Gen Z Discontent And Religious Divides Surface In India – Analysis

P. K. Balachandran

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High unemployment and denial of political, livelihood and religious rights have caused disquiet in many towns in India.

Youth agitations and communal tension gripped parts of India in September. Even as India was reeling under the impact of US President Donald Trump’s 50% tariff on Indian goods and services exports, youths in several towns were agitating over livelihood issues.

The tense situation was exacerbated by a Hindu-Muslim conflict over the appearance of street banners expressing love for Prophet Mohammad in many towns of North India.

Trump’s tariff hike is believed to be threatening 300,000 jobs across multiple sectors. And according to the International Labour Organization (ILO), in 2023, the unemployment rate in India for graduates was 29.1%, nearly nine times higher than the rate for those without formal schooling.

Youth unrest in Ladakh, Uttarakhand and Karnataka was seen as being inspired by the Gen Z uprisings in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal which led to the overthrow of governments. Significance is seen in the fact that affected regions like Ladakh and Uttarakhand border China and Nepal respectively.

However, there is no indication that the unrest in India is comparable with that in Bangladesh and Nepal, given India’s size and diversity.

The most serious of the agitations was the one in Ladakh. It was over the denial of the status of a “State” to Ladakh after the composite State of Jammu Kashmir (and Ladakh) was broken into two smaller units called Union Territories to be ruled directly from New Delhi.

However, while Jammu and Kashmir (J and K) was allowed an elected Assembly, Ladakh was not.

Arrest of Noted Environmental Activist Fuels Unrest in Ladakh

Snigdhendu Bhattacharya

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Ladakh is boiling, and it is not good news for India. It is through this cold Himalayan desert at the northern tip of India that the highly contentious Line of Actual Control, the de facto border between India and China, runs.

Ladakh lies amid disputed territories. The China-held Aksai Chin, which India claims, lies to the east and the Gilgit-Baltistan region of Pakistan-administered-Kashmir sits to its north. Due to a history of conflict with both Pakistan and China, its borders remain highly sensitive. The last thing India needs in Ladakh is internal disturbance. But that’s what is happening.

On September 24, protests demanding protection of local interests suddenly turned violent and an office of India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in Leh was vandalized and set afire. Locals accused the BJP of fooling them with false promises. Subsequently, four protesters were killed in police firing.

The police crackdown that followed, along with administrative attempts to brand the movement as aided by Pakistan, has thrown the icy desert into a frying pan. At the time of filing this report on September 29, curfew and mobile internet suspension are still in force.

Apart from the police firing, the arrest of Ramon Magsaysay awardee and noted educationist-environmentalist Sonam Wangchuk, who emerged as the most prominent face of the protests, has angered locals. Wangchuk is one of Ladakh’s best-known personalities, partly because the popular character Rancho from the Bollywood blockbuster, “Three Idiots,” was based on him.

“People are deeply angry with the highhandedness of the authorities. Their trust in the administration has fallen significantly,” Ladakh Buddhist Association President Chering Dorjay Lakruk told The Diplomat. He also serves as the co-convenor of Leh Apex Body (LAB), the most influential organization in Ladakh’s Leh district.

Following the violence, the police and paramilitary forces arrested a few dozen persons on charges of vandalism and attacking security personnel. However, in a show of solidarity with the protesters, the Bar Association Leh decided to pro bono defend everyone named in police complaints. They demanded a high-level judicial inquiry under a magistrate’s supervision.

The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism in Pakistan

Osama Ahmad

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According to a recent report by Amnesty International, titled “Shadow of Control: Censorship and Mass Surveillance in Pakistan,” Pakistani authorities are monitoring more than 4 million citizens using advanced tools purchased from foreign private companies, such as China’s Geedge Network.

At the core of Pakistan’s surveillance operation are two powerful systems: the Web Monitoring System (WMS 2.0), which acts as a national firewall that can block internet access, virtual private networks (VPNs), and specific websites, and the Lawful Intercept Management System (LIMS), a mass surveillance platform that allows authorities to eavesdrop on phone calls, text messages, internet activities, and even geolocation data through domestic telecommunications providers.

The earlier version of the WMS or WMS 1.0. in Pakistan was enabled by a Canadian company. A newer version, also known as the National Firewall, was put into place in 2023 using technology from Geedge Network.

LIMS is supported by technology primarily supplied by a German company, Utimaco, and an Emirati company, Datafusion. Utimaco’s LIMS enables authorities to analyze subscriber data from telecommunications companies, while the processed information is accessible through Datafusion’s Monitoring Center Next Generation (McNG).

The methods may have changed, but Pakistan actually began surveilling its citizens decades ago. In the 1990s, such activities resulted in the rise and fall of governments, and Pakistan’s surveillance has continued to grow over time.

Nighat Dad, the founder and executive director of Digital Rights Foundation, told The Diplomat, “Available research and reports suggest that Pakistan has developed significant surveillance capabilities over the past decade.”

In 1997, the Supreme Court ruled that state surveillance was illegal, holding it to be a breach of Article 14 of the Constitution, which secures the right to privacy. The ruling came in a case concerning the phone tapping of judges, senior officials, and politicians, allegedly carried out on the instructions of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. The Court emphasized that privacy is a fundamental constitutional guarantee, extending far beyond the private sphere of the home.

A Return to Bagram Air Base

James Cook

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Key Points and Summary – The U.S. exit from Afghanistan in 2021 ended a long war, but great-power competition revived interest in Bagram Air Base.

-President Trump now signals a push to regain access, citing proximity to China.

-Kabul’s defense chief rejected any deal, though the foreign ministry left the door ajar.

-Washington could leverage humanitarian aid, release frozen assets, restore banking connectivity, lift travel bans, or even consider recognition to win Taliban consent.

