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28 July 2025

Kashmir: Death and the River


On a recent spring afternoon I took one of my usual weekday walks along the high, grassy banks of the Jhelum River, near my home in Srinagar, the summer capital of Jammu and Kashmir. A fisherman stood in a narrow boat in the middle of the river and cast a net into the jade waters. Sitting down, he grabbed his hookah and took a drag. Nearby a few workmen shoveled out scoops of wet sand from a shallow patch and dumped them on an old barge. In the distance behind them were the Himalayas, their peaks gleaming with snow, and a vast Indian military camp—a turreted fortress of barracks, machine guns, and concertina wire.

Fed by snowmelt and ample spring and summer rains, the Jhelum has sustained life in Kashmir for millennia, furnishing its people with drinking water and fish, irrigating agricultural land, providing sand that is used as a construction material, and fueling the hydropower projects that power the region’s homes. Tens of thousands of people live along its banks. Periodically it becomes a source of tragedy: when I was a child our neighborhood would go into mourning each time a boy drowned in its waters.

I knew some of those boys. My cousins, my brother, and I grew up on the river’s edge at my parents’ home in Baramulla, some thirty miles downstream from Srinagar, but never dared venture too close. I could only cross in a boat if accompanied by my mother, who would clutch my forearm tightly as we climbed in and pull me back whenever I dipped a hand in the current.

In 1989 Kashmiris—with Pakistan’s encouragement—launched an armed insurgency against India’s deeply resented rule. In the years that followed, the Indian military snatched young men from their homes, tortured and killed thousands of them, and dumped some of the bodies in the Jhelum. I was still in school; from our house we watched bodies float downstream and neighbors pull them out, the water red with blood. “Shaheed kee jo maut hain woh kaum kee hayaat hain,” crowds chanted at the funeral processions: “the death of a martyr is the life of a nation.”

Sometimes the Jhelum has been the source of larger-scale disasters. In September 2014 melting glaciers and persistent rains caused the river to overflow its dykes, drowning Srinagar and nine other districts. At some points the floodwaters reached up to twenty feet high. Around three hundred people in India-controlled Kashmir died; the disaster caused billions of dollars in damage as homes, businesses, roads, and bridges were washed away.

Is Taiwan doing enough to repel a Chinese invasion?

Yenting Lin

The Han Kuang 2025 military exercises marked a major shift in how Taiwan prepares for war.For the first time, the annual national exercise combined ten days of live-fire combat training with a full-society readiness push. Civilians across all 22 counties and cities practiced air raid response, medical supply distribution, food rationing and emergency communications.

On the military side, Taiwan deployed new US-supplied weapons including M1A2T Abrams tanks, HIMARS rocket artillery and upgraded coastal defense missiles. Drones, cyberattacks and joint command systems were tested more seriously than in previous years.This time, the preparation also moved into real-world spaces—Taipei Metro stations, morning markets and major intersections—bringing the public closer to the actual scenarios Taiwan could face. The simulation was no longer abstract; it was physical, visible and local. The political message was clear: Taiwan is preparing as if conflict could be real, and soon.

Still, Han Kuang only covers the end game—what happens if China launches a full attack? It leaves a major gap at the beginning of the conflict. What happens when the threat is not missiles, but cyberattacks, disinformation, cable sabotage, or energy disruption? Taiwan is practicing for total war, but the grey zone is already here.This article examines what that preparation means. Is Taiwan able to hold the line alone before allies arrive? Is the public truly ready? What is the United States signaling through its support—and is it enough? Are Taiwan’s regional partners building a defense that matches the threat? And finally, what must be done now, while there is still time to act?

Taiwanese society has not always viewed Han Kuang with urgency. In the 1990s and early 2000s, it was widely seen as symbolic—just a routine show of weapons, disconnected from any real threat. During calmer periods such as the Ma Ying-jeou presidency, the event was often criticized as out of sync with public sentiment, more about appearances than substance.

As it happened: At least 12 killed in deadly Thailand–Cambodia border clashes


BANGKOK: Thailand launched air strikes on Cambodian military targets on Thursday (Jul 24) as Cambodia fired rockets and artillery in a dramatic escalation of a long-running border row between the two neighbours.

Both militaries accused each other of firing the first shots after weeks of simmering tensions.In a letter to the United Nations Security Council, Cambodian PM Hun Manet requested an urgent meeting of the council and accused Thai troops of launching “unprovoked, premeditated and deliberate attacks” along the border areas of the two countries.

However, Thailand's caretaker Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai said that the country acted in “self-defence to defend its sovereignty” and that operations would continue until the situation at the border had “normalised”.Malaysia's Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, whose country currently chairs ASEAN, called the clashes "concerning" and said he had scheduled calls with both leaders on Thursday evening, with peace being the "only option available".

