What Led to the Recent Crisis Between India and Pakistan?

Diya Ashtakala

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On May 7, 2025, India launched missile strikes in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir. India stated that the strikes targeted terrorist infrastructure, while Pakistan rejected India’s claims. The strikes took place after two weeks of flare-ups between India and Pakistan following a terrorist attack in Pahalgam, a town in India-administered Kashmir. Both countries adopted diplomatic and military measures in response to the situation, drawing international attention. India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire on May 10, after three days of military operations and as the countries stood on the precipice of war.

The crisis between the two nuclear-armed countries indicates how rapidly tensions can escalate to dangerous levels. The intensity of the conflict exceeded that of past episodes, with several rounds of retaliation that undermined strategic stability in South Asia. This is also the first time India and Pakistan have engaged in drone warfare in their rivalry, indicating a new era of technological conflict in the region. The conflict underscores the need for heightened international attention to South Asia more broadly—not only during a crisis, as tensions over the Line of Control (LOC) occur even during relative peacetime. While the ceasefire continues to hold, the region should not reactively develop off-ramps only when tensions reach critical levels. The upcoming dialogues between India and Pakistan, as part of the ceasefire agreement, provide an opportunity for both countries to explore off-ramps and engage in confidence-building measures (CBMs).

India: Persistent Islamist Radicalism – Analysis

Priyanka Devi Kshetrimayum

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On May 10, 2025, the Special Task Force (STF) arrested an operative of the transborder Islamist group, Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), identified as Abbas Uddin Mollah, from Pathra village in the Diamond Harbour of South 24-Parganas District in West Bengal.

On May 9, 2025, the STF arrested two JMB operatives, Ajmol Hossain (28) and Saheb Ali Khan (28), from Birbhum District, West Bengal. Ajmol Hossain was arrested at Nalhati, and Saheb Ali Khan in Murarai. STF suspected that they also maintained links with Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).

After the arrests, the STF disclosed that these persons had been involved in procuring firearms and were planning to prepare explosives for the furtherance of the purported Ghazwatul Hind (the prophesied Islamic conquest of India). The three JMB operatives were produced in the Rampurhat Court of Birbhum District.

Saikat Hati, the Assistant Public Prosecutor of Rampurhat Court, remarked, “All three were connected with JMB, and their role was to increase the membership of the banned outfit by promoting radical ideology. They used to share their thoughts, narratives, and agendas through highly encrypted social media platforms.”

Indian intelligence agencies have increased surveillance in West Bengal following the arrests, particularly in the Murshidabad and Malda Districts, which share borders with Bangladesh. Additionally, Birbhum, East Burdwan, and Hooghly Districts have also been brought under this special surveillance, to identify potential threats.

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), at least three cadres/associates of JMB have been arrested in the current year (data till May 18, 2025). No JMB operatives were arrested in 2024.

Drones, Diplomacy, and the India-Turkiye Rift

Rishma Banerjee

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The April 22 terror attack in Pahalgam, which tragically claimed 26 civilian lives, marked a return to cross-border hostilities, with India and Pakistan falling back into a familiar pattern of airstrikes, ceasefire violations, and international appeals for restraint. However, a more strategic split has emerged amid this crisis: the ongoing chasm in India-Turkiye ties.

On the night of May 6-7, Indian jets struck what New Delhi alleged to be terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Pakistan responded with cross-border stikes of its own – during which the Indian Air Force intercepted multiple retaliatory drones launched from across the Line of Control. According to press briefings by the Indian Armed Forces, among these were Turkiye-manufactured Asisguard Songar models – unmanned armed systems previously exported to Pakistan for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations.

This was the first instance where Turkish-origin defense platforms have been used in a live conflict directly involving Indian forces, escalating long-brewing apprehensions in New Delhi about Ankara’s regional posture. Intelligence reports have alleged the involvement of Turkish military personnel in the planning and execution of these drone operations. Suspicions of logistical coordination were heightened by additional sightings of a Turkish Air Force C-130 Hercules plane landing at Karachi airport and a Turkish Ada-class anti-submarine corvette docked at Karachi Port.

By reiterating his relationship with Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and referring to Turkiye-Pakistan ties as “one of the finest examples of true friendship,” President Recep Tayyip Erdogan demonstrated Ankara’s readiness to operationalize political support as well. This relationship has been shaped and bolstered by a long-standing strategic partnership between the two countries. Turkiye became Pakistan’s second-largest arms supplier after China between 2018 and 2022. Defense diplomacy and operational interoperability have been further solidified by their joint military exercises, such as the yearly “Atatürk” and more recent multinational exercises like Indus Shield.

