Indian Strategic Studies: 09/25/25

25 September 2025

On Reconciliation: Listening To India Is Always Good For Sri Lanka – OpEd

A. Jathindra

As speculation swirls over whether Sri Lanka’s National People’s Power (NPP) government will hold provincial council elections next year, a bigger question looms: Will the NPP genuinely move forward with these elections, or is it preparing to abolish the provincial council system altogether, despite repeated assurances?

Against this backdrop, India has once again reaffirmed its long-standing position—insisting that the full implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment to Sri Lanka’s Constitution is crucial for the country’s unity and stability. India’s recent statement at the 60th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) is not mere diplomatic routine, but part of a decades-long commitment to Sri Lanka’s reconciliation process.

This year, India’s call was echoed by other influential international stakeholders, including the United Kingdom and Canada. These “core group” countries jointly underscored the urgency of early provincial council elections and the further devolution of power in accordance with the Thirteenth Amendment. The message is clear: meaningful devolution and genuine reconciliation are indispensable for Sri Lanka’s future.

Speaking at the UNHRC in Geneva, Anupama Singh, First Secretary at India’s Permanent Mission, summed up India’s enduring support: “As a close friend of Sri Lanka and an immediate neighbour with deep-rooted ties, India has remained steadfast in its support for relief, rehabilitation, resettlement, and reconstruction in Sri Lanka since 2009.”

She continued, “India believes that meaningful devolution and genuine reconciliation, through an inclusive approach, would contribute to nation-building and durable peace. Progress in these areas will benefit all communities in Sri Lanka and reinforce the strong foundation of friendship and trust between our nations.”

As Sri Lanka’s closest neighbour and most influential regional partner, India has long advocated for the full implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment—a provision born from the historic Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987. This accord was intended to devolve power and foster inclusive governance—goals that, decades later, have yet to be realized.

India Extends Support to Interim Government’s Efforts to Stabilize Nepal

Elizabeth Roche

Political unrest has once again roiled India’s neighborhood. In 2022 and 2024, people’s anger against corrupt and inept governance forced out elected governments in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, respectively.

Earlier this month, it was the turn of another of India’s neighbors, Nepal.

On September 9, Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli resigned a day after violent protests led by Gen-Z erupted in the capital Kathmandu and quickly spread to other cities.

A new interim prime minister, Sushila Karki, was sworn in on September 13. Karki, a former chief justice of Nepal who was chosen by the protestors, aged mainly between 13 and 28 years, now has the formidable task of guiding the reconstruction of the country’s institutions, literally and figuratively.

While discontent with governance has been simmering for a while in Nepal, the implosion of the Nepali government was sudden and caught neighboring India off guard. India surrounds Nepal on three sides and provides the landlocked Himalayan country with access to the sea. It plays a major role not only in Nepal’s trade and economic development but also in its domestic politics.

New Delhi was preparing to host Oli on his first visit after a change of government in July 2024. India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri was in Kathmandu on August 18 to invite Oli to visit India on September 16 for the long-overdue visit.

Traditionally, India has been the first port of call for any new prime minister and foreign minister of Nepal. However, Oli visited China, Nepal’s northern neighbor and India’s strategic rival, first. It is widely believed that with an invitation from India to visit not materializing — New Delhi is said to be upset with Oli’s pro-China policies — Oli headed to Beijing in December.

Tejas MK-II Vs Rafale: The $24.5 Billion Decision That Could Double India’s Fighter Fleet – Analysis

Girish Linganna

The Bottom Line: For the same $24.5 billion (₹2,15,600 crore) budget, India can get 250 Tejas MKII aircraft (12-13 squadrons) instead of just 114 Rafales (6 squadrons). This isn’t just about numbers – it’s about building a self-reliant defense ecosystem that will serve India for decades.

India faces a defining moment in its aerospace journey. The Indian Air Force operates with only 31 fighter squadrons against an approved strength of 42 squadrons, creating an alarming capability gap that threatens national security. While the government has launched the Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) program to acquire 114 foreign jets at a massive cost of $24.5 billion (₹2,15,600 crore), a far more strategic and economically sound path exists: dramatically scaling up the indigenous Tejas MKII program.

The mathematical reality is overwhelming. Each Rafale aircraft, if manufactured in India under Make in India, will cost approximately $1.5 billion (₹1,320 crore). The indigenously developed Tejas MKII carries an estimated unit cost of $70-80 million (₹616-704 crore). This means India can procure nearly twenty Tejas MKII aircraft for every single Rafale. With the allocated $24.5 billion (₹2,15,600 crore) budget, India could acquire approximately 250 Tejas MKII aircraft, forming 12-13 complete squadrons compared to just 6 squadrons of Rafales. This would not only eliminate the current squadron shortfall but provide a strategic surplus to counter threats from both Pakistan and China.

India’s Radar Technology Breakthrough

The Tejas MKII will achieve something remarkable – technological superiority over the Rafale in critical areas. The most significant advantage lies in radar technology, where India has made an extraordinary leap forward. The Tejas MKII will be equipped with the indigenous Uttam AESA radar featuring 912 Transmit/Receive Modules based on cutting-edge Gallium Nitride (GaN) technology. This surpasses the Rafale’s Thales RBE2 AESA radar, which uses older Gallium Arsenide (GaAs) technology with only 838 TRMs.

