Russian submarine operations and grey zone activities intensify and China extends its influence deeper into strategically critical Atlantic corridors.

There are several areas where greater alignment between U.S. and NATO maritime forces could enhance warfighting readiness and crisis response. These include streamlining command relationships, enhancing maritime domain awareness, harmonizing rules of engagement, strengthening maritime logistics, integrating NATO into North American defense planning, and improving amphibious force employment. While NATO navies bring significant capability to bear, optimizing these areas will ensure that the alliance is positioned to deter aggression, enhance decision advantage, and maintain maritime superiority in an increasingly complex and contested security environment.

This article offers insights and recommendations based on our wargaming experience to help U.S. and NATO naval leaders strengthen operational integration, refine force employment, and better prepare for future maritime challenges in the Euro-Atlantic theater.

Takeaways from “Cracks in the Network: Cybersecurity Failures, SALT Typhoon, and U.S. Cyber Leadership”

Caroline Palmer

In a timely conversation hosted by the Center for the National Interest in partnership with George Mason University’s National Security Institute (NSI) on April 23, Jamil Jaffer, Founder and Executive Director of NSI, joined policymakers and cybersecurity experts to unpack what may be one of the most consequential digital breaches in U.S. history. The event, titled “Cracks in the Network: Cybersecurity Failures, SALT Typhoon, and U.S. Cyber Leadership,” brought together leading voices from Congress, industry, and academia to explore the growing challenges facing U.S. cyber defenses—both from external adversaries and internal vulnerabilities.

Kicking off the session, Representative Jim Himes (D-CT-4), Ranking Member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, provided a frank, bipartisan look at the state of U.S. cybersecurity. He emphasized the need for legislative renewal and a cautious yet determined approach to managing threats like those posed by state-backed actors. Rep. Himes’ remarks served as a sobering reminder that while the U.S. has made strides in cyber readiness, deep institutional challenges remain—particularly when it comes to attracting and retaining top talent within the government and maintaining a functional public-private cyber partnership.

The panel discussion that followed included cybersecurity veterans from Microsoft, TAG Cyber, and the National Security Institute, each offering distinct perspectives on the scope and consequences of the 2024 SALT Typhoon breach—a Chinese cyber-espionage campaign that reportedly infiltrated U.S. telecommunications networks—which raised urgent questions about the resilience of government surveillance systems and critical infrastructure against state-sponsored cyber-espionage.

Is There a Trump Doctrine?

Ionut Popescu

Is there a grand strategy behind all the dramatic moves in President Trump’s close to 100 days in office? Despite appearances and what many foreign policy experts argue, the answer is yes. Whether this Trump Doctrine will be successful remains to be seen. Still, its principles are sound, and they are grounded in the well-established realist tradition of American foreign policy exemplified by Alexander Hamilton, Theodore Roosevelt, and Richard Nixon.

The Trump administration’s grand strategy rests on three mainstream realist principles: an international system dominated by great power competition, a national interest-based foreign policy of realpolitik (or what they call “America First”), and a powerful appreciation for geoeconomics and the role of financial power in global politics.

After a brief period (the so-called post-Cold War era) of general international amity and low levels of tension among great powers, it is apparent we are now once more in a new era where realist thinking and behavior is dominating world politics, from military competition to trade relations to technological advances. Over the past decade, two geopolitical trends have emerged. First, China is on a quest for regional and, eventually, global hegemony. Second, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is destabilizing European security and the global economy.


Game On: Opportunities for Euro-Atlantic Strategic Stability and Arms Control

Heather Williams, Nicholas Adamopoulos, Lachlan MacKenzie, and Catherine Murphy

Introduction

It is winter 2027. Europe has enjoyed two years of relative calm following a peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine in which Moscow secured territorial gains and imposed limits on Ukraine’s military forces. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has been forced out of power in Kyiv. Immediately following the peace settlement, U.S. President Donald J. Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin secured an arms control agreement to maintain the central limits of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) for an additional five years after its expiration in 2026. The Trump administration is moving ahead with plans to withdraw the U.S. conventional military presence from Europe, and the credibility of U.S. nuclear guarantees to Europe is questionable. European governments are struggling to maintain public support for defense spending following the 2025 peace settlement. Intelligence now shows that not only has Russia ignored the agreed-upon limits on its strategic delivery systems, but it is also just weeks away from deploying a nuclear weapon in space, in violation of the Outer Space Treaty (OST). Additionally, Russia has begun amassing troops on its border with Moldova, in the contested region of Transnistria. What options does NATO have to respond?