"They are very close to Malaysia and I've given messages to both PMs. I'm looking forward to speaking to both of them this evening.Here's a recap of how tensions boiled over.At a glanceThailand says it is prepared to intensify self-defence measures if Cambodia persists in its armed attacksThailand has also accused Cambodia’s military of attacks on civilian areas, confirming at least 12 deaths as of Thursday evening

Cambodia slammed what it said was Thai military aggression, with PM Hun Manet requesting that the UN Security Council convene an urgent meeting The public falling-out between former leaders Hun Sen and Thaksin Shinawatra bodes poorly for the escalating border spat, Control Risks’ Harrison Cheng says in a Snap Insight for CNA CNA correspondent Jack Board takes a closer look at the long-standing tensions between Thailand and Cambodia, the key figures involved and how things may play out in his explainer

Not just meek...': Analyst slams India's response to China building 'world's largest' hydroelectric dam on Brahmaputra river


Strategic affairs analyst Brahma Chellaney on Thursday said that India's silence on Beijing's admission that it is building the world's largest hydropower dam on the Brahmaputra River is "not just meek". China has begun the construction of the world's largest hydropower dam on the Brahmaputra River, known locally as the Yarlung Zangbo.

Chellaney further said that the dam would enable China to control the water flow of the river, which is northeast India's lifeline. He explained that not only this, Beijing could also weaponise water as a tool to exert pressure and inflict massive ecological damage during a conflict.He said that had the roles been reversed, China would have mounted a relentless offensive to shame and isolate India "for undertaking a project of such colossal scale and potentially ruinous environmental impact on downstream regions."

Meanwhile, India is monitoring China's dam construction on the Brahmaputra River, with Arunachal Pradesh Chief Minister Pema Khandu describing it as a "water bomb" and a threat to the state's livelihoods.India is pursuing the Upper Siang Multipurpose Project in Arunachal Pradesh to mitigate potential impacts, the progress on which has been snail-paced due to local opposition.

The project, which commenced on July 19, 2025, aims to accelerate clean energy development and mitigate climate change impacts, according to the Chinese Foreign Ministry. "To build the hydropower project in the lower reaches of the Yarlung Zangbo River (Chinese name for Brahmaputra) is fully within China’s sovereignty," stated the ministry.

The $167 billion initiative has raised significant environmental and geopolitical concerns, especially in neighbouring India and Bangladesh, due to its strategic location near the Indian border. The project is intended to improve local lives and provide disaster prevention benefits without harming downstream regions.

"The project, once completed, will help prevent and mitigate disasters along the entire Yarlung Zangbo River, and will not adversely affect downstream regions," the ministry assured.China has emphasised its commitment to responsible river management, citing its experience in hydropower projects. However, there is no existing water-sharing treaty between India and China, which amplifies the concerns over potential water control during political tensions.

Whole-of-Society Resilience


In late October 2024, just a week after China staged military drills simulating blockades and port attacks around Taiwan, the self-governed island revealed its emergency food plans. In a legislative report, the Agriculture Ministry said rice stocks were sufficient to support the 23.4 million residents for at least seven months, the Reuters news agency reported.

In the event of a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) blockade, Taipei also plans to establish supply stations for rationing; dedicate more land for growing rice; prioritize growing sweet potatoes, soybeans and vegetables; ensure a sufficient feed supply for fish; and use more ponds for aquaculture.

Two months after the drills, Taiwan ratcheted up its defense planning. It conducted its inaugural simulated exercise to test the readiness of government agencies and civil groups in the event of a CCP military escalation, according to Taiwan’s presidential office. The exercise and the emergency food plans are part of Taiwan’s burgeoning defense strategy known as whole-of-society resilience. It puts a premium on government and private sector cooperation to respond to military actions and natural disasters, as well as to counteract information manipulation by foreign actors, cybersecurity vulnerabilities and other threats.

Taiwan President Lai Ching-te announced the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee in June 2024 and presided over its initial meetings in September and December 2024. “To address threats, whether natural disasters or ambitions for authoritarian expansion, we believe that as long as the government and all of society are prepared, we can respond,” he said during the December meeting. “With determination, there is no need to worry. With confidence, our people can rest assured. This is the goal of whole-of-society defense resilience.”

Taiwan’s Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee, which includes representatives from government, industry, civil society and academia, meets in September 2024. Office of President of Taiwan

Asian Powers Set Their Strategic Sights on Europe

C. Raja Mohan

What has often been circumscribed as “the rise of the rest”—the relative ascendancy of the non-Western powers—has been felt particularly acutely in Asia. When the Portuguese navigator Vasco da Gama reached India’s southwestern Kerala coast in 1498, it marked the start of 500 years of European (and later U.S.) dominance over Asia—colonial, imperial, and geopolitical. Decolonization from the middle of the 20th century onward did not much alter Western dominance, nor did it end Asia’s deference to Europe.