-Pakistan’s influence—and its ties to both Washington and Beijing—will be pivotal, while China’s investments and BRI court Kabul to say no.

-Expect a hard trade-off: strategic access versus human rights concerns.

Bagram Air Base 2.0?

On Aug. 31, 2021, grainy images of the last U.S. soldier boarding a C-17 military transport aircraft leaving Afghanistan marked the end of a two-decade “Global War on Terror.”

Senior military leaders have called America’s longest war a “strategic failure,” and as the United States closed this painful chapter, national strategies shifted back toward geopolitics, focusing on emerging great powers and strategic competitors.

Under the Afghanistan Peace Agreement negotiated in February 2020, the United States agreed to withdraw from all bases in the country. However, in an intriguing twist, President Donald Trump recently discussed the return of Bagram Air Base to United States’ control, because of its location “an hour away from where China makes its nuclear weapons.”

U.S. Army Sgt. 1st Class Ricky Bryant is last in line to board a C-130H2 Hercules aircraft at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, for a flight to Forward Operations Base Salearno, Afghanistan, on March 8, 2006. The aircraft and crew are assigned to the 185th Airlift Squadron, Will Rogers World Airport, Oklahoma Air National Guard and are deployed to the 774th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron, Bagram Air Base.

Myanmar’s Election Gamble

Andrew Nachemson

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A protester holds up a sign during a demonstration against Myanmar’s military coup in Yangon, Myanmar on February 14, 2021.Credit: Wikimedia Commons/MgHla (aka) Htin Linn Aye

Most conflict experts will tell you that one of the surest ways to escalate violence during a civil war is to hold an election.

Internal conflicts generally arise when important political stakeholders fail to agree on fundamental principles governing a country. In Myanmar’s case, the military wants to serve as the government, while the overwhelming majority of people want it to have no involvement in politics at all.

This irreconcilable difference came to a head when the military seized power in 2021, three months after losing a second consecutive election in a massive landslide, sparking an ongoing civil war. With the military now planning to administer its own election in several phases in December and January, it would be no surprise if it were to be marred by violence.

Counterintuitively, some diplomats and analysts are hoping the election could actually be a pathway to deescalation, even though major pro-democracy parties are banned and the polls will be tightly managed to ensure victory for the military and its chosen proxies.

This is because the 2008 military-drafted constitution divides power among different political offices, power that right now is centralized in the hands of the coup-maker, Min Aung Hlaing. Some in the diplomatic community hope that even a simulated election will diffuse power among different military figures, potentially opening a pathway to political reform or dialogue with opposition forces.

But the military regime’s internal logic for holding the election is something entirely different. The junta primarily intends to use it to cement its growing, begrudging acceptance by the international community, particularly by regional countries. After weathering nearly five years of armed resistance, many of Myanmar’s neighbors have come to the conclusion that the regime is here to stay. This is in some ways a self-fulfilling prophecy, as they now turn diplomatic efforts towards stabilizing the country under that accepted premise.

Classified US intelligence warns of China's preparations for Taiwan invasion

Henry Zwartz

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A classified US military intelligence report seen by the ABC says China is rapidly building up the country's commercial ferry fleet to prepare for an invasion of Taiwan.

The report dates from earlier this year and was prepared by members of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for the Pentagon.

The US intelligence says the large ocean-going vessels have been modified to carry tanks and partake in amphibious operations.

The ABC has seen the report on the condition that it is not quoted directly, in order to protect the source of the information.

In 2022 alone, some 30 Chinese commercial ferries were monitored by Five Eyes intelligence in military exercises involving People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops.

Five Eyes is an intelligence-sharing alliance between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.

China is building more than 70 of the large vessels by the end of 2026.

Taiwan's government confirmed to the ABC that it viewed the vessels as part of China's "expansionist intentions" vis-a-vis Taiwan.

"We are also seeing increasing grey-zone tactics … to weaken Taiwan's democracy and society, such as cyber attacks," Douglas Hsu, Taiwan's chief representative to Australia, told the ABC.

"Civilian vessels or other dual-use facilities in [the] maritime domain are also part of China's strategy," he said.

China's ocean-going ferries are capable of transporting armoured vehicles and soldiers. (Supplied: CCTV)

Cargo ships being used with new landing docks

How China’s Secretive Spy Agency Became a Cyber Powerhouse

Chris Buckley and Adam Goldman

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American officials were alarmed in 2023 when they discovered that Chinese state-controlled hackers had infiltrated critical U.S. infrastructure with malicious code that could wreck power grids, communications systems and water supplies. The threat was serious enough that William J. Burns, the director of the C.I.A., made a secret trip to Beijing to confront his Chinese counterpart.

He warned China’s minister of state security that there would be “serious consequences” for Beijing if it unleashed the malware. The tone of the meeting, details of which have not been previously reported, was professional and it appeared the message was delivered.

But since that meeting, which was described by two former U.S. officials, China’s intrusions have only escalated. (The former officials spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly about the sensitive meeting.)

American and European officials say China’s Ministry of State Security, the civilian spy agency often called the M.S.S., in particular, has emerged as the driving force behind China’s most sophisticated cyber operations.

In recent disclosures, officials revealed another immense, yearslong intrusion by hackers who have been collectively called Salt Typhoon, one that may have stolen information about nearly every American and targeted dozens of other countries. Some countries hit by Salt Typhoon warned in an unusual statement that the data stolen could provide Chinese intelligence services with the capability to “identify and track their targets’ communications and movements around the world.”

The attack underscored how the Ministry of State Security has evolved into a formidable cyberespionage agency capable of audacious operations that can evade detection for years, experts said.