‘The Art of the Deal’ meets global reality

Stephen Collinson

“The Art of the Deal” opens with an exhausting fly-on-the-wall account of a week in the life of Donald Trump the real-estate shark. He’s never still, always on the phone and cranking out deal-after-deal with big business pals.

The president hoped the first 100 days of his second term would uncork a similar torrent of dealmaking as depicted in the seminal text of Trumpism.

But Trump has softened his tone on his trade war with China; he blinked over reciprocal tariffs on dozens of other nations; and he is fast losing patience with the Ukraine war, which he had predicted he’d end in 24 hours. Deals are proving more elusive when the stakes are not skyscrapers and casinos but entire economies, the credibility of powerful foreign leaders and national sovereignty.

Trump’s belief that every policy issue is a win-lose proposition has dominated his return to the White House – and has led to some nominal successes.

He’s worked out, for example, how to use his considerable executive authority as leverage against an adversary. By threatening to cut security clearances, he won concessions from some top law firms. By brandishing billions of dollars in government funding, he flexed power over several top universities. This is all ethically and constitutionally questionable. But it’s all about chalking up “wins.”


A new media order is emerging

Hamish McKenzie

On Saturday, the White House Correspondents’ Dinner will take place against a backdrop of political tumult and media collapse. Once a marquee event for Washington’s political class, it now anchors a weekend of parties with a festival-like feel, where the nation’s power brokers gather to drink sponsored cocktails, gossip about industry trysts, and, ostensibly, celebrate the First Amendment.

Substack is hosting one such party—at the exact same time as the Correspondents’ Dinner, which will proceed this year without either its scheduled comedian, Amber Ruffin (whose criticisms of President Trump proved too controversial), or the president himself.

The president won’t be at our party either, but hundreds of other media people, Important Political Figures, and independent journalists will be. They come from different political persuasions, backgrounds, and convictions, but they are all on the front lines of a foundational shift in media—a reimagining of how we understand the world around us in this period of profound transition.

Turbulence Ahead: Navigating the Challenges of Aviation Cybersecurity

Jiwon Ma

The Economic Importance of Air Transportation

The aviation subsector includes commercial airlines, air cargo carriers, airports, aircraft manufacturers, and supporting infrastructure and companies, such as maintenance and repair service providers. It accounts for roughly 5 percent of U.S. gross domestic product and plays a crucial role in ensuring timely delivery of people and goods. Each day, U.S. commercial airlines transport approximately 2.9 million passengers and 61,000 tons of cargo across the United States and around the world.2

The aviation industry has recovered rapidly from the COVID-19 pandemic, fueled by a sharp increase in passenger demand for air travel. In 2024, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) reported a 6 percent increase in the daily average volume of passengers passing through security checkpoints compared with 2023.3 This bump followed a 14 percent rise in passenger volume in 2022.4 With over one billion travelers in 2023, airlines filled an average of 83 percent of available seats per flight.5 This combination of increased demand and improved seat utilization boosted airlines’ net profits from $1.63 billion in 2022 to $7.8 billion in 2023.6

In today’s fast-paced global market, air cargo transportation offers a unique advantage over maritime, rail, and trucking, providing unmatched speed, reach, and reliability. While trucking and rail account for a dominant 70 percent share of domestic freight volume, they require longer transit times.7 Air freight is costlier but reduces transit times down from weeks to days. This makes it essential for transporting high-value, time-sensitive goods, such as pharmaceuticals and other critical manufacturing parts, particularly when other transport modes face capacity constraints.8

Lawless cyberspace

Luke Rodeheffer

Cybercrime is a growing global threat, causing trillions of dollars in economic damage annually. This report explores how Eastern Europe and Russia have become a significant hub for cybercriminal activity, fueled by historical legacies, economic disparities, and state connections.

The study outlines the key drivers of cybercrime in Russia and neighboring countries, including the rise of ransomware, the exploitation of geopolitical ‘grey zones’, and the blurred lines between hackers and state-sponsored cyber operations.

One of the most significant shifts analyzed in the report is the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on cybercrime. As the war escalated, cybercriminal groups split along national lines, with some hackers supporting Russian intelligence while Ukrainian cybercriminals turned their efforts against Russia, engaging in financial fraud and targeted attacks.

