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29 July 2025

India Closes Landmark Trade Pact With UK

Elizabeth Roche

India and the United Kingdom signed a landmark trade pact, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit on July 23-24. The pact opens a new chapter in bilateral economic relations against the backdrop of rising geopolitical uncertainty and economic flux stemming from the U.S. announcement of unilateral tariffs.The agreement, which contains almost 30 chapters, has been described as “forward-looking” and the “largest” India has negotiated in terms of complexity and depth. It covers trade in goods and services, telecommunications, digital trade, financial and professional services, labor mobility, environment, and social issues like labor rights and development cooperation, as well as support for small and medium enterprises.

Hailing the agreement as a “blueprint for shared prosperity,” Modi said that it would reduce the “cost of doing business” and enhance “confidence of doing business” between the two economies, even as it strengthens the global economy.U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer described the CETA as “historic” and pointed out that it would “boost wages and living standards” in the two countries. “It will bring down the prices of Indian clothes, shoes, foods for British citizens,” he said.

The agreement with the U.K., the world’s sixth-largest economy, is particularly significant for India as its pacts with two other major developed economies, the U.S. and the European Union (EU), are still under negotiation. The CETA could therefore serve as the template in these negotiations.In addition, India’s deal with the U.K. would help undercut arguments that paint India — the world’s fourth largest economy — as isolationist or obstructive when it comes to trade matters. U.S. President Donald Trump has frequently called India a “tariff king” – a scathing commentary on what he views as India’s high tariffs protecting its domestic markets and industries.

Days after the CETA was signed, Indian Commerce Secretary Sunil Barthwal pointedly said that India was capable of facing competition and was not a “tariff king,” with average tariffs for the U.K. set to drop to 3 percent from the current 15 percent.With India’s economic profile rising, the Indian government would like to be seen as trade-friendly, welcoming of investors, and an easier place to do business. India’s budget 2025-26 contained a slew of measures, including the setting up of a new committee to review regulatory reforms in the non-financial sector with the aim of strengthening trust-based economic governance to improve ease of doing business.

Discussions for a pact between India and the EU began in 2007. But they floundered in 2013, and it was only in 2022 that negotiations were resumed.

Meanwhile, India began trade discussions with the U.S. during Trump’s first term in office (2017-2021). Talks resumed after Trump returned to the White House in January 2025.

India’s trade with the U.S. in 2024 totaled almost $130 billion; trade with the EU was $155 billion (132 billion euros) during the same period. With the U.K., India’s bilateral trade is about $56 billion, with both countries pledging to double this number by 2030.

With the deal with the U.K. in the bag, India now has 16 trade agreements in place, including those with Australia and the United Arab Emirates.

A closer look at the CETA reveals that India has managed to protect its interests while exhibiting flexibility to accommodate demands from the U.K. An Indian government statement said that the CETA provides for the elimination of almost 99 percent of tariff lines, accounting for almost the entire value of Indian exports to the U.K. It will significantly enhance market access and boost the competitiveness of Indian textiles, marine products, leather, footwear, sports goods, toys, gems and jewelry, besides fast-growing sectors like engineering goods, auto components, and organic chemicals. Most of these sectors are labor-intensive, employing millions of workers.

By securing zero duties in these areas, India has ensured its exports remain competitive. For instance, in the case of textiles, the CETA guarantees that Indian exports retain their advantage vis-à-vis those from other textile-exporting nations like Bangladesh or Vietnam.

Analysts have pointed out that finding an alternative market for Indian marine products, including shrimps, in the U.K. through the CETA means that India is ringfencing this sector from future economic and political shocks that could come its way from markets like China. Given India’s mostly tense ties with Beijing, finding alternative markets is an imperative that the CETA addresses. Dairy products and edible oils have been kept out of the ambit of the pact, while almost all of Indian agricultural products and processed food items will now have zero import duties when entering the U.K. market. This protects India’s sensitive farm sector — agriculture and allied activities that contribute to 16 percent of India’s GDP and support 46 percent of the population, according to Indian Finance Ministry data.

A second key feature of the CETA is that India has agreed to loosen controls that will allow U.K. firms into its previously closely guarded government procurement market. British companies will be free to bid for 40,000 Indian government contracts worth about $40 billion, provided the firms fulfil a 20 percent local content sourcing criterion. This move aligns India with global norms on public procurement. However, certain sectors like defense and agriculture remain outside the ambit of the CETA.

