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7 November 2025

Indian Politics Are a Family Business

SHASHI THAROOR

The belief that members of political dynasties are uniquely suited to lead is woven deeply into the fabric of Indian governance, from village councils to the highest echelons of parliament. But when elected office is treated like a family heirloom, the quality of governance inevitably suffers.

NEW DELHI – For decades, one family has towered over Indian politics. The influence of the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty – including independent India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, prime ministers Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, and current opposition leader Rahul Gandhi and MP Priyanka Gandhi Vadra – is bound up with the history of India’s struggle for freedom. But it has also cemented the idea that political leadership can be a birthright. This idea has penetrated Indian politics across every party, in every region, and at every level.

ŞEBNEM KALEMLI-ÖZCAN argues that bond-market participants and others are consciously choosing to ignore obvious policy risks.

While the Nehru-Gandhi family is associated with the Indian National Congress, dynastic succession prevails across the political spectrum. After the passing of Bijayananda (Biju) Patnaik – who was influential in the formation of the Janata Dal party – his son Naveen won his father’s vacant seat in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of parliament). Naveen subsequently founded the Biju Janata Dal, named in his father’s honor, and followed Biju’s footsteps in becoming Chief Minister of the state of Odisha, which he led for over two decades.

The Maharashtra-based Shiv Sena’s founder, Bal Thackeray, passed the leadership mantle to his son Uddhav, whose own son, Aditya, is waiting visibly in the wings. The same goes for Samajwadi Party founder Mulayam Singh Yadav, a former chief minister of Uttar Pradesh, whose son, Akhilesh Yadav, later served in the same post; Akhilesh is now an MP and the president of the party. In Bihar state, the leader of the Lok Janshakti Party, Ram Vilas Paswan, was succeeded by his son, Chirag Paswan.

Beyond the Indian “heartland,” Jammu and Kashmir has been led by three generations of Abdullahs, with the principal opposition party dominated by two generations of Muftis. In Punjab, the Shiromani Akali Dal, long commanded by Parkash Singh Badal, has been taken over by his son, Sukhbir. Telangana is currently witnessing a battle for succession between the son and the daughter of the Bharat Rashtra Samithi’s founder, K. Chandrasekhara Rao. In Tamil Nadu, the late M. Karunanidhi’s family controls the ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam party, with his son, M.K. Stalin, now serving as Chief Minister and his grandson anointed as heir apparent.

How Beijing Views Trump A top China scholar and former Biden administration advisor on the Trump-Xi meeting and the future of the U.S.-China relationship

Ravi Agrawal

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Last week’s meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping was the most-anticipated summit between two world leaders this year. The presidents of the United States and China seem to have come away with things they can both describe as wins—and certainly, the two avoided their trade spat getting worse. But according to Elizabeth Economy, a China scholar and former advisor to the Biden administration, the agreement between the two sides was not only limited to just one year but also skirted around the more fundamental structural issues plaguing the relationship.

Economy is now a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the author of, most recently, The World According to China. I asked Economy to join me as a guest on FP Live, and we discussed takeaways from the summit, how Beijing is navigating Trump’s second term, and how, on balance, countries in Asia are viewing the biggest superpower showdown this century. Subscribers can watch the full discussion on the video box atop this page. What follows here is a lightly edited and condensed transcript.

Ravi Agrawal is the editor in chief of Foreign Policy. X: @RaviReports

Xi’s latest moves show corruption is still a big military problem

Ying Yu Lin

The latest personnel changes in the Chinese military show that Xi Jinping is seeking to tighten control by bringing its political apparatus under the authority of its disciplinary arm. The appointments also demonstrate his ongoing efforts to purge factionalism from the military.

The sweeping changes suggest that the Chinese military still struggles with corruption and instability, to the detriment of its combat readiness.

The specific evidence of Xi’s intention to tighten control of the military’s political organisation are his expulsion of its chief and his promotion of a discipline inspection official to the position of vice chair of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the body that has overall control of the armed forces. The discipline inspection commission of a Chinese government organisation enforces party rules and internal party discipline. This notably extends to catching corrupt officials.

Last month, nine active-duty generals were accused of serious violations and expelled from the party and the military, including CMC vice chairman He Weidong, director of the Political Work Department Miao Hua and commander of the paramiliary People’s Armed Police Wang Chunning. Soon after, during the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee, Zhang Shengmin, secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission, was promoted to the position of CMC vice chair, restoring the dual vice-chairman structure of a political cadre paired with a military officer (Zhang Youxia).

Born in 1958 in Shaanxi Province, Zhang Shengmin served in the Second Artillery (now the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force) before briefly working in the PLA’s General Political Department. In 2016 he became political commissar of the Logistics Support Department, and in 2017 he was appointed secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission, joining the CMC at the 19th Party Congress 

China Started Separating Its Economy From the West Years Ago

Keith Bradsher

Two decades of sustained effort to build national self-reliance and minimize imports have antagonized trade partners but fortified what a senior adviser called Beijing’s “bulwark” against conflicts.

China is able to pressure the U.S. economy, while making it harder for Washington to block China.Credit...Eric Lee/The New York Times

President Trump has used tariffs to try to reduce American reliance on Chinese exports and prevent China’s factory overcapacity from swamping the U.S. economy. But his effort has hit an obstacle: Beijing was already well on its way to weaning its economy from the United States.