Ransomware has emerged as the most profitable form of cybercrime in the region, overtaking other criminal activities like credit card fraud and botnet operations. Russian-speaking cybercriminals dominate the global ransomware industry, with an estimated 75% of ransomware revenue going to actors linked to the Russian-language underground. Despite international sanctions and takedown efforts, ransomware gangs have adapted, operating like structured organizations with management teams and even physical offices.

Automated Recruitment: Artificial Intelligence, ISKP, and Extremist Radicalisation

Fabrizio Minniti

Introduction

The role of artificial intelligence in terrorist recruitment has grown exponentially, which has had a significant impact on the way extremist groups interact with vulnerable individuals online. Recent advances in generative artificial intelligence, deepfake technology and autonomous chatbots have made it much easier for terrorist organisations to amplify their propaganda, personalise radicalisation efforts and circumvent counter-terrorism monitoring. These developments present a direct challenge to digital platforms, intelligence, and policymakers, as AI enables extremist content to spread with greater speed, sophistication and resilience against traditional countermeasures.

This Insight examines the current landscape of AI-enhanced terrorist recruitment, focusing on the ways groups like Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) have integrated AI into their radicalisation strategies. The piece explores the latest AI-driven threats, analysing how extremist groups exploit technology to automate recruitment and improve their ideological dissemination. It also suggests counter-terrorism responses, highlighting AI-based detection mechanisms, algorithmic counter-narratives and proactive monitoring efforts. By providing a comprehensive overview of these trends, this Insight aims to offer practical solutions for policymakers, security operators and technology companies seeking to prevent the terrorist exploitation of AI-based tools.

Scrap the AI Diffusion Rule

Jim Lewis

May 15 is the deadline for comments on the Department of Commerce’s AI Diffusion Rule, issued by the Biden Administration at the last minute and the object of widespread criticism. The rule attempts to use export controls to create industrial policy on a global scale. However, it harms American leadership in AI, and the best thing would be to scrap it and start over.

The rule incentivizes China to accelerate its efforts to develop AI and chips, something it was already doing. The arrival of DeepSeek, China’s homegrown competitor to ChatGPT, caught the U.S. flat-footed. Claims that China “cheated” its way to success with DeepSeek miss the point. No one wins a race by standing on the brakes. Export controls that try to deny access to American technology worked forty years ago, but with the global diffusion of expertise and technology, they are far less effective now.

The essential question is whether it is better to have American or Chinese companies build the data centers and provide the AI hardware and services to meet global demand for new technology. The answer is not micromanaging overregulation, which requires American officials to decide how many chips a country should get. Let the market do that and use regulation to help American companies build revenue and market share, the new metrics for policy success.

The Age of Forever Wars

Lawrence Freedman

In Operation Desert Storm, the 1991 campaign to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation, the United States and its coalition allies unleashed massive land, air, and sea power. It was over in a matter of weeks. The contrast between the United States’ grueling and unsuccessful war in Vietnam and the Soviet Union’s in Afghanistan could not have been more stark, and the speedy victory even led to talk of a new era of warfare—a so-called revolution in military affairs. From now on, the theory went, enemies would be defeated through speed and maneuver, with real-time intelligence provided by smart sensors guiding immediate attacks using smart weapons.

Those hopes proved short-lived. The West’s counterinsurgency campaigns of the early decades of this century, which came to be labeled “forever wars,” were not notable for their rapidity. Washington’s military campaign in Afghanistan was the longest in U.S. history, and in the end it was unsuccessful: despite being pushed out at the start of the U.S. invasion, the Taliban eventually came back.

Nor is this problem limited to the United States and its allies. In February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine that was supposed to overrun the country in a matter of days. Now, even if a cease-fire can be reached, the war will have lasted for more than three years, during which it was dominated by grinding, attritional fighting rather than bold and audacious actions. Similarly, when Israel launched its invasion of Gaza in retaliation for Hamas’s October 7, 2023, assault and hostage taking, U.S. President Joe Biden urged that the Israeli operation should be “swift, decisive, and overwhelming.” Instead, it continued for 15 months, in the process expanding to other fronts in Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, before a fragile cease-fire was reached in January 2025. By mid-March, the war had reignited. And this leaves out numerous conflicts in Africa, including in Sudan and the Sahel, that have no end in sight.