India has also committed to greater transparency by agreeing to publish information related to procurement on government portals. Some strategic sectors, like defense, are out of the purview of this, but still, the move is seen as a significant gesture toward the United Kingdom.

The CETA does not exempt India from the U.K.’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which aims to tax carbon-intensive products. This could affect India’s exports of iron, steel and fertilizers. India has said it would retaliate should the U.K. impose this measure from early 2027.

The pact also provides for increased mobility of Indian professionals by simplifying access requirements and allowing easier movement of contractual service providers, business visitors and independent professionals.

A separate Double Contributions Convention that was signed alongside the CETA will eliminate the need for Indians in the U.K. to pay social security contributions in both countries, simultaneously, for a period of three years. This is expected to benefit some 75,000 Indians working in the U.K.

Analysts Nisha Taneja and Nirlipta Rath of the New Delhi-based Indian Council for Research on International Economic Research have said that CETA sets “a progressive benchmark for the country’s future trade negotiations.”

According to Bidisha Bhattacharya, a senior research consultant at the Chintan Research Foundation, the signing of the CETA is “not a retreat from protectionism but a recalibration of India’s trade strategy.” It involved using strategies like phased liberalization, minimum pricing thresholds, and value addition rules. By doing so, “India is carefully walking the line between global integration and domestic resilience,” Bhattacharya wrote in a recent article. This was not India embracing multilateralism offered on unfavorable terms but India seeking bilateral agreements with high-income economies that offered reciprocal access, she pointed out.

With the World Trade Organization looking increasingly irrelevant and dysfunctional, it’s natural for countries to look for bilateral or regional arrangements that secure their access to key global markets. Though it is a late entrant, India seems to be learning to play the game, albeit slowly.Authors
Contributing Author
Elizabeth Roche


Elizabeth Roche is Associate Professor at the Jindal School of International Affairs, OP Jindal Global University, Haryana, India.View ProfileTagsThe Pulse


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Forecasting the Fifth Wave: Emerging Terrorist Threats in a Changing World

Mahmut Cengiz 

The international defense community consistently struggles to predict the changing landscape of global terrorism. Counterterrorism practitioners have frequently been reactive rather than proactive, while the academic community has faced challenges in developing models that reflect terrorism’s complex and dynamic nature. These deficiencies led to the failure to anticipate and prevent major terrorist incidents such as the September 11 attacks in 2001, the 2002 Bali bombings

the 2015 Paris attacks, and most recently, Hamas’s coordinated attacks on October 7, 2023. This article builds on David Rapoport’s theory of the “four waves” of terrorism to explore a potential “fifth wave.” Analysis of data from the Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center (GTTAC) indicates that the strongest candidates for this fifth wave are the continuation of the religious wave—especially the Salafi-jihadist interpretation, and the activities of Iran-backed terrorist groups.

David Rapoport’s theory of the four waves of modern terrorism presents a typology grounded in political orientation and influenced by the historical, cultural, and ideological conditions of distinct periods characterized by heightened terrorist activity. A “wave” denotes a generational cycle of terrorism unified by a shared ideological drive, with revolutionary change serving as the central objective in each phase. Rapoport identifies four major waves: the Anarchist (1880–1920), Anti-Colonial (1920–1960), New Left (1960–1980), and Religious (1980–ongoing).

The first, the Anarchist Wave began in Russia and is widely recognized as the starting point of modern terrorism. It emerged from deep dissatisfaction with the slow pace of political reform, particularly frustration with entrenched authoritarian systems and the persistence of state power, which anarchists sought to dismantle in favor of stateless, egalitarian alternatives, and was characterized by the tactical use of dynamite and the assassination of high-ranking officials, including heads of state. 

Implications of ISKP’s Declaration of War Against the Baloch Liberation Army

Abdul Basit

On July 20, the Voice of Khorasan, a pro-Taliban and anti-Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) media outlet, claimed that the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) had eliminated the last remaining ISKP fighters in Balochistan’s Mastung district. This was preceded by a 36-minute Pashtu-language video put out by Al Azaim Foundation, the ISKP’s propaganda arm, on May 25, detailing a BLA raid in Mastung that killed 30 ISKP fighters. In the video, ISKP vowed retaliation against the BLA, other Baloch separatist groups, as well as Baloch and Pashtun nationalist groups like the Baloch Yakjehti Council (BYC) and the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM).

