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6 May 2025

India Makes Diplomatic Push for Military Action Against Pakistan - Analysis

Anisha Dutta

The terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir last week that killed 26 tourists has laid bare the persistence of militant threats in the region, exposing serious lapses in Indian security and intelligence.

Amid growing calls in India for military action against Pakistan, which New Delhi accuses of backing the militants involved, the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi is once again posturing toward cross-border retribution. Yet more than a week after the attack in Pahalgam, India has not made a major military move. It suspended its participation in the Indus Waters Treaty, and both countries have expelled each other’s diplomats and military attaches.


Pakistan’s Balochistan Crisis and India’s Defensive Offense

Arsalan Bilal

Pakistan’s Balochistan province is burning. A sharp surge in militant attacks in the province amid a decades-old insurgency has destabilized the entire country. The issue is related to not only internal security but also the deep-rooted Pakistan-India conflict.

Pakistan believes that India is aiding and abetting insurgents in the Balochistan province, which is resource-rich and strategically important. There are reasons to think India might be providing support to militants in Balochistan in a concerted effort to raise Pakistan’s cost for sponsoring cross-border terrorism.

I discern it as New Delhi’s defensive offense strategy, which India’s influential national security advisor Ajit Doval, once a spy inside Pakistan, advocated many years ago. I argue that the strategy has paid important dividends for India by taking the conflict deep inside Pakistan without triggering a full-scale conventional war—but this can become a perilous gamble if a possible escalation is not avoided.

India’s “Defensive Offense” Strategy

Before defining India’s defensive offense strategy, I want to highlight its origins. Interestingly, New Delhi conceived and operationalized the defensive offense strategy in response to what it saw as Pakistan’s efforts to destabilize India internally. Experts believed that Pakistan fanned insurgencies to “bleed India” through “a thousand cuts”. This defined Pakistan’s asymmetric warfare against India.

India-Pakistan Tensions Show Signs Of Easing – OpEd

M.K. Bhadrakumar

Time past is time present in India-Pakistan crisis. The ‘mediation’ by the United States from behind the scene on the diplomatic track appears to be once again working, which calls on both Delhi and Islamabad to show restraint and pull back from a military confrontation. The call for a responsible response by India — and for Pakistan to be cooperative — by the US Vice-President JD Vance serving under the leadership of a ‘peacemaker president’ epitomises the world opinion, for sure.

There are signs that life in India is moving on. The melancholy, long, withdrawing roar of a heavy heart is discernible. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is travelling out of Delhi. On Thursday, he was in Mumbai to inaugurate a 4-day summit, which is a landmark initiative to position India as a global hub for media, entertainment, and digital innovation.

On Friday, Modi will be in the southernmost state of Kerala to formally commission the Vizhinjam International Deepwater Multipurpose Seaport, touted as the country’s first dedicated container transhipment port, representing the transformative advancements being made by the Modi government in India’s maritime sector as part of the prime minister’s unified vision of Viksit Bharat, the initiative to achieve the goal and vision of transforming India into a developed entity by 2047, the centenary year of independence.

On the Brink of Another India-Pakistan War

Tim Willasey-Wilsey

The killing of 26 Indian tourists at Pahalgam in Indian Administered Kashmir (IAK) is the first major terrorist incident in Kashmir since Pulwama in 2019. Following the Pulwama episode, India launched an aerial attack on an alleged training camp outside the Pakistani town of Balakot. Later an Indian MiG 21 jet was shot down and its pilot taken prisoner. The prompt Pakistani release of the pilot enabled both sides to climb down the escalatory ladder and for war to be avoided. It was a fortunate end to a perilous situation.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi set two precedents in the way he responded to the Pulwama episode. The first was that any terrorist attack in which a direct Pakistani hand was evident would be met with a kinetic response. The second was that the retaliation would happen in Pakistan and not in Pakistan Administered Kashmir (PAK) where low-level conflict is relatively commonplace. He also established a belief in India that there exists a space for conventional warfare against Pakistan without the danger of nuclear escalation.

So the strong likelihood now is that India will launch a retaliatory attack in the days to come. New Delhi seems already to have concluded that Pakistan was complicit in the attack and that the relatively new Resistance Front (TRF) is an offshoot of the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) terrorist organization, which is based at Muridke, about 30 miles from Lahore.