Denial or Reform? How Pakistan Might React to Military Setback vs. India

Michael Rubin

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As Pakistan Confronts Military Failure, Will it Follow the Path of Russia, Congo, or Armenia?: With world leaders in the audience, Pope Leo XIV gave his inaugural mass. Among his themes was a condemnation of war. “In the joy of faith and communion, we cannot forget our brothers and sisters who are suffering because of war.” He mentioned Gaza, Myanmar, and Ukraine, but could have mentioned many more. Since the beginning of the decade, wars have erupted across the globe.

In 2020, Azerbaijan attacked the Armenian-run enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, conquering half before accepting a ceasefire which lasted less than three years before overrunning the rest of the territory, expelling the Armenian population.

What History Teaches

Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, a war that continues in the trenches of the Donbas as drones and missiles strike from Kyiv to Moscow. After importing hundreds of millions if not billions of dollars of drones and military equipment from China, Democratic Republic of Congo President Félix Tshisekedi sparked a war in eastern Congo to distract Congolese from his failings elsewhere. It backfired as rebels gained ground both militarily and won hearts and minds of residents with sober and competent governance. The brief India-Pakistan war that erupted earlier this month in the wake of the April 22, 2025 Pakistan-backed terror attack on Indian tourists at Pahalgam was just the latest conflict in a world seemingly increasingly prone to war.

Every war begins with the best laid plans. Often, reality intrudes. The soldiers initially mobilized for World War I in July and August 1914 believed they would be home for Christmas; many spent years in the trenches if they came home at all. Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan both believed they could deliver knockout blows to their enemies, only to see opponents regroup, rally and respond.

Pakistan’s Terror Challenge Isn’t Just India’s Problem

Kriti Upadhyaya

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Tensions between India and Pakistan are high again, this time following a terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir in late April that killed 26 tourists—25 Indian and one Nepali.

In early May, India launched targeted strikes on nine terrorist camps in Pakistan, both in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and in Pakistan’s Punjab province. Pakistan retaliated, and the two sides exchanged volleys of missiles, drones, and artillery. These attacks continued until a ceasefire was announced on May 10.

Border skirmishes and line of control violations in this sector are tragically familiar, but this episode yet again underscores the persistent threat posed by terrorism in South Asia. And it raises complex questions for the United States as it works to deepen its strategic partnership with India.

Pakistan’s Long Shadow on Counterterrorism

Pakistan has long been a hub for regional terrorist groups. Indeed, the discovery of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in 2011 raised very real concerns about Pakistan’s longstanding and ongoing links to various terrorist outfits.

Groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) have launched deadly acts of terrorism like the 2008 Mumbai attacks and the 2019 Pulwama bombing. Yet despite their actions, they continue to operate openly and freely within the country.

Indeed, one of the terrorists killed in India’s recent response was Abdul Rauf Asghar, a top JeM commander implicated in the brutal 2002 killing of American journalist Daniel Pearl. At a funeral following India’s strikes, Pakistani military officers were filmed mourning the dead alongside a notorious U.S.-designated global terrorist from LeT. Pakistan could not claim plausible deniability.

China Energy Profile: Non-Fossil Fuels Account For 56% Of Total Installed Electricity Production – Analysis

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For the third year in a row, China’s population declined in 2025 after decades of continuous growth, falling to 1.42 billion people.1

China’s economy is the world’s second-largest. Its gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 5.0% in 2024, in line with a government target of around 5% growth, however, growth estimates across sources vary and indicate that China’s GDP grew by 2% to 3%. Stimulus measures in the second half of the year as well as increased exports at the end of the year fostered growth.2

Natural gas accounted for the largest increase in primary energy production (6.2%) in 2023 from the previous year, followed by nuclear (3.7%). However, natural gas had the second-largest increase in primary energy consumption (7.4%) after petroleum and other liquids (8.6%). Although coal accounted for the largest share of primary energy production, it grew the least year on year, at 1.3%. Coal still accounted for most (62%) of the energy consumed in China (Table 1).3

In 2024, non-fossil fuels accounted for 56% of total installed electricity generation capacity. Although most of the electricity generation (63%) came from fossil fuels, fossil fuels share of generation decreased by 1% from the previous year.4

China added 356 gigawatts (GW) of non-hydro renewable generation capacity in 2024. Of this, solar accounted for 277 GW, and wind accounted for 79 GW.5

Electric vehicles (EVs) accounted for 48% of new vehicle sales in 2024 for the first time, which surpassed the country’s 2030 target of 40% by six years. Strong government support, a competitive market that has allowed more than half of EVs to be sold at lower prices than their internal combustion engine (ICE) competitors, and advancements in battery and smart vehicle technologies contributed to this milestone.6

Petroleum and other liquids

Petroleum and other liquids production increased by 73,000 barrels per day (b/d) in 2024 from the previous year, driven by Chinese government push for national oil companies to increase production and exploration.7 In 2024, petroleum and other liquids production reached a record high 5.3 million b/d, the fifth-highest in the world.