Since its return to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban regime has carried out ruthless crackdowns on ISKP both at the operational and ideological levels. It arrested and killed several of ISKP’s top commanders and leaders. Simultaneously, the Taliban launched Al-Mirsad, a multilingual online portal, which provides robust ideological rebuttals of ISKP’s ideological propaganda along with running reports of the Taliban’s crackdown against the ISKP. These developments forced ISKP to relocate its assets and fighters across the border in Pakistan.In Pakistan, ISKP has a strong presence in Bajaur and Mastung districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces, respectively.

It was natural for the terror group to set up its presence in Mastung as claimed in the May 25 video. Balochistan is crucial for ISKP for two reasons. First, Balochistan is home to key anti-Shia and anti-Iran Sunni extremist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jaish al-Adl. In the past, ISKP has leveraged its alliances with these groups to survive and persist.

Second, Balochistan’s strategic location at the confluence of South and Central Asia makes it a key transit and logistical hub for ISKP. In the last couple of years, ISKP has recruited from Central Asia and carried out attacks in Russia, Iran, and Turkiye. The terror group’s network stretches from Turkiye and Iran to Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Russia through Balochistan. Reportedly, ISKP fighters transit through Balochistan to travel between these countries and beyond.

China’s Overlooked AI Strategy


In early 2025, the Chinese company DeepSeek released its R1 artificial intelligence model, sending shock waves throughout policy circles in the United States. Despite U.S. export controls on advanced semiconductors, the company had managed to develop a customizable open technology that could compete with some of the most advanced proprietary American AI models, and many feared that U.S. leadership in AI might soon be eclipsed. Now, another Chinese company, Moonshot AI, has released a state-of-the-art open model, Kimi K2, that is capable of autonomously achieving complex tasks, prompting some commentators to call it another DeepSeek moment.

But the threat posed by Chinese open models is not simply about China catching up to the United States in the AI race. It is also about the broader global adoption of AI. For the month of January 2025, the DeepSeek R1 app had 33 million active users across the world; by April, that number had nearly tripled to 97 million. Moreover, the CEO of the open-model repository Hugging Face noted that over 500 derivative versions of the original R1 model had been downloaded a combined total of 2.5 million times in January. 

In other words, derivative versions of R1, which are customized and tailored specifically from the original model to meet users’ needs, were downloaded five times as often as R1 itself, underscoring the value users saw in R1’s adaptability. Given this extraordinary interest, it has become clear that the low-cost, open-model approach favored by DeepSeek, Moonshot AI, and other Chinese companies could offer China an overwhelming advantage in meeting researcher demand for cutting-edge models, particularly in developing countries that are eager to access AI’s benefits.

The question of which country’s AI models achieve global preeminence has policy implications that extend beyond market competition or military applications. Open models such as R1 and Kimi K2 offer users around the world a chance to develop AI systems that can be customized for local needs, including in areas such as health care, education, and the workforce, at a lower cost than their American counterparts. In this sense, the greatest advantage open models could offer China may be in the realm of soft power. 

Jaishankar’s China Visit: The Paradox Of China-India Relations – Analysis

Institute of South Asian Studies

The first visit by India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar to China after five years signals continued steady improvement in China-India relations after a cautious beginning in October 2024, as Jaishankar himself recognised, and is gaining momentum beyond a mere thaw.

Jaishankar was in China for the foreign ministers’ meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Significantly, Beijing received him with particular care and organised bilateral meetings not only with his counterpart, Wang Yi, but also with Vice President Han Zheng. The visit, one of several in less than two months, indicates that recent tensions over Beijing’s support for Pakistan in its May 2025 conflict with India and over the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation have not derailed the process of thawing relations.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s likely visit to China for a SCO leaders’ summit in August 2025 will be the high point of this process. It will indicate that the initial work of restoring basic normalcy in China-India relations has been completed and the border has sufficiently stabilised. Of course, then the hard work of making substantive progress in relations and de-escalating the border dispute will begin.