For two decades, China has systematically pursued economic self-reliance. China has been able to establish choke points to pressure the U.S. economy, while making it harder for Washington to block China.

Self-reliance has been a cornerstone of Chinese policymaking not just under Xi Jinping, the country’s top leader since 2012, but also under his predecessor, Hu Jintao.

Their program of replacing imported manufactured goods with domestic production has been costly and often inefficient. But it has left the West with dwindling leverage it can deploy during disputes.

China’s leaders have become increasingly public about emphasizing the self-reliance drive. It took a prominent place at an annual gathering of the Communist Party’s Central Committee last month, when the country’s top officials laid out a sketch of China’s next five-year plan.

“We must first and foremost intensify efforts toward achieving greater self-reliance and strength in science and technology,” Mr. Xi said in a speech.

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Keith Bradsher is the Beijing bureau chief for The Times. He previously served as bureau chief in Shanghai, Hong Kong and Detroit and as a Washington correspondent. He lived and reported in mainland China through the pandemic.
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Tajikistan Expels India from Ayni Air Base After Russian and Chinese Pressure: A New Great Game in Central Asia

Tajikistan’s decision to reclaim the Ayni Air Base from India marks a turning point in Central Asia’s military landscape, reflecting the growing dominance of Russia and China as New Delhi loses its only overseas airpower foothold after two decades of operation.

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(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — In a landmark geopolitical development, Tajikistan has reclaimed full control of the Ayni Air Base, bringing to an end India’s nearly two-decade operational presence at the strategically vital facility.

This decisive move, concluded in October 2025, marks a significant inflection point in Central Asian geopolitics, as Russia and China intensify their grip over regional military and political spheres of influence.India Air Force fighter aircraft

For New Delhi, the loss of Ayni Air Base is not merely a logistical setback—it represents a profound contraction of its strategic reach in a region crucial for monitoring Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the broader Eurasian security theatre.

As great-power competition deepens, Tajikistan’s action underscores the precarious balancing act faced by smaller states caught between rival nuclear-armed powers and the strategic ambitions of regional giants.

Located roughly 15 kilometers west of Dushanbe, the Ayni Air Base—also known as Farkhor-Ayni complex—has its roots in the Soviet era.

Constructed during the Cold War, Ayni was a linchpin in the Soviet Union’s military architecture, supporting operations across the Pamir Mountains and sustaining the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Tajikistan inherited the facility but lacked the economic means and stability to maintain it amid the devastating civil war that ravaged the nation through the 1990s.

India’s involvement began in the early 2000s, at the height of the global war on terror.

In 2002, New Delhi and Dushanbe signed a bilateral agreement to renovate and jointly operate the base, which became India’s first and only overseas military installation.


India reportedly invested between USD 70 million and USD 100 million (approximately RM 330 million to RM 470 million) to modernize the airbase, extending its runway to 3,200 meters, constructing new hangars, air traffic control towers, radar facilities, and perimeter fortifications.


The upgrades allowed the base to accommodate Su-30MKI multi-role fighters and Mi-17 helicopters, along with an estimated 200 Indian Air Force (IAF) and Army personnel overseeing maintenance and logistics.

Here’s What Mamdani Has Promised to Do as Mayor. Can He Get It Done?


Connor Greene

New York Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani built his platform around a simple premise: The city is far too expensive, and he’s going to make it more affordable.

From freezing rents and making buses free to boosting the minimum wage and increasing taxes for New York’s wealthiest residents, nearly all of the major actions Mamdani has pledged to take as mayor are aimed at lowering costs for New Yorkers and shrinking the wealth gap in the country’s biggest city.

“I think that the Democratic Party must always remember what made so many proud to be Democrats, which is a focus on the struggles of working-class Americans across this country,” he said in an interview on ABC.

Those ambitious, affordability-focused proposals have been key to Mamdani’s unlikely rise from a lesser-known Queens assemblymember who came into the crowded Democratic primary as a heavy underdog to New York City’s next mayor. Now, as he leaves the campaign trail and turns toward governing the city, the question looms large: Will he be able to make his plans work in practice?


“Mamdani’s going to face a lot of pressure to make good on some of these promises,” says Doug Turetsky, the former chief of staff and communications director at New York's City's Independent Budget Office.

“They're all feasible, and they're feasible because they're not really new,” he says, pointing to past mayors like Michael Bloomberg and Bill de Blasio who were able to implement some similar city reforms after campaigning on them themselves. But Turetsky predicts that though the proposals are “good promises in my estimation,” they will be “tough to enact, and tough to enact quickly.”

The Regime Change Temptation in Venezuela

If Past Is Prologue, a U.S. Attempt to Overthrow Maduro Would Not End Well
Alexander B. Downes and Lindsey A. O’Rourke

A member of the Bolivarian Militia of Venezuela in Caracas, Venezuela, October 2025Gaby Oraa / Reuters

Alexander B. Downes is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at The George Washington University and author of Catastrophic Success: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Goes Wrong.