What a China-Egypt Military Training Reveals About the PLA’s Air Combat Readiness

Ying Yu Lin

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Participants in the Eagles of Civilization 2025 joint training between China and Egypt, held from April 19-May 4, 2025.Credit: Facebook/ Egyptian Armed Forces

From April 19 to May 4 China and Egypt conducted the joint military exercise “Eagles of Civilization 2025.” The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) dispatched a detachment to Egypt for joint training with the air force of one of China’s key strategic partners in Africa. According to the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, it was the first ever joint training between the militaries of China and Egypt.

The training subjects included airspace management, air combat operations management, efficient execution of orders, theoretical instruction, practical lectures, joint flights, basic maneuvers, air combat training, joint airstrikes, aerial refueling, air support, battlefield search and rescue, coordinated operations, and tactical confrontations. Over the course of two weeks, participating forces from both sides engaged in activities such as air combat training, aerial refueling, air support, battlefield search and rescue, professional knowledge exchanges, and air combat skill sharing.

The PLAAF detachment included four Y-20 transport aircraft and one YY-20 aerial refueling aircraft, primarily from the Western Theater Command; two J-10C fighter jets and as many J-10S trainer aircraft; one KJ-500 early warning aircraft, and at least one support helicopter transported by a Y-20. Chinese media reported that the J-10C’s active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, WS-10B turbofan engine, and PL-15 long-range air-to-air missile remained reliable under desert conditions.

Egypt deployed its Russian-made MiG-29 fighter jets for the exercise, with no publicly available information indicating the participation of any F-16 fighter planes bought from the United States. The U.S. does not provide AIM-120 missiles to Egypt, significantly restricting the air combat capabilities of its F-16 fleet. In terms of aerial performance, then, Egypt’s F-16s are considered weaker than the MiG-29M2s in its inventory, which are equipped with R-77 air-to-air missiles. This limitation has been a key factor in Egypt’s decision to purchase Rafale fighter jets from France in recent years.

Is the U.S. Drifting Toward a Taiwan War with China?

Ramon Marks

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Taiwan is finally getting more serious about its defense, extending the draft to a year and increasing its defense budget to purchase new military capabilities, including drones and anti-ship missiles. It is shifting from a long-time emphasis on heavy weapons and conventional warfare approaches to more asymmetric, porcupine defense strategies.

Whether all this comes in time remains to be seen. Military analysts fear that China could invade Taiwan as early as 2027. If war comes, Taiwan’s hope and expectation is that the United States will enter the fray. Wargames point to costly fighting and losses if that happens, including the specter of potential escalation to nuclear war.

The big question is whether the United States will defend Taiwan or not. Foreign policy experts call for the United States to defend Taiwan, a contingency for which INDOPACOM trains, complying with the requirements of the Taiwan Relations Act, which requires such contingency planning.

President Biden publicly stated several times that the United States would defend the island if attacked by China. Under Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, the president does possess the authority as commander-in-chief to order the use of military force, particularly in response to an attack. That executive power is insufficient, however, to confer upon the president the unilateral power to declare a Taiwan defense alliance without further congressional participation as required not only by the Constitution but also by the War Powers Act.

The United States has no military treaty with Taiwan. Neither the Taiwan Relations Act nor any other federal statute commits the United States to its defense. The Taiwan Relations Act goes only as far as binding the United States to “maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.”

Congress has never passed a resolution calling for the defense of the country. Polls repeatedly show that an American majority does not support fighting for Taiwan, preferring instead the current ambiguous status quo. Still, Washington and Beijing remain locked in a dangerous drift toward war.

The Taiwan Tightrope Deterrence Is a Balancing Act, and America Is Starting to Slip

Oriana Skylar Mastro and Brandon Yoder

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As tensions rise across the Taiwan Strait, the policy debate in Washington remains fractured. U.S. strategy broadly revolves around deterring China from attacking Taiwan, and for the past three presidential administrations, it has consisted of three central components: increasing the ability of the United States and Taiwan to defend the island militarily; using diplomacy to signal U.S. resolve to protect Taiwan while also reassuring China that Washington does not support Taiwanese independence; and using economic pressure to slow China’s military modernization efforts.