Nepal Uprising Is Latest Challenge to India’s Backyard Diplomacy

Anupreeta Das and Hari Kumar

Just weeks before Nepal erupted in flames this month, India had invited the Nepali prime minister to New Delhi on a state visit, partly to smooth over testy ties between the South Asian neighbors.

The prime minister, K.P. Sharma Oli, never got the chance. He was forced to resign earlier this month as sudden protests engulfed the small Himalayan nation, fueled by a groundswell of anger among young people at corruption, elitism and widening inequality.

A similar uprising in Bangladesh last year upended the authoritarian government of Sheikh Hasina. And in 2022, protests in Sri Lanka over a tanking economy forced out a president who was a member of a political dynasty many Sri Lankans saw as brazenly corrupt.

Such instability across South Asia distracts India from focusing on its ambition to be a global superpower. But India cannot leave things unattended in its own backyard. It already faces accusations from its smaller and poorer neighbors that it switches between ignoring them and bullying them, postures driven by self-interest rather than helping their development.

Neighbors such as Nepal have occasionally found themselves depending on India for humanitarian assistance and their economic stability, while chafing at its meddling in their domestic affairs.

Pakistan-Saudi Arabia Defense Agreement Tests India’s Gulf Balancing Act

Rushali Saha

On September 17, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif signed the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) during the latter’s visit to Riyadh.

“Any aggression against either country shall be considered an act of aggression against both,” the landmark agreement states.

New Delhi’s official response has been measured. It “was aware” of this “development which formalizes a long-standing arrangement between the two countries,” India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) said. When asked about the Pakistani-Saudi pact at the ministry’s weekly media briefing, spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal spoke of India’s expectation that Saudi Arabia “will keep in mind mutual interests and sensitivities.”

When Pakistani media asked Defense Minister Khwaja Asif whether Saudi Arabia would get involved if India and Pakistan went to war, he replied in the affirmative, without mentioning India directly.

Despite Islamabad’s ambitious expectations, it is highly unlikely that Saudi Arabia would involve itself militarily in the event of an India-Pakistan conflict.

Very few details about the pact’s contents have been revealed so far. But placing it in context helps clarify what it provides for — and, more crucially, what it does not.

First, the timing of the agreement, just days after Israel bombed Qatar, is not a mere coincidence. While it may have been in the making for a long time, as Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar alluded to, the signing was definitely accelerated by Israel’s military targeting of Qatar, which has thrown West Asia into turmoil. For the Saudis, the strategic imperative of formalizing a long-standing strategic relationship with an Islamic country was likely aimed at sending a political signal of solidarity to Israel, rather than getting entangled in Islamabad’s long-standing bilateral disputes. This explains why officials in Riyadh have been careful to portray the deal as a natural evolution of long-standing ties.

Trump says he’s trying to get Bagram Air Base back from Taliban

Alex Gangitano

President Trump said he is aiming to regain control of Bagram Air Base, which has been under Taliban control since U.S. forces withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021.

“We gave it to them for nothing. We’re trying to get it back, by the way. That could be a little breaking news, we’re trying to get it back because they need things from us,” Trump said Thursday of the base.

“We want that base back but one of the reasons we want the base is, as you know, it’s an hour away from where China makes its nuclear weapons,” he added.

The president, while speaking at a press conference in the United Kingdom with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, did not expand on plans to get the base in U.S. hands and did not explain what he meant by the Taliban needing “things” from the U.S.

The base was the largest U.S. military base in Afghanistan and fell to the Taliban during the chaotic withdrawal under the Biden administration. Trump in February asserted the U.S. should have kept control of the base and claimed that China’s People’s Liberation Army had taken control of it, which China previously denied.

The Taliban last week said it reached an agreement on a detainee swap as part of its efforts to normalize the U.S.-Afghanistan relationship, The Associated Press reported. Talks included Afghanistan’s foreign minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, and Trump’s special envoy for hostage response, Adam Boehler.

Trump has been critical of the 2021 departure, which he set in motion in 2020 when he negotiated and signed a deal with the Taliban committing to an earlier timeline for the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Former President Biden delayed the withdrawal by a few months before following through on the exit in August 2021, when 13 U.S. service members were killed by a suicide bombing at the airport in Kabul.

From Smartphone to Streets, Will Nepal’s Gen Z Revolution Deliver Change?

Meena Bhatta

In an unprecedented 36 hours, the Himalayan Republic of Nepal experienced one of the most dramatic political upheavals since the abolition of the monarchy in 2008. What began as a peaceful, youth-led demonstration against corruption and nepotism spiraled into a nationwide resistance. Nepal’s streets and digital spaces converged into a powerful force of dissent resulting in the toppling of K.P. Sharma Oli’s government and the appointment of Sushila Karki, a former chief justice, as the head of the interim government.

Karki is Nepal’s 14th prime minster in the 17 years since Nepal was declared a republic. She is also the first ever woman to hold the post. Her interim leadership now has the mandate to undertake governance reform and hold fresh elections to gather a new public mandate.