Lindsey A. O’Rourke is Associate Professor of Political Science at Boston College, a Nonresident Fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, and author of Covert Regime Change: America’s Secret Cold War.More by Alexander B. Downes

What began in early September as a series of American airstrikes on boats in the Caribbean—which U.S. officials alleged were trafficking drugs from Venezuela—now seems to have morphed into a campaign to overthrow Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro. Over the course of two months, President Donald Trump’s administration has deployed 10,000 U.S. troops to the region, amassed at least eight U.S. Navy surface vessels and a submarine around South America’s northern coast, directed B-52 and B-1 bombers to fly near the Venezuelan coastline, and ordered the Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group—which the

What Does Trump Think Nuclear Testing Is?

A vague statement opens a range of expensive possibilities.
Decker Eveleth

An associate research analyst at CNA, a nonprofit research and analysis organization based in Washington.A view of the entrance of White Sands Missile Range, where the Trinity nuclear test site is located, near White Sands, New Mexico, on Feb. 21, 2024.A view of the entrance of White Sands Missile Range, where the Trinity nuclear test site is located, near White Sands, New Mexico, on Feb. 21, 2024. Valerie Macon/AFP via Getty Images

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While on his way to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping for trade negotiations, U.S. President Donald Trump posted a short statement on Oct. 29 that appeared to suggest the United States would shortly resume explosive nuclear testing. “Because of other countries testing programs, I have instructed the Department of War to start testing our Nuclear Weapons on an equal basis. That process will begin immediately,” he said on Truth Social.

What Trump means by this is unclear at best, and he has now been contradicted by the U.S. energy secretary, leaving the waters even murkier. While some have assumed that this constitutes a direct order to resume explosive testing of nuclear devices, stating that the United States would be testing on an “equal basis” suggests this is more about testing delivery systems, or conducting very-low yield supercritical tests of materials and subcomponents, not warheads themselves.

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Decker Eveleth is an associate research analyst at CNA, a nonprofit research and analysis organization based in Washington. He studies foreign nuclear postures utilizing satellite imagery. He holds a master’s degree from the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey and a bachelor’s degree from Reed College.

Integrated Deterrence 2.0

Rudy L. Novak

This paper critically examines the concept of "integrated deterrence," introduced in the Biden Administration’s 2022 National Security Strategy, which aimed to align all elements of national power to deter peer adversaries, such as China and Russia. Although theoretically sound, the strategy suffered from ambiguous interpretation and inconsistent interagency execution. The paper argues that the Trump Administration has an opportunity to revitalize this concept through a more structured and operationalized approach— “Integrated Deterrence 2.0.” This enhanced model calls for clear leadership, whole-of-government coordination, and strategic resource reallocation, while strengthening alliances and improving strategic communication. The analysis outlines how the U.S. can transition from military-first deterrence to a truly integrated framework involving diplomatic, informational, economic, and military tools aligned with the Trump Administration's priorities. By institutionalizing these changes, the U.S. can more effectively deter adversaries and navigate the evolving challenges of great power competition.

The Biden Administration introduced the concept of “integrated deterrence” in its 2022 National Security Strategy, describing it as a way to align all elements of national power against revisionist competitors. The goal was to combine American capabilities to “sustain and strengthen deterrence” against China, Russia, and other malign actors. Yet the idea never gained traction; it became more of a slogan than a strategy. The Trump Administration faces a clear choice: let integrated deterrence fade or transform it into a framework that shapes adversary behavior. Integrated Deterrence 2.0 provides that framework, offering a path forward aligned with this administration’s strategic objectives.

The bipartisan, congressionally mandated 2024 Commission on the National Defense Strategy asserted that the “Department of Defense (DoD) cannot, and should not, provide for the national defense by itself.” Instead, it argued for a “whole-of-government approach” that coordinates “all elements of national power” to satisfy the current demands of American security. Unfortunately, even after introducing integrated deterrence in 2022, the Biden Administration never fully realized its potential or provided a clear path for implementation. This led to competing interpretations and fragmented action. Two years later, it was rarely used by senior officials. The Trump Administration, specifically the acting National Security Advisor, Marco Rubio, the National Security Council’s Principals Committee, and Congress, now have an opportunity to define and implement a stronger version of this strategy, one that meets the urgent needs of great power competition.

What did Trump threaten?

Pranav Baskar

“If the Nigerian Government continues to allow the killing of Christians, the USA will immediately stop all aid and assistance to Nigeria, and may very well go into that now disgraced country, ‘guns-a-blazing,’ to completely wipe out the Islamic Terrorists who are committing these horrible atrocities,” Mr. Trump posted on social media on Saturday.

“I am hereby instructing our Department of War to prepare for possible action. If we attack, it will be fast, vicious, and sweet, just like the terrorist thugs attack our CHERISHED Christians!”

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth responded to the president’s post with: “Yes sir.” The Pentagon, he said, was “preparing for action.”

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 is an international reporter and a member of the 2025-26 Times Fellowship class, a program for journalists early in their careers.

The Latest on the Trump Administration

Boat Strikes: The U.S. military killed two people in another strike on boats suspected of smuggling drugs in the eastern Pacific Ocean, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced. It was the 16th announced strike in the offensive that began in early September.

Supreme Court: The justices are facing a so-called legitimacy dilemma as they deal with a tricky legal dispute about tariffs issued by the president, who has made clear he would view defeat as a personal insult. Even so, the Trump administration says it has plenty of other options to impose tariffs if the court rules against them.

Redistricting Push: Trump is imploring lawmakers to redraw their congressional maps to stave off Democratic control of the House. But the debate has revealed fissures in both parties. Here’s a state-by-state guide on the efforts.