But there is little consensus on the right balance among these three components—and that balance determines to some degree how deterrence looks in practice. Some contend that diplomatic pressure—along with military restraint, to avoid antagonizing China—will keep Beijing at bay. Others warn that unless Washington significantly strengthens its military posture in Asia, deterrence will collapse. And a third approach, outlined recently in Foreign Affairs by Jennifer Kavanagh and Stephen Wertheim, emphasizes that bolstering Taiwan’s self-defense and enabling offshore U.S. support is the best route to sustaining deterrence while also mitigating the risk of escalation.

These prescriptions have merit but fall short of grappling with the paradox at the heart of U.S. strategy: deterrence can fail in two ways. Do too little, and Beijing may gamble it can seize Taiwan before Washington is able to respond. Do too much, and Chinese leaders may conclude that force is the only remaining path to unification. Navigating this dilemma requires more than a stronger military or bolder diplomacy. It requires a calibrated strategy of rearmament, reassurance, and restraint that threads the needle between weakness and recklessness. Combined properly, forward-deployed capabilities, diplomatic restraint, and selective economic interdependence can reinforce one another to maintain credible deterrence while avoiding provocation.

China’s geopolitical dominance game in the South China Sea

Euan Graham

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For all the talk about the South China Sea’s complexity as a security issue, its geopolitical significance to China is simple: China wants to condition Southeast Asian states to subordinate status. Southeast Asian countries would do well to consider this when assessing Beijing’s motivations and behaviour.

I was in Singapore earlier this month to participate in the International Maritime Security Conference, organised by the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies. The conference was part of IMDEX Asia 2025, a biennial congregation of sailors and warships from around the region, hosted by Singapore’s navy. This edition included senior representatives from Australia, Britain, Canada, China, India, France, Japan, New Zealand, Sri Lanka, the United States, and member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

It’s common for speakers at regional conferences to present the maritime environment in terms of complex, cross-cutting transnational security challenges, such as illegal fishing, critical seabed infrastructure, marine pollution, cyber, climate, autonomy, energy exploration and others. (The list expands continually.)

The importance of cooperation and adherence to international law remains a staple theme of such gatherings. Yet advocates of regional maritime cooperation struggle to name new initiatives. The widely referenced Malacca Strait Patrol, for example, is two decades old. It is also telling that the lexicon of power and competition has gradually crept back into session titles. Phrases such as ‘geopolitical implications’ and ‘armed conflict’ were an uncommon sight at maritime conference agendas 15 years ago. This is no longer the case.

Buh-Bye West Point

Pyrene

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Assistant Professor Graham Parsons got a long screed on the sanctimony of his virtue-signaling resignation from the faculty at the United States Military Academy published in the New York Times1. His letter to the editor as a profile in academic courage indicates the need for a serious investigation at West Point. Additionally, his other publications absolutely shout out for a Blue Ribbon panel to take a deep dive into what in the living, screaming Hell is happening at West Point and the other Service Academies.

The inquiry shouldn’t be about why Parsons left, but who hired him, who retained him, who approved what he taught, who else is teaching like him, and who is accountable to make sure a “Parsons” is never hired again? And how can such drivel be kept from West Point and never be indoctrinated again?

A Commission should consider the following:

Immediately and in the future, no faculty member at West Point should associate ending DEI and CRT indoctrination with “West Point abandoned its core principles2.”

All the faculty should understand that West Point isn’t “Once a school that strove to give cadets the broad-based, critical-minded, non-partisan education they need for careers as Army Officers3”, but a military academy which trains and educates Army Officers to meet the needs of the Army to fight and win wars.

All faculty should understand the difference between a liberal arts college and a military academy.

One hopes West Point might recover from Parsons being “ashamed to be associated with the academy in its current form4.” It can happen if future faculty doesn’t have an issue with prohibitions on “gender ideology”5 and doesn’t push the Cultural Marxist propaganda that “America’s founding documents are racists or sexist6.”

Turkey's Erdogan Has Become One of World's Most Powerful Men—And Trump Ally

Tom O'Connor

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As President Donald Trump seeks to reshape Washington's foreign policy in the Middle East, the U.S. leader has increasingly looked to the head of a longtime ally who has emerged as one of the most influential voices in the region—and beyond.

Over the past week alone, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has proved himself a crucial player on several geopolitical fronts. Days after overseeing an end to a four-decade insurgency waged by the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Erdogan was credited by Trump in convincing him to lift sanctions on Syria and even meet the country's rebel-turned-interim leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa, during a high-profile visit to Saudi Arabia, the first foreign trip of Trump's second presidency.

Turkey, officially known as Türkiye, went on to host high-stakes nuclear talks between Europe and Iran, along with elusive wartime discussions between Russia and Ukraine. The engagements came as Trump sought to lead diplomatic efforts on both issues and now finds himself aligning with the one leader seemingly capable of helping to advance his vision.

