India, Israel sign new MOU on defense tech

Seth J. Frantzman 

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JERUSALEM — Israel and India reaffirmed defense ties on Tuesday, with the signing of a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to enhance defense, industrial, and technological cooperation.

The new MOU, announced by Israel’s Ministry of Defense, is the latest in the developing strategic partnership between the two countries. It came during the annual meeting of the Joint Working Group (JWG) of Israel and India.

Amir Baram, the Israel Ministry of Defense’s director general, said in a government statement that “our strategic partnership is based on deep mutual trust and shared security interests. We view India as a first-rate strategic partner and are determined to continue deepening cooperation in the fields of defense, technology, and industry.”

Outside of those broad descriptions, it’s unclear what may come out of the MOU. However, it’s notable that while visiting, the Indian delegation met with CEOs from Israeli firms, according to the announcement.

Although the statement did not specify which CEOs were involved, Israel’s big three defense firms — Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries and Elbit Systems — have all done business in India, frequently working with joint ventures as part of the Make in India policy that New Delhi pushes at home. Israeli defense industries have cooperated on air defense, UAS and other systems in deals worth billions of dollars over the last decade.

During the meetings with the Israeli industry heads, “innovative and groundbreaking Israeli technologies were presented, along with ideas and projects aimed at deepening industrial-defense partnerships between Israel’s defense industries and India,” per the statement.

The ministry further noted that “Israel was represented by senior officials from the Ministry, including the directors of the Political-Military Bureau, the Directorate of Defense Research and Development (DDR&D), the Directorate of Security of the Defense Establishment, and the International Defense Cooperation Directorate (SIBAT), alongside representatives from the IDF Planning Directorate and other defense officials. The Indian delegation also included senior representatives from the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces.”

Can Chinese investment still find a home in America?

Bochen Han

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Long-simmering debates in Washington about the benefits of increased investment from China were revived in recent weeks after Beijing reportedly pushed US President Donald Trump’s administration to roll back national security restrictions on Chinese deals in the US.

But despite signs of high-level political warming to the idea, analysts say the path forward for Chinese firms remains steep given federal and state restrictions and the realities of congressional and local politics.

China’s security rollback request came up during September trade talks in Madrid, with Beijing dangling the prospect of a large investment package. No such pledge immediately came out of the Trump-Xi summit last week.

After the talks, Trump said China felt very “strongly” about investing in the US. “They have investments and they will invest,” he told reporters.

In September, US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer told Fox Business that in Madrid the two sides had discussed “the investment climate in the United States for Chinese companies”.

China’s senior trade negotiator, Li Chenggang, told reporters the US had “expressed its willingness to move together with China … when it comes to reducing barriers to investment”.

Beijing has repeatedly urged Washington to create a non-discriminatory environment for Chinese companies, which in recent years have faced growing restrictions over concerns ranging from data security to military espionage.

In a September phone call, Chinese President Xi Jinping himself urged Trump to create “open” and “fair” conditions for Chinese investors.

The two leaders are expected to meet again next year. The discussions so far, meanwhile, set up a possible departure from a long-standing status quo: Beijing is testing whether Washington’s rhetoric on reshoring can coexist with its years-long attempt to put up walls against Chinese businesses, including those in strategic sectors.

Is Trump changing how Chinese can invest?

America’s Self-Defeating China Strategy

Lael Brainard

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The landmark meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping in October brought a respite to the trade war and led to some reciprocal deals. But it did not suggest any breakthrough in addressing the problems that have fueled tensions between the two countries in recent years. Instead, the meeting confirmed the curious direction of U.S. China policy in Trump’s second term. The president has not only broken with the policy of the Biden administration but also seems to have forsaken the strategic direction of his own first term.

Junta Creates Body to Fast-Track China’s BRI Projects in Myanmar

Maung Kavi 

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The Myanmar junta has formed a committee to expedite implementation of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure projects in the country, according to the regime’s latest gazette published in late October.

Established on Aug. 15 and led by junta chief Min Aung Hlaing himself, the Leading Committee for Implementation of the BRI includes Union ministers, deputy ministers, heads of Union-level agencies, and chief ministers of states and regions. It is tasked with coordinating and implementing BRI-related projects across national and regional levels, particularly those forming part of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) and China-Myanmar Border Economic Cooperation Zones.

The BRI, China’s global trade and infrastructure strategy, seeks to connect Asia and Europe through networks of roads, railways and sea routes. Myanmar is among more than 70 participating countries and hosts several major projects under the initiative, including the CMEC.

CMEC projects include the Kyaukphyu Deep-Sea Port in Rakhine State and planned railway links between Rakhine and China’s Yunnan Province.

The Kyaukphyu project is central to China’s strategic ambition to secure stable access to the Indian Ocean while spurring development in its southwestern provinces. Oil and gas pipelines already run from Kyaukphyu through central Myanmar to Yunnan, serving as a key artery for Beijing’s energy imports.