29 April 2025

The Once and Future China

Rana Mitter

If you dropped in to China at any point in its modern history and tried to project 20 years into the future, you would almost certainly end up getting it wrong. In 1900, no one serving in the late Qing dynasty expected that in 20 years the country would be a republic feuded over by warlords. In 1940, as a fractious China staggered in the face of a massive Japanese invasion, few would have imagined that by 1960, it would be a giant communist state about to split with the Soviet Union. In 2000, the United States helped China over the finish line in joining the World Trade Organization, ushering the country into the liberal capitalist trading system with much fanfare. By 2020, China and the United States were at loggerheads and in the midst of a trade war.

Twenty years from now, Chinese leader Xi Jinping might still be in power in some fashion even into his 90s; Deng Xiaoping, China’s paramount leader from 1978 to 1989, retained considerable influence until his death at 92, in 1997. Since taking the reins in 2012, Xi has pushed China in directions that have increasingly placed it at odds with its neighbors, regional powers, and the United States. At home, authorities are widening and deepening systems of surveillance and control, clamping down on ethnic minorities and narrowing the space for dissent. On its maritime borders, China engages in ever more confrontational acts that risk sparking conflicts not just with Taiwan but also with Japan and Southeast Asian countries. Farther afield, Beijing has tacitly supported Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine and is widely believed to be responsible for major cyber-interference in Western infrastructure. This trend is hardly promising, and things could get even worse were China to take the bold step of starting a war over Taiwan, an operation for which the Chinese military has long been preparing.

DEEPSEEK UNMASKED: EXPOSING THE CCP'S LATEST TOOL FOR SPYING, STEALING, AND SUBVERTING U.S. EXPORT CONTROL RESTRICTIONS

John Moolenaar (R-MI) and Ranking Member Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL)

DEEPSEEK’S OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 

DeepSeek operates within a sophisticated ownership structure where founder Liang Wenfeng maintains effective control despite formal separation.1 While officially owned 99% by Ningbo Cheng’en Enterprise Management Consulting Partnership (LP) (Ningbo Cheng’en), Deepseek is controlled by Liang through his majority stake in Ningbo Chen’en and other affiliated companies.2 DeepSeek’s close ties to High-Flyer Quant, also founded by Liang, are evidenced by substantial initial funding ($420 million) and shared access to the powerful Firefly supercomputing infrastructure with 10,000 A100 GPUs.3 These ties are shown in Appendix A. 

Beyond this corporate arrangement, DeepSeek’s connections to PRC state interests are significant. The company operates within the state-subsidized “Hangzhou Chengxi Science and Technology Innovation Corridor,” a government initiative explicitly guided by “Xi Jinping Thought,” the guiding ideology of the CCP, that aims to create China’s answer to Silicon Valley.4 Liang studied under Xiang Zhiyu, whose research includes military applications like drone swarms and battlefield systems.5 

Through legally distinct entities, DeepSeek and High-Flyer Quant function as an integrated ecosystem under Liang’s control, with ties to state-linked hardware distributors and the strategic Zhejiang Lab—described by China’s Ministry of Science and Technology as the “core soul” of building “national strategic scientific and technological capabilities.”6 These connections, along with evidence of data transmission to Chinese servers and censorship of politically sensitive topics, have prompted multiple countries to impose restrictions on the app over security concerns.7

What are the key drivers of Xi’s economic policy in 2025?

Jonathan A. Czin

Xi, China’s economy, and the three “Ds”

For much of President Xi Jinping’s third term, he and his coterie of advisors have struggled to cope with the three “Ds” afflicting China’s economy: debt, deflation, and demography. The prevailing diagnosis of China’s economic malaise tends toward the same prescription—namely, an expansive fiscal stimulus designed to enhance consumption as a driver of GDP growth and alleviate the pain caused by the collapse of China’s real estate sector.

Yet, Xi’s policies thus far have been criticized for being too austere and doing too little—and sometimes too late—to stimulate China’s sagging economic numbers. It is worth asking why Xi has been reluctant to change course. This month’s National People’s Congress (NPC) marks the halfway point in Xi’s third five-year term as general secretary, which began in October 2022, and is, therefore, a natural point at which to answer this question, particularly as the second trade war with the United States intensifies.

Prologue to the problem

Throughout Xi’s third term, many analysts of China’s economy seem to have gone through a boom-and-bust cycle of inflated and then disappointed expectations. The story starts with China’s abrupt exit from its “zero-COVID” policy in late 2022—just after Xi started his third term as general secretary. Following that dramatic policy shift, many observers—especially in the business community—wrongly assessed that China’s economic trajectory would follow a roughly V-shaped trajectory similar to the United States and other Western economies as they recovered from the pandemic. These analysts believed that the initial rollback of the pandemic control measures would lead to a short-term spike in disease and death, but that then China’s economy would come roaring back—perhaps abetted by government stimulus.