Until now, that is. The rapid growth of Asian economies and the redistribution of global power in favor of the East heralds a new era in the relationship between Europe and Asia. What began as a shift in economic power is now extending to the geopolitical, military, and technological realms.This article is free to read for a limited time. It’s one of a selection of FP’s recent favorites—scroll down to read more.

Europe has already become a military theater for Asian actors. Large-scale deliveries of drones, ammunition, and weapons components from Iran, North Korea, and China are helping Russia fight Ukrainian forces and rain death on civilians in Ukrainian cities. Iranian military advisors have been reported on the ground in occupied Ukraine, although the Iranian government denies their presence there. Beijing, too, is a major supporter of Moscow’s war effort—economically, but also through the delivery of weapons components, even if Beijing has been careful so far in order to avoid Western sanctions.

And just last week, Chinese soldiers arrived in western Belarus, only a few miles from the border of Poland—a NATO member state—for 11 days of joint military exercises dubbed Eagle Assault 2024. China and Russia held their own first joint naval exercises in the Mediterranean Sea last year; joint drills between the two have been taking place in the Baltic Sea since 2017. Slowly but surely, Beijing is making it clear that it has military ambitions in Europe.



Can Europe Break Free From China’s Rare-Earth Grip?

Christina Lu

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen looks on during a press conference at the end of a European Council summit at the EU headquarters in Brussels on April 18, 2024.European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen looks on during a press conference at the end of a European Council summit at the EU headquarters in Brussels on April 18, 2024.

Washington and Beijing’s bitter trade spat over rare earths—the powerful elements that are crucial to defense and other advanced technologies—has left vulnerable European leaders worried that they could be next.

Decades of Chinese government investment in the country’s domestic industry have allowed China to command the global supply chains for rare earths, with Beijing establishing a chokehold over 85 percent of processing and more than 90 percent of magnet production. When U.S. President Donald Trump launched his trade war in April, China fired back by leveraging that dominance and restricting rare-earth exports—delivering a sharp warning not only to the White House but to all of Beijing’s trade partners.


The Great Dismantling

Suzanne Nossel

Shadows of columns and people are seen in front of a large historic painting of George Washington standing before Congress. The columns obscure much of the foreground, revealing only small fragments of the painting.People walk through the rotunda of the U.S. Capitol in Washington on Feb. 24. Kent Nishimura/Getty Images

The foreign-policy experts and practitioners who have devoted their careers to liberal causes have had a rough six months. Since U.S. President Donald Trump reentered office, he has upended their life’s work.

The headlines covering his overhaul of the federal government have largely focused on a few earthquakes, such as the demise of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the dismantling of State Department bureaus dealing with human rights and refugees. But Trump’s cuts have also battered scores of civil society organizations and policy centers that received funding from the U.S. government.

Suzanne Nossel is a former U.S. government official and former CEO of PEN America. She is the author of Dare to Speak: Defending Free Speech for All. X: @SuzanneNossel


Inside the minds of the cyber attackers - opinion


As Israel fended off physical attacks from the air, it also grappled with a surge in silent, sophisticated cyber warfare.Since the launch of Operation Rising Lion on June 13, cyberattacks against Israeli entities have surged by more than 700%.The targets? Not just defense systems or infrastructure, but civilians and financial institutions at the heart of the economy.

One particularly widespread campaign came disguised as an act of aid. Thousands of Israelis received a message claiming to be from the Finance Ministry, offering wartime grants to households.The form looked official: clean branding, bureaucratic language, a tone of reassurance. But behind the scenes, it was a data trap.Cyber Attack (credit: INGIMAGE)Victims were asked to submit sensitive personal information: ID numbers, home addresses, number of family members, and bank account details.“It looked completely legitimate,” one recipient said. “I only realized I had handed over everything to attackers after it was too late.”

This is the essence of wartime social engineering, exploiting panic, urgency, and confusion to trick people into giving attackers exactly what they need.These attacks are not only aimed at the public. They have penetrated deep into Israel’s financial sector, where remote work and digital collaboration have become the norm.From phishing emails that mimic IT departments to fake Zoom invites and Slack messages urging urgent action, attackers are targeting the internal systems companies rely on most, especially when they are stretched thin during conflict.In a world where physical borders are fading, the battlefield has moved to the screen. Israel, widely regarded as a global cyber power, is not only a defender; it’s also a high-value target. What drives the attackers? How do they view their operations? And why is Israel such a coveted target?

An expert’s point of view on a current event.