What distinguishes this upheaval from prior political movements in Nepal is its genesis and character. Unlike Nepal’s past political movements, the Gen Z revolution was not designed in party offices or tea shops, but rather born online, in the glare of smartphone screens through social media and digital networks. This Gen Z Revolution represents more than an outburst of anger. It represents a significant shift in Nepal’s political structure, where digital tools empower and drive the young to challenge deep-rooted political imbalances.

The path ahead is far from straightforward forward, yet the uprising has planted a seed of hope for accountability, transparency. The fundamental question remains whether this revolution will produce genuine systemic change or fade into another cycle of instability. The real test hinges on translating the digital momentum into meaningful democratic and institutional reform.

Nepal is no stranger to political upheavals. The 1950-51 revolution ended the Rana rule and introduced democracy, the 1990 People’s Movement reinstated party-based democracy, the decade-long Maoist insurgency (1996-2006) drove the nation through armed struggle that ended in the Comprehensive Peace Accord, and the 2006 People’s Movement (Jana Andolan II) forced the monarchy’s end to transform Nepal into a federal democratic republic in 2008. All of these movements were characterized by elite political bargaining between Nepal’s established political parties, leading to negotiated power sharing agreements that were eventually endorsed by Nepal’s clientelist political culture. The Gen Z revolution led by Nepal’s young “digital netizens” has tried to break this pattern.

Why China Won’t Weaponize Clean Energy Tech

Hao Tan

Today, China has built vast production and export capacity in clean energy and the upstream materials that support it, supplying over 80 percent of global solar panels and 70 percent of batteries and EVs. This dominance has sparked a growing number of headlines in major media outlets recently warning about a looming “clean energy race” or “battle” with China. These concerns have also filtered into policy across Western capitals: the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act, the EU’s de-risking strategy, and other national industrial policies all reflect deep anxiety about China’s dominance.

At the heart of this anxiety lies a core assumption: that China might leverage its clean energy advantage to advance diplomatic and geostrategic interests – even to coerce.

To some extent, this concern is understandable. China has actively promoted its clean energy leadership as a form of soft power, funding green projects abroad and championing decarbonization through platforms like the Belt and Road Initiative. But whether China would – or even could – turn its clean energy dominance into a coercive tool of statecraft remains an open and far more complex question.

Most current debates reflect Western threat perceptions, emphasizing the geopolitical risks of China’s dominance and the challenges of decoupling. However, few analyses examine the prospect of weaponizing clean energy from the Chinese perspective. Yet viewed from within China, turning clean energy dominance into a geopolitical weapon would be extremely difficult, likely unwise, and perhaps self-defeating.

A Double-Edged Sword

From the standpoint of mutual interdependence, China’s reliance on others for materials, markets, and technology is as significant as others’ reliance on Chinese exports.

China’s industrial might in clean energy depends heavily on overseas resources and technologies, including from Western countries. The production of clean energy technologies requires a stable supply of a wide range of critical minerals and bulk commodities – many of which China imports. On the technology side, high-end semiconductors and industrial software – essential for keeping China’s EVs globally competitive – still come primarily from the West. If China were to weaponize its exports, it could disrupt the very supply chains its own industries rely on.

How Good a Fighter Plane Is China’s J-20 Mighty Dragon?

Harrison Kass

Whereas the US relies on a boutique fleet of F-22s, the PLAAF seems to be bent on fielding hundreds of J-20s—a scale that promises to overwhelm US and allied forces in the region.

China’s Chengdu J-20 Mighty Dragon is a much-hyped fifth-generation fighter—the centerpiece of a rapidly modernizing air force built to challenge US supremacy in the skies of the Indo-Pacific. First flown in 2011, and entering service with the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) in 2017, the J-20 is now an operational system that reflects China’s industrial advancement and its wider strategic ambitions.

While the J-20’s performance, relative to Western counterparts like the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning II, has not been established, it is clear that the J-20 represents a significant technological leap over China’s legacy fighters.

The J-20 Mighty Dragon’s SpecificationsYear Introduced: 2017

Number Built: Estimated 200+ in service as of 2024 (production ongoing)

Length: 69 ft 7 in (21.2 m)

Wingspan: 42 ft 9 in (13.0 m)

Empty Weight: ~43,000 lb (19,500 kg)

Maximum Takeoff Weight: ~80,000 lb (36,000 kg)

Engines: Two Shenyang WS-10C turbofans (27,000 lbf each with afterburner); future variants expected with WS-15 (~35,000 lbf)

Top Speed: ~Mach 2.0 (est.)

Range: ~700 nmi (1,300 km) combat radius; ~2,000 nmi ferry range

Service Ceiling: ~66,000 ft (20,000 m)

Loadout: Internal bays for long-range PL-15 and short-range PL-10 air-to-air missiles; precision-guided munitions in internal bays; external stores possible, at cost to stealth

Aircrew: 1

Assessing the J-20’s Capabilities

The J-20’s full capabilities have not been disclosed, but the aircraft obviously incorporates features associated with fifth-generation fighters: stealth shaping, internal weapons bays, advanced avionics, and sensor fusion. The J-20’s long, chined fuselage and canard-delta wing configuration provide a distinct silhouette that seems to combine low observability with maneuverability and range. Coated with radar-absorbent materials (RAM), the J-20 is presumed to be very stealthy, especially from the front, which should allow for some degree of penetration in contested air spaces.