China's Cyber Maze: Challenges and Prospects for the United States

Nistha Kumari Singh

The Cyber Maze is a strategic framework for managing modern cyberattack patterns by prioritising adaptability, layered risk mitigation, and context-specific responses over rigid measures. It acknowledges that cyberattacks, whether state-sponsored campaigns, proxy actors, or novel attack vectors, are not straightforward, symmetric, or static. The framework advocates for a flexible strategy combining deterrence, diplomacy, and defence to adapt responses based onattacks and context. This framework is useful for countering China’s ambition to become a cyber superpower (Wangluo Qiangguo, 网络强国), a policy fueling its state-aligned cyber ecosystem.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) cyber ecosystem is a “maze” of interconnected formal and shadow institutions, feeding into state-linked cyberattacks involving the People’s Liberation Army, the Ministry of State Security (MSS), and the Ministry of Public Security. A US Homeland Security report from February 2025 shows 224 cyber espionage incidents targeted at the US from China, with over 60 directly linked to the Chinese Communist Party.

China’s state-linked cyber operations connect to its desire for technological dominance, aiming to lead innovation in critical sectors like artificial intelligence, 5G infrastructure, and quantum computing while reducing foreign technology dependence. This ambition, pronounced in platforms such as Made in China 2025 and the 14th Five-Year Plan, drives geopolitical rivalry to counter Western cyber hegemony and maintain domestic stability. Experiences during the “century of humiliation” (1840-1949) have shaped Beijing’s strategic vision, justifying narratives by emphasising technological self-reliance and cybersecurity.

Forget Tariffs—The Real US-China Tech War Is Over Internet Freedom

Jill Goldenziel

U.S.-China tech competition is about more than tariffs. The future of the Internet is at stake. China is not just exporting hardware—it is exporting laws, standards, and authoritarian control. China is promoting its vision of what cyberspace should look like, which clashes sharply with the U.S.’s vision for a free and open Internet. To do so, China is training other governments in its authoritarian ways. It is fiercely seeking to dominate the little-known international organizations that literally set the standards for global tech, ensuring that Chinese firms have a global edge. China is also exporting its Legal Great Wall, repressive laws related to China’s national security and cybersecurity. China is attempting to enforce those laws abroad—even in the U.S. The U.S. and the private sector must act to counter China’s legal warfare—and keep China from taking over the Internet.

China’s Competing Vision for Tech and Cyberspace

The U.S.’s conception of what the Internet should look like is vastly different than China’s. The latest U.S. National Security Strategy, released in 2022, endorses the UN Norms of Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace as the “rules of the road” for cyberspace and says the U.S. will promote them together with partner and ally nations. These “UN Cyber Norms,” were created by a UN Group of Governmental Experts and affirmed by the UN General Assembly in 2021. The 11 basic norms specify that states should not attack critical infrastructure, respond to requests for assistance by those attacked, and cooperate with other states to stop crime and terrorism, and other rules designed to keep civilians safe from cyber conflict. As the Strategy says, the Norms affirm that “human rights apply online just as they do offline.” Project 2025 goes even further than non-binding norms. Project 2025 advocates for the State Department to work with allies on a binding framework of enforceable norms that would “draw clear lines of unacceptable conduct” in cyberspace.

China’s ‘Great Firewall’ Spreads to Other Countries

Salman Rafi Sheikh

China has spent decades framing—and continues to frame—its partnership with BRI member states as purely economic. That China doesn’t interfere in the domestic politics of its member countries has been one of the key hallmarks of Beijing’s self-styled model of economic development, making it different from the sort of interventionism that characterizes the West in general, and the US in particular.

China, however, no longer appears to be different, with Beijing supporting the installation of “Great Firewalls”—systems of censorship and surveillance to control access to the internet and keep its citizens from hearing or experiencing anything the government doesn’t approve of. It operates by blocking access to websites and services, filtering content, and monitoring online activities.

The firewall, also known as the Golden Shield Project in China, allows member states such as Pakistan to monitor, restrict, and even block access to the internet and foreign websites. Beijing’s political entanglements in target states are already taking an obvious form with one clear purpose: to help extend the typically closed Chinese model of political system to other states. Other countries are thought to be using Chinese technologies for their own control measures, although the extent of this collaboration can’t be pinned down. 

“Made in China 2025”: A Decade of Industrial Policy and Its Geopolitical Effects


Geopolitical Scenario

MIC2025 coincided with a broader shift in China’s global role. In 2024, China’s manufacturing value-added reached approximately 29% of the global total, nearly matching the combined output of the United States and the European Union.