China Goes on Offense

Jeffrey Prescott and Julian Gewirtz

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Agreat unanswered question of the second Trump administration has been how its outright rejection of the existing global order would affect China’s international strategy. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has called this order both “obsolete” and “a weapon being used against” the United States, and in his speech at the United Nations on September 23, President Donald Trump pilloried the “globalist” institution for “creating new problems for us to solve.” In the early months of this year, Beijing’s response to Washington’s attacks on the international order seemed mostly cautious and measured. China traded tit-for-tat tariffs with the United States, but it otherwise remained content to sit back and accrue benefits from Trump’s alienation of U.S. allies and withdrawal from international institutions.

That period of caution is now over. Beijing has decided on a much more ambitious course, putting its plans on vivid display at a September meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Hosting the once sleepy regional economic and security body, Chinese leader Xi Jinping clasped hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and met with 18 other leaders from across the Eurasian continent. A few days later, flanked by Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, Xi presided over a massive military parade in Beijing to show off China’s fast-growing arsenal. Trump’s comment about seeing the summitry on TV—“They were hoping I was watching, and I was watching”—inadvertently revealed the precise position in which China hoped to place the United States: the American president, so often the prime mover of global politics, had become a spectator on the sidelines of a changing world.

Xi aims to establish China as the fulcrum of an emerging multipolar world, and he is advancing a new, more active diplomatic strategy to realize that goal. Rather than force the United States out of its leading position in the international system or overturn the existing order, China is exploiting Trump’s rapid, willing abdication of Washington’s role. And China is building up its own power and prestige within existing institutions, seeking to shift their centers of gravity irrevocably toward Beijing. If this gambit succeeds, it will transform the international order from the inside out, placing China at center stage and undermining U.S. influence in ways that future American administrations may find difficult to reverse.

WORLD BUILDING

Hidden Huaweis

Nathan Picarsic & Emily de la Bruyere

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For 70 minutes on September 3rd, China paraded its military forces along Beijing’s Chang’an Avenue – exhibiting everything from stealth UAVs to long-range missiles, laser weapons to robot dogs. The display sent a clear message. Beijing is a global military force and has no intention of hiding it. That is concerning and potentially destabilizing. But it also obscures the real Chinese threat, and arsenal. The military hardware that Beijing celebrated are shiny accessories to the country’s already deployed force: China’s globally proliferated Hidden Huaweis.

Over the past decade, China has leveraged State-led industrial policy, a strategy of military-civil fusion, and the country’s advantages of scale and industrial capacity to dominate the upstream of information and communication technologies – including critical materials, modules, and components. Despite growing recognition of China as a strategic adversary, the United States has not grasped the extent of this threat. Trying to fight Huawei, Washington has missed a global arsenal of Hidden Huaweis. And focused on traditional security frameworks, Washington has failed to recognize the strategic effect those Hidden Huaweis deliver. They promise Beijing the power to shape tomorrow’s data flows – and the resources, ideas, and movements that depend on them. Until the United States engages seriously in the contest for the upstream hardware of information and communication technologies, Hidden Huaweis promise Beijing global control.

Chinese State-backed and -directed companies sit at the core of every information technology component, and therefore every foundational infrastructure, of the connected world. China’s Quectel and Fibocom control the majority of the cellular IoT module, mobile hotspot device, and fixed wireless access equipment: Anywhere you connect to WiFi, they are positioned to collect. Hesai, Robosense, and other Chinese companies account for 89 percent of the global LiDAR market, and therefore have veto power over the ability of self-driving vehicles to operate. Chinese champions, including Sungrow, make most of the world’s power inverters, the smart components that connect power sources to the grid – unless they decide to disconnect them. In data center optical transceivers, Innolight alone accounts for more than 10 percent of global market share, and is increasingly present across the U.S. artificial intelligence ecosystem.

Anchor Acquisition and Force Development on Targeting China’s C4ISR

Nicholas Weising

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Admiral Daryl Caudle’s tenure as CNO began on August 25th, 2025, meaning his four-year term includes the end of the Davidson window in 2027, when China will have reached its milestone of developing sufficient defense capability to forcefully annex Taiwan. The key to China succeeding is maintaining their anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) approach intended to keep adversary forces out of the first island chain. U.S. Navy operational concepts must make an explicit priority of targeting the C4ISR architecture that fundamentally enables China’s A2/AD approach and have it serve as a core organizing principle for Navy acquisition and force development.

The center of China’s A2/AD strategy involves long-range precision-strike (LRPS) missiles, encompassing anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-surface capabilities. The DF-21D is a road-mobile ballistic missile capable of targeting a moving carrier strike group at 1,450 kilometers away. The DF-26 is an intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of hitting Guam, Okinawa, and other American military installations in the region. The DF-17 is a road-mobile missile that delivers a hypersonic glide vehicle that can penetrate air and missile defenses. These are the primary long-range conventional weapons the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) has at its disposal. The PLARF’s LRPS capabilities can attack carrier strike groups and military bases across the First Island Chain and up to the Second Island Chain on short notice.

The ability to establish and contest air control over Taiwan would be pivotal in any scenario, but the effects of China’s A2/AD posture are most acute in the air domain. Advanced sensors, integrated air defenses, and surface-to-air missile systems create a highly contested environment. Aircraft are limited by endurance and mission availability rates, meaning they cannot maintain presence indefinitely. Even the most capable U.S. jet fighter today has a combat radius of only about 600 nautical miles without aerial refueling. This constraint goes back to the origins of modern airpower. Fighter aircraft were first designed for the European theater, where dense networks of airfields exist. Meanwhile, the Indo-Pacific has vast stretches of water and land separated by hundreds or thousands of miles. In a Taiwan contingency, sorties from Japan or Korea would almost certainly require midair refueling and would struggle to maintain a consistent presence in the battlespace. This is why carriers remain indispensable. Yet the PLARF LRPS capabilities threaten to box carriers out of the region.

