Indian Strategic Studies: 10/04/25

4 October 2025

The Red Tumor: The Growth and Persistence of the Naxalite Insurgency and India’s Response

Dharma Bhatt

Insurgencies have existed throughout history, shaping the dynamics of state governance and stability across various regions. According to the Central Intelligence Agency, an insurgency is a political-military activity involving the control of territory within a country through irregular forces, aimed at weakening a government’s authority while building its own. Common tactics employed by insurgent groups include guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and political mobilization. The success of insurgencies requires strong morale, effective leadership, supportive infrastructure, and access to a sanctuary. In India, multiple insurgencies are currently operating at varying degrees, with the most well-known being the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) conflict since 1989.

The Naxalite insurgency, also known as the “Maoist” insurgency, has persisted longer than the J&K insurgency and still exists in central and eastern India. Specifically, the Naxals mainly operate in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, and Jharkhand, with some presence in Karnataka, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal; collectively called the “Red Corridor.” The Naxalites structure their activities and insurgent ideology around Maoism, a subset of communism characterized by an anti-capitalist stance and a focus on armed revolution. The presence of the Naxalites is driven not merely by a desire to seize land and territory, but to increase control and engage in efforts to disrupt state authority functions. This paper will review and evaluate the effectiveness of the methodologies and strategies employed by the Naxalites in waging the insurgency, as well as the role of the Indian government in its respective counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts.

India’s Relation to Naxalites

Like most Asian states during the 20th century, communism was a growing ideology often found in a post-colonial state. Many took a liking to the ideology based on anti-imperialist sentiment and to push back against the ruling class. In India specifically, the Communist Party of India (CPI), founded in 1925, created a medium to consolidate the communist ideology in India. Peasant rebellion is a familiar occurrence in India, given its history as a colony of the British Empire. The sentiment in support of communism had already existed and persisted even after India achieved independence in 1947. In 1964, following a series of miscalculations and a lack of support from foreign states, such as the Soviet Union, the CPI experienced a schism, with the Communist Party of India (Maoist) (CPI-M) emerging.

The Stunning Reversal in U.S.-India Relations

Isaac Chotiner

Almost exactly six years ago, Donald Trump and Narendra Modi headlined an event in the Houston Texans’ football stadium called “Howdy, Modi.” Trump, then in his first term as President of the United States, and Modi, just beginning his second term as Prime Minister of India, held hands and waved to a crowd of around fifty thousand people. The two leaders had each risen to power by taking over their country’s dominant conservative parties—in Modi’s case, the Bharatiya Janata Party (B.J.P.)—and reorienting them around the demonization of ethnic or religious minorities and the promise of economic competence. During Trump’s Howdy, Modi speech, he said, “You have never had a better friend as President than President Donald Trump, that I can tell you.” There are more than five million people of Indian origin in the U.S., and in three Presidential elections Trump has steadily increased his vote share in that group, from under thirty per cent, in 2016, to nearly forty per cent last year, according to some estimates. (Modi is tremendously popular with the Indian diaspora.)

And yet, despite the fact that Trump is back in office, and Modi was elected to a third consecutive term, the relationship between the two countries is at its lowest point in many years. Earlier this summer, Trump put a twenty-five-per-cent tariff on India; then, in late August, he doubled it to fifty per cent, arguing that the rate was meant to punish India for buying Russian oil. Trump had already enraged some Indians by taking credit for brokering a ceasefire, in May, between India and Pakistan, after the countries had engaged in their worst military conflict in decades. (Pakistan’s government said that it would nominate Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize; Modi, on a tense phone call with Trump, was reportedly unwilling to support such a proposal.) And now Modi, whose country was once seen by Washington as a bulwark against China in Asia, recently visited Tianjin as part of Xi Jinping’s push to create a new global diplomatic architecture without the United States.

To talk about the India-America relationship, I recently spoke by phone with Milan Vaishnav, a senior fellow and director of the South Asia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed why Trump has really turned against India, whether Modi’s political standing in India is finally showing some signs of strain, and why Indian Americans have been so quiet about Trump’s India policies.

Flights in Afghanistan grounded after internet shutdown

Mahfouz Zubaide, Hafizullah Maroof and Anbarasan Ethirajan

Afghanistan's main airport is at a standstill as the country grapples with the fallout of a nationwide internet shutdown imposed by the Taliban government.

The Taliban has yet to give an official reason for the decision, which took effect on Monday, but did say it would last until further notice. The UN said it risked inflicting significant harm.

Communication within Afghanistan, and out to the wider world, has been severely affected, as have essential services - including banking and payments - and access to online education, a lifeline for many women and girls.

Kabul airport, meanwhile, was "nearly deserted", according to one resident, with no evidence of planes arriving or leaving.

#Flight tracking service Flightradar24 showed that a handful of incoming and outgoing flights on Tuesday had been cancelled. Many more simply had their status marked as "unknown".

One passenger who planned to fly into Kabul International Airport on Tuesday was told there would be no flights until Thursday at the earliest.

Another local said all flights from Kabul airport had been cancelled since Monday evening.

He added that life in Kabul "seems to be normal", but added that there was "no communication at all" across the country.