Bhaskar Chakravorti

U.S. President Donald Trump, accompanied by White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt, speaks with members of the media before boarding Marine One on the south lawn of the White House in Washington on July 15.U.S. President Donald Trump, accompanied by White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt, speaks with members of the media before boarding Marine One on the south lawn of the White House in Washington on July 15. Mehmet Eser/Middle East 

Donald Trump “really gets it.” This is according to no less an authority than Sam Altman, OpenAI’s CEO, who was commenting on the U.S. president’s understanding of AI and ways to maximize its potential.Surely, the fact that Trump blocked time on his very first full day in office to line Altman up along with other tech luminaries in the White House’s Roosevelt Room to announce a half-a-trillion-dollar AI infrastructure project tells us that Trump gets AI’s national significance.

Bhaskar Chakravorti is the dean of global business at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is the founding executive director of Fletcher’s Institute for Business in the Global Context, where he established and chairs the Digital Planet research program. His next book Defeating Disinformation (co-edited with Joel Trachtman) will be published by Cambridge University Press in January 2025.

Trump Dredges Up the Russian Oil Fight

Rishi Iyengar

Russian President Vladimir Putin greets Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during a welcoming ceremony for participants of the BRICS summit in Kazan.Russian President Vladimir Putin greets Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during a welcoming ceremony for participants of the BRICS summit in Kazan on Oct. 22, 2024. Maxim Shemetov/AFP

India thought it had found clear waters. Initial U.S. and European hand-wringing over New Delhi’s continued purchases of Russian oil despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine gave way to a grudging but quiet acceptance of geopolitical realities.But that was then, 

and this is now. That was under former U.S. President Joe Biden, who saw building ties with India as more important than cutting off a major lifeline for Russia’s economy. This is President Donald Trump, who has gone from admiration to exasperation with Russian President Vladimir Putin, is willing to use trade as a weapon against pretty much anyone, and most importantly, has a complete disregard for norms and precedent—recent or otherwise.


The Great Dismantling

Suzanne Nossel

The foreign-policy experts and practitioners who have devoted their careers to liberal causes have had a rough six months. Since U.S. President Donald Trump reentered office, he has upended their life’s work.

The headlines covering his overhaul of the federal government have largely focused on a few earthquakes, such as the demise of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the dismantling of State Department bureaus dealing with human rights and refugees. But Trump’s cuts have also battered scores of civil society organizations and policy centers that received funding from the U.S. government.

I Covered the Epstein Case for Decades. These Are 9 Questions We Actually Need Answered.

Barry Levine

This article has been updated to include new information about President Trump’s knowledge of whether his name appeared in the F.B.I.’s files on Jeffrey Epstein.President Trump and members of his administration teased us with the prospect of making public Jeffrey Epstein’s F.B.I. files. Instead, we got zilch.

Mr. Trump then ordered the Department of Justice to seek the release of some grand jury testimony — a request that a federal judge in Florida denied on Wednesday. But even that information, though it might have filled in some gaps in the Epstein story, would have been only a sliver of what’s in the F.B.I. files — which include a mind-boggling “300 gigabytes of data and physical evidence,” according to the Department of Justice and the F.B.I.

The American people — and above all, the victims of Mr. Epstein’s crimes — deserve answers to outstanding questions about how he operated, with whose help and in whose service. With the exception of redactions required to protect the innocent and materials that must be withheld while under court seal, the complete F.B.I. files should be released.

Here are nine unanswered questions about the Epstein case — ones that a curious, non-conspiracy-minded citizen might have — that the files might help answer:
No. 1: How did Mr. Epstein make his money, and how did he finance his sex trafficking over two decades?

At the time of Mr. Epstein’s death in 2019, his estate was worth an estimated $600 million. He worked briefly on Wall Street and built his wealth with the help of several billionaires, including the L Brands founder Leslie Wexner and the Apollo Global Management co-founder Leon Black, for whom Mr. Epstein provided consulting, tax advice and other financial services. But it’s still not clear how Mr. Epstein amassed such a large fortune — or how he was able to fund such a complex trafficking scheme.

Gaza is starving and outrage is spreading. Will Netanyahu listen?

Paula Hancocks

Sham Qadeh, a 22-month-old Palestinian girl suffering from severe malnutrition and an enlarged liver, is pictured with her mom in a makeshift tent on June 28 in Khan Younis, Gaza. Doaa Albaz/Anadolu/Getty ImagesThe images of skeletal children that are now pouring out of Gaza are shocking but they should not be surprising. Humanitarian groups with decades of experience distributing aid in the Strip have been warning about this scenario for months, since Israel began throttling aid to a trickle.

Haunting footage of lifeless bodies with sharp bones protruding through stretched skin can be seen around the world. The pictures of starvation in Gaza are horrific, distressing and inescapable.The main United Nations agency for Palestinians said Thursday that “people are being starved, while a few kilometers away supermarkets are loaded with food,” highlighting the stark and uncomfortable reality between life in Israel and survival in Gaza.