How Apple Turned China Into a Tech Behemoth

Dan Blumenthal and Ian Jones

In Apple in China, Patrick McGee, a veteran Financial Times journalist, provides a sobering and meticulous account of how Apple's pursuit of scale and profit helped fuel the meteoric rise of China's techno-industrial power. Ultimately, Apple outsourced not just production, but national leverage.

McGee compares Apple's total investment in China—through capital, supplier development, logistics, and ecosystem support—to over twice the inflation-adjusted cost of the Marshall Plan that helped rebuild Western Europe after World War II. According to internal documents, Apple was investing up to $55 billion annually in China by 2015. In 2016, Apple CEO Tim Cook pledged $275 billion over five years—more than all American and Canadian investment into Mexico from NAFTA between 1993 and 2020. By comparison, the United States' supposedly "generational" federal investment in the semiconductor industry—the CHIPS and Science Act—will cost taxpayers $52 billion over four years.

But, while the Marshall Plan rebuilt democratic allies, Apple's version helped turbocharge an authoritarian competitor. Apple helped build railways, power infrastructure, specialized tooling, and entire cities around assembly lines. All of this enabled a level and precision in Chinese manufacturing that no other Western firm could match. As McGee states: "What Apple was doing was akin to making 10 million Ferraris a year." Apple's plan was not simply about cheap labor, but China's unmatched capacity to coordinate state-backed infrastructure, training, logistics, and scale.

Apple implemented a form of contract manufacturing that McGee dubs the "Apple squeeze." Apple products demanded novel components, cutting-edge techniques, rapid scale, and stringent quality control. To achieve this, Apple embedded designers and engineers into its manufacturers, training and co-inventing with them. Apple "squeezed" suppliers for low-margin high-volume output. In turn, suppliers gained valuable know-how that it could use to win contracts from other clients. Taiwan features prominently in McGee's tale. Foxconn, a Taiwanese firm led by Terry Gou, was the key intermediary that allowed Apple to scale in China. Gou emerged as a figure who combined industrial savvy with a disregard for the risks of building China up.

Nobody Lost Taiwan

Philip H. Gordon and Ryan Hass

Over the past several years, few topics in international relations have gotten more attention than a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan. And for good reason: China has never given up its claim to the island; it is in the middle of one of the largest military buildups in history; it conducts regular incursions into Taiwan’s airspace and maritime zones; and its president, Xi Jinping, has directed his military leadership to develop the capacity to conquer Taiwan by 2027 should he give the order to do so, according to senior U.S. government officials. For anyone skeptical that such an attack could take place in the twenty-first century, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was a sharp reminder that major war over territory is not a thing of the past. Russian President Vladimir Putin seized what he thought was an opportunity to take back what he considered a wayward territory that was slipping away. Sooner or later, Xi could very well try to do the same.

Other factors have also contributed to growing anxiety about Taiwan’s future. Few doubt that China would try to use force to seize Taiwan militarily if it felt all other options to prevent permanent separation had been exhausted, but Beijing’s strong preference would be to take it over peacefully—with the island’s economy, technology, and human capital still intact. To achieve that goal, China is using a combination of relentless propaganda, infiltration, and military pressure to undercut U.S. support for Taiwan and to persuade Taiwan’s residents that they have little choice but to accept a political accommodation that recognizes Taiwan as part of China’s sovereign territory.

The past two months have produced growing concerns that Beijing is making progress on this front. Taiwan’s politicians have inflamed partisan divisions with rhetoric accusing one another of undermining Taiwan’s security, Taiwan’s ruling party pushed a failed “recall” of opposition members that deeply divided the population, and President Lai Ching-te’s popularity is collapsing. Taiwan’s dealings with the United States, meanwhile, have become trickier. The Trump administration has refused Lai’s routine transit through the United States, postponed efforts to reach a trade deal with Taiwan, halted some planned arms deliveries, and expressed harsh criticism about Taiwan’s defense spending. Washington has also loosened high-tech export controls on China, which suggests that President Donald Trump puts a higher priority on reaching a trade deal and improving relations with Beijing than on steadfast support for Taiwan. The pessimism about Taiwan’s future was best exemplified in August, when an article by a former Trump administration official went viral in Taiwan. It was called “How Taiwan Lost Trump.”

The Iran–Israel Conflict Through the Lens of Game Theory

Masoud Zamani

The 12-day war between Israel and Iran may have paused—but the next round of violence is already taking shape. As of writing this piece, the 12-day war has been halted by a fragile ceasefire—one that could collapse at any moment. While the possibility of renewed hostilities is high, the more pressing question is whether the 12-day war was predictable and whether the continuation of the conflict can be anticipated based on underlying realities.

This is where game theory can help us assess how likely the emergence of a new round of hostilities may be. International relations is often seen as a domain of uncertainty and vagueness, but in this cloudy landscape, game theory can provide a faint light of determinacy. And that determinacy matters. Understanding escalation probabilities is not an academic exercise; it is essential for policymakers and regional actors deciding whether to intervene, mediate, or prepare for the next round of conflict. But first, some context.