The United Nations mission in Afghanistan called on the Taliban authorities to immediately and fully restore nationwide internet and telecommunications access.

"The cut in access has left Afghanistan almost completely cut off from the outside world, and risks inflicting significant harm on the Afghan people, including by threatening economic stability and exacerbating one of the world's worst humanitarian crises," it said in a statement.

'We are blind without internet'

Five Takeaways About the Culture of Lawlessness in the U.S. Special Forces

Matthieu Aikins

In Afghanistan, during the United States’ longest war, special operators like the Green Berets shouldered a disproportionate share of the fighting. At home, they were held up as heroes for their highly publicized exploits. But behind the glory, there was a dark side the public did not see: a culture of rule-breaking that led to war crimes and, eventually, a vigilante ethos openly embraced by leaders at home.

This troubling history has been shrouded by the Army’s intense secrecy around its operators. In the past four years, I interviewed two dozen current and former members of Army Special Operations, including some who were willing to publicly accuse the organization of misconduct. The Times filed lawsuits that yielded thousands of pages of previously unpublished investigations, detainee files and other military records. To track down and interview scores of local witnesses, I made multiple trips to Afghanistan, where I have been reporting since 2008.

A spokeswoman for Army Special Operations, Lt. Col. Allie Scott, defended the organization. “We have fully investigated and adjudicated the cases you cover,” she wrote. “We are confident our actions stand up to the strictest scrutiny.”

Until now, it hasn’t been possible to reckon with many of these events because they were kept secret. Doing so helps us to understand not only the toll of the war on the U.S’s elite forces but also our current political moment, as the Trump administration loosens restraints on the military, orders lethal military strikes on alleged Venezuelan “narco-terrorists” in the Caribbean and deploys troops to American cities.

The Chance to Save Myanmar

Dan Swift and Sean Turnell

Since Myanmar’s military overthrew the country’s democratically elected government in 2021, it has ruled with devastating violence. Junta forces have bombed civilians in a bid to suppress rebellious provinces, killing thousands. Junta-supported paramilitary groups have targeted political opponents and their families. And the regime has furthered an ethnic cleansing campaign against the Rohingya, a Muslim-minority population. Since 2017, Myanmar’s military has killed tens of thousands of Rohingya and exiled hundreds of thousands more to neighboring Bangladesh; in early 2025, the junta cut off food and supplies to the 130,000 Rohingya in Myanmar living in prison-like refugee camps, leading to starvation and

In the race to attract the world’s smartest minds, China is gaining on the US

Simone McCarthy, Joyce Jiang, and Yong Xiong

A Princeton nuclear physicist. A mechanical engineer who helped NASA explore manufacturing in space. A US National Institutes of Health neurobiologist. Celebrated mathematicians. And over half a dozen AI experts. The list of research talent leaving the US to work in China is glittering – and growing.

At least 85 rising and established scientists working in the US have joined Chinese research institutions full-time since the start of last year, with more than half making the move in 2025, according to a CNN tally – a trend experts say is poised to expand as the White House pushes to slash research budgets and steps up scrutiny of foreign talent, while Beijing increases investment in homegrown innovation.

Most are part of a so-called reverse brain drain that is raising questions about the US’ long-term ability to attract and keep top-tier foreign scientists – a singular quality that has underpinned its status as the world’s undisputed leader in tech and science throughout the post-World War II period.

And that could have an impact on the race between Washington and Beijing to dominate future-shaping industries such as AI, quantum computing, semi-conductors, biotech and intelligent military hardware.

The Chinese government has for years looked for ways to attract talented international scientists, including the thousands of Chinese researchers who left the country to pursue advanced degrees in the US and other countries, many of whom went on to become pioneers and leaders in American science and technology.

That mission has only become more critical as the US maintains tight tech controls over China, and Chinese leader Xi Jinping increasingly sees the country’s ability to innovate as the only path to economic security.

Now, as the administration of US President Donald Trump pushes for massive cuts to federal research budgets, ramps up government oversight of research, dramatically hikes the price of H1-B visas for specialized foreign workers, and uses federal funding as leverage against universities, the mission is getting a boost.

Rare Earth Regulation Shifts From Decentralized Planning to Centralized Control

Shijie Wang

Beijing has shifted its rare earth management model to a “total volume control” system, in which annual production caps are set centrally and allocated directly to enterprises. This reflects tighter centralization and a new focus on controlling overall output rather than mandating production targets.

New measures realesed in August derive authority from the Mineral Resources Law and the Rare Earth Regulations, elevating rare earth governance from earlier measures implemented in 2012 and reinforcing Beijing’s ability to close loopholes and strengthen enforcement.

Industry participation is now limited to state-designated groups, and all production and sales must be recorded on a centralized traceability platform. This ensures rare earths remain firmly under central control, reduces opportunities for illicit flows, and enhances Beijing’s leverage in global competition.

On August 22, the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), together with the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR), jointly issued the “Interim Measures for the Administration of Total Volume Control over Rare Earth Mining and Rare Earth Smelting and Separation” (稀土开采和稀土冶炼分离总量调控管理暂行办法), replacing the “Interim Measures for the Administration of Rare Earth Directive Production Plans” (稀土指令性生产计划管理暂行办法) issued in 2012 (MIIT, August 22).