But Myanmar’s ongoing civil war has disrupted trade routes and slowed the Chinese projects, prompting repeated demands from Beijing that the junta prioritize implementation and safeguard its personnel and investments.

Media, Martyrdom, & Manipulation

Jacob S. Feinstein 

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On November 28, 1997, in a small village in Kosovo, three armed men interrupted the funeral of a schoolteacher to proclaim the revolution of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) against Serbian authority. Roaring applause conveyed the crowd’s understanding that the age of nonviolent reform was over, while international press outlets reported cautiously on the fiery development in Yugoslavia. Years of shadowy planning by Albanian nationalists was bursting into action.

The KLA’s revolutionary proclamation was a combination of theatrical flair and strategic timing. KLA insurgents had struggled for years to gain popularity over their pacifist counterpart, the League for a Democratic Kosovo (LDK), whom the KLA believed were ineffective for securing meaningful Albanian rights under oppressive Serbian authority. By 1997, after years of fruitless LDK reform efforts, the KLA capitalized on mounting public frustration, using the funeral as a boiling point to stage a dramatic challenge to the LDK’s pacifist approach, draw global media attention, and rally Albanians under its banner.

This account of the KLA’s dramatic emergence illustrates how propagandists can exploit psychological advantage at pivotal moments to craft enduring narratives with lasting political impact. The following article uses the Kosovo conflict as a case study to demonstrate how media, martyrdom, and war can be manipulated to shape perception and power alike.

Historical Background

The 1998-1999 Kosovo conflict was part of the larger 1991-2001 Yugoslav wars, which were sparked by ethnic conflict and exacerbated by economic and political instability. Croatia, Slovenia, North Macedonia, and Bosnia’s secessions from Yugoslavia throughout 1991-1992 sparked several multi-front civil wars between the Yugoslav States, wherein most nations fought to retain their historic borders and sometimes to annex “foreign-held” lands inhabited by same-kin. Kosovo primarily avoided the 1991-1995 fray because, as a province of Serbia rather than an independent state, it lacked conventional forces, political autonomy, and historical precedent for nation-state independence.

Strategic Targets: Analyzing Facility Selection in Global Terrorist Attacks

Mahmut Cengiz, Christopher Costa 

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Terrorist organizations are rarely random or senseless in their acts of violence. Rather, their attacks are often strategically planned to reflect their ideological goals, operational capabilities, and political objectives. While some groups are selective in targeting military and law enforcement personnel, others adopt a more indiscriminate approach, directing violence toward infrastructure, commercial centers, or cultural landmarks. The Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center (GTTAC), operating under the US Department of State, has compiled extensive records on global terrorist incidents, documenting over 60,000 cases from January 2018 to June 2025. These records include detailed variables such as perpetrator group, attack type, victim category, logistical details, and—critically—the type of facility targeted. Facility types are classified into six categories: commercial, government, cultural, infrastructure, military, and miscellaneous.

This study examines GTTAC data from 2018 to 2024, analyzing patterns in facility targeting across global terrorist incidents. Understanding which types of facilities are most frequently attacked provides valuable insights into the strategic behavior, ideological perspectives, and resource capabilities of terrorist groups. This analysis also supports broader counterterrorism efforts by identifying vulnerable sectors and guiding targeted protective measures.

Facility Type Targeting Trends

Figure 1 below shows the distribution of facility types targeted by terrorist groups from 2018 to 2024. The data reveal that infrastructure was the most commonly targeted category, with a total of 22,108 incidents recorded. This category includes a wide range of sub-targets, including agriculture and food systems, civilian aviation, communications, cyber and digital infrastructure, construction and factory sites, educational institutions, healthcare facilities, land transportation systems, maritime and fishing sectors, private property, residential areas, and utilities and mining operations. The variety of these subcategories reflects the extensive scope of what counts as infrastructure and highlights terrorist organizations’ strategic focus on disrupting essential services and causing widespread societal instability.

Pentagon revises cyber force generation model to increase lethality

Vaughn Cockayne

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The Department of Defense is revising its cyber force generation model to give U.S. Cyber Command more control over recruitment and training as the Pentagon works to counter China in the cyber domain.

In a release Thursday, the Pentagon said the new model will be facilitated by three organizations and be based on seven “core attributes” that are expected to “build mastery, specialization, and agility in the cyber forces assigned to the United States Cyber Command.”

“This model will accelerate our efforts to build the leading cyber capabilities required to address acute and emerging cyber threats, and to deter escalating aggression in the cyber domain,” Anthony J. Tata, under secretary of defense for personnel and readiness, said in a statement. “Under the leadership of Secretary [Pete] Hegseth, the Department is acting swiftly to establish policy, implement programs, and execute a new approach to recruiting, developing, and retaining cyber talent, ensuring that we remain ready to achieve peace through strength.”

The attributes in question focus on building demand for cyber positions at the recruitment level by offering incentives and targeting specific roles at U.S. Cyber Command. Others focus on retention by creating “tailored and agile” training programs for specific operational needs.