An Old Conflict, Deep Ideological Roots

The military tension and hostile interaction between the Islamic Republic and Israel is not a new phenomenon. It began the moment the 1979 Iranian Revolution upended the Middle East. From its inception, the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary identity was steeped in anti-Israel sentiment. Khomeini repeatedly called Israel a “cancerous tumor” that had to be removed, and his successor, Khamenei, elevated the rhetoric further, predicting that ‘there will be nothing called Israel in 25 years.’

This ideological hostility was not merely rhetorical. It has been consistently operationalized through three official policies:Building a regional network of armed proxies (Hezbollah, Hamas, Iraqi Shiite militias, the Houthis),

Developing a clandestine nuclear program,

Expanding a sophisticated ballistic missile arsenal.

For Israel—a small country with bitter historical experience, a deep memory of the Holocaust, and a low tolerance for existential threats—these ideological declarations, coupled with military capability, are not something to dismiss as hollow gestures.

Game Theory and the Logic of Escalation

The Return of ISIS

Caroline Rose and Colin P. Clarke

Nine months after the longtime dictator Bashar al-Assad was toppled by a rebel offensive, Syria faces a litany of new challenges. The country, which is now being led by the militant group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), is contending with recurring violent sectarian clashes, successive Israeli strikes into Syrian territory, and internal disputes within the new government. Adding to the tumult is a resurgence of one of Syria’s most enduring challenges: the Islamic State, also known as ISIS.

Russia’s Drone Incursion Exposes NATO’s Blind Spots Over Poland

Stephen Blank

Key Points and Summary – Russia sent 19 drones from Belarus into Polish airspace, loitering for seven hours before one crashed and three were shot down.

-Beyond a scare, the incursion exposes NATO’s thin air-and-drone defenses, sluggish command-and-control, and intelligence blind spots.

Lancet Drone from Russia. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

-Moscow likely treated the raid as razvedka—recon in force—to test readiness and warn against allied ‘peace force’ ideas.

-It also highlights Belarus’s de facto subordination to Moscow and nuclear hosting. Critics argue talk of sanctions and summits won’t deter Putin; only steady arms for Ukraine, real secondary sanctions, and rapid rearmament can restore credible deterrence. Absent action, further probes and escalation are likely.

19 Drones, 7 Hours: What Russia Just Learned About NATO

On Sept. 9-10, Russia dispatched 19 drones from Belarus into Polish air space, where the drones loitered for seven hours before one crashed into a house and NATO air defenses shot down three others.

These are the facts that we know, but there are more aspects to this story that we can discuss here. First, the episode reveals just how unready NATO is to defend its member-states and their territory, let alone to deter Russian attacks.

This is not solely due to the absence of a viable integrated air defense and anti-drone network, although that is a factor. This attack – for an attack by Russia is what this was – also revealed huge gaps in NATO intelligence, reconnaissance, and command-and-control capabilities. These drones were in Polish air space for seven hours before their mission was forcibly terminated, and only three of the 19 drones were shot down. Thus, for all the talk of improving defenses, and all the acknowledgment of the threat that Russia might be planning a war against alliance members, NATO remained asleep at the wheel.

Russia Is Probing and Measuring Readiness

Why Trump’s Desperate Chase For Bagram Airbase Could Reshape Afghanistan’s Future Forever – Analysis

Girish Linganna

The return of Donald Trump to the White House has brought back one of his most persistent fixations – the Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan. His recent threats to punish Afghanistan if they don’t return the strategic military facility reveal a deeper game of global power politics that could have far-reaching consequences for the war-torn nation.

Trump’s obsession with Bagram is not just about military pride or correcting what he sees as Biden’s withdrawal mistakes. The 79-year-old President’s determination to reclaim this airbase stems from three critical strategic calculations that go far beyond Afghanistan’s borders.

The China Factor: A New Cold War Battleground

The most compelling reason behind Trump’s Bagram fixation is its proximity to China. Located just 800 kilometres from the Chinese border, Bagram offers an unmatched strategic advantage in America’s growing rivalry with Beijing. Trump has repeatedly mentioned China’s increasing influence in Afghanistan, and he sees Bagram as the perfect counter-move in this chess game.

China has been quietly expanding its presence in Afghanistan since the Taliban’s return to power. Through infrastructure projects and mining deals, Beijing is slowly but steadily gaining a foothold in the region. For Trump, losing Bagram means giving China a free pass to dominate Central Asia without American oversight. Reclaiming the base would allow the US to monitor Chinese activities closely and maintain a strategic presence in this crucial region.

The Geopolitical Chessboard: More Than Just Afghanistan

Bagram’s value extends far beyond its role in Afghan affairs. The airbase sits at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Control over Bagram means having a launching pad for operations across this volatile region. It provides easy access to Pakistan, Iran, and the Central Asian republics – all areas where American influence has been declining.

For a president who believes in projecting American strength globally, Bagram represents the ultimate power projection tool. It’s not just about Afghanistan; it’s about maintaining American dominance in a region that’s becoming increasingly important for global trade and security.