SNAP Program: The Trump administration will send partial payments to the roughly 42 million Americans who receive food stamps, offering only a temporary reprieve to low-income families. Some may receive nothing at all. Meanwhile, shoppers are grappling with growing fears and lighter carts.

Nigeria: President Trump threatened the country with military action and said the U.S. might cut off aid, accusing its government of failing to protect Christians. Here's what to know.

Connection to Crypto Billionaire: President Trump claimed he did not know Changpeng Zhao, the Binance founder he pardoned, even though his company struck a business deal involving the Trump family’s crypto venture.

How We Report on the Trump AdministrationHundreds of readers asked about our coverage of the president. Times editors and reporters responded to some of the most common questions.

The US May Conquer the Americas But Lose the World

Hal Brands

US presidents have long pledged to prioritize the Western Hemisphere — to put the Americas First, so to speak. Donald Trump is doing it today. The world waits to see if Trump will strike Venezuela, as the Pentagon masses planes and warships in the Caribbean. But coercing Nicolás Maduro’s autocratic, anti-US regime is merely part of a larger campaign to reassert America’s hemispheric hegemony. That campaign is rooted in history and sound strategic logic. It is also fraught with unanswered questions and serious risks.

“The era of the Monroe Doctrine is over,” Secretary of State John Kerry announced in 2013. Not so fast, Trump has long rejoined. During Trump’s first term, his administration promised to resurrect that two-century old doctrine. It sought, unsuccessfully, to rid the region of Maduro. Trump launched his second term with an inaugural address that seemed like it was stolen from the 19th century. He has pushed a forceful agenda of hemispheric primacy ever since.

The administration pressured Panama to quit China’s Belt and Road Initiative and limit Beijing’s sway over ports along the Panama Canal. Trump extended an economic lifeline to Argentina, aiming to strengthen its pro-US, pro-market government and distance Buenos Aires from Beijing.

The White House forged a deportation alliance with El Salvador. It used threats of military intervention to prod Mexico to get tougher on drug trafficking and illegal migration. Trump threatened governments, in Brazil and Venezuela, that defied US power; he used punitive tariffs as cudgels against Mexico and Canada. He even renamed the Gulf of Mexico as the Gulf of America, a symbolic assertion of US dominance in the region to its south.

The centerpiece of this offensive is the showdown with Venezuela. Trump has ramped up lethal strikes against suspected drug traffickers. But the armada he has assembled — soon to be augmented by an aircraft carrier — is vastly more than anything needed for a counternarcotics campaign.

Trump is building to a coercive crescendo meant to send Maduro fleeing, or perhaps an air campaign meant to forcibly fracture his regime. The hope seems to be that taking down the Venezuelan government will set the hemispheric dominoes toppling: It will increase pressure on Cuba and Nicaragua, two other autocracies backed by Russia and China, and motivate other countries to get tough on narco-traffickers, fast.

Donald Trump Is Going Maximum Pressure on Venezuela

Andrew Latham

The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81) sails alongside the world’s largest aircraft carrier the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), Sep. 24, 2025. Winston S. Churchill, as part of Carrier Strike Group 12, is on a scheduled deployment in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of operation to support the warfighting effectiveness, lethality and readiness of U.S. Naval Forces, Europe-Africa, and defend U.S. Allied and partner interest in the region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Hector Rodriguez)

Key Points and Summary – A U.S. aircraft carrier strike group, likely to be soon near Venezuela, is neither a token counternarcotics gesture nor a prelude to invasion. It’s compellence: calibrated military pressure to force behavioral change and reassert a U.S. sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere.

-The move signals hierarchy and escalation dominance to Caracas and its extra-regional patrons while stopping short of regime change.

The first-in-class aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) transits the Atlantic Ocean, March 19, 2023. Ford is underway in the Atlantic Ocean executing its Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX), an intense, multi-week exercise designed to fully integrate a carrier strike group as a cohesive, multi-mission fighting force and to test their ability to carry out sustained combat operations from the sea. As the first-in-class ship of Ford-class aircraft carriers, CVN 78 represents a generational leap in the U.S. Navy’s capacity to project power on a global scale. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jackson Adkins)

-More broadly, it reflects Washington’s shift from passive deterrence to active boundary management amid multipolar rivalry—echoed in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

-Success hinges on credibility and restraint: persuading under pressure, enforcing limits without overreach, and restoring a regional equilibrium long assumed but seldom spelled out.

Nick Fuentes, Tucker Carlson, and the GOP’s reckoning on Israel

A ballooning dispute over a recent interview has thrust a quiet right-wing debate about foreign policy into the open

Connor Echols

For years, a debate over Israel has been raging behind the scenes of Republican politics.

Then, last week, Heritage Foundation President Kevin Roberts thrust that battle into the open.

“Christians can critique the state of Israel without being antisemitic,” Roberts said in a widely circulated defense of Tucker Carlson following the podcaster’s friendly interview with avowed white nationalist Nick Fuentes, which focused on American support for Israel. While the right should support Israel in areas of mutual interest, Roberts continued, “conservatives should feel no obligation to reflexively support any foreign government, no matter how loud the pressure becomes from the globalist class or from their mouthpieces in Washington.”