The release also demands that recruits be presented with a fully functional tactical headquarters to ensure effectiveness.

The Pentagon listed three organizations that will facilitate the revised model: the Cyber Talent Management Organization, the Advanced Cyber Training and Education Center and the Cyber Innovation Warfare Center. The organizations will focus on targeted recruitment and the accelerated development of an “elite cyber force,” according to the release.

“The model fundamentally changes the Department’s approach to generating cyber forces, enabling increased lethality in our cyber forces and establishing a warrior ethos built on domain mastery, specialized skills, and mission agility,” said Katie Sutton, assistant secretary of defense for cyber policy and principal cyber adviser to the defense secretary.

The release did not reveal when the Pentagon expects the revised model to be implemented.

U.S. Army considers halting new helicopter purchases

Colton Jones

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Key PointsThe Department of War is evaluating a proposal to halt new U.S. Army helicopter purchases beginning in late 2026 and shift investment toward uncrewed aerial systems.

The concept focuses on sustaining and upgrading existing UH-60, AH-64, and CH-47 fleets while expanding strike, reconnaissance, and logistics drone programs.

The Department of War is evaluating a reform concept that would sharply reduce or halt the purchase of new piloted helicopters for the U.S. Army beginning in the second half of the decade, according to individuals familiar with internal discussions.

The concept under review focuses on maintaining and upgrading the current helicopter fleet while transitioning funding and force structure toward uncrewed strike, reconnaissance, and logistics platforms.

According to the individuals, the proposal centers on ending new helicopter acquisition as early as late 2026. Instead of investing in new production lines of piloted aircraft, the Army would consolidate spending on sustaining existing UH-60, AH-64 and CH-47 fleets while expanding programs that convert or supplement aviation units with uncrewed aerial systems. The concept is being presented as a way to reduce long-term personnel requirements, lower training and sustainment costs, and limit the exposure of aircrews during high-intensity operations.

The individuals said supporters of the reform have received backing from the Secretary of the Army, who is described as favoring increased reliance on uncrewed systems and less emphasis on new production of piloted rotorcraft. The concept also includes examining options to convert some existing platforms into remotely operated or autonomous variants where technically feasible.

The discussions take place as the Army continues to assess operational lessons from recent conflicts where uncrewed aircraft have operated at scale for reconnaissance, precision strike, artillery coordination, and logistics resupply. The individuals stated that the ability to deploy unmanned systems in larger numbers and at lower cost is a core argument behind the proposal.

Israeli defense leaders chart future of deep tech

ANNA AHRONHEIM

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Leading defense industry figures convened on Thursday at the Elron Ventures Defense Tech Breakfast, a high-level summit that brought together the “holy triangle” of the sector – military, industry, and finance – to discuss the future of deep tech and their roles in shaping Israel’s strategic edge.

Hosted at the Shibolet and Co. law offices in Tel Aviv, the event showcased how defense tech is evolving into a central growth engine for the economy and is becoming a pillar of its technological superiority on the global stage.

Modern warfare turning pointDr. Yuval Steinitz, the chair of Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, spoke of Operation Rising Lion, Israel’s recent war with Iran, which, he said, had marked a historic shift.

“For the first time in human history, a military outcome was determined almost entirely by technological and scientific superiority,” he said.“Real-time intelligence, precision sensors, artificial intelligence, and advanced tracking systems enabled Israel to neutralize threats remotely, without ground combat,” he told those gathered.

Hypersonics and the first space battleA panel led by Elron Ventures CEO Yaniv Schneider, along with Aeronautics CEO Dan Slasky, MoonShot founder Shahar Bahiri, and a representative from the Directorate of Defense Research and Development (MAFAT), highlighted future developments in defense tech and deep tech, with hypersonic technologies as an upcoming critical frontier.

Israel Aerospace Industries’ Arrow 3 system’s interception of missiles outside the atmosphere during Operation Rising Lion was described by participants as the “first space battle in history,” a milestone that opened the door to a new and complex arena of satellite defense and space system strikes, to name a few.“Defense tech is moving from the lab to the field and from the military to the market,” Schneider said.“This is a global trend that Israel is leading, thanks to a rare combination of technology, operational experience, and first-class human capital,” he added.

“The defense tech sector is reclaiming its central role. The new era of warfare restores the importance of technological superiority, and Elron is positioned at the crossroads of nurturing industry and encouraging an entrepreneurial ecosystem,” Schneider continued.

Israeli soldiers speak out on killings of Gaza civilians

Julian Borger 

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Israeli soldiers have described a free-for-all in Gaza and a breakdown in norms and legal constraints, with civilians killed at the whim of individual officers, according to testimony in a TV documentary.

“If you want to shoot without restraint, you can,” Daniel, the commander of an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) tank unit, says in Breaking Ranks: Inside Israel’s War, due to be broadcast in the UK on ITV on Monday evening.

Some of the IDF soldiers who talked to the programme requested anonymity while others spoke on the record. All pointed to the evaporation of the official code of conduct concerning civilians.