In critical sectors like electric vehicles and high-speed rail, Beijing met or surpassed MIC2025 targets. By 2023, China produced over 60% of the world’s EVs, led by companies like BYD, NIO, and SAIC. In shipbuilding, Chinese firms controlled more than 50% of global orders by tonnage. These accomplishments reflect the effectiveness of policy tools used under MIC2025.

However, technological self-reliance, the program’s core ambition, remains incomplete. China continues to rely heavily on imported semiconductors, foreign aviation components, and high-end manufacturing tools. Despite years of targeted investment, the overall self-sufficiency rate for China’s semiconductor industry stood at approximately 13% in 2024, far from Beijing’s goal of 70% self-sufficiency., The C919 aircraft developed by COMAC to rival Boeing and Airbus, still incorporates engines and avionics systems sourced from US and European firms. Similarly, China’s automation systems frequently depend on German, Japanese, and Swiss technologies.


China-US AI Technology Competition: Who’s Winning in Key Inputs?

Sara Hsu

After China revealed its own homegrown large-language model, DeepSeek, in January 2025, the artificial intelligence (AI) competition intensified. Much of the conversation on this new technology has focused on semiconductors or model speeds, but the race is very much dependent on several upstream factors: energy, rare earth elements, and talent. These critical inputs into the AI industry face vastly different structures in the two countries and may determine the pace and scale of AI innovation.

Energy: Powering the AI Revolution

AI models use massive amounts of energy to power their computations. Ensuring a consistent and growing energy supply to power data centers and cool servers is now an essential part of national AI strategies. The United States and China have different energy ecosystems, with alternative methods of pricing, regulating, and sustaining energy for AI endeavors.

Due to increasing investment in electricity generation, the energy requirements of AI data centers have placed a great amount of pressure on local power grids. A notable incident occurred in July 2024, when 60 data centers in Northern Virginia were disconnected from the grid due to a surge protector failure. This incident forced operators to rapidly reduce power generation to prevent widespread outages, and demonstrated the challenges that utilities face in providing data centers with growing amounts of power.


Hegseth issues Army a lengthy to-do list

MEGHANN MYERS

The Army got a long list of marching orders from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth on Thursday, with deadlines for fielding new weapons and technology, directives to unload old equipment, and orders to merge the service’s futures and doctrine organizations.

The memo includes a lot of items the service was already working on, or had considered but hadn’t been told to prioritize, a Defense official told Defense One.

“It is nothing but good news, nothing but excitement for us to build judicious plans and move as fast as we can,” the official said.

Weapons deadlines top the list. Long-range missiles that can hit moving land and sea targets, an apparent reference to the Precision Strike Missile now under testing, are to be fielded by 2027. Every division is to receive unnamed unmanned systems and “Ground/Air launched effects” by 2026. Counter-drone systems are to be sent to maneuver platoons by 2026 and maneuver companies by 2027.

Then there’s offloading outdated equipment and axing wasteful programs. The memo calls out the Humvee, which the service will begin to replace in brigade combat teams this year with its new infantry squad vehicle.

“We don’t want to take them to the next war,” the Defense official said of the Army’s roughly 100,000 older ground vehicles.

Hybrid Threats and Modern Political Warfare: The Architecture of Cross-Domain Conflict

Beniamino Irdi

In December 2024, Romania’s intelligence agencies revealed that Russia had orchestrated a highly sophisticated social media campaign to boost Călin Georgescu, the far-right, pro-Russian presidential candidate. This operation successfully exploited TikTok’s extreme popularity in the country—some 47 percent of the population were believed to have an account already in 2014, the highest rate in the European Union (Romania Insider, December 6, 2024).

The pro-Georgescu TikTok campaign represented a blatant attempt to influence the outcome of the Romanian presidential election. Georgescu won the first round of the presidential race on November 24, 2024, only for the country’s Constitutional Court to annul the results two days before the December 8 runoff, citing a series of irregularities in his campaign funding, including allegations of Russian interference on his behalf (POLITICO, December 6, 2024; Adevarul, April 24). The second round of voting in December 2024 was cancelled, and the first round of the election has been rescheduled for May 4.