China Goes on Offense

Jeffrey Prescott and Julian Gewirtz

Source Link

Agreat unanswered question of the second Trump administration has been how its outright rejection of the existing global order would affect China’s international strategy. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has called this order both “obsolete” and “a weapon being used against” the United States, and in his speech at the United Nations on September 23, President Donald Trump pilloried the “globalist” institution for “creating new problems for us to solve.” In the early months of this year, Beijing’s response to Washington’s attacks on the international order seemed mostly cautious and measured. China traded tit-for-tat tariffs with the United States, but it otherwise remained content to sit back and accrue benefits from Trump’s alienation of U.S. allies and withdrawal from international institutions.

That period of caution is now over. Beijing has decided on a much more ambitious course, putting its plans on vivid display at a September meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Hosting the once sleepy regional economic and security body, Chinese leader Xi Jinping clasped hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and met with 18 other leaders from across the Eurasian continent. A few days later, flanked by Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, Xi presided over a massive military parade in Beijing to show off China’s fast-growing arsenal. Trump’s comment about seeing the summitry on TV—“They were hoping I was watching, and I was watching”—inadvertently revealed the precise position in which China hoped to place the United States: the American president, so often the prime mover of global politics, had become a spectator on the sidelines of a changing world.

Xi aims to establish China as the fulcrum of an emerging multipolar world, and he is advancing a new, more active diplomatic strategy to realize that goal. Rather than force the United States out of its leading position in the international system or overturn the existing order, China is exploiting Trump’s rapid, willing abdication of Washington’s role. And China is building up its own power and prestige within existing institutions, seeking to shift their centers of gravity irrevocably toward Beijing. If this gambit succeeds, it will transform the international order from the inside out, placing China at center stage and undermining U.S. influence in ways that future American administrations may find difficult to reverse.

Xi Jinping’s Visit to Lhasa Elevates Tibet in National Policymaking Agenda

Devendra Kumar

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Xi Jinping’s third trip to the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) underscores its importance to his agenda at the national level. His Tibet policy emphasizes regional stability, economic development, ecological conservation, and border defense, but the top priority remains stability.

The ceremony, which celebrated the TAR’s 60th anniversary, saw low public attendance, undermining the Party’s narrative of ethnic unity and “unwavering support” for the Party-state’s policies in the region.

The sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism and culture serves to sever religious, cultural, and political links across borders, reinforcing the CCP’s control of lama reincarnation.

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping visited Lhasa on August 20–21, to participate in the celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR; 西藏自治区). Xi’s itinerary included attending a ceremony in Lhasa and a visit to the region’s party committee. His limited participation in the ceremony itself suggests that his visit may have been decided on relatively short notice. Xi nevertheless traveled with a powerful delegation, including senior Party leaders such as Wang Huning (王沪宁), the chairperson of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and fourth-ranked member of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC). [1] Wang and others remained in the TAR for two additional days after Xi departed on August 21 (Xinhua, August 21).

The backdrop to the visit was the Dalai Lama’s decision in July that Tibetans will be responsible for recognizing his successor, without interference from CCP authorities (Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, July 2). This decision has been denounced by officials, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson claiming that succession is “determined by the central government” (由中央政府确定的) and ambassadors warning that suggestions otherwise are “purely malicious misrepresentation and distortion” (纯属恶意篡改和歪曲) (MFA, March 11, June 2, July 1). Xi’s visit underlines the confidence among his advisors about the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) current policies for reinforcing control and legitimacy in the region. It also indicates Tibet’s importance to Xi’s agenda at the national level.

Gulf Countries Need to De-Risk Their Relationship with the U.S.

James Durso

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An Israeli strike on a Hamas delegation in Qatar strained U.S. guarantees to Gulf allies.

The recent attack raised questions about Washington’s reliability and prompted calls for strategic diversification of partnerships.

Gulf states are looking beyond the U.S. to China, Russia, Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan for defense and technology ties.

On 9 September, Israel attacked Qatar, a U.S. ally that was hosting a Hamas delegation that was considering a peace proposal from U.S. President Donald Trump. Israel killed three low-ranking officials, a child of a delegation member, and a Qatari security officer. The targeted officials survived.

The White House claimed Trump wasn’t notified in advance by Israel and learned of the attack from the Pentagon, though Israeli sources claim he was notified in advance. Trump ordered his crisis negotiator, Steve Witkoff to alert Doha, but Witkoff’s call came too late.

The attack and Trump’s casual reaction underlined what Al-Akhbar called “The Myth of US Guarantees” and highlighted a world where some American allies are “more equal than others.”

In the Middle East, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Qatar, and Tunisia are Major Non-NATO Allies which used to mean something. America isn’t leaving the Middle East, but the first order of business for its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) allies is how to “de-risk” the American relationship and work towards “strategic diversification.”

First, find new partners. The U.S. stood aside when Israel attacked Qatar, so the tens of billions of dollars to U.S. defense contractors, and the free use of military bases, were for nothing when it counted, so the region should supplement the U.S. relationship.

We saw the first instance with the Saudi Arabia-Pakistan defense pact that makes Islamabad’s nuclear capabilities available to the kingdom, and other petrostates may soon follow suit. Pakistan is the “P” in CPEC, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Beijing’s US$65 billion regional connectivity project. China is already Pakistan’s top arms supplier, so the defense pact will provide Islamabad with access to Chinese technology and Saudi money.