The short video set off a civil war on the right. Many pro-Israel conservatives, from think tankers like Michael Doran to politicians like Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas), have framed the debate as a question of fighting antisemitism. Fuentes is, after all, an unabashed antisemite. He has openly expressed doubt that 6 million Jews died in the Holocaust, and he has called for “a total Aryan victory.” To drive the point home, Fuentes followed up the Carlson interview with a video slamming “Jewish oligarchy” and complaining about the “Holocaust religion.”

Roberts attempted to walk a tightrope by denouncing many of Fuentes’ views in a lengthy statement on X and making the case that the best way to confront these opinions was to debate them. He later explained that he made the video after facing “a lot of pressure” to “cancel Tucker,” and many MAGA leaders have indeed flocked to Roberts’ and Carlson’s defense. But these efforts have only heightened the split, in which most prominent Republicans are now being asked to pick a side.

Russia has a new strategy for winter war in Ukraine

Sergey Maidukov

The goal is to cause an energy crisis and trigger a new refugee wave to destabilise Ukraine’s European allies.

A man walks in Khreshchatyk street during a snow storm, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in central Kyiv on February 19, 2025 [File: Thomas Peter/Reuters]

As winter approaches, there is much anxiety in Ukraine.

Last month, the so-called Coalition of the Willing, a group of Ukraine’s allies led by France and the United Kingdom, agreed to mobilise significant resources to help Kyiv maintain its supply of electricity and central heating in big urban areas. The effort appears to have had some effect as the heating season began only slightly later than usual, on October 28.

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Yet this offers little reassurance that Ukrainian homes will be warm in the months ahead. The Russian army continues to strike the country’s critical infrastructure, aiming to cripple its power grid and gas supplies just as the cold sets in.

“General Winter”, the loyal ally of Russia against Napoleon and Hitler, is serving in this war as well – not only against Ukraine but also against Europe.

Having failed to win on the battlefield or coerce Kyiv through ultimatums, Russian President Vladimir Putin has shifted the war to Ukraine’s energy and logistics systems. At first glance, it looks like a replay of past winters, but the strategy has evolved.

In 2022 and 2023, Russia tried to freeze Ukrainians into surrender. It failed. The spirit of the nation held, and the lights returned. Now Putin’s calculation is different. This time, the aim is not merely to punish Ukraine but to also destabilise Europe through the human consequences of cold and darkness.

For Trump, the entire Western hemisphere is America’s



Ivo Daalder

The U.S. president’s “Donroe Doctrine” represents a deep break from modern national security thinking.

Donald Trump is now the first U.S. president since Franklin D. Roosevelt to believe the principal threats to the U.S. aren’t in far-away regions or stem from far-away powers. | Aaron Schwartz/Getty Images

Ivo Daalder, former U.S. ambassador to NATO, is a senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center and host of the weekly podcast “World Review with Ivo Daalder.” He writes POLITICO’s From Across the Pond column.

U.S. President Donald Trump loves the 19th century.

His heroes are former presidents William McKinley who “made our country very rich through tariffs,” Teddy Roosevelt who “did many great things” like the Panama Canal, and James Monroe who established the policy rejecting “the interference of foreign nations in this hemisphere and in our own affairs.”

These aren’t just some throw-away lines from Trump’s speeches. They signify a much deeper and broader break from established modern national security thinking.

Trump is now the first U.S. president since Franklin D. Roosevelt to believe the principal threats to the U.S. aren’t in far-away regions or stem from far-away powers — rather, they’re right here at home. For him, the biggest threats to America today are the immigrants flooding across the country’s borders and the drugs killing tens of thousands from overdoses.

And to that end, his real goal is to dominate the entire Western hemisphere — from the North Pole to the South Pole — using America’s superior military and economic power to defeat all “enemies,” both foreign and domestic.

Of course, at the top of Trump’s list of threats to the U.S. is immigration. He campaigned incessantly on the idea that his predecessors had failed to seal the southern border, and promised to deport every immigrant without legal status — some 11 million in all — from the U.S.

Making Multipolarity Work How America Should Navigate a New Global Order

Emma Ashford

Chinese and U.S. flags on a screen in Beijing, October 2025 Florence Lo / Reuters

Emma Ashford is a Senior Fellow at the Stimson Center. She is the author of First Among Equals: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Multipolar World.More by Emma Ashford

The “unipolar moment” of American predominance is over. Long-term economic, demographic, and military trends have undeniably shifted global politics, and the United States now needs a strategy to manage this emerging world in a way that preserves at least some of its unipolar advantages without leaving it overstretched. Which strategy Washington should pursue, however, largely depends on the kind of world it believes is emerging.

The Biden administration envisioned a bipolar world, with the United States and China locked in a fierce competition. As a result, it assiduously built a strategy around a new cold war, and it sought to stitch together discrete U.S. alliances and reframe Washington’s adversaries as an “axis of authoritarians.” But a coherent democratic axis failed to emerge, and states chafed against a unified democratic policy: consider India, which is still an active participant in BRICs, a bloc it founded with Brazil, Russia, and China in 2009, or the tensions between the United States and the Netherlands over the latter’s export of critical chip-making technology to China.

This is because the Biden administration was wrong about bipolarity. With increasing economic interconnectedness; the rise of militarily capable regional powers such as Turkey, India, and South Korea; and economic and technological power less concentrated in the hands of the United States and China, it seems more likely that a fragmented and complex multipolar world will follow the unipolar moment.