Beyond symbolising the thaw in Sino-Indian relations, Jaishankar’s visit demonstrates a paradox. China and India have greater interest and space to cooperate more amid a fast-shifting global environment, but are constantly hampered by contentious bilateral issues.

On one hand, the visit and the thaw behind it have opened space for more global cooperation between New Delhi and Beijing. During his meetings in China, Jaishankar spoke about the “very complex” international situation, while in his official address, he described growing “economic instability” in the world and urged the SCO to “stabilise the global order” and “address longstanding challenges that threaten [their] collective interests”. He also highlighted the rise of multipolarity, which officially both China and India pursue, and the SCO’s key role in advancing it. In short, Jaishankar underscored the need for the two Asian giants to cooperate on a global level in response to the growing global instability.

Pentagon lags behind China in realizing strategies for cognitive warfare, Senate report finds

Bill Gertz

A version of this story appeared in the daily Threat Status newsletter from The Washington Times. Click here to receive Threat Status delivered directly to your inbox each weekday.

The Pentagon lacks “strategic clarity” when it comes to conducting the cognitive warfare that analysts see as necessary for confronting China, according to the Senate Armed Services Committee.The committee’s report on the fiscal 2026 defense authorization bill warns that despite congressional action, the Pentagon and military services remain unclear in defining this new domain of nonkinetic warfare, which is a major focus of China’s People’s Liberation Army.

The panel wants the Pentagon to produce a report for Congress on cognitive warfare.Chinese cognitive warfare involves an array of weaponry ranging from “brain control” arms, to sophisticated information warfare operations. The goal, according to the Pentagon’s annual report on the Chinese military, is to manipulate information to attack an adversary’s decision-making abilities.

“The PLA is exploring a range of ‘neurocognitive warfare’ capabilities that exploit adversaries using neuroscience and psychology,” the latest report said.Examples include plans to use artificial intelligence-powered deepfake videos to mislead and confuse military and political leaders during conflicts, and psychological warfare to demoralize U.S. troops and polarize society.PLA researchers are working on advanced voice synthesis tools that will be used for low-cost, high-impact disinformation campaigns to defeat enemies without conventional conflict.

The committee report said the global security landscape is rapidly evolving with the increasing sophistication of information-centric, strategic threats.China, for example, “is actively engaged in developing what it terms ‘informatized warfare’ and ‘intelligentized warfare,’ with a strong emphasis on cognitive domain operations, involving the integration of information warfare across military and civilian sectors and viewing information as a critical domain for achieving strategic advantage in great power competition,” the report said.

China puts new restrictions on EV battery technology in latest move to consolidate dominance

John Liu

China has put export restrictions on technologies critical for producing electric vehicle batteries, in a move to consolidate its dominance in the sector that has contributed to the country’s lead in the global EV race.

Several technologies used to manufacture EV batteries and process lithium, a critical mineral for batteries, were added to the government’s export control list.Inclusion on the list means transferring the technologies overseas – such as through trade, investment, or technological cooperation – will require a government-issued license, according to a statement by the country’s Commerce Ministry.

The new controls mirror similar restrictions introduced just three months ago on certain rare earth elements and their magnets – critical materials used not only in EV production, but also in consumer electronics and military equipment such as fighter jets. China’s dominance of the rare earths supply chain has emerged as among its most potent tools in a renewed trade war with the United States.

China has emerged as a leading player in the competitive global EV market, thanks in part to its ability to develop high-performance, cost-effective batteries through its comprehensive supply chain, from raw material processing to battery manufacturing.

Huge numbers of car manufacturers around the world use Chinese EV batteries in their vehicles. Chinese EV battery makers accounted for at least 67% of the global market share, according to SNE Research, a market research and consultancy firm.

First proposed in January, the latest licensing requirements have cast uncertainty over Chinese EV makers’ overseas expansion plans, particularly as markets like the European Union have employed tariffs on Chinese car exports to push them to set up shop there. Many Chinese battery makers also have plans to localize production in markets such as Southeast Asia and the US.

Pie in the Sky: The Robotic Loyal Wingman


This is partly because the Navy and the Air Force have failed to invest in the manned combat aircraft that would be necessary to defeat China. Not incorrectly, the two services point to constrained budgets and competing priorities. Nevertheless, the cost of creating the air power necessary to beat China is trivial compared with the impossible-to-imagine cost of losing the war.