Economic and Resource Considerations

The Next U.S. National Security Strategy Risks Misreading History Again

Andrew A. Michta

At the twilight of globalization, as the next U.S. National Security Strategy is about to be finalized, America’s current and future strategic choices are being impacted by a misreading of the drivers of state behavior, as well as the degree to which Washington can shape the global systemic transformation lurking over the horizon. The second Trump administration’s policy decisions that are reshaping the international security environment are not simply, as POTUS’s critics imply, the product of a mercurial presidency. Rather, they are a consistent manifestation of the US policy community’s shared world view, steeped in a historically derived though ultimately flawed diagnosis of what drives great power competition. We seem to have consensus that the prospect of the United States’ relative decline as a great power stems from changes in global power distribution, but what’s missing is a clear recognition that we are locked into an ideological framing of our own making that constrains how we approach the increasingly unstable world. Simply put, we are continuing to misread history.

Three decades of unprecedented U.S. power in the wake of our victory in the Cold War have conditioned America’s policy elites to assume that the international system will ultimately always bend to our will. Drawing on abundant military stocks accumulated during the Cold War, after 1991 successive presidents saw their wins generously rewarded while their policy missteps routinely carried but a marginal penalty. This state of affairs quickly gave rise to a sense of ideological certitude bordering geostrategic arrogance, one that still infuses the nation’s policy debates. The Washington policy community continues to operate on the assumption that the U.S. retains the ability to impose its priorities on other principal players without first incurring additional costs, even though Russia and China have demonstrated repeatedly that the enemy gets a voice when it comes to shaping regional balances close to home and beyond. We believe that we have agency in world affairs, while we remain unwilling to pay for properly resourcing our military and our defense industry, as though we were still living in the post-Cold War world.

The Trump administration’s policy choices, especially in its relations with European NATO allies and of late with India, have accelerated the process of a systemic transformation toward what Beijing and Moscow like to call the “multipolarization” of the world. We have yet to acknowledge that this transformation will inevitably impact America’s ability to protect its national interests. A case in point: Repeated efforts to reset the United States’ relations with Russia to woo it away from China’s embrace have failed, and yet the administration keeps returning to this formula, seemingly convinced that this time the result will be different. And so, instead of communicating to the nation that to retain its competitive edge the United States will need to commit significant additional resources to rebuild its military and its defense industry, our defense planners stipulate that this can be achieved through a strategic sleight of hand, whether through a pivot from Europe to Asia, or perhaps even away from both theaters.

The United Nations at Eighty: Reform for a New Geopolitical Era

Selim Yenel

When the Second World War ended eighty years ago, the United States established an order supported by several multilateral organizations. That scaffolding was not only to prevent another world calamity but also to forge a system that would perpetuate its preponderance. That system continued unevenly until the end of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union collapsed.

Afterwards, the system survived, albeit not in the manner that the United States had envisioned. As membership increased in the United Nations and its associated institutions such as the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World Trade Organization, the influence of the United States began to wane. In fact, the cracks in the system had started even before the Cold War ended, as the United States left organizations such as UNESCO under President Ronald Reagan because they were seen as acting against the administration’s policies.

A shared system of global governance is only possible if members of an organization take collective ownership, abide by its rules, and implement its decisions. Yet, as another UN General Assembly (UNGA) session begins in September, we witness a weakened institution. The UN system has been sidelined in today’s geopolitical landscape, and decades of efforts to overhaul the UN Security Council have yielded no results. It is thus necessary to make a distinction between what has worked so far and what has not. Prior to the League of Nations, organizations such as the International Telegraph Union, the Universal Postal Union, and others that dealt with maritime, agriculture, science, health, or labor issues were established. Most of the organizations have been incorporated into the UN system and are still operational. Those institutions that have survived did so due to shared interests on matters that cannot be handled alone.

Today, certain matters such as artificial intelligence require collaborative efforts, even as an increasing number of countries, including the big powers, disregard rules or decisions that they disagree with. Moreover, the UN system has not managed politically sensitive questions that have bedeviled regions for decades because votes in the Security Council can be blocked by one member’s veto. We cannot expect much change as long as we live in the current era where might is the chosen method for policymaking.

Who Owns the Middle Corridor? Agency and Rivalry in Eurasia

Dr. Magsud Mammadov

A single deal this August in the White House has redrawn the politics of Eurasia’s transport map. Washington, claiming to broker peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in an unprecedented move secured exclusive development rights to a new corridor through southern Armenia. Branded the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity,” the passage links Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan and grants the United States a 99-year lease on a strategic choke point at the heart of Eurasia. What looks like infrastructure is, in fact, a bold assertion of geopolitical influence, creating an alternative East–West trade route.

The corridor’s significance extends well beyond commerce. Within weeks of the deal, both Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders were in China pitching the same project to Xi Jinping as part of the Middle Corridor’s eastward expansion. The route once designed to reduce regional rivalries, has instead become another arena of global competition. The real question is not only who builds the Middle Corridor, but who will use it and, more importantly, who owns it.

Core States: From Agency to Arena

At its foundation, the Middle Corridor is a regional project. Initiated by Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—and later joined by Turkey—these states have invested in ports like Baku and Aktau, built new railways and roads, and engaged heavily in soft infrastructure to streamline customs procedures and regional rules. Their goal has been clear: to shift from resource dependence, especially in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, toward becoming transit and logistics hubs linking Europe and Asia.

Yet operational agencies have not shielded them from external intrusion. The Zangezur Corridor/“Trump Route” deal illustrates how quickly sovereignty can be compromised. While formally under Armenian law, the corridor is effectively leased to Washington for nearly a century. What seems like a technical arrangement, in reality, a projection of US strategic control—one that provoked Iranian threats and uneasy silence from Moscow. The regional operators remain central, but the ground beneath them is increasingly contested.