Contrary to popular opinion, however, multipolarity is not a death sentence for the United States. In an era of declining relative U.S. power, it benefits Americans to let other capable countries handle some of the load of global leadership. If Washington embraces this fact, it can pursue a more flexible strategy—one that allows the United States to operate more efficiently and effectively in a rapidly changing world.

Why Is Trump Suddenly Talking About Invading Nigeria?

A U.S. military intervention would be a disaster in an already divided country.

Kọ́lá Túbọ̀sún 

Over the past year, a talking point about Nigeria has gradually gained a foothold in U.S. right-wing media. It spread even to relatively liberal spaces such as Real Time With Bill Maher, and has now become an official government policy. On Oct. 31, U.S. President Donald Trump instructed his cabinet to put the country in the category of “country of particular concern” and, if necessary, make plans for going in “guns-a-blazing.”

The ostensible reason: the Nigerian government’s terrible job in protecting “Christians” in its fight against bandits, terrorists, and other purveyors of insecurity.

It’s true that there has been violence against Christians in Nigeria—but they are not the only victims, nor would U.S. military intervention help. Nigeria, Africa’s largest democracy, is a multiethnic, multireligious country, with the northern part of the country mostly inhabited by Muslims and the southern part of the country mostly inhabited by Christians. But the delineation is not black and white. The middle belt, often characterized as part of the north, has a number of non-Muslim residents. In the south, Christians, Muslims, and traditional animist believers live side by side.

China is able to pressure the U.S. economy, while making it harder for Washington to block China

Two decades of sustained effort to build national self-reliance and minimize imports have antagonized trade partners but fortified what a senior adviser called Beijing’s “bulwark” against conflicts.

China is able to pressure the U.S. economy, while making it harder for Washington to block China.Credit...Eric Lee/The New York Times

Reporting from Beijing

President Trump has used tariffs to try to reduce American reliance on Chinese exports and prevent China’s factory overcapacity from swamping the U.S. economy. But his effort has hit an obstacle: Beijing was already well on its way to weaning its economy from the United States.

For two decades, China has systematically pursued economic self-reliance. China has been able to establish choke points to pressure the U.S. economy, while making it harder for Washington to block China.

Self-reliance has been a cornerstone of Chinese policymaking not just under Xi Jinping, the country’s top leader since 2012, but also under his predecessor, Hu Jintao.

Their program of replacing imported manufactured goods with domestic production has been costly and often inefficient. But it has left the West with dwindling leverage it can deploy during disputes.

China’s leaders have become increasingly public about emphasizing the self-reliance drive. It took a prominent place at an annual gathering of the Communist Party’s Central Committee last month, when the country’s top officials laid out a sketch of China’s next five-year plan.

“We must first and foremost intensify efforts toward achieving greater self-reliance and strength in science and technology,” Mr. Xi said in a speech.

This year, China has wielded one of its most powerful choke points — its almost complete control over the world’s supply of rare-earth metals and rare-earth magnets.

Faced with restrictions on China’s supply of rare earths, Mr. Trump last week accepted a compromise with Mr. Xi.

Trump Proclaims “Everlasting Peace” With China as Skeptics Wince President ‘creates’ co-equal superpower by touting US-China “G2”

Toh Han Shih

White House photo

US President Donald Trump has spread uncertainty among diplomats and analysts in a November 1 tweet in which he referred to his October 30 APEC meeting with President Xi Jinping of China as a “G2” event, thus conferring great-power status on Beijing in the face of years of attempts by Washington to downplay the country’s rising standing.

“Even if nobody believes that the G2 order is emerging by agreement, Beijing must be pleased to be seen as an equal peer,” tweeted Sari Arho Havren, a China analyst, on October 31.

The fact that Trump and his War Secretary repeatedly mentioned G2 suggests Trump is taking seriously this concept of grouping the world’s two most powerful countries, a notion first mooted by US economist C. Fred Bergsten in 2005. G2 talk occurred during the 2008 financial crisis, when US and European policymakers called on Beijing to shoulder greater responsibility for rescuing the global economy, according to an article in The Diplomat on October 31. The concept of G2 has been shelved since then, as relations between the US and China deteriorated.

Trump’s hyperbole over the summit meeting with President Xi Jinping in Busan, South Korea, which he rated as “12 out of 10” in importance, also led him to describe it as likely to “lead to everlasting peace and success.”

Others greeted with skepticism the proclamation of “everlasting peace” with the superpower he called a “strategic competitor” during his first presidency. The accord seems more of a “temporary truce” between the world’s two largest economies, Singapore Prime Minister Lawrence Wong told Singapore media on November 1.

Choices of a Higher Caliber: NATO, the US Army’s New Service Rifle, and Visions of Future Warfare

Guido Rossi

While it is generally true that amateurs talk tactics and professionals talk logistics, ammunition calibers is a point where the two levels of conversation meet. The adoption of a new service rifle by a branch of the US military can appear to be a topic just for grunts and gun enthusiasts. However, even minute technical aspects can suddenly acquire great importance when they concern the largest branch of the world’s most powerful military. From a deeper analytical point of view, the adoption of a new individual service weapon that utilizes a new cartridge can have profound consequences at the tactical and even operational levels. In fact, an effective weapon can make the difference between life and death for the individual soldier on the battlefield and determine success or failure for small-level units to achieve their objectives. In a snowballing fashion, tactical units’ ineffectiveness can compound to make larger units also less effective, gradually making their effects heard at the operational and even strategic levels. Logistics directly impact strategy, and the switch to a different round by the US Army affects the interoperability among the branches for combined operations and among NATO partners for joint operations. Moreover, the adoption of the M7 rifle and its unique cartridge is also a window into the procurement system of the US Military and invites reflection on how conservatism and innovation – often at odds in military culture – need to balance each other out. Most importantly, conversations over battle rifle designs and calibers are actually debates over what warfare might look like in the future and how to tackle new challenges.