In February, the investigation into these irregularities deepened, leading to nationwide raids that uncovered an arsenal of weapons, over a million euros in cash, and tickets to Moscow at the home of Horațiu Potra, Georgescu’s bodyguard (Adevarul, March 13; for more on Potra, see Militant Leadership Monitor, June 27, 2024). On March 9, Romania‘s Electoral Commission formally rejected Georgescu’s candidacy for the upcoming election, citing his “failure to comply with the legal regulations” (Constitutional Court of Romania, March 11). The response to the court’s decision was swift, with fights breaking out in the streets of Bucharest between Georgescu’s supporters and police. Elon Musk chimed in as well, calling the decision “crazy” on X (X/@elonmusk, March 9; YouTube/@Digi24 [Romania], March 10).

‘There's an information war, and we’ve disarmed ourselves’ — ex-US diplomat on Trump cuts to counter Russian disinformation

Natalia Yermak

Russia has used information warfare to promote its interests and undermine opponents across the world as a part of its foreign policy for decades.

The Russian state was spending an estimated $1.5 billion annually on its foreign disinformation campaigns, Christopher Walker, National Endowment for Democracy vice president for studies and analysis, told Congress in 2023.

These campaigns skillfully take advantage of already existing divisions in society, inflaming tensions to divide and destabilize countries around the world, according to experts.

In the U.S., the State Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC) had acted as the main tool to expose Russia and China’s disinformation campaigns abroad since it was reformed in 2016.

But in 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration shut the center down, citing concerns about free speech and the rights of American citizens.

The Kyiv Independent spoke with James Rubin, a former diplomat who led the GEC for two years starting in 2022, about the consequences of Trump’s decision, as well as Russia’s continued information operations worldwide.

Choosing a New National Security Advisor

H.R. McMaster

As the news breaks today that National Security Advisor Mike Waltz is leaving the job as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA) to become U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and that Secretary of State Marco Rubio will serve as interim APNSA, President Trump has an opportunity to reflect on his expectations for his next National Security Advisor.

The candidate’s base motivation will be of paramount importance. My experience in the White House convinced me that those who serve in any administration fall into one of three categories. First, those who want to give the President best analysis and multiple options so the President can advance his agenda. Second, those who serve because they want to manipulate decisions consistent with their, not the President’s, agenda. And third, those who assume the role of protecting the country (and maybe the world) from what they regard as a dangerous agenda. The President should choose someone in the first category—but once he does, those in the second and third categories will try to undermine efforts to provide best advice and multiple options.

I believe that Mike Waltz understood his role as the honest broker, and that may be the fundamental reason for his relatively short tenure.

Trump, Ukraine, and the Limits of Presidential Peacemaking

Timothy Naftali

A U.S. president was trying to end an exceptionally violent war between Russia and its neighbor. He also had clear preferences on which side he admired more. “I like the Russians,” the president wrote. But the American people favored the other side, and, as a result, he noted, Washington needed to be “scrupulous in its impartiality between the combatants.” The president was Theodore Roosevelt, and the war was between Russia and Japan. U.S. neutrality, combined with Russia’s and Japan’s respect for Roosevelt and American power, allowed the White House to mediate an end to that bloody war in 1905. For his efforts, Roosevelt would become the first U.S. president to earn a Nobel Peace Prize.

More than a century later, another U.S. president is seeking to end another bloody war involving Russia and a neighboring country. Even more than Roosevelt, President Donald Trump favors the Russians in this war, while again most Americans support the other side. Trump has also made clear that he regards ending the war in Ukraine as a crucial goal for his presidency and that in bringing the two sides together, he, too, hopes to win a Nobel Peace Prize—adding to a hallowed U.S. tradition of presidential peacemaking. But this time, the path forward is far less certain. During his campaign, Trump promised he could end the war in 24 hours. Despite much maneuvering by the White House, however, the first hundred days of Trump’s second administration have come and gone with little prospect of the fighting ending soon. The administration has reached a separate deal with Ukraine, announced on April 30, to give the United States a stake in Ukraine’s mineral resources, but although the agreement is meant to signal U.S. investment in Ukraine’s future, it appears largely unrelated to the more pressing question of its war-torn present. All of which suggests that Trump has taken a very different approach to mediation from that of his predecessors.

Blowing up Bridges in Vilnius: The Tactical Lit Review

Zachary Griffiths

You defend Vilnius by blowing the bridges.

A few years ago, during a warfighter exercise, my battalion was tasked to delay Donovian forces assaulting through Vilnius into the Suwalki Gap. While poring over the maps, I paused to wonder: Has Vilnius been fought over before? A quick search on Google and Google Scholar turned up examples from 1655, 1812, and 1944—all pointing to the same solution: blow the bridges. We did. It worked.