Unmatched Geopolitics: China, Europe, and the Expanding Web

Funding Europe’s Firepower

Dalibor Rohac and Eduardo Castellet Nogués

European leaders know by now that they need to invest more in security. They know that the continent needs bigger defense budgets to fund more military capabilities and larger armies. Some of their motivation comes from Washington, which this year pushed European NATO members to commit to military spending targets of five percent of GDP (including 3.5 percent for outlays on core defense needs such as hardware). But Europe needs to spend for its own sake, too, to ensure the continent’s safety in a world in which it can rely less and less on the protection of the United States.

A Baltic Maginot Line Won’t Stop Russia

Michael Peck

Though their landscape is picturesque, the Baltic states are not built for defense. Lakes and swamps provide some benefit, but there are no mountains, jungles, or Rhine-sized rivers to stop an invader. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania can be Holland, but not Switzerland.

Hence, the Baltic states want to build the “Baltic Defense Line” to stave off a Russian attack. Announced in January 2024, the idea is that by working together, three small nations can overcome their numerical and geographical weaknesses versus their giant and aggressive neighbor.

Estonia plans to build 600 bunkers along its 300-km (186-mile) border with Russia. Latvia is emplacing dragon’s teeth. Lithuania announced a plan last month to build a multi-layer border defense system stretching up to 50 km from the border. Directly on the border would be the first layer — 5km in depth — comprising a wide anti-tank ditch, backed up by dragon’s teeth, then minefields, then strongpoints and trenches, followed by a second line of trenches. The second layer would include trenches as well as bridges wired for demolition, with a third layer studded by trees ready to be felled into obstacles, and yet more trenches and wired bridges.

“Fixed fortifications are a monument to the stupidity of man,” declared the ever-aggressive Gen. George Patton. But in reality, they are a sensible and cost-effective idea, especially for weaker nations. They increase the survivability and lethality of friendly troops, impede enemy mobility and logistics, and allow the defender to economize on manpower and resources. As the early days of the Ukraine war showed, it doesn’t take much to derail and disrupt Russian armored columns. For the Baltic states not to build fixed defenses would be negligent, if not criminal.

However, fortifications can also be an albatross. The most infamous example is the Maginot Line, which has become a meme for how static defenses can become a trap. Yet in theory, the concept was good. Maginot defenses were a force multiplier that allowed the French to garrison the southern part of their line with second-line troops while concentrating higher-quality mechanized forces to stop a German offensive in the open terrain to the north.

The problem was that the Germans attacked in the center and quickly penetrated through the lightly defended Ardennes Forest. While the sclerotic French high command failed to counterattack or shift reserves to block the German thrust, the panzers fanned out north and south to split the Allied line in half and encircle each wing. In other words, the fault lay not with the forts, but with the lack of mobile reserves and agile commanders.

Deconstructing Deterrence

Paul Ingram & Ted Seay

Since October 7, 2023, the term “deterrence” has circulated with increased frequency. There is one problem: as it is currently defined and understood, deterrence does not work.

The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the US Military defines deterrence as “the prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction.” From this, readers can deduce that deterrence is a state of mind and a product of rational decision-making.

Basing security policy on either of these assumptions is foolhardy. It is challenging to calibrate deterrence. This requires distinguishing enough deterrence, where credible fear of counteraction keeps the peace, from too much deterrence, where credible fear of an opponent’s motives can lead to a preemptive attack.

First, some practical examples. Returning to October 7, 2023, it is possible to say Israeli deterrence failed. Since 1948 Israel has sought to maintain a level of strength and preparedness sufficient to prevent its enemies from planning and executing attacks, using the threat of overwhelmingly force to maintain deterrence against its enemies.

The first major sign of trouble with this approach came in 1968, months after Israel’s defeat of its Arab neighbors in the Six-Day War, when Egypt began preparing a response. This came in October 1973 with Operation Badr, the attack which kicked off the Yom Kippur War. Similarly, Hamas began planning its 2023 attack immediately after a major defeat nine years before in the Gaza War of July–August 2014.

In both cases, deterrence failed years before the actual attacks. Israel’s overwhelming military superiority simply delayed the inevitable response to a situation its adversaries saw as absolutely unacceptable. Israel, overconfident in its deterrent capability, discounted the danger when intelligence assets began to report trouble. Thus, a single-minded reliance on deterrence actually led to future conflict.

The Battle of Novodarivka, Part II: The Challenge of Combined Arms on Tomorrow’s Battlefield

Joshua Ratta

In June 2023, days into a major counteroffensive in the Russo-Ukrainian War, Ukrainian forces attacking along a supporting axis faced the task of seizing the village of Novodarivka from Russian occupying forces. Although it was an otherwise unremarkable village, the way in which Ukraine succeeded in the battle is anything but. Ukrainian forces’ decision to discard the initial high-tempo, armor-centric concept of operations they brought to Novodarivka in favor of a slow and methodical dismounted infantry–centric approach reveals much about armor’s limitations on the modern battlefield. Yet it also yields clues about how to overcome those limitations, recapturing the advantages of combined arms teams facing prepared defenses.