The Fatal Flaw in the Transatlantic Alliance

Jennifer Kavanagh and Peter Slezkine

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When U.S. President Donald Trump returned to the White House, he had his sights set on rebalancing the transatlantic relationship. He would be right to do so. The United States’ burden in NATO is out of proportion with the interests at stake, and regulations set in Brussels have resulted in a lopsided U.S.-EU trade regime. Although it is one of 32 NATO members, the United States covers 16 percent of NATO’s annual budget and shoulders most of the operational and logistical burden for Europe’s security. Meanwhile, the EU has long used tariff and nontariff barriers to limit access for U.S. agricultural and industrial products and has obstructed the operation of American small business and Big Tech with rules and red tape.

Trump took aim at Europe as soon as he entered office. Shortly after his inauguration, he dispatched Vice President JD Vance and the freshly confirmed U.S. defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, to warn Europeans that Washington’s “new sheriff” was intent on changing the terms of the relationship. In Paris, Vance called on Europe to lower regulation of artificial intelligence and energy. In Munich, he questioned Europe’s continued commitment to shared Western values. In Brussels, Hegseth announced that the United States could no longer focus primarily on Europe’s security and would be shifting to other priorities. Soon after, Trump levied punitive tariffs designed to pressure Europe to reduce trade barriers and regulations that limit the access of U.S. firms.

This multifront pressure campaign produced some initial results. At a NATO summit meeting in June, European allies promised to increase their defense spending to five percent of GDP by 2035. In July, Trump and the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced a trade deal committing the EU to purchase $750 billion in American energy products and invest $600 billion in the U.S. market by 2028.

Yet these successes were at best partial, and perhaps illusory. The five percent pledge by European allies does almost nothing for the United States in the near term, and since today’s leaders cannot credibly bind the hands of future ones, it is an open question whether European countries will ever meet these spending targets. Moreover, the United States has retained control of key leadership positions in NATO, ensuring that Europe’s institutionalized military dependence will endure.

Why economists get Trumpism wrongIt will succeed before it fails

Wolfgang Munchau

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I can say safely that nobody understands the economic and political consequences of Donald Trump. I am not likening his policies to one of the greatest scientific discoveries of all time. But what the two have in common is radical unpredictability. In quantum mechanics, unpredictability arises at the time of measurement. Economists have the same problem with Trump. We cannot look at the current slew of economic data to see where this is going. If you are an anti-Trump economic evangelist, you are very likely to get things wrong, just as economists did with Brexit or Trump’s first term.

I expect that the US economy will probably be fine. Before you jump to the conclusion that I am a Trump supporter, I can assure you that I am not. Nor was I a Brexit supporter, though I was critical of the self-defeating arguments of the Remain campaign. I see similar dynamics at work in the US right now. Trump’s critics, both in the US and Europe, keep on underestimating him with predictions of imminent gloom.

They predicted that his tariffs would raise inflation. So far that has not happened. I don’t think it will. Some also predicted that the US stock market would soon crash. In fact, Europeans celebrated the collapse in the S&P 500 that followed the Liberation Day tariffs. They erroneously relied on the markets as a corrective mechanism to frustrate Trump’s tariffs. That did not happen. The markets recovered and never looked back. The overall level of tariffs today is at least as high as those announced by Trump on 2 April. They are bound to get higher still, now that he has slapped a 100% tariff on branded pharmaceutical products and a 50% tariff on Ikea furniture.

It does not look like the stock market will do us the favour of crashing during the Trump presidency. It is quite possible that the S&P 500 will rise from its current level of around 6,400 to 10,000. Market valuations could rise from the stratospheric to the mesospheric to the exospheric. Prices will crash eventually. But that might not happen until the next Democratic president.

September 2025 Issue Volume 18, Issue 9

Colin Clarke, Clara Broekaert, Brian Michael Jenkins, Kathleen Collins, Animesh Roul

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The prospect of, and the potential outcomes and dynamics associated with, possible U.S. military action against cartels in Mexico is the subject of our feature article this month—a commentary by preeminent terrorism scholar Brian Michael Jenkins, who has been studying terrorism for over half a century. In it, he describes a complex landscape of actors—from the FTO-designated cartels to the Mexican government to opportunistic hostile foreign powers—with various motives, objectives, and potential counter-responses that could shape and complicate the trajectory of U.S. military involvement and the U.S. campaign. Jenkins urges for “a clear exposition of the objectives to be achieved; a comprehensive appreciation of the situation; a thorough review of all options; and an assessment of the potential consequences of U.S. actions—in particular, an effort to anticipate surprises and possible responses, including escalation and off-ramps; the formulation of concurrent strategies to augment military efforts in Mexico with increased law enforcement measures at home; and above all, ensure domestic law enforcement preparedness for possible cartel responses.”

In our feature analysis this month, Colin Clarke and Clara Broekaert examine the current state of al-Qa`ida, two dozen years after the attacks of September 11th. As they note, al-Qa`ida’s pivot toward franchising has come with both advantages and disadvantages for the group: “Franchising allowed al-Qa`ida to survive a sustained U.S. counterterrorism campaign that decapitated its leadership and drove it from its preferred safe havens. It also helped al-Qa`ida weather the Islamic State storm … But at the same time, the dispersion and franchising model has watered down what al-Qa`ida actually stands for, having a deleterious impact on group cohesion and brand identity.” Despite some ideological incoherence, however, they warn that ignoring al-Qa`ida would be a mistake. “If left unmolested, al-Qa`ida will likely continue to regenerate at a steady pace over time … biding its time until it can strike again.”