In May 2025, the US Army dropped the experimental “X” designator for its newly adopted service rifle in 6.8x51mm. This signaled one more step toward its adoption for the entire branch after its selection in April 2022 during the Next Generation Squad Weapons Program (NGSW). Started in 2017, the NGSW program represented yet another attempt by the US Army to replace the 5.56 NATO caliber M4A1 carbine – the individual rifle currently in widespread service with most units. This program, in turn, was part of the never-ending quest by the US Army to find the “best” armament capable of ensuring firepower, lethality, and allowing for the optimal organization of its units from fire-teams to armies. This constant pursuit of the perfect weaponry is the same impulse that led to the adoption of the M-1 rifle in 1936, the decision to retain a large-caliber rifle in 1957 with the M-14, and, in 1965, the selection of the smaller-caliber M16 rifle, of which the currently serving M4A1 carbine is a descendant. Some of these choices proved wise moves that made the US military a more lethal force. Others proved blunders that cost money and lives. The US Army and potentially the entire US military may make another similar decision that could have momentous consequences well beyond the tactical realm.

US–Pakistan Ties are Quietly Redrawing South Asian Geopolitics

Ishaal Zehra

The US–Pakistan relationship is thawing after years of mistrust. The two nations are rediscovering each other through energy, technology, and minerals, and appear to be building something that neither quite dared before: a partnership designed to last beyond crisis cycles.

This new phase of the partnership was marked by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Army Chief General Asim Munir’s recurring meetings with President Donald Trump, signaling Pakistan’s return to Washington’s strategic radar after nearly a decade on the sidelines. The transition from counterterrorism and wars to investment and interdependence is striking.
Commerce Drives the Revival

For decades, Pakistan–US ties were a study in volatility—alternating between cooperation and confrontation. Yet this time feels different. Washington is seeing Islamabad not merely as a security client but as a potential economic ally in the race to reshape global supply chains.

The breakthrough came when US Strategic Metals (USSM) pledged $500 million in Pakistan’s critical minerals—one of the largest US industrial pledges to Islamabad in recent years. The MoU focuses on exploring and processing rare earths, copper, and lithium—vital to electric vehicles and defense manufacturing.

Weeks later, Pakistan shipped its first batch of rare earth elements to the U.S., turning talks to trade. Reports suggest that both countries are negotiating trade and investment frameworks, including tariff relaxations and incentives for US companies in Pakistan’s mining and tech sectors.
Turning Resources into Geopolitical Power

For Islamabad, the minerals deal was more than an export milestone; it was a geopolitical message. By positioning itself as a new source of critical minerals, Islamabad is staking a claim in one of the most competitive arenas of modern-day economics.

Pakistan sits atop vast, largely untapped reserves of copper, gold, and rare earths—that could reshape its global standing. As Washington looks to reduce dependence on China, which currently controls 70 percent of global rare earth processing, Pakistan offers an alternative supply route connecting South and Central Asia to Western markets.

The equation is pragmatic: the United States gets diversification; Pakistan gets investment, recognition, and leverage. For Pakistan, the symbolism is deeply satisfying—a diplomatic return to South Asia’s strategic equation after years on the margins.
The Regional Chessboard

But this revival does not exist in a vacuum. China, Pakistan’s long-time strategic partner, is closely watching Washington’s return. With over $60 billion investments, Pakistan is a key player in China’s global Belt and Road Initiative, and now the US capital and mining interests are entering the same terrain. Yet Pakistan seems focused on diversification, not replacement— aiming to leverage both Chinese infrastructure and Western capital to overcome its economic challenges.

From hackers to tech companies: IHL and the involvement of civilians in ICT activities in armed conflict

Tilman Rodenhäuser 

Picture a potential future armed conflict: missiles and drones crowding the skies, uncrewed vehicles rolling across borders, and governments scrambling to coordinate their defences. Their conclusion: Every citizen is needed. Some collect and relay information about the approaching enemy into an artificial intelligence (AI) platform that supports military decision-making. Reservists join the ranks of the armed forces. Computer experts choose to contribute by conducting cyber operations aimed at disrupting military operations, sowing chaos among the civilian population, and harming the enemy’s economy. As the militaries on both sides rely heavily on digital communication, connectivity, and AI, the armed forces call on tech companies to provide cybersecurity services, computing power and digital communication networks.

In this post, Tilman Rodenhäuser, Samit D’Cunha, and Laurent Gisel from the ICRC, Anna Rosalie Greipl from the Academy, and Professor Marco Roscini from the University of Westminster (and former Swiss IHL Chair at the Geneva Academy) present five key risks for civilians, along with the obligations of both civilians and states, related to the involvement of civilians in information and communication technology (ICT) activities in armed conflict.