On a popular US-Canadian podcast this week, listeners learned that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu prefers Burger King to McDonalds, a ‘Whopper’ seeming to be his burger of choice. While Netanyahu did not introduce the topic, the public discussion on fast food by the man responsible for getting food into Gaza is, at its most generous, tone deaf.The US correspondent for Israeli newspaper Haaretz noted that Netanyahu “spent valuable time” on the burger chat “rather than answering legitimate questions about the Gaza humanitarian crisis or the delays in sealing a hostage deal and cease-fire.”

World leaders see the same pictures of starvation as everyone else and yet seem powerless to stop them, unable to pressure Israel into allowing more aid in or returning to the tried and tested UN-led distribution methods.Seela Barbakh, an 11-month-old Palestinian girl who is malnourished according to medics, is held by her mother Najah at Nasser Hospital in Khan Younis, Gaza on Wednesday. Ramadan Abed/Reuters

Russia Is Losing Its Near Abroad


Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine is one piece of a broader campaign to restore a sphere of influence in post-Soviet Eurasia. The 2022 invasion came as a shock to many of Russia’s neighbors in eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, confirming their fears that Russia remained a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their countries. Yet because the war in Ukraine has been a massive drain on Russian attention and resources, it has also presented many of these countries with an opportunity. Taking advantage of Moscow’s distraction, they have enhanced their cooperation with one another, cultivated and deepened partnerships outside the region, and loosened some of the bonds tying them to their former imperial hegemon.

Although many governments in the Eurasian interior have been cautious about criticizing the Russian invasion, they are creating facts on the ground that reinforce their sovereignty and independence—a key objective of U.S. policy in the region since the 1990s. As the Russian military’s demand for weapons has left Moscow unable to fulfill promised exports, countries such as Armenia are turning to other suppliers in Europe and India; other regional states are purchasing weapons from Turkey and even China. 

And as Russia has withdrawn forces and equipment from its military bases in the Caucasus and Central Asia to redeploy them to Ukraine, countries in both places are resolving conflicts that Russia has long exploited for its own benefit. Improved cooperation within the wider region is also creating new opportunities to enhance trade connectivity and build alternatives to transit through Russia. By reducing the dependency that once defined their relationship with their former hegemon, countries in the region have become increasingly capable of engaging Russia (and other powers) on favorable terms.

And yet if history is any guide, Moscow could go to extreme lengths to preserve its regional dominion. In 2014, before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia annexed Crimea and intervened in the Donbas region; earlier, in 2008, it invaded Georgia. Today, the Kremlin maintains a proprietary view of not only Ukraine but also many other countries. Ukraine and Belarus remain Moscow’s top priorities, but the Kremlin also aspires to a kind of suzerainty over Armenia, Azerbaijan.

Iran’s Nuclear Program Has Survived

Michael Young

Diwan, a blog from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East Program and the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, draws on Carnegie scholars to provide insight into and analysis of the region. Learn More Rosemary Kelanic is director of the Middle East Program at Defense Priorities, a think tank that promotes a foreign policy prioritizing restraint, diplomacy, and free trade to ensure U.S. security. Kelanic publishes widely on energy security, 

great power politics, and U.S. grand strategy in the Middle East. She is the author of Black Gold and Blackmail: Oil and Great Power Politics (Cornell University Press, 2020), and has co-edited, with Charles L. Glaser, Crude Strategy: Rethinking the U.S. Military Commitment to Defend Persian Gulf Oil (Georgetown University Press, 2016). Diwan interviewed Kelanic earlier this week to discuss her publicly expressed scepticism that the recent U.S. attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities did the damage that President Donald Trump and officials in his administration have claimed they did.

Michael Young: You have just been cited in a New York Times article suggesting that the U.S. bombing of nuclear facilities in Iran last month was more successful than initially believed. In your remarks, however, you sounded a cautionary note about this assessment. Can I ask you to explain your reasoning?Rosemary Kelanic: The assessments focus on the three big sites that the United States hit: Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. And while those sites are important, they are not the be-all and end-all of Iran’s nuclear program.

 Iran has been enriching uranium for over 20 years, and its capabilities are entirely indigenous, meaning that it manufactures its own centrifuges and other critical equipment. It has produced an entire generation of nuclear scientists and technicians, numbering in the thousands, that understands the technology and can rebuild what was damaged. The Iranian nuclear complex is sprawling and includes many additional sites beyond Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan that were not hit by airstrikes. Focusing too much on the fate of the big three risks being unable to distinguish the forest from the trees. And the forest is this: Iran has the knowledge to rebuild what was destroyed, probably within months.


Netanyahu’s Hold on Power Is Slipping. Will Trump Help?