Kathleen Collins traces the origins and development of two primarily ethnic Uzbek fighter groups in Syria—Katibat Imam al-Bukhari (KIB) and Katibat Tavhid va Jihod (KTJ)—that were instrumental in supporting Hayat Tahir al-Sham during its campaign for Damascus last fall. She outlines “KIB’s and KTJ’s ongoing ties to al-Qa`ida and the Taliban and recommends that policymakers and counterterrorism experts consider the implications of their continued presence in Syria under the new regime, as well as the potential consequences if they leave Syria.”

Gabbard Ends Intelligence Report on Future Threats to U.S.

Julian E. Barnes and Helene Cooper

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Every four years U.S. intelligence officials have published Global Trends, a public document that predicts what challenges the United States — and the world — will face in the coming decades.

With the intelligence community often focused on immediate issues, the Global Trends report has taken a longer-term look. Past editions warned of threats and shifts that came to pass, including climate change challenges, new immigration patterns and the risk of a pandemic.

But the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, led by Tulsi Gabbard, is eliminating the group that compiles the report.

Some of the warnings, most notably on climate change, had become politically inconvenient, according to former officials.

Ms. Gabbard’s office, in announcing the decision, said the National Intelligence Council’s Strategic Futures Group had “neglected to fulfill the purpose it was created for” and had pursued a partisan political agenda.

“A draft of the 2025 Global Trends report was carefully reviewed by D.N.I. Gabbard’s team and found to violate professional analytic tradecraft standards in an effort to propagate a political agenda that ran counter to all of the current president’s national security priorities,” the office said.

Should The U.S. Continue To Ally With Israel? A Strategic Analysis

Walter E. Block and Oded J. K. Faran

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Critics of U.S. aid to Israel frequently portray the relationship as entirely one-sided, questioning what America gains from this alliance. Senator Bernie Sanders recently argued on the Senate floor that “what we are doing today is aiding and abetting the destruction of the Palestinian people”¹, while Al Jazeera claims “the US is no longer the senior partner in the US-Israel relationship”². The Cato Institute goes further, asserting that “Israel Is a Strategic Liability for the United States”³.

These critiques miss the substantial strategic benefits America derives from this partnership. As one Quora discussion on this topic notes, many people genuinely “don’t understand the benefit” of the U.S.-Israel alliance⁴ to the former. Here’s what the data reveals about why this alliance serves U.S. interests.

Military Capabilities and Strategic Value

According to the 2024 Global Firepower Index, Israel ranks as the world’s fourth most powerful military, despite having only 9.5 million citizens⁵. This ranking is confirmed by the Times of Israel, which reports that “Israel ranks among 10 most powerful countries in annual list; 4th strongest military”⁶. This places Israel ahead of nations like the United Kingdom, France, and Germany in overall military capability. For context, Russia and China occupy the second and third positions respectively, making them problematic alliance partners for the United States.

Israel’s military effectiveness becomes even more impressive when considered on a per-capita basis. The Israeli Defense Forces maintain approximately 170,000 active personnel and 465,000 reserves, creating one of the world’s highest military participation rates relative to population size, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies Military Balance 2024⁷.

Recent conflicts demonstrate this capability. During the 2023-2024 Gaza conflict, Israel has simultaneously engaged multiple adversaries while maintaining operational security and minimizing civilian casualties through precision strikes and advance warnings. Compare this to Russia’s performance in Ukraine, where after nearly three years of warfare against a much smaller military, victory remains elusive despite Russia’s willingness to target civilian infrastructure without warnings of any kind.

Intelligence and Technology Sharing

Update: Why Is Secretary Hegseth Calling His Generals and Admirals to Washington?

Mark F. Cancian

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On September 30, hundreds of generals and admirals will descend on Quantico, Virginia, for a meeting with the secretary of defense, with the president as a late addition. The meeting’s large size, short notice, and lack of an agenda are unprecedented. Indeed, the lack of an agenda has sparked a wide range of rumors, from a purge of senior officers to preparations for war. This Critical Questions lays out what is known publicly about the meeting, what can be inferred, and what this might mean for the military and national security.

Q1: What is the event?

A1: On September 25, the Washington Post reported that Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth had called an in-person meeting of up to 800 flag and general officers (FO/GOs, or officers of one to four stars). This event will take place on Tuesday, September 30, at Marine Corps Base Quantico, located just south of Washington, D.C. The Department of Defense (DOD) has confirmed such a meeting.

President Trump has announced that he will also attend. That makes sense since the commander-in-chief should take advantage of the opportunity to meet with his senior military commanders. On the other hand, it’s unclear why this decision was made two days before the event and not far in advance.

Q2: Is this meeting unprecedented?

A2: Yes, despite Vice President Vance’s downplaying of it: “It’s actually not unusual at all and I think it’s odd that you’ve made it into such a big story.” It is true that meetings of general officers for specific purposes are not unusual. For example, the 11 four-star combatant commanders come to Washington twice a year to meet with the secretary, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the president. Each service has an annual meeting of its flag and general officers and often its senior civilians as well. However, the reported scale, short timeline, and lack of a clear agenda are unprecedented.

Why Is Pete Hegseth Meeting With Hundreds of Generals?

Brandon J. Weichert

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Secretary Hegseth’s secretive meeting with all senior officers tomorrow is likely about President Trump’s proposed national security strategy.

There is, right now, a document bouncing around the Pentagon’s elephantine bureaucracy that has yet to be revealed but has already sparked a high degree of fear and loathing among the professional pearl-clutching set in Washington.

Last week, part of the document, which was drafted under the supervision of current Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, was leaked to Politico. Much to the consternation of Washington’s professional class, the document hints at a significant strategy shift in which the United States will effectively deprioritize its European, Middle Eastern, African, and Indo-Pacific areas of responsibility in favor of Western hemispheric defense.