The new regulation retains some characteristics of a planned economy, with output still under the control of the central government. It also introduces upgrades and revisions to how the industry is regulated, enhancing central oversight, reducing the power of local governments, and digitizing data collection on supply chain flows.

State Advances Regulatory Authority Over Sector

Israel’s Strike on Qatar Is a Disaster for US Gulf Influence

Sara Harmouch, and Abdullah Hayek

For decades, America’s role in the Gulf rested as much on trust as on power—the belief that hosting US forces guaranteed protection of sovereignty. That belief has now been shaken.

Israel’s strike on Hamas leaders in Doha came as a strategic shock to Hamas, to the United States, and to the Arab world. For Hamas, it may have eliminated senior figures who had taken refuge outside Gaza. For Qatar—a US Major Non-NATO Ally and the host of America’s Al Udeid Air Base, the largest Air Force installation in the Middle East and the forward headquarters of the US Central Command—it marked an unprecedented breach of sovereignty. And for Washington, it struck at the credibility of the security order it has long built in the Gulf.

America’s preeminent position in the Gulf rests on a simple bargain: Arab partners host US forces in exchange for deterrence against external threats and protection of sovereignty. That bargain now looks increasingly fragile. If Arab states conclude that Washington cannot or will not shield them from violations of sovereignty, US security guarantees decline in value, lessening America’s influence and opening the door for other partnerships. Russia and China are already positioned to exploit the gap, offering arms, energy, and diplomatic cover while presenting themselves as more respectful of Arab sovereignty. At the same time, regional powers may accelerate their drive for defense autonomy, with Turkey casting itself as both supplier and enabler. The strike in Doha, in other words, has implications far larger than its immediate target: it calls into question not just one alliance, but the very foundation of US dominance in the Gulf.

Israel’s Strike on Doha Showed the Limits of US Influence

Even as Qatar anchors the US military presence in the Gulf, trust in Washington’s willingness to defend its sovereignty had already begun to fray. Since 2003, Al Udeid has served as CENTCOM’s forward hub for America’s wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria, housing over 10,000 personnel and projecting power across the Gulf, Levant, and South Asia. For Washington, Qatar offers a launchpad at the region’s crossroads. For Doha, on the other hand, the base has long functioned as a shield deterring rivals from direct confrontation. The base’s presence in Qatar proved invaluable during the 2017-2021 Gulf diplomatic crisis, in which three of Qatar’s neighbors severed relations and imposed trade embargoes—but stopped short of direct military intervention, in part due to concerns about how the US would respond.

A Ceasefire Alone Won’t Result in Israeli-Palestinian Peace

Ronit Levine Schnur

Ceasefires must be stepping stones, not dead ends

US president Donald Trump and Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s declaration on September 29, 2025, marks a notable political moment. It highlights the power of strong personalities to push through agreements, pause violence, and open channels of dialogue. Ceasefires matter. Returning the hostages matters. Ending Hamas’s terrorist control over Gaza matters. But if the last three decades of Middle Eastern diplomacy have taught us anything, it is that advancing such important steps cannot substitute for institutions and long-term state-building. Durable peace requires a deeper strategy.

From Leaders to Institutions

Leadership charisma can deliver breakthroughs, and Trump’s leadership is, in contemporary politics, unparalleled. But institutions are what sustain peace once the spotlight fades. Without functioning institutions—parliaments, courts, fiscal authorities, police forces—the foundations of a stable state remain fragile. For Palestinians, this means that nation-building must precede or at least accompany any political resolution. A moderate, demilitarized, democratic (“MDD”) Palestinian polity cannot emerge simply as a byproduct of negotiations with Israel, where the focus currently resides. It must rest on a domestic architecture of governance that is legitimate, transparent, and effective.

From Bilateral to Multilateral

The declaration, like many before it, leans heavily on bilateral interaction—leader-to-leader negotiations, Israel vis-à-vis the Palestinians, the United States as sponsor. But the Middle East’s complexity cannot be managed bilaterally. Regional frameworks are indispensable. They pool resources, set common standards, and create shared stakes in peace. The Abraham Accords provided an important precedent, but they remain essentially a series of bilateral normalization deals. What is needed now is a regional institutional framework: a multilateral body anchored in Arab partners and supported by extra-regional actors, and ideally chaired by Washington, with a mandate that extends beyond peacemaking to economic investment, security oversight, and dispute resolution.

From Ceasefire to Peace

Let Them Fly: To Generate Drone Combat Readiness, Army Installations Must Step Up

Charlie Phelps

The ridgelines were jagged and unforgiving, carved by centuries of wind and water. On a narrow plateau above a coastal highway, Task Force Wolfhound had just completed hasty defensive preparations. The task force, built around a reinforced infantry battalion with attached fires, engineers, and expeditionary sustainment support, faced an adversary division equipped with armor, long-range artillery, and rotary-wing aviation in support, advancing south. Task Force Wolfhound had been deployed on a Pacific Pathways rotation in US Indo-Pacific Command’s area of responsibility, but was quickly caught in the middle of a cascade of geopolitical events. The venerated Wolfhounds of the 25th Infantry Division rapidly transitioned from executing operations in competition to doing so in crisis—and now found themselves on the cusp of armed conflict. By every conventional measure, Task Force Wolfhound was outnumbered and outgunned, but it possessed a decisive edge: small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) integrated at echelon from fire teams to the battalion headquarters. As a derivative of the Army Transformation Initiative, efforts within the Army’s Maneuver Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate, and Project Convergence, the Wolfhounds were determined to not relive the memory of Task Force Smith.