Aaron David Miller

Buckle your seat belts for the wild ride that Israelis, along with the Trump administration, are about to experience between now and year’s end as the prime minister, a man whose almost every move is tethered to his determination to remain in power, plans and plots his reelection bid, most likely for early 2026. As former U.S. House Speaker Tip O’Neill famously said, “All politics is local”—a truth that holds in Israel as well. Just look at the issue of ultra-Orthodox conscription, which has rocked Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition of late.

But one element of Netanyahu’s bid for reelection isn’t local: Donald Trump. Indeed, the U.S. president may not be the only factor shaping Netanyahu’s political future, but he certainly is an important one. That gives Trump, whose relationship with Netanyahu has been rocky at times, significant leverage. He can either help or hurt Netanyahu’s bid to extend his domination of Israel’s political scene. So, how will Trump play his part, and will he continue his propensity to be more supportive of Netanyahu than not?

Aaron David Miller is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former U.S. State Department Middle East analyst and negotiator in Republican and Democratic administrations. He is the author of The End of Greatness: Why America Can’t Have (and Doesn’t Want) Another Great President. X: @aarondmiller2


The Nvidia Chip Deal Trades Away the United States’ AI Advantage

Sam Winter-Levy

Last week, U.S. chip designer Nvidia announced that it would resume sales of one of its best-selling artificial intelligence chips to China after obtaining the go-ahead from the U.S. government. In April, the Trump administration had blocked exports of the chip, known as the H20, but after months of lobbying from Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, it has reportedly agreed to lift the ban. Some Trump officials have described the move as a part of the recent trade truce between the United States and China, through which China agreed to resume exports of rare-earth minerals. Beijing has described it as a unilateral concession by Washington.

Whatever the true sequence of events, the move has huge implications for both the future of the Chinese artificial intelligence (AI) industry and the Trump administration’s ability to control advanced technology sales to China in the future. Right as powerful AI reasoning systems are emerging, the administration has chosen to allow companies to sell China the AI chips suited to running them. And by linking, at least rhetorically, chip sales to the trade talks—talks in which the United States has shown a striking desperation to reach a deal—U.S. officials have revealed to their Chinese counterparts that national security policies that were once off the table are now up for negotiation. In doing so, they may have hamstrung their ability to impose new chip export controls without reigniting a losing trade war.

Reinventing European Diplomacy

Pierre Vimont


Following recent Western allies’ summits—G7 and NATO in particular—European participants have come under fire from their constituents for meekly pandering to U.S. President Donald Trump. And current trade negotiations, with the EU’s repeated failure to impose an economic cost on the United States, despite its trade heft, have only fed the narrative.

In response to these critics, European leaders have stressed their sense of responsibility. The burden-shifting inside NATO in favor of an enhanced European defense cannot be done overnight. It must rely for the time being on an enduring, if gradually reduced, U.S. military presence in Europe. It is this dependence that pushes many European leaders to appease Trump. As for trade, European leaders seem to still be hoping they can avoid a full-fledged confrontation, even though Trump could not be clearer that asymmetrical tariffs are the new norm.

But European leaders are playing for time, because the twenty-seven EU member states do not share a common assessment of the extent and depth of change happening in the United States. They also lack a strategic vision for the new role the EU and their countries need to play in the post–World War II order. But in opting for a wait-and-see approach, they risk programming their own geopolitical obsolescence.

Even though Trump’s foreign policy has been less isolationist than expected, it has been frenetic and often half-baked. The U.S. moves on Ukraine, Israel, and Iran, in Europe’s most critical surroundings, have dire consequences for Europeans unless they snap out of their effacement and establish themselves as power brokers. Trump’s equivocating on Ukraine and his participation in the Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities have worsened these already fraught situations, with Europeans vastly exposed to their indirect effects.

Making America Alone Again


Henry Kissinger once compared himself to the lone cowboy who rode into town to sort out the bad guys. But the U.S. secretary of state, who also served as national security adviser, knew different when it came to dealing with major powers. His hero was the Austrian statesman Klemens von Metternich, who somehow brought together the unlikely combination of Austria, the United Kingdom, Prussia, Russia, and a number of even smaller allies and their incompatible leaders into the alliance that finally defeated Napoleon in 1815. As Kissinger understood, even lone rangers need friends.