Pete Hegseth’s Strategic Reprioritization

Rumors abound that Secretary of Defense (and now “Secretary of War”) Pete Hegseth’s secretive meeting in Quantico, Virginia tomorrow, in which all of America’s generals and flag officers and key members of their staffs stationed in all corners of the world will convene in a rare meet-up, is about the proposed national security strategy memo. Because this memo is such a sea change from the last 80 years of US grand strategy, it will likely require a high degree of handholding from the secretary.

Beyond the proposed reorganization of US strategic priorities and resources, it is expected that Hegseth will likely use this possible reorganization of the US military’s combatant commands and overall strategy to pressure elements in the highest ranks of the uniformed military to either retire or risk being fired.

The uniformed leaders who, through the Trump administration’s own as-yet-undeclared rubric, are deemed to be impediments to military readiness will soon face immense pressure. Of course, it should come as no surprise that President Donald Trump—who has had a famously stormy relationship with some of his former generals—wants to purge admirals and generals who are deemed to be “woke” and too supportive of priorities other than warfighting, such as fighting anthropogenic climate change.

By creating a national strategy memo that prioritizes a fundamental reorganization of military commands and forces, Western hemispheric defense, and space-based missile defense, Hegseth can also use it as a cover to pressure the commanders he and Trump want removed for political reasons.

Israel’s Strike on Qatar Is a Disaster for US Gulf Influence

Sara Harmouch, and Abdullah Hayek

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For decades, America’s role in the Gulf rested as much on trust as on power—the belief that hosting US forces guaranteed protection of sovereignty. That belief has now been shaken.

Israel’s strike on Hamas leaders in Doha came as a strategic shock to Hamas, to the United States, and to the Arab world. For Hamas, it may have eliminated senior figures who had taken refuge outside Gaza. For Qatar—a US Major Non-NATO Ally and the host of America’s Al Udeid Air Base, the largest Air Force installation in the Middle East and the forward headquarters of the US Central Command—it marked an unprecedented breach of sovereignty. And for Washington, it struck at the credibility of the security order it has long built in the Gulf.

America’s preeminent position in the Gulf rests on a simple bargain: Arab partners host US forces in exchange for deterrence against external threats and protection of sovereignty. That bargain now looks increasingly fragile. If Arab states conclude that Washington cannot or will not shield them from violations of sovereignty, US security guarantees decline in value, lessening America’s influence and opening the door for other partnerships. Russia and China are already positioned to exploit the gap, offering arms, energy, and diplomatic cover while presenting themselves as more respectful of Arab sovereignty. At the same time, regional powers may accelerate their drive for defense autonomy, with Turkey casting itself as both supplier and enabler. The strike in Doha, in other words, has implications far larger than its immediate target: it calls into question not just one alliance, but the very foundation of US dominance in the Gulf.

Israel’s Strike on Doha Showed the Limits of US Influence

Even as Qatar anchors the US military presence in the Gulf, trust in Washington’s willingness to defend its sovereignty had already begun to fray. Since 2003, Al Udeid has served as CENTCOM’s forward hub for America’s wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria, housing over 10,000 personnel and projecting power across the Gulf, Levant, and South Asia. For Washington, Qatar offers a launchpad at the region’s crossroads. For Doha, on the other hand, the base has long functioned as a shield deterring rivals from direct confrontation. The base’s presence in Qatar proved invaluable during the 2017-2021 Gulf diplomatic crisis, in which three of Qatar’s neighbors severed relations and imposed trade embargoes—but stopped short of direct military intervention, in part due to concerns about how the US would respond.

Ukraine’s Ground-Drone Revolution: A Wake-Up Call for the U.S. Army

Mackenzie Eaglen

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An M1A2 Abrams main battle tank with 1-16th Infantry, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, conducts a Live Fire Accuracy Screening Test Sept. 28, 2025, on Novo Selo Training Area, Bulgaria. The LFAST is used to assess and confirm the accuracy of its firing system before live fire gunnery, ensuring the tank is ready for combat and its firing control systems are functioning correctly. Abrams live fire exercises increase the lethality of crews on collective tables while generating warfighting readiness and combat credible forces along NATO’s Eastern Flank. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Richard Perez)

Key Points and Summary – Ukraine’s war has shifted the drone revolution to the ground, where unmanned ground vehicles now deliver supplies, evacuate wounded, breach mines, conduct ISR, and lay suppressive fire.

-The U.S. Army is racing to adapt—overhauling organizations, consolidating HQs, and pivoting to portfolio-based budgeting to move money faster across counter-UAS, EW, and swarms.

U.S. Marine Corps Sgt. Colin Clark, a mortarman assigned to Bravo Company, Battalion Landing Team 1/5, 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, and a native of Texas, engages a target with a NightFighter S counter-unmanned aerial vehicle system during a demonstration for Philippine Marines assigned to Intelligence Company, 3rd Marine Brigade, as part of exercise KAMANDAG 8 at Tarumpitao Point, Palawan Province, Philippines, Oct. 17, 2024. KAMANDAG is an annual Philippine Marine Corps and U.S. Marine Corps-led exercise aimed at enhancing the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ defense and humanitarian capabilities by providing valuable training in combined operations with foreign militaries in the advancement of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. This year marks the eighth iteration of this exercise and includes participants from the French Armed Forces, Royal Thai Marine Corps, and Indonesian Marine Corps; including continued participation from the Australian Defense Force, British Armed Forces, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, and Republic of Korea Marine Corps. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Amelia Kang)

-Elite units are live-testing expendable drones while new efforts—xTech, “Ready Now,” and the VC-style “Fuze” initiative—aim to scale innovations and avoid the acquisition valley of death.

Putin Attempts to Shift Nuclear Brinkmanship

Pavel K. Baev

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Russian President Vladimir Putin is shifting from overt nuclear brinkmanship to using Russia’s nuclear energy program as a “peaceful” tool of influence, especially through technology transfers to developing countries.