PLA INFORMATION SUPPORT TO THE BATTLEFIELD: UAV EMPLOYMENT CONCEPTS AND CHALLENGES

Caroline Y. Tirk and Eli B. Tirk

ASSESSMENTS OF UAVS IN PLA DOCTRINAL EDUCATION TEXTS

PLA authoritative academic texts have long emphasized the importance of unmanned systems and their contributions to ISR and other information support missions on the future battlefield. Published in 2003, Integrated Aerospace Information Warfare (空天一体信息作战) outlines UAVs’ ability to surveil an enemy’s rear area and guide munitions onto targets as an important use case of these systems. 10 The 2006 Science of Campaigns discusses UAVs in the limited role of supporting suppression of enemy air defense operations using electronic jammers and kinetic strike, tactics inspired by Israel’s UAV employment against Syrian air defenses in 1982.11 By 2009, the textbook Precision Operations Command remarks that UAVs had already become the primary means of battlefield reconnaissance, target designation, and damage assessment. 12 The 2013 edition of the PLA Academy of Military Science’s Science of Military Strategy (SMS) reflects an expanded interest in UAVs, emphasizing that unmanned systems have played an increasingly prominent role in an increasingly multi-dimensional battlefield, and in concert with other technologies would eventually cause revolutionary changes in operational theory, operational patterns, and ultimately the structure of nation’s militaries.13 The 2020 edition of SMS, published by the National Defense University, identifies the supporting role of intelligent unmanned systems as indispensable for modern military operations.14 The 2020 edition of SMS highlights that UAVs carried by surface ships can enable reconnaissance of larger areas and better early warning at sea.15 Over time, these publications have expanded their descriptions of UAVs roles and importance to overall military modernization.

ISR, TARGETING, AND BDA MISSIONS

PLA-affiliated authors contend that UAVs increasingly contribute to ISR operations. Overall, UAVs have expanded the “three-dimensional” nature of the battlefield by operating from high altitudes to extremely low altitudes and being able to effectively conduct close-range reconnaissance. 16 This section summarizes how PLA-affiliated authors describe UAV ISRTargeting (ISR-T) missions across domains

What Air Defenses Do The Houthis In Yemen Actually Have?

Joseph Trevithick

Iranian-backed Houthi militants in Yemen have proven to have an air defense arsenal that presents real threats, as evidenced by a still-growing number of shootdowns of U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drones. Still, many details about the scale and scope of Houthis’ air defense capabilities continue to be obscure and ambiguous. The U.S. military’s use of an increasing variety of air-launched stand-off munitions against targets in Yemen, as well as the employment of B-2 stealth bombers, also point to the danger posed to aircraft being even higher than is widely appreciated. So what actually are the Houthis’ air defense capabilities? That’s a clear question with at best a murky answer, but here is what we know.

The Houthi Surface-To-Air Missile Arsenal And MQ-9 Losses

Questions about the full extent of Houthi air defense capabilities have been growing for months now as the Yemeni militants have been able to down an alarming number of U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drones.

A U.S. defense official told TWZ yesterday that Yemeni militants have or are suspected to have brought down six MQ-9s since March 15. Fox News reported today that U.S. officials have acknowledged the loss of another Reaper, the seventh one since the beginning of last month. Back in March, an unnamed U.S. defense official told Stars and Stripes that the Houthis had downed 12 Reapers since October 2023.

The Houthis themselves have claimed the destruction of at least 22 Reapers since October 2023, including the one just yesterday, but this cannot be readily verified independently. That tally does not include a number of drones belonging to the United States and other countries that the Yemeni militants shot down prior to October 2023.

Top Russian general killed in Moscow as U.S. envoy talks with Putin

Mary Ilyushina

A high-ranking Russian military official was killed Friday in an explosion in a suburb of Moscow, in what authorities are treating as a case of murder. The incident coincides with the meeting of President Donald Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff, in Moscow for high-stakes talks with President Vladimir Putin.

The Kremlin disclosed few details following the three-hour meeting between Witkoff and Putin, their fourth in recent months, as Trump continues to push for a resolution to the three-year war in Ukraine.