Upon receiving the directive to dig in and fight, the task force commander had ordered every company to seed engagement areas with hundreds of sUAS of varying size and purpose. Soldiers referred to it as “the swarm,” though in reality it was a carefully orchestrated ecosystem of sensors, decoys, and strike-capable platforms. Some drones were the size of a person’s hand, operating at treetop level and tasked with finding enemy scouts and screening elements. Others were Group 2 quadcopters, equipped with thermal cameras and loitering munitions. Still others carried electronic warfare payloads to jam adversary GPS signals or spoof targeting radars. Critically, these systems were operated at the company, platoon, and squad levels, allowing leaders to direct their employment to meet commander’s intent.

The Wolfhounds built their engagement areas not only on terrain, obstacles, and fires, but on data. By midafternoon, drone operators had mapped every approach route with high-resolution imagery, tagging choke points where engineers emplaced obstacles and mining systems. Real-time aerial feeds confirmed when enemy reconnaissance patrols attempted to breach these obstacles. A platoon leader from Borzoi Company received a drone alert showing adversary sappers clearing a lane through a minefield. Within minutes, he retasked a loitering munition to destroy their breaching vehicle, forcing the enemy main body to halt. This was the essence of Task Force Wolfhound’s defense: drones extending eyes, ears, and weapons far forward of the line of contact, disrupting tempo before the first artillery rounds landed.

The Middle East That Israel Has Made

Galip Dalay and Sanam Vakil

The countries of the Middle East increasingly see Israel as their new shared threat. Israel’s war in Gaza, its expansionist military policies, and its revisionist posture are reshaping the region in ways that few anticipated. Its September strike on Hamas’s political leaders in Qatar—the seventh country hit by Israel since the October 7, 2023, attacks, in addition to the Palestinian territories—has shaken Gulf states and cast doubt on the credibility of the U.S. security umbrella. In the last two years, Israeli leaders have hailed their evisceration of Hezbollah’s leadership in Lebanon, their repeated strikes on targets in Yemen, and their battering of Iran. But rather than consolidate Israeli power or improve relations with Arab states that have long been wary of Iran and its proxies, these actions are backfiring. States that once regarded Israel as a potential partner, including the Gulf monarchies, now perceive it as a dangerous and unpredictable actor.

This week, U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced a new 20-point “peace plan,” celebrating the framework as a major breakthrough and a way to return stability to the region. But its prospects are dim as long as Israel continues to behave aggressively and ignores the legitimate demands and concerns of Palestinians. Although a raft of leaders in the region have welcomed the announcement, the plan seems unlikely to reverse the damage of two years of war. Before the October 2023 attacks, Israel, with strong American backing, had hoped to remake the region to its advantage, casting itself as a partner for Arab governments while sidelining rivals, notably Iran. Now, Israel has only isolated itself, made Arab states reluctant to stomach the reputational and political costs of working with it, and turned former partners into wary adversaries.

Many countries in the region are responding to Israeli aggression by diversifying their security partnerships, investing in their own autonomy, and moving away from normalization with Israel. A welter of projects that sought to bind Israel closer to Arab countries—principally with the help of the United States, but also with Indian and European support—will likely fall by the wayside. That is bad news not just for Israel but also for the United States. Unstinting American support for Israel is undermining Washington’s standing in the region. Where once the threat of Iran could encourage states in the region to hew close to the U.S. line, the specter of a bristling Israel now pushes them away from the United States.

To Survive, the United Nations Must Leave America

CARL BILDT

While the demand for what the United Nations does is as great as ever, its ability to deliver has obviously been diminished. There is no way for it to survive without scaling back its ambitions and abilities, and that, in turn, may require a move to a more hospitable country.

STOCKHOLM – The annual United Nations General Assembly is always an occasion for taking stock of the state of the world. But this year, on the 80th anniversary of the UN’s founding, it was also an occasion to take stock of the organization itself.

By any measure, the UN’s situation is dire. While Russian aggression against Ukraine and mounting tensions between the United States and China cannot be blamed on the UN, they do highlight a fundamental problem. The UN Security Council – where China, Russia, and the US each wield a veto – is locked in a permanent confrontation over one issue or another, blocking the rest of the organization from moving forward on almost anything.

Consider the situation in the Middle East, where the UN has played a central role in conflict resolution and peacemaking ever since the State of Israel was established (under a UN resolution). Numerous UN peacekeeping operations in the region have helped to alleviate tensions, and massive humanitarian efforts, primarily aimed at Palestinian refugee communities, have saved countless lives. While the UN has not forged a lasting peace, it has certainly helped prevent some wars and shorten others.