The soldiers who agreed to talk confirmed the IDF’s routine use of human shields, contradicting official denials, and gave details of Israeli troops opening fire unprovoked on civilians racing to reach food handouts at the militarised distribution points set up by the US- and Israeli-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF).

“In basic training for the army, we all chanted ‘means, intent and ability’,” Capt Yotam Vilk, an armoured corps officer, says in reference to the official IDF training guidelines stipulating that a soldier can fire only if the target has the means, shows intent and has the ability to cause harm.

“There’s no such thing as ‘means, intent and ability’ in Gaza,” Vilk says. “No soldier ever mentions ‘means, intent, and ability’. It’s just: a suspicion of walking where it’s not allowed. A man aged between 20 and 40.”

Another soldier, identified in the programme only as Eli, says: “Life and death isn’t determined by procedures or opening fire regulations. It’s the conscience of the commander on the ground that decides.”

Human rights laws shouldn’t apply to soldiers on duty, say former military chiefs

Samuel Montgomery

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Nine former military chiefs have called for human rights laws to be disapplied for British Army soldiers on duty.

In a letter to Sir Keir Starmer, they said allowing historic cases against veterans to be reopened is playing into the hands of Britain’s enemies.

Elite soldiers in units such as the SAS are quitting in droves because they fear repercussions for decisions taken in the heat of the moment, they add.

Sir Patrick Sanders, a former chief of the general staff, is among the letter’s signatories.

In the letter to The Times, they wrote: “Today every British soldier deployed must consider not only the enemy in front of them but the lawyer behind them.

“Make no mistake, our closest allies are watching uneasily, and our enemies will be rubbing their hands.”

They argue that “an ever-broadening interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)” means decisions taken by troops in combat that may have been lawful at the time are being re-evaluated “in the misplaced light of hindsight”.

This “lawfare”, which the generals describe as “the use of legal processes to fight political or ideological battles”, is said to be “paralysing decision-making, distorting rules of engagement and deterring initiative”.

The generals have called on the Government and Lord Hermer KC, the attorney-general, to disapply the ECHR and Britain’s own Human Rights Act from troops on active service.

Signatories of the letter include ex-deputy Nato supreme allied commanders, three former chiefs of the general staff, and a former chief of the air staff.

The warning follows the acquittal of a Troubles veteran known as Soldier F, who is now in his 70s, who was accused of the murders of two unarmed protesters on Bloody Sunday.

Mamdani’s Big Bet

SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK

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LJUBLJANA – Emancipatory movements around the world rightly rejoiced at Zohran Mamdani’s victory in the New York City mayoral race. Clearly, today’s populist right has no monopoly on the ability to mobilize crowds and attract new or disillusioned voters. Democratic socialists can do it, too.

But as Mamdani well knows, his victory will be met by attempts at economic and financial sabotage. The US political establishment – both the Republican and Democratic “deep state” – has a fundamental interest in seeing his mayoralty become a fiasco. US President Donald Trump himself appealed to New Yorkers to vote for Mamdani’s leading challenger, the former Democratic governor of New York, Andrew Cuomo. With Mamdani in power, Trumpian populists and mainstream Democrats will suddenly be speaking the same language. They will do everything they can to make Mamdani appear a failure. In Trump’s case, that may even involve another “emergency” declaration to justify sending in the National Guard.

For the left, then, this is not only a moment to act, but also a time to think about the bigger picture. The United States is transforming from a two-party political system into one comprising establishment Republicans, establishment Democrats, alt-right populists, and democratic socialists. One can already see the makings of new coalitions stretching across the old party lines. Back in 2020, Joe Biden hinted that he might nominate a moderate Republican as vice president, while Steve Bannon, Trump’s former chief strategist, urged supporters of Bernie Sanders, the independent democratic socialist US senator from Vermont, to vote for Trump after the Democratic Party nominated Biden.

The big difference is that while Trump’s brand of populism easily achieved hegemony over the Republican establishment (clear proof, if any were needed, that his concern for ordinary workers was a sham), the split within the Democratic party is getting stronger and stronger. Indeed, the struggle between the Democratic establishment and the Sanders wing is the only true political battle in the United States today. As The Guardian’s Emma Brockes put it: “Mamdani’s biggest threat is not Donald Trump, it’s the Democratic old guard.”

Alex Karp Goes to War

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Alex Karp and I would not seem to have much in common. I work for WIRED, which does tough reporting on Trumpworld; Karp is the CEO of Palantir, a $450 billion firm that has contracts with agencies like the CIA and ICE and worked for the Israeli military during its campaign in Gaza. I live in the East Village of New York City, and the home Karp spends the most time in is a 500-acre compound in rural New Hampshire. (Last year he was one of the highest paid executives in the United States.) I was a plain old English major, and he’s got a law degree and a PhD in philosophy, studying under the legendary Jürgen Habermas. I consider myself a progressive; Karp regards that stuff as “pagan religion.”