"Mr. Trump calls him a friend," Cagri Erhan, Erdogan's chief adviser and member of the Turkish presidency's security and foreign policy council, told Newsweek. "And he wants him to be a key actor, both on the regional and global level, to cooperate with the United States under the Trump administration."

"And I think both countries can mutually benefit in this new era," Erhan said.

John C. Calhoun, Ayatollah Khamenei, and the Geopolitics of Middle Powers

Eamonn Bellin

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The 1840s were a watershed decade in U.S. foreign policy marked by naval expansion, intervention in Cuba, annexation of Texas, and war with Mexico, constituting a smaller nation’s strategy to counter the enmity of a great power, the British empire. American statesmen feared that Britain, having taken the revolutionary step of abolishing slavery in 1833, would, in the words of an American diplomat, “form around our southern shores a cordon of free negroes” to destroy American slavery. Motivated “by a spirit of conquest and domination” cloaked “in the cause of humanity and liberty,” Britain would, according to South Carolina Senator and Secretary of State John C. Calhoun, destroy slavery in America to impose its economic domination on the world. Although separated by centuries, antebellum America’s strategic positioning against Britain resembles the causes and conditions which shape the strategy of another second rate power, today’s Iran, in resisting another hostile great power, today’s United States. Iran, like antebellum America, has made its strategic choices based on its proximate past and geopolitical position. Understanding Iran’s behavior in these terms is the first step in constraining it.

Antebellum America could not conventionally compete with Victorian Britain. Instead, Washington protected its interests by making local waters like the Gulf of Mexico unsafe for British naval power and supporting fellow slaveholding regimes in Cuba, Brazil, and Texas to prevent encirclement. Iran has likewise destabilized American security in the Persian Gulf and, until recently, projected strategic depth across a regional “axis of resistance.” This cursory comparison indicates how insurgent states with limited resources have defended their interests by adapting to their great power rivals’ weaknesses, investing in local superiority, and defending regional partners. Moreover, American strategy in the 1840s does not reflect a static “American way of war” but elicits proximate historical forces like American commitments to slavery, fear of Britain, and hemispheric relationships with other slave societies. Likewise, the bases of Iranian strategy today do not hinge on shibboleths of Persian culture or the teachings of Ruhollah Khomeini, but turn on recent events, apprehension of American power, and assessments of regional context. 

Trump Is Destroying a Core American Value. The World Will Notice.

Michael Posner

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In the late 1980s, Joseph Nye, the Harvard political scientist who died this month, developed the concept of soft power. His central premise, that the United States enhances its global influence by promoting values like human rights and democracy, has guided U.S. foreign policy for decades across both Republican and Democratic administrations.

President Trump has made clear that he fundamentally rejects this vision. As president, he has ordered a sweeping overhaul of the State Department that will cripple its capacity to promote American values abroad. At the center of this effort are drastic cuts to the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor — the State Department’s core institution for advancing soft power, which I led under President Barack Obama. Unless Congress intervenes, the debasement of the bureau’s role will impair America’s ability to challenge authoritarianism, support democratic movements and provide independent analysis to inform U.S. foreign policy. The long-term result will be a United States that is weaker, less principled and increasingly sidelined as authoritarian powers like Russia and China offer their own transactional models of global engagement.

The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor was created with bipartisan congressional support in 1977, a time when lawmakers sought greater influence over foreign policy in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and America’s support for authoritarian regimes in countries like Chile and South Korea. President Jimmy Carter’s religious convictions and deep commitment to human rights gave the fledgling bureau early momentum. Still, its purpose was always practical: to ensure U.S. foreign aid and trade decisions were informed by credible assessments of human rights conditions around the world. That’s why every year, the bureau prepares congressionally mandated human rights reports.

The Golden Dome and the New Missile Age

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Andrew Schwartz: I’m Andrew Schwartz, and you’re listening to The Truth of the Matter, a podcast by CSIS where we break down the top policy issues of the day and talk with the people that can help us best understand what’s really going on.

To get to the truth of the matter about the development of Golden Dome plus the 10th anniversary of the founding of the CSIS Missile Defense Project, we have with us none other than my good friend Tom Karako, who’s the director of our Missile Defense Project and a senior fellow in our Defense and Security Department. Welcome to the podcast, my friend.

Tom Karako: Great to – great to see you again, Andrew.

Mr. Schwartz: So before we get into the Golden Dome, which is, you know, quite in the news today and it’s fascinating, I want to ask you about what the mission of the Missile Defense Project that you direct was at its inception and how that’s evolved over the past decade.