In recent years, however, the UN has increasingly been sidelined. The so-called Quartet – the UN, the US, the European Union, and Russia – is now a distant memory, and numerous UN operations have come under direct attack, primarily by Israel. The Israeli government not only questions the humanitarian efforts of UNRWA (the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees) but now also blocks the organization’s work whenever it can.

Strategic Autonomy: A Reality Check

James Jay Carafano

What does “strategic autonomy” really mean?

Are we entering an era of strategic autonomy? I think so. Is that a good thing? Yep, I’m pretty sure it is. Is this concept really well understood? Ah, well, you got me there. I’m not so sure.

Strategic Autonomy’s Bus to Nowhere

So many times, folks have invoked an old army colloquialism, about “jumping on the bus to Abilene.” The story goes that when others climbed on the bus, there was one guy who stepped out of line, asking, “Is that really where we want to go,” waving in the rearview mirror from the gravel parking lot, through a cloud of diesel and asphalt. Only long after the Greyhound had left the station did the passengers begin to question if groupthink was a good idea (because let’s be honest, who wants to go to Abilene?).

Since the end of the Cold War, we were so anxious for a new framing consensus after containment that crowds pilled on the geopolitical joyride, like a mob at Krispy Kreme grasping for free Ozempic prescriptions—declaring the end of history; bracing for the clash of civilizations; and dreading the Thucydides Trap—only to demand ticket refunds in retrospect.

Now in the halls of the UN, stranded on broken escalators and befuddled by inoperative teleprompters, they fret over the demise of the rules-based order and brace for great power competition—another set of unexamined ideas already as expired as leftovers in the back of the fridge.

The term “rules-based order” was coined after it became clear that no one was following the rules. After all, if there were actually such a setup, Russia would not have invaded Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia; China would not be threatening Taiwan, Iran would not have launched its surrogates at Israel, and the United States wouldn’t be ignoring the WTO. If there really were an order—in a myth created by the United Nations, the European Union, and a host of other multinational gangs—the order would have policed itself. Clearly, it has not.

2025 Future Force Capabilities e-Book

Inside the pages of the Future Force Capabilities e-Book by National Defense Magazine is an in-depth look at the most pressing themes discussed at NDIA’s 2025 Future Force Conference and Exhibition.

This e-Book covers critical capability topics including munitions, armaments, robotics, explosive ordnance disposal and more.

Secretary of War Pete Hegseth Addresses General and Flag Officers at Quantico, Virginia

SECRETARY OF WAR PETE HEGSETH: Mr. Chairman, the joint chiefs, generals, admirals, commanders, officers, senior enlisted, NCOs, enlisted and every member of our American military, good morning.

UNKNOWN: Morning.

SECRETARY OF WAR PETE HEGSETH: Good morning and welcome to the War Department because the era of the Department of Defense is over. You see, the motto of my first platoon was those who long for peace must prepare for war. This is, of course, not a new idea. This crowd knows that.

The origin dates to fourth century Rome and has been repeated ever since, including by our first commander in chief, George Washington, the first leader of the War Department. It captures a simple yet profound truth. To ensure peace, we must prepare for war.

From this moment forward, the only mission of the newly restored Department of War is this: warfighting, preparing for war and preparing to win, unrelenting and uncompromising in that pursuit not because we want war, no one here wants war, but it's because we love peace. We love peace for our fellow citizens. They deserve peace, and they rightfully expect us to deliver.

Our number one job, of course, is to be strong so that we can prevent war in the first place. The president talks about it all the time. It's called peace through strength. And as history teaches us, the only people who actually deserve peace are those who are willing to wage war to defend it.

That's why pacifism is so naive and dangerous. It ignores human nature and it ignores human history. Either you protect your people and your sovereignty or you will be subservient to something or someone. It's a truth as old as time.

And since waging war is so costly in blood and treasure, we owe our republic a military that will win any war we choose or any war that is thrust upon us. Should our enemies choose foolishly to challenge us, they will be crushed by the violence, precision and ferocity of the War Department. In other words, to our enemies, FAFO.

How America Outcompeted Japan

Carl Benedikt Frey

In Washington today, a familiar anxiety hangs in the air. American policymakers fear that China will leapfrog the United States in the technologies that matter most, including robotics and artificial intelligence. The United States has been here before, in the 1980s. Then, the specter wasn’t Beijing but Tokyo. Best-selling books such as Japan as Number One warned of Japanese dominance. The PBS series Frontline aired the documentary “Losing the War to Japan.” Silicon Valley looked spent after U.S. producers exited the market for memory chips such as DRAM. Detroit, humbled by the Japanese carmaker Toyota’s lean production, seemed a cautionary tale. Japan’s grip on automobiles and consumer electronics appeared unshakable.

But by 1995, when the information technology boom finally showed up in productivity statistics, the United States had pulled decisively ahead. Forecasts of relative American decline were wrong not because Japan stumbled but because the United States excelled when it mattered at the opening of the computer age. The United States didn’t beat Japan by building tariff walls or propping up national champions. U.S. leadership rested on open competition and the flexibility to rewire supply chains globally as technology shifted—in a word, dynamism.