Bill Gates’s Controversial COP Challenge

Lindsay Iversen

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A drone view of the world's largest iron ore mine, run by Brazilian mining company Vale in the middle of a vast rainforest preserve, where autonomous mining vehicles are used to increase productivity by operating around the clock in hazardous environments Jorge Silva/REUTERS

Last week, tech titan and clean energy mega donor Bill Gates offered some surprising advice. Writing ahead of this month’s United Nations climate summit, Gates argued that the world was paying altogether too much attention to cutting greenhouse gas emissions.

Climate change, he contended, does not pose a threat to human survival. “People will be able to live and thrive in most places on Earth for the foreseeable future,” he wrote. By focusing too much on near-term emissions reductions, he continued, policymakers are “diverting resources from the most effective things we should be doing to improve life in a warming world,” including fighting poverty and improving human health.

The essay generated shockwaves in the climate community. It strains credulity, advocates point out, to claim that the world is doing too much to curb emissions. Global average temperatures hovered more than 1.5°C above the preindustrial average for all of 2024, and even the world’s highest climate ambitions—to say nothing of its actual policies—fall far short of what’s needed to avoid the worst effects of climate change.

Gates knows this, of course; indeed, he spends the middle third of the piece talking about the necessity of emissions cuts across various critical economic sectors. The argument he really seems to be making isn’t so much about trade-offs between mitigation and adaptation as such, but rather about trade-offs across time.

Cutting an additional ton of carbon will make a marginal contribution to improving lives in the future. Vaccinating a child will protect a life now. The choice between spending a dollar on vaccination versus a dollar on cutting emissions, therefore, comes down in large part to how you value a life today relative to one tomorrow.

COP30 in Belém: A Stress Test for Global Climate Cooperation

Alice C. Hill and Angus Soderberg

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The thirtieth Conference of the Parties (COP30) will present a stress test for multilateralism and the greater climate effort when it kicks off on November 10 in Belém, Brazil. Negotiators from around the world will gather to curb global emissions and strengthen climate ambition, but they will face substantial headwinds. While countries have made progress since the Paris Agreement was signed in 2015 and projected warming for this century has fallen, according to the United Nations, the Paris Agreement goal of keeping global average temperature rise well below 2°C—and preferably at 1.5°C below the pre-industrial era—is moving out of reach. In 2024, global average annual temperature rise breached 1.5°C for the first time, while atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide increased by a record amount since measurements began.

The current commitments made by countries are not enough to rein in accelerating warming, and some are stepping away from the effort despite a need for greater implementation. The Donald Trump administration, for one, does not appear interested in honoring any promises that the United States—the world’s second-largest emitter and historically greatest emitter—has made at previous summits. Against this backdrop and the heightened stakes of a warming world, COP30’s ability to address and help the globe navigate the climate crisis will be challenged.

Brazil wants to capture the ambition evident during the first climate summit it hosted, the Rio Earth Summit, thirty-three years ago. But the world looks vastly different than it did in 1992—economically, politically, and environmentally—and climate efforts have only managed to grow incrementally in recent years. Brazil has framed COP30 as the COP of implementation and adaptation, which has invited the burden of expectation. The question now is whether it lives up to that name.

At its core, the COP process relies on countries to voluntarily choose to engage in ambitious collective action. After three decades of meetings, the COP process has faced mounting criticism for stalled negotiations, weak implementation, and an inability to spur sustained climate ambition. Perhaps the best measure of ambition is the expectation under the 2015 Paris Agreement that nations will submit their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) every five years to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Fewer than 10 percent of countries managed to meet the February 2025 deadline for submission of their latest commitments. The NDCs that subsequently trickled in generally lack ambitious targets.

If the Pentagon Wants More Speed and Scale, It Should Be a Better Customer

Clayton Swope and Kari A. Bingen

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In a speech on November 7, 2025, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced new measures to accelerate the fielding of new technology and advanced capabilities—complementing plans announced in August 2025 to transform the military requirements process. Among the many important structural and policy changes he outlined, one stood out: forthcoming guidance on how the Pentagon intends to provide “stable, clear, and consistent demand signals for industry to invest and scale production of lethal capabilities.” Persistent uncertainty in long-term defense spending levels, fluctuations in demand, and perennial priority shifts have long deterred business partners from making early capital commitments. At the heart of this challenge is trust—the Pentagon should want to instill in industry partners that it will ultimately buy what it says it will. If industry does not have confidence that the military will stick to its budget plans, it will hesitate to make the capital expenditures (capex) and private investments desired by Pentagon leaders. In short, the Pentagon needs to be a better customer.

Companies spend a lot of time trying to understand and forecast demand for their products and services before making investments by looking at historical trends, market conditions, and other indicators—essentially, companies make educated guesses on what customers want to reduce investment risk. Because no one can predict the future, market demand forecasts can be wrong and much-hyped new products can flop—think the Apple Lisa, Microsoft Zune, and Amazon Fire Phone. But defense companies essentially have only one main customer—the Pentagon—so an equivalent mistake can be fatal. In the past, to buy down that risk, the government picked up the bill for research and new product development. The Pentagon wants to change that and shift more upfront costs onto the private sector. But for defense companies to justify spending capex to build more production lines or self-fund new product development, they need to trust that the Pentagon will stick to its plans for buying more military kit, and see that such plans are backed up by money.