Of course, our military leaders do not want to lose to China’s growing and increasingly capable air and naval forces. So, because they have failed to make a compelling case for the funding to create the capabilities to counter China, they have embraced an asymmetric solution: the loyal wingman. Unmanned aircraft—robots—that will fly missions together with manned aircraft. Envisioned as inexpensive force multipliers imbued with advanced AI, these wingmen are intended to perform many of the same missions as manned aircraft, but without carrying any pesky humans and at a fraction of the cost.

The problem is that neither the real world nor physics works that way.Consider that the loyal wingman must be roughly the same size as a manned aircraft if it is to perform the same missions. This is because it will have to carry enough fuel to reach the same area of operations, as well as the same payload: bombs, missiles, and sensors. And it will need a powerful—and expensive—engine. The robot does not have to carry a human, but it does have to carry all the bits and pieces that make it function without that human. And it must have a unique (read, pricey) communication suite to maintain contact with its flesh-and-blood overlords.

Moreover, it must possess the same performance characteristics as the manned aircraft it supports—that is, it must be able to go as fast, as far, and as high. And if it is going to be useful against China, it must have some degree of survivability or stealth.Perhaps most expensive of all will be the AI to ensure the system behaves exactly as it should every single moment. Robot vacuum owners roll their eyes at that idea. And those vacuums don’t carry bombs and missiles.


The Chinese Communist Party's Strategic Engagement in South Asia


In the first two weeks of 2025, Vice-Minister of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (IDCPC) Sun Haiyan met with the Bangladeshi and Nepali ambassadors to China. This was in line with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) deploying an increasingly sophisticated party-to-party diplomatic strategy across South Asia, revealing a comprehensive approach to regional influence that extends beyond traditional state-to-state relations. Through the IDCPC, which is also known as the International Liaison Department, Beijing has developed a systematic framework for building and maintaining influence through party-level relationships in South Asia, demonstrated by an intensive series of diplomatic engagements throughout 2024.

The IDCPC, established in 1951, serves as the CCP's primary organ for conducting relations with foreign political parties and organisations. While technically separate from China's state diplomatic apparatus under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the IDCPC plays a crucial and complementary role in advancing Chinese foreign policy objectives. The department maintains contacts with hundreds of political parties across the globe and has evolved from its original focus on communist and socialist parties to engage with a broad spectrum of political organisations. Under Minister Liu Jianchao's leadership, the IDCPC has taken on an increasingly prominent role in China's international engagement strategy, particularly in developing regions like South Asia where party-to-party relationships offer unique channels for influence building.

The IDCPC's organisational structure reveals a carefully calibrated approach to diplomatic engagement. At the helm, Liu handles strategic-level interactions, while Vice-Minister Sun manages regular diplomatic engagements across the region. Liu, appointed in 2022, has taken a more active diplomatic role than his predecessor and could become the country’s next foreign minister. Sun spent the majority of her career at the IDCP. Prior to her appointment as the first female vice-minister of the IDCPC in 2023, she was the Chinese ambassador to Singapore.

This two-tier system enables China to maintain both high-level strategic dialogue and consistent working-level engagement. For instance, when engaging with Pakistan, Liu led the China–­­­­Pakistan Political Parties Forum and the third meeting of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor Political Parties Joint Consultation Mechanism, while Sun handled regular interactions with delegations from various Pakistani political parties.

Thai-Cambodian Clashes Along Border After Months Of Building Tensions – OpEd

Murray Hunter

On Thursday July 24, Cambodia and Thai forces clashed for over 8 hours. This is after a Thai soldier was maned by a mine planted on what is claimed as Thai territory at Ta Muen Thom Temple in Surin province.Early on the morning of July 24 Cambodian drones were seen circling over Ta Muen Thom Temple area. Cambodian troops then allegedly opened fire on Thai troops at the temple in a skirmish that lasted over an hour. Sporadic fire erupted all along the Thai-Cambodia border, up to the Emerald Triangle, 

being the border between Lao-Thai-Cambodia. By 9.30am Cambodian artillery fire started hitting houses in the Kantharalak Distrist in Sisaket province. BM-21 rockets were forced by the Cambodians from a base in Khao Laem Hill in Cambodia, hitting 6 km south in the Chong Chom border town in Thailand. Rocket attacks from Cambodia also opened up upon border areas in Surin, Ubon Ratchatthani, and Sisaket provinces.