This is the power of what we might call a tactical literature review. In academic writing, literature reviews discuss and analyze “published information in a particular subject area.” A tactical literature review, then, systematically reviews historical accounts, today’s articles, and archives relevant to a specific mission or problem. Just as you might borrow the order for a rifle range from your sister platoon leader, the tactical literature review uncovers what others have already learned, so you don’t have to reinvent the wheel.

A Few Keystrokes from Everything

Professional writing is not just an institutional indulgence—it makes our Army more lethal. Historically, leaders faced with tactical problems could draw on little more than their training and experience—the total of reachable knowledge on hand. Leaders have always battled this challenge. During World War II, General George S. Patton carried along a small library with him and borrowed experience in European campaigning by reading German and French authors before the war began. In fact, the American Library Association even took libraries to war in World War I and II, bringing both reference texts and recreational reading to the front.

Hegseth orders sweeping changes to Army structure

Mark Pomerleau

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth is directing sweeping transformational changes at the Army.

In an April 30 memo to the secretary of the Army, Hegseth ordered a vast set of alterations to the service aimed at building a leaner and more lethal force that prioritizes defending the homeland and deterring China in the Indo-Pacific.

The administration has made homeland defense — to include securing the southern border and building the “Golden Dome” missile defense system — as well as deterring China, top priorities. The latter includes shifting resources to the Pacific at the potential expense of other theaters, according to press reports.

Some of the changes pushed by Hegseth in his directive — such as consolidated budget lines in unmanned systems, counter-drone systems and electronic warfare, force structure changes and expanded use of other transaction agreements — are already being pursued.

The memo, however, directs much deeper change to include consolidating certain headquarters elements and changes to how the Army contracts, some of which were reported earlier this week by Breaking Defense.

Ukraine Faces New Nuclear Threats Thirty-Nine Years After Chornobyl

Anna J. Davis

April 26 marked the 39th anniversary of the 1986 Chornobyl disaster. A few days prior, on April 24, Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) was surrounded by “loud bursts of gunfire” and a “drone threat” (Energoatom; IAEA, April 24). This is the latest incident demonstrating that nuclear disasters remain a very present threat to Ukraine so long as Russia’s war against the country continues.

Speaking of the 39th anniversary of the Chornobyl disaster, Energoatom head Petro Kotin argued that the risks of radiation accidents remain high at ZNPP because of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine. Russia has occupied ZNPP, the largest NPP in Europe, since March 4, 2022 (see EDM, November 22 [1] [2], 2022; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, March 4; Energoatom, accessed April 27). Kotin claimed that Russian forces, who have occupied that plant since the start of the full-scale invasion, have turned ZNPP into a military base and disregarded all international security norms (Facebook/@Energoatom, April 26). Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently claimed that ZNPP is “in safe hands” and is being run by Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation, Rosatom (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, April 27).

Moscow has long characterized the Chornobyl disaster, which occurred under the authority of the Soviet Ministry of Energy, as a Ukrainian problem (Kasperski, February 18, 2020). This narrative has allowed Russian officials to question Ukraine’s legitimacy as a civil nuclear power and blame Kyiv for attacking its own nuclear facilities (Davis, October 2023; Interfax, July 12, 2024). Sergey Mironov, a deputy in the Russian State Duma, told the state-owned news agency RIA Novosti on April 26 that “the world community [needs] to do everything to ensure that the Chornobyl tragedy is not repeated due to the fault of insane Ukrainian politicians. In order for the peaceful atom to remain peaceful, it should not be in their hands” (RIA Novosti, April 26).

Comparing and Contrasting Western Peace Frameworks for Russia-Ukraine War

Vladimir Socor

Western governments have issued competing proposals on how to end Russia’s war against Ukraine. The first was the U.S. proposal tabled for Ukrainian consideration on April 17, followed by a joint proposal on April 23 by France, Germany, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. The joint proposal marked the Europeans’ first entry into these negotiations. Both reported texts have been published in full without changes by the Reuters news agency (Reuters, April 25 [United States], [France, Germany, Ukraine, and United Kingdom]).

The five governments involved have not confirmed, denied, or otherwise commented on these documents. Both proposals are labeled as “frameworks,” which leaves room for more detailed formulation. Their nature is the usual one of unsigned nonpapers, and their classification level is relatively low (the U.S. document “verbally transmitted,” the quadripartite document “official-sensitive”). International and Ukrainian media treat them as authentic expressions of those governments’ current policies, while Russia, the main addressee of these proposals, has only responded obliquely thus far.