But an honest assessment of trends in U.S. defense spending does not necessarily encourage greater capital expenditures on product development and manufacturing capacity. While U.S. officials stress the need to invest more in defense, long-term defense spending levels have not shown sustained, dramatic growth. Rather, they have failed to even keep pace with inflation, resulting in real budget decline. Between fiscal year 2014 and FY 2025, U.S. defense funding fluctuated, peaking in FY 2024, when including Ukraine security assistance funding. The reconciliation bill passed in July 2025 included a $156 billion one-time boost in military funding between FY 2025 and FY 2029. Yet future growth in U.S. defense spending remains uncertain. Though the Trump administration advertised a trillion-dollar defense budget, to get to that number, it plans to use $119 billion from the reconciliation bill for defense purposes in FY 2026, asking Congress for $892.6 billion in its FY 2026 defense budget request. While outside the control of the Pentagon, repeated delays in passage of full-year appropriations and use of continuing resolutions add yet another element of uncertainty to defense spending.

Securing Space Superiority: U.S. Deterrence Options in a Two-Rival Threat Environment

Katherine E. Dahlstrand

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Military competition in and for space is rising. Both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation have put significant effort into developing, demonstrating, and fielding counterspace capabilities that could allow the Chinese and Russian militaries to threaten U.S. space systems. Is the United States prepared to compete with and deter two space rivals simultaneously?

In Securing Space Superiority, CSBA Senior Fellow Katherine E. Dahlstrand argues that the United States cannot treat the space threats from China and Russia in isolation and must instead be prepared to deter or counter both simultaneously. She examines Chinese and Russian space doctrine and investments, establishing that these U.S. adversaries have significant space and counterspace capabilities. Dr. Dahlstrand then analyzes the ways in which the two countries’ efforts in space could interact to pose concurrent challenges to the United States.

To compete and deter in this two-rival space environment, Dr. Dahlstrand contends that the U.S. Space Force (USSF) should adopt a more proactive approach and match efforts at deterrence by denial and resilience with investments in counterspace capabilities. Developing, exercising, and selectively revealing these capabilities would enable deterrence-by-punishment options in space and support cost imposition during both peacetime and conflict. Ultimately, a U.S. approach to space that balances resilience with proactive counterspace capabilities would provide the United States with a more flexible, sustainable, and effective framework to achieve its stated goal: space superiority.

Russia has a new strategy for winter war in Ukraine

Sergey Maidukov

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A man walks in Khreshchatyk street during a snow storm, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in central Kyiv on February 19, 2025 [File: Thomas Peter/Reuters]

As winter approaches, there is much anxiety in Ukraine.

Last month, the so-called Coalition of the Willing, a group of Ukraine’s allies led by France and the United Kingdom, agreed to mobilise significant resources to help Kyiv maintain its supply of electricity and central heating in big urban areas. The effort appears to have had some effect as the heating season began only slightly later than usual, on October 28.

Yet this offers little reassurance that Ukrainian homes will be warm in the months ahead. The Russian army continues to strike the country’s critical infrastructure, aiming to cripple its power grid and gas supplies just as the cold sets in.

“General Winter”, the loyal ally of Russia against Napoleon and Hitler, is serving in this war as well – not only against Ukraine but also against Europe.

Having failed to win on the battlefield or coerce Kyiv through ultimatums, Russian President Vladimir Putin has shifted the war to Ukraine’s energy and logistics systems. At first glance, it looks like a replay of past winters, but the strategy has evolved.

In 2022 and 2023, Russia tried to freeze Ukrainians into surrender. It failed. The spirit of the nation held, and the lights returned. Now Putin’s calculation is different. This time, the aim is not merely to punish Ukraine but to also destabilise Europe through the human consequences of cold and darkness.

When Russia’s full-scale invasion began in late February 2022, millions of Ukrainians fled west by train, car and on foot, creating the largest wave of refugees since World War II. Should the energy system collapse, that wave could return with devastating force. This is the Kremlin’s most cynical design: to weaponise winter.

Guns and Ammo: The Ukraine War and NATO’s Ammunition Interoperability Problem

Eric Johnson 

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If the war in Ukraine has reinforced one truism of modern warfare, it is that artillery remains the king of battle. Its central role in Ukrainian combat operations has been sustained by the commitment of Ukraine’s international supporters. The extensive provision of artillery shells from the United States and other NATO members led to serious concerns about the depth of ammunition stockpiles and shell manufacturing capacity in both the United States and Europe. A production surge has at least partly mitigated concerns this year, but there remains a separate issue that has received far less public attention and yet is a critical one for NATO: ammunition interoperability.