Cambodian troops attempted to enter into Thailand. The Thais responded with artillery fire. At 11.00 am the Thai Air Force sent in F-16 fighter jets to attack Cambodian military bases.As a result of the battles along the border, a hospital in Surin province was hit by Cambodian missiles, a PTT Petrol Station was hit in Kantharalak, and residential areas in Sisaket, Surin were hit by rockets and artillery. The government has called for Thais to evacuate some adjacent border areas, where hotels in towns like Buriram, Surin, Sisaket, and Ubom Ratchatthani are full. Many businesses and affected areas have closed until further notice.

On the Thai side there are reports of 14 dead and many more injured, mainly civilians. Cambodian territory opposite the Thai border areas has a sparse population and there have so been no casualties reported.Militaries in control of disputeBoth the Cambodian and Thai civilian governments have little direct control of the situation. There is a civilian power vacuum in the border dispute as decisions and operations are in the hands of others.

The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) System – Analysis


According to the Department of Defense (DOD), the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system is a key element of U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD). THAAD employs interceptor missiles, using “hit-to-kill” technology, to destroy threat missiles.

Reportedly, THAAD is capable of engaging targets at ranges of 150–200 kilometers (km). THAAD covers the BMD middle tier and defends a larger area than the Patriot Air and Missile Defense System. It complements the Patriot, the Navy’s AEGIS Missile Defense System, and the Ground-based Midcourse Defense System.

A THAAD battery consists of 90 soldiers, six truck mounted launchers, 48 interceptors (eight per launcher), one Army/Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control Mode 2 (AN/TPY-2) radar, and a Tactical Fire Control/Communications component. THAAD provides Combatant Commanders a rapidly deployable capability against short-range (up to 1,000 km), medium-range (1,000–3,000 km), 

and limited intermediate-range (3,000–5,000 km) ballistic missile threats inside or outside the atmosphere during their final (terminal) phase of flight. THAAD was developed by Lockheed Martin Corporation, headquartered in Bethesda, MD, and is being manufactured in Troy, AL. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is responsible for the development of THAAD. According to the MDA,

“MDA is responsible for the sustainment of the THAAD missile defense unique and development items, while the U.S. Army is responsible for the operations and sustainment of the common items. MDA funding provides sustainment for all fielded THAAD batteries, ensures THAAD assets are properly maintained and crews are trained to meet Combatant Commanders’ needs.”

The Army provides soldiers for THAAD units. As such, the ability to field and operate THAAD batteries can be affected by recruiting and retention shortages, as well as the availability of qualified critical technical military occupational specialties.

Frontline Fusion: The Network Architecture Needed to Counter Drones


A squad of infantry dismounts their infantry squad vehicle and begins moving toward the objective. As the soldiers approaches their assault position, an alert pings throughout the squad’s command-and-control team awareness kit devices: “HOSTILE GRP 2 DRONE DETECTED, 1.7km, 045°, TRACK-ID 2112.” The drone’s location populates as a red dot on the map, along with its ID, and the text message drops from the screen. The drone was detected by an acoustic sensor from a forward multifunctional reconnaissance company and a small panel radar mounted on an infantry squad vehicle from an adjacent platoon. Although the sensors are distributed among separate echelons, 

the drone tracks from each sensor are fused into a single track and populated on the squad’s team awareness kit devices. The battalion headquarters sees the same threat and directs its multipurpose company to launch a first-person-view drone with the task of destroying Track 2112. Within seconds, the friendly drone is launched, and the hostile drone is destroyed. As the infantry squad approaches the assault position, the hostile track drops off the map, and a text alert—“Track 2112 destroyed”—is sent throughout the squad.

This is the power of deliberately architected networks and sensor fusion: fast, efficient, shared awareness. One track, one threat, one decision, one common operational picture. As drones proliferate across every theater, this kind of seamless, fused detection will define the difference between successful operations and losses of combat power.