It is an insight that appears to be lost on U.S. President Donald Trump. Since returning to office in January, Trump has called the United States’ closest allies cheaters and freeloaders. Japan and other Asian trading partners, he insists, are “very spoiled”; immediate North American neighbors stand accused of exporting drugs and criminals. He freely and publicly labels the leaders of some of the United States’ most important democratic partners as has-beens, weak, or dishonest, 

while heaping praise on autocrats he finds easier to deal with, such as Hungarian President Viktor Orban (“a very great leader”), Salvadoran strongman Nayib Bukele (“a great friend”), North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un (“a smart guy”), and—at least until very recently—Russian President Vladimir Putin, whom he has called “a genius” and “very savvy” in attacking Ukraine. In what would have been unthinkable in previous administrations, including Trump’s first, the United States in February even sided against its own democratic allies and with Russia and other authoritarian states, such as North Korea and Belarus, in voting against a UN resolution that condemned Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and upheld the latter’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Perhaps most baffling, at a time when Washington is trying to contain China and shore up U.S. defenses in the Indo-Pacific, the administration is preparing punitive tariffs on South Korea and Japan, the United States’ closest Asian allies, as well as on a sweeping list of European partners it is trying to keep away from Beijing. U.S. allies around the world are also rattled by the public musings of Trump and members of his cabinet that the so-called nuclear umbrella under which the American nuclear deterrent was a guarantee for their defense is no longer a sure thing. 

Heeding the Risks of Geopolitical Instability in a Race to Artificial General Intelligence


As artificial intelligence (AI) rapidly advances, many AI experts predict that the first state to develop artificial general intelligence (AGI) that can perform a wide range of tasks better than humans will gain huge advantages in military and economic power. If U.S. and Chinese leaders believe that losing the race to AGI would pose a dire threat to their nations, how will they respond if their strategic competitor appears poised to win it? Or, how will they respond if their state successfully develops AGI and then faces challenges to its newly achieved technological dominance?

The author of this paper presents a typology of potential strategic responses, focusing on preventive actions that states might take to undermine an opponent's AI development efforts, and draws on the history of geopolitical power shifts and nuclear proliferation to identify key factors that are likely to affect whether national leaders will decide to launch preventive attacks against rival AI programs. 

Uncertainties about the potential characteristics and implications of AGI might make pressures for preventive action especially powerful but might also discourage leaders from taking great risks when the magnitude and proximity of the danger are unclear. This analysis suggests that strategists and decisionmakers should seriously consider how incentives for preventive action might make the period of transition before and after the emergence of AGI geopolitically fraught. The assessments presented in this paper can provide a starting point for making policy choices to manage the resulting risks of international instability.

One in five children in Gaza City is malnourished, UN aid agency says


One in five children in Gaza City is malnourished and cases are increasing every day, the UN's Palestinian refugee agency (Unrwa) says.In a statement issued on Thursday, Unrwa Commissioner-General Philippe Lazzarini cited a colleague telling him: "People in Gaza are neither dead nor alive, they are walking corpses."More than 100 international aid organisations and human rights groups have also warned of mass starvation - pressing for governments to take action.

Israel, which controls the entry of all supplies into Gaza, says there is no siege and blames Hamas for any cases of malnutrition.The UN, however, has warned that the level of aid getting into Gaza is "a trickle" and the hunger crisis in the territory "has never been so dire".In his statement on Thursday, Lazzarini said "more than 100 people, the vast majority of them children, have reportedly died of hunger".

"Most children our teams are seeing are emaciated, weak and at high risk of dying if they don't get the treatment they urgently need," he said, pleading for Israel to "allow humanitarian partners to bring unrestricted and uninterrupted humanitarian assistance to Gaza".Unrwa workers are "increasingly fainting from hunger while at work", according to Lazzarini, who added: "When caretakers cannot find enough to eat, the entire humanitarian system is collapsing".

On Wednesday, the World Health Organisation (WHO) said a large proportion of the population of Gaza was "starving"."I don't know what you would call it other than mass starvation - and it's man-made," the head of the WHO, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, said.Listen: The story behind the harrowing photograph of a starving Gaza babyIn northern Gaza, Hanaa Almadhoun, 40, said local markets are often without food and other supplies.

Trump Makes Some Apparent Trade Deals in Asia, but Could be Poisoning the Waters Long Term

Joshua Kurlantzick,  Annabel Richter,

Amidst electoral turmoil in Japan and an upcoming summit between top leaders from the EU and China, President Donald Trump has announced what appears to be the settlement of trade deals with three Asian partners, though there has been little follow-up formalizing some agreements. Months of negotiations seem to have finally paid off this week, helping the United States ahead of a supposed August 1 deadline for new country-specific tariffs to take effect. But despite Trump’s proclamation of his role in securing “the largest trade deal in history” with Tokyo, the needle may not have moved much when it comes to swaying Southeast Asia to make deals that also include their commitments to remove China from their supply chains and transshipments, and ultimately isolate Beijing economically.

On Tuesday, July 22, President Trump shared a post on his Truth Social account declaring that Japan had agreed that exports to the U.S. would face tariffs of 15 percent, a figure which Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru confirmed to members of the press on Wednesday morning in Tokyo.