Interoperability is a central tenet of NATO, and the key to interoperability is standardization. The alliance’s method of choice for achieving this is a set of standardization agreements, or STANAGs. Moreover, in 2009, the United States and four other major NATO members—France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, signed the Joint Ballistics Memorandum of Understanding (JBMoU), intended to “maximize the potential for the achievement of Interchangeability of the Participants’ 155MM Weapon and Ammunition Systems.” The war in Ukraine, however, has been a unique test of NATO 155-millimeter ammunition compatibility in a way that was not foreseen when STANAGS and the JBMoU were written. Instead of a national army using a supply of ammunition from another alliance nation in an emergency situation, Ukraine is continuously operating a vast array of howitzers and ammunition from across (and beyond) NATO within its own single national army. And Ukraine’s experience has made clear that NATO and JBMoU 155-millimeter howitzers and munitions are not truly interoperable. While they are physically compatible, in the sense that they will safely fire with approved shell, propellant, and fuze combinations, they are not truly technically interoperable until a howitzer battery can achieve accurate first-round effects with munitions from another nation or nations.

First-round effects are the goal of every artillery leader. Achieving first-round effects preserves ammunition, maintains the element of surprise, and improves survivability of friendly artillery units. To do so, artillery units must meet the five requirements for accurate predictive fire. In this context the key requirement is “accurate weapon and ammunition data.” This includes all factors regarding the cannon and ammunition components that have effects on ballistics, such as shell weight, fuze weight, propellant efficiency, barrel wear, and historic muzzle velocity with a given ammunition combination. This is difficult enough with only one nation’s equipment and ammo set.

Why conflicts in the 21st century are becoming “hybrid”

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In recent decades, the nature and character of armed and non-armed confrontations have undergone significant transformation. The traditional model of warfare — clearly defined belligerents, armed forces engaging in open pitched battles, declared war and peace — is no longer dominant. Instead, what we increasingly observe is what is called hybrid warfare: conflicts that blend military, informational, economic, cyber and diplomatic tools. Why has the 21st century ushered in this shift to hybrid methods — and which factors underpin its rise? In this article I analyse the nature, causes, features and implications of this change.

Definition and features of hybrid conflict

The term “hybrid warfare” was first popularised by Frank G. Hoffman in 2007 to describe a situation in which an adversary simultaneously employs conventional forces and methods, as well as irregular, asymmetric, informational and cyber tools. Википедия+2marshallcenter.org+2

According to NATO the phenomenon refers to the “interplay or fusion of conventional and unconventional instruments of power and tools of subversion.” nato.int+1

Key characteristics include:A combination of different forms of force or influence (conventional military, irregular warfare, cyber and information operations) in a blended fashion. smallwarsjournal.com+1

Employment of non-military or semi-military means: informational campaigns, disinformation, economic pressure, legal and diplomatic tools (so-called lawfare). cepa.org+1

Blurred boundaries between war and peace, between combat operations and political/informational pressure. nato.int+1

Difficulty of attribution: identifying who is the aggressor, which instruments are used, and whether the situation constitutes war. nato.int+1

AI To Win the Next War

John Adams

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To Win the Next War, the Pentagon Must Make AI Its Strongest Technological Ally

This Veterans Day is a reminder that our armed services have earned the title of the world’s most lethal fighting force. Through blood, sweat, and bravery, America’s military has dominated the past 250 years of combat. But winning wars in the next century will require the defense community to stop treating AI like a potential adversary and embrace it as our trusted ally.

In the years since I retired from active duty, military technology has rapidly advanced. Indeed, the pace of change has only accelerated under the Trump Administration.

Spurred by the President’s AI Action Plan and Secretary Pete Hegseth’s focus on rebuilding our military, the Pentagon has forged promising partnerships with leading AI innovators. Just this summer, the Pentagon’s Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO) awarded contracts worth up to $200 million each to OpenAI, Google, Anthropic, and xAI. Tech on display at the recent AUSA conference – from ShieldAI’s X-BAT autonomous takeoff fighter jets to Anduril’s Eagle Eye modular AI-powered soldier headsets – only confirms that the future is here.

Recent actions from Congress and the White House laid the groundwork for this transformation. But, especially with the federal government stuck in a shutdown, policy alone won’t lead to operational outcomes. That’s where the private sector comes in.

Even with government activity grounded to a near-halt and 2026 appropriations uncertain, private sector pioneers are open for business and committed to the relentless pursuit of AI excellence. Nimble start-ups and established innovators continue working directly with mission partners to deliver AI-driven capabilities. If carried to their full potential, these AI/ML solutions could unlock new tactics and sharpen our competitive advantage across domains.

The Air Force’s SaaS Policy

Rohith Narayan

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“Software is never done and must be managed as an enduring capability that is treated differently than hardware,” observed the Defense Innovation Board (DIB) in its influential Software Acquisition report, urging the Pentagon to treat code as a ‘living system’, not a finished product. Yet, the Department of the Air Force’s (DAF) new Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) policy does the opposite. Aimed at standardizing enterprise IT and improving cybersecurity, the memo bans “custom code development” or “modification that extends a SaaS platform beyond its original design,” including APIs or integrations to meet evolving mission needs.