Understanding sensor fusion and network architecture isn’t optional to solve the C-UAS (counter–unmanned aircraft system) problem—it’s the entry fee to the professional conversation. To repurpose a well-known aphorism, amateurs will highlight the newest kit on the market, while professionals will discuss network integration and sensor fusion.

There are two critical tasks the Department of Defense must accomplish to solve its current C-UAS challenges: first, prescribing a common command-and-control (C2) system for all services, and second, implementing a network architecture to share sensor and effector data from the tactical to the strategic levels. Science and technology bureaucrats beware: The good old days of implementing bespoke systems on hub-and-spoke networks are ending, as leaders become more aware of our archaic and siloed air defense architectures.

The Real Meaning of Putin’s Middle East Failure


Just a few years ago, Russian President Vladimir Putin seemed to have reasserted Moscow’s influence in the Middle East after decades in which it had waned. As Putin deepened ties with long-standing Russian allies Iran and Syria while nurturing more cordial relationships with Israel and the Arab monarchies, his pragmatic realism seemed to represent a more comfortable alternative to what many countries in the region perceived as the United States’ naive and destabilizing commitment to promoting democracy.

This strategy allowed Russia to become an important counterweight to the United States in the region, but it also paid dividends closer to home. Leaders in the Middle East were notably quiet in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Not even Israel, a close U.S. ally, criticized Russia, let alone took part in sanctioning it.

But over the past 20 months, Russia’s standing in the Middle East has cratered. Israel’s response to Hamas’s October 7 attacks has devastated the so-called axis of resistance, the Iranian-backed network with which Russia had forged close ties. The Assad regime in Syria, long a valuable Russian client, collapsed spectacularly. U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities severely weakened Russia’s most important regional ally. As a result, Russia’s reputation as a patron and guarantor of security in the region lies in tatters. In the new Middle East now taking shape, Moscow is no longer needed.

Moscow’s failures will resound beyond the Middle East. Whether the result of Putin’s conscious decision not to intervene or of the Kremlin’s inability to do so, Russia’s abandonment of partners in the region should be a sobering lesson for Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party: that in times of crisis, Russia will not be a reliable ally.

What Does the Expected New CNO Think?


The Senate Armed Services Committee has published the advance policy questions, with answers, for the nominee for appointment to be our next Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Daryl L. Caudle, USN.If you want to know where he stands or where the center-mass of consensus thinking on topics are, this is about as good of a source as any.Yes, there is a fair bit of boilerplate, but there are some solid answers as well. Even better, it is a serious set of questions. I did word searches for some of the socio-political garbage previous CNOs invested their personal capital in, and none of it is there.

The first one is, for me, the most important one. It has been eight years since the horrible summer of 2017. It has been 2.11 WorldWars since the last of the collisions of that summer, and yet we are still working through the issues.The report of the post-mishap investigation into the June 17, 2017, collision between the USS Fitzgerald and a Philippine-flagged container ship found that the collision was avoidable and resulted from an accumulation of “smaller errors over time,” ultimately resulting in a lack of adherence to sound navigational practices. Similarly, the report of investigation into the collision of the USS John S. McCain and merchant vessel Alnic MC on August 21, 2017, also was avoidable and resulted primarily from crew complacency, over-confidence, and lack of procedural compliance.

37. What has the Navy done to counter the “smaller errors over time” and the “complacency, overconfidence, and lack of procedural compliance” that resulted in these otherwise “avoidable” collisions?Simply said, the Navy is embracing, assessing, and leveraging near misses using the best practices honed over decades by Naval Reactors versus only responding to corrective actions following a significant incident or mishap. Prior to these collisions, the Navy reviewed each incident as a standalone issue and established a working group to directly tackle and address the deficiencies without holistic extensions of the problems or ruthlessly executing all corrective actions to closure. 

As a direct result of the collisions in 2017 and the fire that destroyed USS BONHOMME RICHARD (LHD-6) in 2020, the Navy implemented sweeping changes with a targeted objective of increased safe operations through rigorous compliance with safety standards, increased focus on improving overall fleet manning and training, improving long-term sustained readiness and establishing a stronger culture of operational excellence. In October 2021, the Navy established the Learning to Action Board (L2AB), which supports the implementation of critical recommendations and measures sustainment and effectiveness of those recommendations over time.