Dr. Karako: Yeah. No, I appreciate that. We’re excited about marking 10 years. You know, this was – it was this month when we kicked it off. We had over the vice chairman, Admiral Winnefeld, and this was back in 2015. And I think, you know, what we’re trying to do – and Kath Hicks and John Hamre took a bet on us to get this thing off the ground, and as it turns out it’s become considerably more important over the past 10 years, considerably more in demand, which is great – I guess great in some ways, bad in others just in terms of how the world has shaped up.

Drone Saturation: Russia’s Shahed Campaign

Benjamin Jensen and Yasir Atalan

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CSIS published an interactive dashboard that explores the daily and cumulative trends of Russian missile attacks, including the number of missiles launched, types of missiles used, and the success of Ukrainian intercepts. Explore the interactive dashboard here.

The IssueRussia’s drone campaign utilizes inexpensive Shahed drones to saturate Ukrainian air defenses and erode civilian morale through persistent nightly attacks. Originally Iranian made, these drones are now mass produced in Russia using Western electronics and essential Chinese components.

Ukraine urgently requires layered, cost-effective air defenses, including high-energy laser systems, to counter drone saturation. Targeted long-range strikes on drone production and launch sites and disrupting China’s supply of critical electronics to Russia are essential steps.

Russia’s relentless use of low-cost drones signals a broader shift toward attrition warfare based on overwhelming air defense systems with sheer numbers. Western governments must innovate in economical defenses and tackle Chinese technology flows fueling Russian drone production.

Russia is using a punishment strategy to force Kyiv into negotiations designed to end the war and hamper Ukrainian sovereignty for the next generation. This approach increasingly relies on a single weapon: the Shahed drone. Originally imported from Iran but now mass produced in Russia using a mix of smuggled Western electronics and important Chinese parts, these low-cost attack drones cause millions of Ukrainians to wake up to the sound of air raid sirens every night. This terror campaign has lasted longer than the infamous Blitz aerial bombing of London during World War II and shows no signs of letting up.

Trust Fails

Jon B. Alterman

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"Trust Fails" is part of Scenarios That Could Define 2035, a series that seeks to understand more about the future. The CSIS Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy drafted several scenarios to help think through aspects of the world in 2035. It then turned to trusted experts, inside and outside of CSIS, for their comments, insights, and concerns. The experts' contributions overlay the scenarios themselves, highlighting further areas of emphasis, implications, or alternative outcomes.

One of technology's relatively unappreciated qualities is that it has helped boost global trust. The internet has become an ecosystem whereby anyone can purchase goods from any seller anywhere in the world. Both the buyer and seller have relatively high confidence that the promised goods will be delivered and the seller will be paid, even if this is a one-time transaction where the parties have no connection to each other. Government identification documents have increasingly moved beyond photographs to include definitive biometric data. The global banking system mostly has abandoned paper documents that can be forged—or lost—and sends money around the world in a fraction of a second. Databases contain vast amounts of information that can verify almost any data point and make information available to any mobile phone user anywhere.

Technology's ability to ensure that strangers can trust each other has accelerated and deepened economic activities, even in remote places. 1 If one side or another fails to meet obligations, that will be recorded in some way in the vast depository of shared information: Credit reports will be hurt, online reputations will be tarnished, and platform access will be revoked. In that environment, individuals and firms need not limit their engagements to a small number of well-known entities, promoting efficiency, innovation, and agility.

Scenarios That Could Define 2035

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The goal of scenario planning is to understand more about the future, not to predict it. Identifying key drivers of change, as well as understanding their second- and third-order effects and the interrelationships between them, does more than help to prepare for contingencies—it also helps to look for warning indicators and triggers of profound change, and it can drive action to prevent scenarios from coming about in the first place.

The CSIS Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy drafted several scenarios to help think through aspects of the world in 2035. It then turned to trusted experts, inside and outside of CSIS, for their comments, insights, and concerns. The experts' contributions overlay the scenarios themselves, highlighting further areas of emphasis, implications, or alternative outcomes.

Russia’s Two Minds on Ukraine

NINA L. KHRUSHCHEVA

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NEW YORK – The double-headed eagle that dominates Russia’s coat of arms holds many meanings, from signifying a historical connection to the Byzantine empire to acknowledging the influence of the vast country’s eastern and western regions. Following the recent meeting between Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul, and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s subsequent phone conversation with US President Donald Trump, the eagle’s two heads is also a reminder of the country’s two minds, pulling it in opposing directions – and, potentially, tearing it apart.