Yury Ushakov, Putin’s foreign policy adviser, described the talks as “constructive,” saying they helped narrow the gap between Russian and U.S. positions not only on Ukraine but on several broader international issues. Ushakov added the possibility of resuming direct negotiations between Russian and Ukrainian representatives was discussed.

As Witkoff’s private jet approached Moscow ahead of the talks, Russia’s Investigative Committee, its top policing body, launched a criminal investigation into the death of Lt. Gen. Yaroslav Moskalik, who was killed when a vehicle rigged with an improvised explosive device packed with shrapnel detonated. Surveillance footage published from the scene suggests Moskalik was walking past the car at the time of the explosion.



Israel’s A.I. Experiments in Gaza War Raise Ethical Concerns

Sheera Frenkel and Natan Odenheimer

In late 2023, Israel was aiming to assassinate Ibrahim Biari, a top Hamas commander in the northern Gaza Strip who had helped plan the Oct. 7 massacres. But Israeli intelligence could not find Mr. Biari, who they believed was hidden in the network of tunnels underneath Gaza.

So Israeli officers turned to a new military technology infused with artificial intelligence, three Israeli and American officials briefed on the events said. The technology was developed a decade earlier but had not been used in battle. Finding Mr. Biari provided new incentive to improve the tool, so engineers in Israel’s Unit 8200, the country’s equivalent of the National Security Agency, soon integrated A.I. into it, the people said.

Shortly thereafter, Israel listened to Mr. Biari’s calls and tested the A.I. audio tool, which gave an approximate location for where he was making his calls. Using that information, Israel ordered airstrikes to target the area on Oct. 31, 2023, killing Mr. Biari. More than 125 civilians also died in the attack, according to Airwars, a London-based conflict monitor.

What’s secret? When is it secret? Well, that’s complicated

Kyle McCurdy

The argument over US officials’ misuse of secure but non-governmental messaging platform Signal falls into two camps. Either it is a gross error that undermines national security, or it is a bit of a blunder but no harm was done.

US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has twice used Signal for sensitive national security conversions, including once in which he and officials discussed planned military operations against Houthis in Yemen. When we consider the security implications of this, we see that classification systems are complicated, subjective and nuanced. Many people, even those who have worked within government for years, don’t understand them.

A classification is simply a label that the originator of the information attaches to it based on his or her perception of the damage that would happen if it became public. Information can be declassified by group consensus and through a proper process, but it is generally up to the originator to make a reasonable judgment at the time.

Only certain government systems are permitted to hold the most sensitive information, and these are highly protected and monitored. They are usually air gapped, meaning they are separated from other networks and not connected the internet. Still today, the most sensitive information is shared only on specific coloured paper that is destroyed after being read in a special room. In 2013, the Russians even bought up a stock of typewriters to make sure they were truly offline. The much discussed secure compartmented information facility (SCIF) is there to protect from physical attacks such as eavesdropping or covert cameras.

30 Award-Winning Street Photos Make the Ordinary Truly Extraordinary

JEREMY GRAY

International street photography platform Pure Street Photography (PSP) announced today the winners and finalists of the Pure Street Photography Grant 2025, showcasing and celebrating incredible photographic voices from around the world.

Pure Street Photography, founded in 2020, is a female-led initiative co-founded by acclaimed photographer Dimpy Bhalotia and creative partner Kamar Kumaar Rao.

PSP is dedicated to being a supportive platform for photographers to share diverse, impactful, and thought-provoking photography with a global audience. A significant part of the platform’s appeal to photographers is its ability to help creators get feedback and refine their skills. To that end, this year’s Pure Street Photography Grant 2025, which celebrates 30 different photographers, provides expanded support and exposure for budding creators.

“These photographs reflect the pulse and purity of street life — spanning continents, cultures, and contexts,” Pure Street Photography says. “Each photograph captures more than just a moment; it tells a story that is layered, spontaneous, and emotionally resonant.”

“This grant is a celebration of the human spirit through photography. These 30 iconic photographers come from different corners of the world, yet their stories echo the same truth: there’s extraordinary power in how we see the ordinary,” says Bhalotia.