Both documents address a wide range of war termination aspects, including military security, economics, and reconstruction. The territorial aspects, however, loom larger than other aspects at this stage, given Russia’s military occupation of Ukrainian territories and its grip on the initiative on the ground.

How US Aid Cuts Are Putting Millions of Lives at Risk

Farhat Mantoo

In a remote health facility in Afghanistan, a young mother clutches her newborn, desperately waiting for the care she and her child so urgently need. But the clinic’s doors may soon close. Like hundreds of other health centers across Afghanistan, this facility is caught in the fallout of abrupt U.S. foreign aid cuts. For this mother, and millions like her in crisis-affected regions, the consequences are immediate and tragic — losing access to essential care at the very moment it is needed most.

In Afghanistan, several international NGOs have been forced to suspend critical health services, from maternal care to tuberculosis (TB) treatment, due to the abrupt termination of U.S.-funded programs. Therapeutic feeding centers in provinces like Badakhshan and Kabul have shut down, leaving malnourished children without care. Key services such as TB treatment, maternal health, mental health, mobile clinics, and vaccination programs have been suspended in multiple provinces, leading to reduced patient care, increased referrals to private (often unaffordable) facilities, and gaps in disease surveillance.

This is not an isolated story. Over the past 100 days, we have witnessed a growing, human-made disaster. The abrupt termination of U.S. foreign aid is dismantling critical health and humanitarian services across the globe, as the United States alone accounted for nearly 40 percent of global humanitarian funding.

One Hundred Days that Shook US Foreign Policy

RICHARD HAASS

We are barely 100 days into US President Donald Trump’s second term, but much is already clear. Trump 2.0 is starkly different: more confident and surrounded by a team determined to implement a far more sweeping agenda. Those staffing the administration – amplifiers more than restrainers, enablers more than guardrails – spent the past four years preparing for this moment.

Trump 2.0 is an activist, imperial presidency, at home and abroad. He seems to be everywhere, dominating public space and private conversations alike in much of the world. The contrast with his predecessor President Joe Biden could not be starker.

The administration’s principal policy goal thus far has been to make good on Trump’s campaign pledge to secure the United States’ southern border. But import tariffs – an across-the-board 10% baseline levy, plus additional country-specific tariffs, reaching 145% in China’s case – have become the defining initiative of his presidency.

Foreign policy is also substantially changed. The US has shifted from being a steadfast supporter of Ukraine to tilting decidedly in Russia’s favor. The shift appears to be motivated by a clear dislike for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and an embrace of Russian President Vladimir Putin for reasons unknown.

Adapt or Die: Redefining Wargaming for the Age of Algorithmic Warfare

S.L. Nelson

“Adapt or die.” This isn’t just a cliché; it’s a fundamental truth of human survival. Security—the psychological need for stability and protection—is second only to food and water in Maslow’s hierarchy. War directly threatens this security, so understanding war is essential for preserving peace.

One of the oldest tools for grasping the nature of war is wargaming. It is, in essence, a rehearsal—an intellectual simulation that helps leaders make sense of complex, high-stakes decisions before lives and national resources are on the line. But while its utility has persisted, its form has not evolved fast enough to meet the demands of the modern battlefield.

The Problem with Today’s Wargaming

Wargaming is indispensable, but too often, it’s outdated, misused, or misunderstood. In some defense circles, it functions as little more than a stage for confirmation bias, where senior leaders seek validation for preconceived notions rather than insight into novel threats. Worse, wargames frequently remain trapped in analog formats: players huddle around maps, move tokens, make subjective choices, and imagine the rest.

Data Is Fundamental to the Space Force. But Sharing It Is a Challenge

Shaun Waterman

The Space Force relies entirely on data—but it lacks the systems and tools to analyze and share that data properly even within the service, let alone with international partners, officials said May 1.

“It’s the backbone of everything that we’re going to do, every application that we’re going to build, every system that we use,” Shannon Pallone, program executive officer for battle management and command, control, and communications at Space Systems Command, told an audience of defense contractors at the ACFEA Northern Virginia chapter’s Space Force IT Day in suburban Virginia.