Putin has, at long last, secured the upper hand in the Ukraine war. Russian troops are making (admittedly slow) progress toward seizing full control of the regions Russia claimed as its own in September 2022: Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia. The country is achieving this despite unprecedented sanctions and many billions of dollars in Western support for Ukraine. Putin has thus sent a clear message to the West and any would-be challenger: never underestimate Russia. There has never been a better time to end the fighting.

Yet, in the first direct talks between the two sides since the beginning of the war, held in Istanbul last week, the Russian delegation issued a list of harsh demands, which Ukraine was certain not to accept – and threatened to “wage war forever.” Don’t forget, the head of the delegation cooly noted, Russia fought Sweden for 21 years in the 1700s. When the talks ended after just a couple of hours, the Russian stock market fell, in what amounted to a clear rebuke from investors.

On May 19, Putin essentially confirmed his delegation’s demands in the two-hour conversation with Trump. But while he and Trump were still talking, investors were optimistic about the hopeful outcome, predicting a dollar at 78 rubles (until recently it was over 100).

Insights for Future Conflicts from the Russia-Ukraine War

CSIS Military 

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The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine was the most violent seizure of sovereign European territory since World War II.

In the spring of 2025, CSIS military fellows worked with top resident defense experts to produce nonpolitical, actionable takeaways from the Russia-Ukraine War. Ukrainians, academics, industry leaders, and military professionals who have experienced and studied the war were brought together for this purpose.

Insights from this regional war have critical global relevance, as they will likely inform large-scale combat operations between great powers in the future.

Can Ukraine Fight Without U.S. Aid? Seven Questions to Ask

Iselin Brady, Daniel Byman, Riley McCabe, and Alexander Palmer

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The Trump administration has repeatedly threatened to walk away from Ukraine if there is no progress on a peace deal between Ukraine and Russia. Although the administration has sent mixed signals, its threat is not empty. On March 3, 2025, the United States suspended military aid and intelligence sharing to Ukraine following a tense meeting between President Trump and President Zelensky on February 28, only lifting the suspension on March 11.

A U.S. suspension of military support to Ukraine would be a grievous blow to Kyiv. But would it be fatal? Ukraine’s own resolve has been formidable even after three years of war, and Europe, which already provides tens of billions of euros in financial and military aid, might play a still greater role. This paper argues that a complete U.S. military and intelligence aid cutoff would significantly harm Ukraine’s ability to fight Russia but would not necessarily lead to immediate defeat—and that more limited cutoffs would have more limited effects on Ukraine’s battlefield performance. But the exact extent to which a U.S. cutoff would harm Ukraine depends on Europe’s ability to fill the gap with its own capabilities. Ukraine currently relies heavily on U.S. systems, training, intelligence, and logistics, and although European support and Ukraine’s own defense industry are substantial and growing, they cannot fully replace U.S. capabilities—particularly in the areas of air defense and intelligence assistance for precision targeting. The result is that continued U.S. aid remains extremely important for Ukraine’s long-term effectiveness on the battlefield. The broader geopolitical implications of a U.S. withdrawal could embolden Russia and its allies while straining transatlantic unity.

Ukraine currently relies heavily on U.S. systems, training, intelligence, and logistics, and although European support and Ukraine’s own defense industry are substantial and growing, they cannot fully replace U.S. capabilities.

Understanding the true impact of a cutoff, however, requires a deeper understanding of the types of weapons involved, European and Ukrainian capabilities absent the United States, and how China and other Russian allies would respond. The responses to the seven questions below illustrate the impact of a cutoff, important ambiguities regarding several key specifics of the U.S. threat, and the possibilities and limits of non-U.S. sources of aid.

Singapore’s Extra Large Order of Chips

Sribala Subramanian

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A data center in Singapore ordered $250 million worth of U.S.-made servers containing advanced AI chips. The vendor subsequently shipped the devices to an unauthorized third party.

Did the transaction violate export control laws in both countries?

The question came up in a tariffs-related phone call between Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister Gan Kim Yong and Howard Lutnick, the U.S. commerce secretary. Lutnick expressed concern about the unrestricted sale of high-end chips “not just to Singapore, but generally.”

The servers were dispatched to a customer in Malaysia and likely contained chips from Nvidia, a leading manufacturer of GPUs (graphics processing units) used by the artificial intelligence companies.

Singapore was Nvidia’s second-largest market in 2024, accounting for nearly $24 billion, or 18 percent of the chip maker’s revenues.

The magnitude of sales to the city-state spurred a U.S. congressional committee to investigate the national security risk posed by Nvidia chip orders from Southeast Asian countries. Lawmakers were concerned that vendors in Singapore and Malaysia may have been part of an illicit chip pipeline for DeepSeek, China’s new artificial intelligence startup.