Civilians have long been involved in activities closely linked to hostilities during armed conflict. With strategies such as ‘total defence’ and ‘comprehensive defence’ – which entail mobilizing the ‘whole of society’ in the defence of a country – civilian involvement in armed conflict may become increasingly direct and widespread. Further catalyzing this shift, the rapid digitalization of our societies and the way in which wars are fought means the involvement of civilians in armed conflicts can take new forms, with the result that the related risks reach an unprecedented scale.

The number one sign you're watching an AI video

Thomas Germain

Your social media feed is being taken over by AI video slop. There's one giveaway that can help you spot the fakes – does it look like it was filmed on a potato?

It's over. You're going to fall for it. You probably have already. In the last six months, AI video-generators got so good that our relationship with cameras is about to melt. Here's the best-case scenario: you'll get fooled, over and over again, until you're so fed up that you question every single thing you see. Welcome to the future.

But for now, there are still a few red flags to look out for. One stands out. If you see a video with bad picture quality – think grainy, blurry footage – alarm bells should go off in your head that you might be watching AI.

"It's one of the first things we look at," says Hany Farid, a computer-science professor at the University of California, Berkeley, a pioneer in the field of digital forensics and the founder of the deepfake detection company GetReal Security.

The sad truth is AI video tools will eventually get even better, and this advice will soon be useless. That could happen in months, or it could take years. Hard to say! Sorry. But if you swim around in the nuance with me for a minute, this tip could save you from some AI junk until you learn to change how you think about the truth.

Let's be clear. This isn't evidence. AI videos are not more likely to look bad. The best AI tools can deliver beautiful, polished clips. And low-quality clips aren't necessarily made by AI, either. "If you see something that's really low quality that doesn't mean it's fake. It doesn't mean anything nefarious," says Matthew Stamm, a professor and head of the Multimedia and Information Security Lab at Drexel University, US.

Instead, the point is that blurry, pixelated AI videos are the ones that are more likely to trick you, at least for right now. It's a sign you may want to take a closer look at what you're watching.

AI Is Making Jobs, Not Taking Them

Jonathan W. Welburn and Vegard M. Nygaard

The future of AI, depending on whom you ask, is everything and anything. It is the key to never-ending economic growth. It is the cause of catastrophic unemployment. It is the driver of lifesaving medical advances. It is the source of grave risks to national security.

The truth is that no one knows the full implications of AI. But what researchers like us are starting to see in the data is that it isn't the speed of AI development that will shape the near-term future. It is the speed of its adoption. And AI use across various sectors shows that adoption is uneven and slower than the Silicon Valley and Wall Street hype suggests.

In August, a research paper on AI investments from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology spooked the markets for tech stocks. Headlines underscored just one of the researchers' findings: 95 percent of firms were seeing no return on their hefty AI investments. The more telling data got at why. Few companies have successfully integrated AI into their core business functions, despite the rollout of increasingly powerful models.

Few companies have successfully integrated AI into their core business functions, despite the rollout of increasingly powerful models.

At RAND, our research on the macroeconomic implications of AI also found that adoption of generative AI into business practices is slow going. By looking at recent census surveys of businesses, we found the level of AI use also varies widely by sector. For large sectors like transportation and warehousing, AI adoption hovered just above 2 percent. For finance and insurance, it was roughly 10 percent. Even in information technology—perhaps the most likely spot for generative AI to leave its mark—only 25 percent of businesses were using generative AI to produce goods and services.

One + One = Zero? The Challenge of Battle Networks and Parallel Command Structures in a Bilateral Fight - Modern War Institute

Scott Blyleven 
Source Link

A week ago, the crisis became an armed conflict. The United States formed a joint task force and led a coalition of allies and partners, with the JTF establishing a joint operating area and assigned battlespace and authorities to subordinate task forces. However, due to national policy some of the battlespace was designated a bilateral operating area, in which the partner forces operated within a parallel command structure. Coordination centers were established to generate unity of effort, in the absence of unity of command. However, kill chains were not being closed. Bilateral intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets remained misunderstood, preventing integration. With no common intelligence picture, forces could not pass target custody. Several engagements were successful but came at a high cost in munition expenditure due to redundant targeting.

Individually, each nation had a plan to deliver lethal and nonlethal effects. But the bilateral efforts remained asynchronous.

The result: friendly losses and missed opportunities to defeat the adversary.

The vignette is not speculative fiction; it is the operational reality in the Pacific. A potential fight in that region will hinge on America and its allies’ ability to construct a bilateral battle network. The opening and closing of kill chains are complicated by parallel command structures, where countries retain command and control of their forces. These considerations, coupled with the decades-long work of building battle networks, can now move planning concepts to realized capabilities in the Pacific. In 2021, Todd Harrison, then a director and senior fellow at CSIS, identified five functional elements that comprise a battle network. The elements included sensor, communications, processing, decision, and effects. This battle network is another way to describe kill chains or a reconnaissance-strike network. While the crux of Harrison’s article was an examination of a unilateral US battle network, when we place the discussion in the context of bilateral (or multilateral) combat operations, we discover that battle networks organized in a parallel command structure will face substantial barriers hindering the completion of a dynamic targeting cycle. Against the backdrop of looming threats in the region and a significant shift in the United States’ expectations of its regional allies, building bilateral battle networks is now imperative.