Today, the Trump administration seems to have forgotten that lesson. Since returning to the presidency, Donald Trump has urged Intel’s chief to resign, demanded a 15 percent remittance to Washington on certain Nvidia and Advanced Micro Devices chip sales to China, and carved out a government “golden share” in U.S. Steel as part of the Japanese company Nippon Steel’s takeover. Such arbitrary, deal-by-deal interventions break with the rules-based approach that kept the United States ahead of Japan.

How the United States outcompeted Japan is more than history: it’s a guide to the China challenge. Tokyo’s economic model looked unbeatable for a time, as Beijing’s does now. But the tools that make U.S. markets more innovative and, in the end, more competitive haven’t changed—and Washington should not discard policies that have worked.

More EU defence, but where is the money?

The European Union’s schoolmarm in chief, Ursula von der Leyen, has called her unruly charges together this week in Copenhagen, where she will rap knuckles and extract commitments needed “… to enhance our readiness and have the tools to be able to react to threats when needed.” Exactly what tools the EU could employ to deter an aggressive Russia remains unclear, although they will certainly depend on money. Lots of money. Talk of a “drone wall” to protect all of eastern Europe from future airborne incursions is cheap, but the reality remains beyond the EU’s technical or financial capacity. As von der Leyen knows, cash is pretty tight in Europe. France is struggling to cut its staggering deficit, and even Germany recognises that its welfare state is not financially sustainable.

The EU as a whole is embroiled in a vicious backroom fight over its next seven-year budget, with the net takers resolved to retain their benefits, and the net payers determined to limit new spending. Commission plans to amalgamate farming subsidies and regional development aid under general national accounts are rightly seen by the primary recipients as a prelude to eventual cuts to these programmes, and they are fighting hard to preserve their traditional entitlements. Looming over this dispute is the impending need to begin repayment of the massive pandemic rescue loans incurred by Brussels, an obligation estimated to exceed 15 per cent of the bloc’s annual spending. At the same time, the EU is scratching around in the sofa cushions for the additional €9 billion Ukraine needs by the end of the year to continue basic government operations. Not exactly an ideal time to pass the hat for new and expensive military commitments needed to “react to threats when needed”.

But what other than cash does the EU bring to European security? It doesn’t command military forces, procure equipment, or possess a planning staff worth the name. NATO remains the indispensable security provider for Europe, with decades of experience in arranging national military budgets in the service of a common defence. Donald Trump managed a neat trick in arranging for EU states to buy American equipment for Ukraine. But additional EU monies funnelled through NATO will happen only over strenuous French objections. NATO cannot discriminate against American suppliers, and will use any EU money as it sees fit, which may well favour US defence contractor Raytheon over French defence corporation Thales. Were the EU able to issue debt and pour funds directly into defence programmes, it could claim an equal voice at NATO in how those monies were used.

In Ukraine, the whispers of Vietnam could soon become shouts

Harlan Ullman

Perhaps historical amnesia is not such a bad thing, despite George Santayana’s warning in 1905’s “The Life of Reason” that those who “cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

One reason is that, even with recollections of the past, we are often doomed to repeat its blunders and even catastrophic errors. After all, what did the U.S. learn from its Vietnam failures that it did not repeat in Afghanistan and Iraq three decades later?

That said, links between the Ukraine War and Vietnam do provide intellectual fodder in assessing how this conflict may evolve and eventually end. What is interesting is that after the 1954 division of French Indo-China into North and South Vietnam, Ukraine could be seen as a representation of either.

The North was determined to unite Vietnam. As it recovered from the war with France and began rebuilding a state under communist design, its leader, Ho Chi Minh, understood it would be a long struggle, possibly lasting decades.

Ho also realized that the basis for his unification strategy would be to exploit fault lines in the South — first between the rich, who governed to their benefit, and the poor and out-of-power who suffered; then between various religions, including Buddhism, Catholicism and the Can Dai and Hoa Hao sects.

This led to his establishment of cadres of revolutionaries in the South, some of whom had interests diverging from Hanoi’s. Over time, these groups would gradually increase control of parts of the south, and the government in Saigon was unable to reverse their gains. The rest is history.

Fearful of dominoes falling in South East Asia to the so-called Sino-Soviet communist monolith — that could not have been a more mistaken assumption — in 1961, the new Kennedy administration acted. Promising to pay any price and bear any burden, the U.S. slid into what would become the Vietnam quagmire.

Why Is Pete Hegseth Meeting With Hundreds of Generals?

Brandon J. Weichert

Secretary Hegseth’s secretive meeting with all senior officers tomorrow is likely about President Trump’s proposed national security strategy.

There is, right now, a document bouncing around the Pentagon’s elephantine bureaucracy that has yet to be revealed but has already sparked a high degree of fear and loathing among the professional pearl-clutching set in Washington.

Last week, part of the document, which was drafted under the supervision of current Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, was leaked to Politico. Much to the consternation of Washington’s professional class, the document hints at a significant strategy shift in which the United States will effectively deprioritize its European, Middle Eastern, African, and Indo-Pacific areas of responsibility in favor of Western hemispheric defense.

Pete Hegseth’s Strategic Reprioritization

Rumors abound that Secretary of Defense (and now “Secretary of War”) Pete Hegseth’s secretive meeting in Quantico, Virginia tomorrow, in which all of America’s generals and flag officers and key members of their staffs stationed in all corners of the world will convene in a rare meet-up, is about the proposed national security strategy memo. Because this memo is such a sea change from the last 80 years of US grand strategy, it will likely require a high degree of handholding from the secretary.