The Challenge for Armor: US Army Experimentation

At the same time as the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ transition to an infantry-centric concept of operations was causing controversy among Ukraine’s international partners, some one thousand miles to the north, a similar transition was quietly occurring. A US Army battalion task force, TF Mustang—1-8th Cavalry, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division—in Finland for a series of multinational exercises, quickly realized that attempting to dislodge a defending Finnish mechanized battlegroup tied into Finland’s natural canalizing forests and swamps through mounted maneuver was a losing proposition. Instead, the task force switched to a tactical paradigm of dismounted infantry, scouts, and engineers pulling their accompanying armored formations forward whenever encountering natural or man-made restricted terrain. It was, in effect, a rediscovery of the forgotten defile drill. As two of TF Mustang’s armor officers would note on their experience “Armor [may be] the combat arm of decision, but it still needs the infantry to set conditions and lead the way!”

But while both TF Mustang during exercises in Finland and Ukrainian forces at Novodarivka adopted to lead with infantry, it is not the only proposed solution to overcome tanks’ inherent limitations on the battlefield. Earlier this year, Colonel Bryan Bonnema and Lieutenant Colonel Moises Jimenez undertook a broad observation of changing battlefield conditions in Ukraine and reached a very different conclusion, which they presented in the pages of the Modern War Institute. They proposed that armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs) shift from confronting a prepared defense through an approach based on suppressing, breaching, and seizing to one of isolating, suppressing, and destroying.

Drone that helped Ukraine destroy Russia’s S-400, $2.5 billion assets eyed by Taiwan

Kapil Kajal

A European drone that supported Ukraine in destroying billions of dollars’ worth of Russian military assets, including the advanced S-400 air defense system, could soon be made in Taiwan under a new defense partnership.

Portugal-based Tekever, a leading provider of AI-driven autonomous systems, announced a partnership with Taiwan’s Apex Aviation during the Taipei Aerospace & Defense Technology Exhibition held from September 18 to 20.

Central to the agreement is the potential local production of Tekever’s AR3 drone, which has been widely deployed in Ukraine.

The AR3, a medium-sized unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with modular payload options including synthetic aperture radar and infrared sensors, has logged over 10,000 flight hours in combat operations, according to Tekever.

Scott McClelland, Tekever’s deputy defense director, told Interesting Engineering during the exhibition that the drone has “supported Ukraine in the destruction of nearly $2.5 billion in Russian assets, including an S-400 air defense system.”

The model is also in service with the UK military for electronic warfare missions.

AR3 drone

The AR3 drone is designed as a compact fixed-wing system for endurance and flexibility in maritime and land missions.

It can stay aloft for up to 16 hours and comes with an optional beyond-line-of-sight datalink, making it well-suited for extended operations such as intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR), border protection, artillery fire correction, and infrastructure monitoring.

The Problem Isn’t ChatGPT. It’s Us.

David Hutt

Talk to a university professor these days, and it isn’t long before they’re complaining that almost every student is now using ChatGPT to write essays. My response is always the same: maybe the problem is that essays have taken over the way universities judge a student’s aptitude. What about scrapping essays and going back to hand-written or oral exams? Attempting this response recently, a professor friend agreed with me but opposed the solution in principle because “it would mean I have to spend more time with students.”

In the 1930s, the economist Paul Anthony Samuelson coined the term “revealed preference” to explain how consumer behavior could be discovered by simply observing what people bought, not just by asking them what they wanted or by making assumptions. Likewise, as all psychologists know, allowing someone to vent their grievances usually uncovers a “revealed problem,” usually a psychological plight that is causing the physical behavior. Alcoholism or drug addiction, for instance, are often manifestations of depression or social isolation, rather than being the root problem.

On the whole, I’m rather pro-ChatGPT, in part because I’ve come to think of it as the great revealer of problems. As with my professor friend, the problem isn’t that students are using ChatGPT to write essays; it’s that professors don’t want to spend even more time with students that alternative examinations would require. To be fair to most academics, this is because universities now require them to spend almost all their hours researching and publishing, since the number of publications a faculty produces has become the sole metric by which their competence is measured.

Likewise, is it a problem that ChatGPT can write legal copy better than most trainee lawyers? Or is the problem that law firms have, for too long, demanded interns and trainees do endless drudge work because of the legal profession’s money-grabbing obsession with “billable hours,” which has convinced clients that time spent equals value delivered, thus allowing a firm’s partners to earn millions of dollars from slothfulness? One might also ask whether ChatGPT’s ability to write turgid journalistic copy is an existential crisis to my own industry, or whether it reveals the actual problem: so much of journalism has become writing clickbait bumf that requires no actual investigation or original thinking and can easily be done by an LLM that’s far better at searching on Facebook for the latest consumer craze or exaggerated outrage?

A Cyberattack on Jaguar Land Rover Is Causing a Supply Chain Disaster

For almost three weeks, the production lines at global car giant Jaguar Land Rover have stood still. Usually busy turning out an estimated 1,000 vehicles per day, staff at multiple JLR factories across Britain have been told to stay at home as the automotive firm responds to a damaging cyberattack. But as its recovery has stretched from days to weeks, the knock-on impacts are being felt at the hundreds of companies that supply JLR with parts and materials and risk turning the attack into a full-blown crisis.