In February, three individuals faced fraud charges in Singapore for making false statements to U.S. suppliers (Dell and Supermicro) about the identity of the end user.

Nvidia’s spokesperson put out a clarification stating that “the revenue associated with Singapore does not indicate diversion to China.”

In past years, Singapore’s trade surplus ($2.8 billion in 2024) was viewed favorably in Washington, D.C. The affluent city-state splurges on a host of high-end American products ranging from strawberries to semiconductors.

Blow for ‘progressive’ Tusk: Anti-abortion trio receive majority in presidential vote

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The Brussels elites were surely dismayed at how well conservative populist candidates fared in Sunday’s first round of Poland’s presidential election. They would probably be even more surprised to discover a likely cause: abortion.

Poland’s ruling coalition was openly backed by the establishment powers that be in the run-up to the 2023 parliamentary vote. The European Commission had feuded for years with the conservative-populist Law and Justice party, alleging that it was suppressing the rule of law and threatening democracy.

They were relieved when Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s coalition took power. Surely, they believed, democracy was saved, and modernity was coming to backwards little Poland.

Legalising abortion was a large part of that push for so-called modernity. Poland is one of Europe’s most religious countries, with at least 71 per cent of the population stating they are are Roman Catholics.

They also still practice their religion. Roughly 37 per cent attend mass weekly, with that number rising well above 40 per cent for Poles without a college degree.

It should thus be no surprise that Law and Justice passed a law during its tenure that is a near total ban on abortion in the country. Their voters tend to be less educated and more religious; banning abortion is simply what their supporters want.

Tusk took aim at this law during the parliamentary campaign, pledging to repeal it. In power, his government introduced a law that would legalise abortion up to the 12th week of pregnancy, bringing it in line with Western European norms.

So far this story runs along the line the elites prefer: win an election, pass laws pushing an elite social agenda, and move “forward”. That’s where the story starts to run off the rails, however.

Space Force official: Commercial satellites can do a lot more than we thought

Stephen Clark 

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A generation ago, when former NASA Administrator Dan Goldin promoted the mantra of a "faster, better, cheaper" approach to the agency's science missions, critics often joked that NASA could only pick two.

That's no longer the case. NASA is finding success in its partnerships with commercial space companies, especially SpaceX, with lower costs, quicker results, and improved performance.

The Space Force and the National Reconnaissance Office, the US government's spy satellite agency, are also capitalizing on new products and services from commercial industry. In many cases, these new capabilities come from venture-backed startups already developing and operating satellites for commercial use.

The idea is to focus the Space Force and the NRO on missions that only they can do, according to Chris Scolese, director of the NRO. Military and intelligence agencies are already buying launch services, communications services, and satellite surveillance imagery on a commercial basis. These missions also have commercial applications, so the government is purchasing products and services with rockets and satellites that already exist.

Now, the military is starting to use a commercial model for missions that, at least today, lack any meaningful commercial market. In these cases, the Space Force and the NRO must go out and pay a company to build an entire fleet of satellites that will exclusively serve the government. But rather than dictating stringent requirements and micromanaging every phase of the program, as the Space Force and NRO have typically done, they're going with a more hands-off approach.

This change in procurement strategy is yielding results, officials said last week in a hearing convened by the House Armed Services Committee. Numerous companies are now manufacturing satellite buses, the basic chassis that hosts instruments, sensors, and payloads tailored for a range of missions. Most of them come from SpaceX, which mass-produces satellites for its Starlink broadband network. But there are others, and the market is richer than many US officials thought.

The Max Effective Range of Your Voice

COL Andrew Morgado

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“…we must all own our profession – share ideas, engage in debate, and learn together.” Michael Weimer, Randy George, and Christine Wormuth, “Message to the Army Team,” 27 October 2023

LT Years - Something to write on, something to write with

“Lieutenant, the uniform around here for officers includes a pen, a pencil and something to write on. Are you in the right uniform?” This was my introduction to 2nd Platoon, 1st Battalion, 72nd Armor Regiment from SFC Contreras, a sergeant who knew his business. He even knew my business better than I.

SFC Contreras taught me the first two enduring lessons of my career. First, the human body and mind is fallible so build systems to make up for your deficiencies. Second, a leader must be able to communicate through multiple media to get the message across; and you must make it stick.

As I assume the role as the Director of Army University Press (AUP), the Army’s premier communications and publishing house, I am a long way from that day in a humid Korean motor pool where my introduction to sense-making and writing began. Thirty years on, I have not forgotten these lessons and realize they have only increased in value. Leaders capture what is going on around them, contextualize the experience, and communicate that to others.