Beyond the proposed reorganization of US strategic priorities and resources, it is expected that Hegseth will likely use this possible reorganization of the US military’s combatant commands and overall strategy to pressure elements in the highest ranks of the uniformed military to either retire or risk being fired.

The uniformed leaders who, through the Trump administration’s own as-yet-undeclared rubric, are deemed to be impediments to military readiness will soon face immense pressure. Of course, it should come as no surprise that President Donald Trump—who has had a famously stormy relationship with some of his former generals—wants to purge admirals and generals who are deemed to be “woke” and too supportive of priorities other than warfighting, such as fighting anthropogenic climate change.

Ukraine’s Plan to Starve the Russian War Machine

Anne Applebaum

In one section of a sprawling warehouse in central Ukraine, workers have stacked what appear to be small airplane wings in neat rows. In another section, a group of men is huddled around what looks like the body of an aircraft, adjusting an electronic panel. In makeshift locations elsewhere in Ukraine, workers are producing these electronic panels from scratch: This company wants to use as few imported parts as possible, avoiding anything American, anything Chinese. Jewelers, I was told, have turned out to be well suited for this kind of finicky manufacturing. Ukraine’s justly celebrated manicurists are good at it too.

They are not alone in being new to the job. Everyone in this factory had a different profession three years ago, because this factory did not exist three years ago. Nor did the Ukrainian drone industry, of which it forms part. Whatever their job description before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, everyone at this production site is now part of a major shift in the politics and economics of the war, one that hasn’t been fully understood by all of Ukraine’s allies.

Once almost entirely dependent on imports of weapons from abroad, the Ukrainians are now producing millions of drones, large and small, as well as other kinds of weapons, every year. They are using them most famously on the front line, where they have prevented the Russians from making large-scale gains this year, despite dire headlines, and where they have ensured that any territory occupied by the Russians comes at a terrible price, in equipment and lives. The Ukrainians have also used sea drones to clear their Black Sea coast of Russian ships, an accomplishment that seemed impossible even to imagine at the start of the war.

Finally, they are using drones to hit distant targets, deep inside Russia, and lately they are hitting so many military objects, refineries, and pipelines that some Ukrainians believe they can do enough damage to force the Russians to end the war. On Monday, they once again struck Gazprom’s fuel-processing plant in Astrakhan, for example, one of the largest gas-chemical complexes in the world and an important source of both gasoline and diesel. Yesterday, they hit a key part of an oil pipeline in Bryansk. Presumably President Volodymyr Zelensky transmitted this optimism to President Donald Trump, who again upended his administration’s previous policies yesterday and declared that Ukraine is “in a position to fight and WIN all of Ukraine back in its original form.”

Fortifying America: Is the Pentagon Ready?

Henry Sokolski

Soon, the Pentagon will release its National Security Strategy. It’s rumored to rank homeland security as priority one. Enforcing immigration controls, defending America against missile attacks, and countering narco-terrorist operations are sure to get mission plus-ups.

None of this, though, will be enough: in addition, the Pentagon will have to double down on defending America’s critical civilian infrastructure. A quick scan of recent headlines overseas explains why and affords a solid peek of what we’re in for.

Last week, drones overflew major airports in Copenhagen and Oslo. A ransomware attack disrupted passenger security screening systems in Berlin, London, Brussels, and Dublin, shutting down operations throughout the weekend.

These assaults on Europe’s air transport system align with several years of suspicious train derailments and telecom and electrical supply system cable cuts in Sweden, Norway, Finland, and the Baltic Sea. Two major train derailments have occurred along the Malmbanan iron ore line which connects Norway, Sweden, and the Baltic Sea near Finland and Estonia – a prime target for Russian sabotage.

Since 2022, ten subsea cables connecting Baltic Sea states, including several telecom cables and one power cable, have been cut, with seven cuts occurring between November 2024 and January 2025. China and Russia are the suspected perpetrators. Halfway around the world, Taiwan is suffering repeated telecom cable cuts as well. Beijing is suspect.

Well above sea level, Russia has been jamming satellite telecom links in Ukraine and GPS signals for civilian aircraft in Europe. Russian electronic warfare bases, particularly in Kaliningrad, have been directly linked to widespread GPS interference affecting Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the surrounding Baltic Sea.

Then, there are cyber attacks that have locked up medical facilities’ electronic systems throughout Europe and Asia, paralyzing the helping hand of healthcare. A 2025 survey found that three quarters of the hospitals in the EU have been attacked in the last twelve months. Hospitals in Asia have been hit even harder.

Trump’s H-1B Gambit Will Gut American Universities

Devesh Kapur and Milan Vaishnav

The South Asia Program informs policy debates relating to the region’s security, economy, and political development. From strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific to India’s internal dynamics and U.S. engagement with the region, the program offers in-depth, rigorous research and analysis on South Asia’s most critical challenges.Learn More

President Donald Trump’s decision to impose a $100,000 fee on new H-1B visas—the main channel through which U.S. employers hire foreign professionals in specialized fields such as technology, engineering, and research—has ignited a firestorm over its impacts on U.S. workers and Indian tech firms. But the far greater casualty may be America’s universities, and with them the long-term strength of the U.S. economy.