Additionally, in a development that shocked most analysts of both countries’ business communities, the agreement stipulates that Japan will create a $550 billion fund that would fall under the discretionary direction of President Trump, with 90 percent of the profits from the fund’s investments returned to the United States. U.S. officials have described its intended use to revitalize specific industrial sectors, including energy infrastructure, pharmaceuticals, and minerals processing, but neither Tokyo nor Washington has issued any comments articulating how it would really work. And with the ruling Japanese LDP losing voters to conservative/nationalist parties, the idea of Japan giving in so much could prove politically untenable in Tokyo.

Meanwhile, Indonesia has apparently signed a deal with the United States—again, formal signing and details agreed by both countries remain sketchy—that creates a tariff rate of 19 percent with commitments to roll back a number of significant non-tariff barriers in a move that defies its traditionally protectionist approach. According to a joint statement released on Tuesday that clarified the terms of the deal initially announced on July 15, Jakarta will essentially eliminate tariffs on American goods despite still facing U.S. tariffs on its exports, invest in $15 billion worth of American energy exports and $4.5 billion of agricultural products, and remove key export restrictions on industrial commodities and critical minerals purchased by the United States.

Safeguarding Critical Infrastructure: Key Challenges in Global Cybersecurity

Nidhi Singh

Cyberattacks against critical infrastructure (CI) have evolved from isolated incidents to coordinated campaigns by both state and non-state actors. Cyber threats have become increasingly sophisticated and frequent, particularly those that leverage artificial intelligence (AI). Technologists have noted that AI-powered cyberattacks can bypass traditional defenses, with recent breakout times as short as fifty-one seconds, illustrating the rapid evolution of these threats.[1] These advancements are further exacerbated by China’s increasing offensive cyber capabilities that pose rising threats to CIs, thereby shrinking response windows and making real-time defense capabilities essential.

A closed-door discussion titled “Safeguarding Cybersecurity of Critical Infrastructure” was organized at the Global Technology Summit 2025, co-hosted by Carnegie India and the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. The event brought together cybersecurity experts from Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, and France, along with industry leaders, legal experts, academics, and senior Indian policymakers. The discussion aimed to identify vulnerabilities in CI protection, discuss ways to enhance national cybersecurity resilience through international cooperation for incident response, and deliberate coordination required between government, the private sector, and international partners for protecting CI. Based on the discussion, this essay outlines four key challenges: varying definitions of CI across countries, gaps in international cooperation for norm enforcement, difficulties in public-private information sharing, and vulnerabilities in the hardware supply chain.

Inconsistencies in the definition of CI across countries persist because each nation prioritizes and protects different sectors based on its own frameworks and threat perceptions. This creates challenges for a coordinated crisis response, as illustrated during the 2017 NotPetya attack. When the attack stopped container transport at Rotterdam’s port, city authorities struggled to respond effectively because Maersk’s APM Terminals, despite being vital to port operations, was not classified as CI. This definitional gap prevented national support mobilization and delayed crisis coordination. While this example illustrates challenges for national responses, it poses an even greater challenge at the international level, where varying definitions of CI could hinder aligned threat assessment, mutual aid, and collective response efforts.

America Should Assume the Worst About AI


National security leaders rarely get to choose what to care about and how much to care about it. They are more often subjects of circumstances beyond their control. The September 11 attacks reversed the George W. Bush administration’s plan to reduce the United States’ global commitments and responsibilities. Revolutions across the Arab world pushed President Barack Obama back into the Middle East just as he was trying to pull the United States out. And Russia’s invasion of Ukraine upended the Biden administration’s goal of establishing “stable and predictable” relations with Moscow so that it could focus on strategic competition with China.

Policymakers could foresee many of the underlying forces and trends driving these agenda-shaping events. Yet for the most part, they failed to plan for the most challenging manifestations of where these forces would lead. They had to scramble to reconceptualize and recalibrate their strategies to respond to unfolding events.

The rapid advance of artificial intelligence—and the possible emergence of artificial general intelligence—promises to present policymakers with even greater disruption. Indicators of a coming powerful change are everywhere. Beijing and Washington have made global AI leadership a strategic imperative, and leading U.S. and Chinese companies are racing to achieve AGI. News coverage features near-daily announcements of technical breakthroughs, discussions of AI-driven job loss, and fears of catastrophic global risks such as the AI-enabled engineering of a deadly pandemic.

There is no way of knowing with certainty the exact trajectory along which AI will develop or precisely how it will transform national security. Policymakers should therefore assess and debate the merits of competing AI strategies with humility and caution. Whether one is bullish or bearish about AI’s prospects, though, national security leaders need to be ready to adapt their strategic plans to respond to events that could impose themselves on decision-makers this decade, if not during this presidential term. Washington must prepare for potential policy tradeoffs and geopolitical shifts, and identify practical steps it can take today to mitigate risks and turbocharge U.S. competitiveness. Some ideas and initiatives that today may seem infeasible or unnecessary will seem urgent and self-evident with the benefit of hindsight.