Putin’s proposal to extend some terms of the U.S.–Russia New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) projects restraint but lacks real arms control measures. This move is intended to make the Russian posture toward the West more ambiguous against the background of their ongoing war against Ukraine and gray zone tactics in Europe.

The Kremlin’s softened nuclear rhetoric, paired with recent incursions into European airspace, seeks to split opinion and undermine U.S. and European responses to Russian aggression.

Instead of following the series of aerial Russian provocations in the Baltic Sea region with nuclear brinksmanship, Russian President Vladimir Putin has taken a more subtle tack. At the so-called Global Atomic Forum in Moscow, Putin praised Russia’s nuclear power program and offered to share relevant technologies with “the states of the Global South and East” (President of Russia; Izvestiya, September 25). Only the leaders of Ethiopia and Myanmar were present to applaud this speech, but Rafael Mariano Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), who appears to find it important to cultivate connections with Putin, confirmed Russia’s leadership in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy (RBC, September 26). Putin’s tone was notably different from the address to nuclear scientists at the Sarov federal research center last month, where he held a closed meeting on the Burevestnik nuclear-propelled drone, emphasizing the role of science in strengthening Russia’s strategic deterrence (President of Russia; Vedomosti, August 22; The Moscow Times, August 23).

The key element of Putin’s “peaceful” nuclear campaign is his offer to continue observing the limitations on the size of nuclear arsenals set by the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which is due to expire on February 5, 2026, for an additional year (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, September 22). Putin announced the initiative on September 22 at a special meeting of the Russian Security Council (President of Russia, September 22). State-affiliated media instantly trumpeted this announcement as a major breakthrough, so the Kremlin was disappointed by Washington’s slow response (RIAC, September 24; RIA Novosti, September 26). Russian experts have illuminated the risks of dismantling the basic structure of the arms control system, but the Kremlin’s offer would not actually resume data exchange or any other confidence-building measures (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 29). Putin’s approach may not fully account for the history of New START, which U.S. President Barack Obama signed in Prague in April 2010 and U.S. President Joe Biden extended in the first weeks of his presidency (Kommersant, September 22).

Deal: Military leadership overdue for a reset

Steve Deal

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Are you worried about the president’s meeting with more than 800 senior generals and admirals tomorrow? Consider this: how our military prepares for global conflict hasn’t changed since the Obama era.

And if you also think that America is at an inflection point of global leadership – and, perhaps languishing in terms of defense production – then, maybe, such a unifying connection between senior military leaders isn’t such a bad idea.

So instead of asking why a large meeting of U.S. military leadership is happening in Virginia this week with the President and his Secretary, perhaps we should first ask why we are so concerned in the first place.

If our first thought is distrust of motive, then perhaps we aren’t really thinking for ourselves. That is the work of ideology – to presuppose or preconceive reality. Vermont’s congressional delegation already has that one covered.

Reality is far different. Secretary of War Henry Stimson met with his senior leadership multiple times to guide the country through World War II. So did Robert D. McNamara during Vietnam, for better or worse. As did Richard Cheney during Gulf War I, and again Donald Rumsfeld after 9/11.

Even when gatherings were limited to four- and three-stars, the impact upon their enormous, far-flung staffs — filled with two- and one-star officers, aides, and other support elements — has always made such presidential- and secretarial-level events momentous, if not temporarily paralyzing.

So, what might our concerns about this meeting presuppose? What realities lie behind such worry?

First, some may well believe that our country is fully ready for the next epoch in technology, weapons systems, and the kind of education, training, and talent management needed for Americans willing to serve. In that thinking, such a large meeting just slows progress for leaders already working on the right things.

Feature Commentary: Confronting Cartels: Military Considerations South of the Border

Brian Michael Jenkins

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Abstract: Possible U.S. military action against Mexico’s drug cartels poses unique challenges. The situation is complicated, and the United States must be prepared for possible counteractions. The cartels are not a single actor. If attacked, they may avoid direct confrontation, accepting temporary losses, anticipating that the United States will not sustain a long campaign. Or Mexico’s cartels may respond violently, exploiting U.S. vulnerabilities in Mexico—and possibly north of the border. The government of Mexico is a separate actor. It can assist or undermine U.S. efforts. Past government campaigns against the cartels led to soaring rates of criminal violence. Chaos in Mexico could have serious implications for U.S. homeland security. The United States needs a ‘Red Team’ to examine a range of scenarios. The article proceeds in six parts: Part I contrasts recent U.S. military actions in Yemen and Iran with possible military action in Mexico. Part II examines perceptions of the threat. Part III examines how the history of U.S.-Mexico relations will shape the battlefield. Part IV reviews our own experience in combating foreign drug traffickers, offering some preliminary takeaways. Part V examines possible options. Part VI looks at how the cartels might react, how the United States might be forced to respond—and how other adversaries of the United States might attempt to exploit the situation.

Recent public statements from the White House and news media reports suggest that the United States is preparing for military action against Mexico’s drug cartels. On January 20, 2025, the president designated six Mexican cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. In the following weeks, the United States deployed several active-duty Army and National Guard units, including a Stryker Brigade combat team and a general support aviation battalion, to combat illegal immigration and drug trafficking.1 U.S. Navy destroyers were deployed to “restore territorial integrity at the U.S. Southern border” and assist in preventing narcotrafficking and operations against transnational criminal organizations.2 The destroyers, which will be accompanied by U.S. Coast Guard vessels, will strengthen maritime interdiction capabilities, but they are also armed with Tomahawk missiles, which recently were used in the bombardment of Houthi targets in Yemen.