If the administration justifies large new tariffs on imported goods as a way of curbing the trade deficit, it has conveniently ignored the substantial trade surplus the United States enjoys in services. Education is one of America’s most successful exports. In 2024, roughly 1 million international students brought nearly $55 billion into the economy, supporting 400,000 jobs (about a tenth of all positions in higher education).

For many students, that investment only makes sense if they can work in the United States after graduation—to repay debt, gain experience, and sometimes build careers here. Many hope to remain in the United States, but only about two in five successfully do so over the long run. Even for those who return home, experience in the U.S. labor market boosts career prospects and reinforces the value of a U.S. degree. The new H-1B fee threatens to upend that bargain.

We have seen this movie before. When Britain curtailed post-study work rights in 2012, enrollment stagnated, while Canada and Australia surged ahead. By 2021, the United Kingdom was forced into a humiliating reversal. Even before the latest H-1B gambit, America’s global share of international students had fallen from nearly 30 percent in 2000 to around a fifth among Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries and 16 percent among all countries. Visa hurdles remain the most frequently cited barrier. Now, Canada enrolls nearly as many international students as the United States, despite being one-eighth its size.

Bowen: Momentum is the strength of Trump's Gaza plan, but lack of detail is its weakness

Donald Trump's framework agreement for ending the Gaza war and reconstructing the devastated territory has momentum behind it.

Much of it comes from the president himself. Momentum comes too from leading Arab and Islamic countries who have supported the plan, including Jordan, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Pakistan, Indonesia and Turkey. And Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, standing next to Donald Trump, accepted it too, despite the fact it contains talk of a pathway to a Palestinian state that he has repeatedly denounced.

To keep the pace up, Trump says that Hamas has "three to four days" to decide whether to say yes or no.

If the answer is no, the war goes on.

The proposed deal looks a lot like a plan put forward by Joe Biden well over a year ago. Since then there has been massive killing of Palestinian civilians, more destruction in Gaza, and now a famine, while Israeli hostages in Gaza have had to endure months more of agony and captivity.

There were many reports in the Israeli media that the Biden initiative failed because Netanyahu moved the goalposts with a new set of demands - under pressure from the hard right in his cabinet.

Even so, the framework plan is a significant moment. For the first time, Donald Trump is putting pressure on Israel to end the war. Donald Trump has made himself into a leader to whom it is hard to say no. Nobody wants to end up getting the roasting Ukraine's president Volodymyr Zelensky received in the Oval Office back in February. But things can change when leaders leave the White House.

Before Benjamin Netanyahu left Washington DC to go back to Israel his staff filmed him putting over his version of events. One element was the idea of an independent Palestine next to Israel, the two-state solution which the UK and other Western countries have tried to revive by recognising Palestine.

How to Fix the Security Counci

Wang Huiyao

At the 80th United Nations General Assembly high-level debates last week, a host of global leaders called for a more effective and representative Security Council. In the words of Finnish President Alexander Stubb: “If countries from the global south, from Latin America, from Africa, from Asia, do not get agency in the system, they will turn their backs against the United Nations.”

Indeed, the council’s shortcomings are playing out all too clearly today in Gaza and Ukraine. The U.S. has used its unilateral veto to block a host of resolutions calling for a cease-fire in Gaza, enabling the genocidal conflict to continue. Meanwhile, Russia has consistently blocked any meaningful Security Council response to the war in Ukraine since 2022, despite international condemnation and profound humanitarian suffering.

JUST IN: Affordable Mass of Munitions a ‘Necessity’ for Modern Warfare

Josh Luckenbaugh

FORT WORTH, Texas — The United States needs more munitions — and more production capacity to build those weapons — if it wants to win the conflicts of the present and the future, a Defense Department official said Sept. 30.

Conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have demonstrated that the consumption of ammunition in modern warfare “defies our expectations,” Boyd Miller, principal deputy director for strategic logistics, J4, the Joint Staff, said during a keynote speech at the National Defense Industrial Association’s Future Force Capabilities Conference and Exhibition.

The modern operating environment is a “very different battlefield” with a “very different rate of consumption” than the past, Miller said. This evolution makes an affordable mass of munitions a “necessity,” he said.

“Deterrence requires both exquisite, high-performance weapons, and it also requires scalable and adaptable systems we can produce by the tens of thousands at cost that will not bankrupt the nation,” he said. On the modern battlefield, “platforms without munitions are glorified paperweights, and without the munitions, we can't do as a joint force what the nation requires in the most difficult circumstances,” he said.

“Make no mistake — the nation that scales first, wins,” he added.

The United States’ “secret weapon” in this race to scale munitions production fastest is its industrial capacity, Miller said.

“The arsenal of democracy has never been a closed club,” he said, and just as “it took the national strength of our industrial base and our economy” to win World War II, “we’ve got to do the same today.”

The future arsenal of democracy “must include startups, innovators, small manufacturers and entrepreneurs; the garage tinkerers, the coder up in a loft, the robotics team at a university lab,” he said.