She said space is increasingly a “system of systems environment … You don’t have satellite A over here, and satellite B over there and they never talk to each other. Everything interacts.” She compared it to a mapping app on a modern smartphone: “They’re interacting with data, they’re getting smarter over time. They’re pulling in restaurant reviews, pulling in real-time traffic data, pulling in weather,” she said.

In the same way, Pallone said, the Space Force has to think about data as a principle element in all its technology. “If we’re not thinking about it with a data-first mentality, we’re going to end up buying the wrong things. They’re not going to talk to each other, and we’re never going to get to where we need to go.”

SWJ Interview with Dr. Steve Tatham: Will an AI-centric Social Media Take Us Further and Quicker Towards the 1984 Society?

Octavian Manea

Manea: What are the convergences and divergencies between Russian and Chinese modus operandi in IO (Influence Operations/Information Operatuibs)?

Tatham: The West has long studied Russia. The Cold War sustained vibrant linguistic and analysis education and training programs across most NATO nations. Whilst the general public may not have had the understanding or interest in Russian disinformation that they do today, our various Armed Forces and intelligence agencies certainly did. For three years I worked at the Advanced Research Group of the UK Defense Academy, a successor to the Soviet Studies Research Center, that for years had tracked and written about Russian military affairs and information warfare. In the US the Foreign Military Studies Office did much the same. Collectively we have a good understanding of how Russia deploys its IO – particularly post the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact as Eastern European nations, such as Poland and the Baltic States, brought their experience and knowledge to the West.

This is not however the case for China. China only opened up to the West in the late 1970s and the number of Western analysts who can speak Mandarin has remained low for years. In this sense, our collective ability to access Chinese documents, doctrine and academic journals is limited. So, I would argue that we are on the back foot, we don’t have the necessary depth and history of understanding about the nature of Chinese IO that we have with Russia.

(Re)Claiming Our Deterrence

Chad Williamson

As SOF Week 2025 opens in Tampa on Monday, two messages may shape every interaction while speaking to the urgency of now. The first—Palmer Luckey’s very vivid TED Talk, depicting a catastrophic failure of deterrence in a Taiwan invasion scenario. The second—a newly penned Letter to the Force by Secretary of the Army Dan Driscoll and General Randy George, launching the Army Transformation Initiative (ATI). This initiative was catalyzed by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s directive on Army Transformation and Acquisition Reform.

Luckey warns, “Our sheer shortage of tools and platforms means we can't even get into the fight.” The Army’s top leaders now agree: “Adaptation is no longer an advantage — it's a requirement for survival.”

This alignment—between defense industry disruptors and senior military leadership—could define the strategic tone of SOF Week 2025.
Belief, Not Bureaucracy

In his seminal RAND paper, Understanding Deterrence, senior political scientist Mike Mazarr argues that deterrence is about shaping the thinking of a potential aggressor. The adversary must believe they cannot win. “Countries only go to war,” Luckey reminds us, “when they disagree as to who the victor will be.”

Letter to the Force: Army Transformation Initiative

Gen. Randy A. George

Army Leaders,

Battlefields across the world are changing at a rapid pace. Autonomous systems are becoming more lethal and less expensive. Sensors and decoys are everywhere. Dual-use technologies are continuously evolving and outpacing our processes to defeat them. To maintain our edge on the battlefield, our Army will transform to a leaner, more lethal force by adapting how we fight, train, organize, and buy equipment.

Consistent with the Secretary of Defense directive dated 30 April 2025, the Army is implementing a comprehensive transformation strategy — the Army Transformation Initiative (ATI). This initiative will reexamine all requirements and eliminate unnecessary ones, ruthlessly prioritize fighting formations to directly contribute to lethality, and empower leaders at echelon to make hard calls to ensure resources align with strategic objectives. To achieve this, ATI comprises three lines of effort: deliver critical warfighting capabilities, optimize our force structure, and eliminate waste and obsolete programs.

Deliver Warfighting Capabilities. ATI builds upon our Transformation in Contact (TiC) effort, which prototypes organizational changes and integrates emerging technology into formations to innovate, learn, refine requirements, and develop solutions faster. We will introduce long-range missiles and modernized UAS into formations, field the M1E3 tank, develop the Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft, and close the C-sUAS capability gap. Command and control nodes will integrate Artificial Intelligence to accelerate decision-making and preserve the initiative. Agile funding, which shifts from program-centric to capability-based portfolios, will increase timely equipment fielding and accelerate innovation cycles. Adaptation is no longer an advantage — it's a requirement for survival.