The Pentagon Can’t Be Run Like a Business

Mara Karlin

Over the last decade, calls to reform the Department of Defense have grown ever louder. Everyone, from Congress, which convened a special commission on the urgent need for change, Pentagon officials, who have drafted countless internal reports examining how to improve many aspects of the department's ability to function, and pleading defense industry leaders, seems to agree that things need to be done differently. And no wonder: accelerating technological change is reshaping conflict around the world. China is making historic progress upgrading its military, and Russia has redoubled its military modernization despite massive losses of personnel and equipment in its war on Ukraine. The increasingly turbulent security environment offers regular reminders that taking a business-as-usual approach to investing in the U.S. military is shortsighted.

The latest group to call for a shakeup at the Pentagon is the Trump administration’s so-called Department of Government Efficiency, which is turning its attention toward the Defense Department as its next target for reform. “We welcome DOGE to the Pentagon,” declared U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth in February. The group, he said, would bring “actual businesslike efficiency to government.”

The Real Lesson of SignalGate

Ronald J. Deibert

In the weeks since the explosive revelation that top U.S. officials inadvertently shared attack plans in Yemen with a journalist on a Signal group chat, fresh questions about the Trump administration’s lax approach to digital security have continued to emerge. On April 20, The New York Times reported that the security breach is even worse than initially understood: Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth had also shared many of the same details about the imminent U.S. bombing strike in Yemen in a second group chat with several family members, a personal lawyer, and others, using his private phone.

The fiasco now known as SignalGate raises many urgent issues related to national security. Communicating classified information via nonapproved channels potentially violates the U.S. Espionage Act, setting messages to automatically disappear contravenes U.S. federal laws on preservation of official records, and officials’ family members and journalists should certainly not be privy to this kind of information. These are huge lapses. But by focusing on National Security Adviser Mike Waltz’s unwitting inclusion of The Atlantic’s editor in chief, Jeffrey Goldberg, in the first chat group, much of the debate has downplayed an even larger problem: the very real possibility that a foreign government or other hostile power was snooping on the devices through which those communications were taking place.


Would De-Dollarization Threaten The Dominance Of The US Dollar? – OpEd

Dr. Bawa Singh, Sonal Meena and Jay Koche M

The U.S. Dollar (USD) has long been holding the strong position in the financial world as the primary reserve currency. The strong status of the USD has shaped the global financial world since the end of World War II. The dominance of the USD was solidified by the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944, which pegged the dollar to gold. Notwithstanding, the US abandoned the gold standard in 1971 and in the post of the same, the USD continued to dominate the global financial world due to the strength of the US economy, political stability, and the establishment of the petrodollar system. Under the petrodollar agreement which mandated the oil exporting countries to carry out the oil transactions in USD. This arrangement further bolstered the US to exert a strong dominance and influence over the global economic systems and implement effective international sanctions.

However, given the recent geopolitical and geo-economic developments, particularly the rise of the BRICS (comprising of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) has raised questions about the future of the dollar. The agenda of de-dollarization has become a central agenda for the BRICS countries, as they seek to reduce their dependence on the USD for their international trade and financial transactions. It is argued by many policy makers and practitioners that this shift is driven by several geopolitical and geo-economic factors, including the frequent use of the dollar as a tool for imposing financial sanctions. The frequent imposing of the financial sanctions further pushed many countries such as Russia, Iran, and Venezuela towards the de-dollarization. These countries perceiving that such actions on part of the US, threatening to their sovereignty and are motivated to seek alternatives to the dollar.

Trump Is Facing Six Wars, and He’s Losing All of Them - Opinion

Hal Brands

Donald Trump anointed himself, in his second inaugural, as the world’s “peacemaker.” Just three months later, his presidency is consumed by conflict. The coming months will be Trump’s season of crisis, a legacy-making period in which he must navigate three hot wars, a cold war, a potential war and a trade war.

Unfortunately, he’s starting from a deficit of his own making: His decisions have left America’s alliances strained, its economic power tattered, and its strategic competence in question.

The first war is the one Trump has always seemed most confident about ending: the cataclysmic conflict in Ukraine. Trump wagered that making peace would be easy — a matter of menacing Russia with sanctions and forcing Ukraine to give up on regaining lost lands. Yet Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s maximalist aims, and his belief that he is slowly winning, have made reaching a settlement all too hard.

Trump must choose, in the coming weeks, whether to really squeeze Russia — through harsher oil sanctions and other economic coercion, along with continued military and intelligence support for Ukraine — or walk away and let the war take its course. The first course would be distasteful for a president who often shows sympathy for Moscow and contempt for Kyiv. The second, by raising the risk of a Ukrainian defeat, could be disastrous for the security of Europe and the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.