While the policy seeks to reduce vulnerabilities and enforce uniformity, it risks rapid and adaptive innovation – necessary for resilience and mission success. In trying to mitigate risk, the DAF undermines the core principles of software-defined warfare - speed, iteration, and continuous adaptation that are the foundations of lean development, DevSecOps, and the DIB’s doctrine that “software is never done.” These practices lock systems into static silos resulting in slower iteration, and a regression to the bureaucratic “security theater” that modern DevSecOps was meant to replace.

By locking platforms to their vendor’s original design, the department hopes to maintain a uniform, ‘locked down’ software environment that’s easier to monitor, certify and secure. There are three key problems with this approach –

Software is never done

One, the provision misunderstands the nature of software - it is never static, only constantly evolving. In contrast to hardware, which can be maintained in a linear fashion, software degrades not through physical wear, but through obsolescence. By prohibiting custom code development and API-based modification, the provision freezes every SaaS platform at the point of purchase.

'Shockingly large' amount of sensitive satellite communications are unencrypted and vulnerable to interception, researchers find

Tereza Pultarova

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Cybersecurity researchers have intercepted vast quantities of private voice calls and text messages, including potentially sensitive communications of government and military officials, transmitted over completely unprotected satellite communication links.

When the researchers decided to put satellite communications under scrutiny, they thought they would find some flaws. What they discovered was much worse than their wildest dreams. Using a commercial off-the-shelf satellite dish mounted on the roof of a university campus in San Diego, they scanned internet traffic routed via 39 geostationary satellites visible from southern California.

They soon realized that sensitive messages including those involving critical infrastructure and internal corporate and government communications were broadcast via those satellites completely unprotected. The experiment could be easily replicated by hackers using commercially available equipment, the researchers warn, saying the results were "as bad as one could hope."You may like

"A shockingly large amount of sensitive traffic is being broadcast unencrypted, including critical infrastructure, internal corporate and government communications, private citizens' voice calls and SMS, and consumer Internet traffic from in-flight wifi and mobile networks," the researchers wrote in a statement. "This data can be passively observed by anyone with a few hundred dollars of consumer-grade hardware."

It turns out that many of these satellites are using outdated equipment, the researchers say. "Geostationary satellites are a somewhat older technology so our expectation was that they will be using some older, outdated cryptography," Dave Levin, an associate professor in computer science at the University of Maryland who led the research, told Space.com. "So, we thought we would try to listen and then see whether we could break this cryptography. It turned out we didn't have to because the cryptography wasn't used at all in large part."

Geostationary satellites orbit Earth at a distance of 22,000 miles (36,000 kilometers). At this distance, the orbital velocity of a satellite matches the speed of Earth's rotation. As a result, the satellite appears suspended above a fixed spot on the equator, having a stable view of a large portion of the globe.

Avoiding Catastrophe: The Importance of Privacy when Leveraging AI and Machine Learning for Disaster Management

Leah Kieff

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In developing countries, the impact of significant events such as earthquakes, extreme weather, terrorist attacks, cyber incidents, or health emergencies can be more pronounced given the lack of planning, budget constraints, and weak infrastructure that these countries are confronted with. Leveraging data effectively is fundamental to managing the impact of these disasters. New and emerging technologies, including machine learning (ML) and AI, can be leveraged to process and organize the data into usable information, as well as to support effective collection. But any mass collection of data carries privacy concerns, which must be mitigated from the start. Given the recent devastation of Hurricane Melissa in the Caribbean and with the AI Impact Summit approaching in February 2026, these are timely topics to address.

The type of data that may be useful in a disaster can range from personal health information to satellite imagery of an affected geographic area. Satellite imagery can be invaluable in determining the level of destruction, including baseline and post-disaster comparisons. Census data can help determine the demographic characteristics of a region for logistics for evacuations, and the movement of supplies. Successful intelligence collection and analysis can allow law enforcement to stop a terrorist attack from occurring.

The usefulness of data in disaster management is only increasing in the era of big data. The term “big data” describes massive data sets that are collected from the palms of our hands, via cell phones, wearable technologies, and digital transactions. This data may be actively volunteered by the individual (such as social media postings) or passively provided (such as automated means like credit card usage). While large data sets such as censuses have been collected for thousands of years, the types of data sets, as well as collection methods and speed, have been revolutionized by technological advances.

Despite the promise, the collection and use of data for disaster management is not without risks. Data quality may not be accurate, leading decisionmakers to believe that they have a truthful picture of the disaster, including those impacted, when they may not. And even if the data sourcing and validation are done correctly, the aggregation, synthesis, and analysis must be done well to allow for effective inference-driven decisionmaking. The existence of these huge data repositories without a process to transform them into informed decisions is equivalent to attempting to put crude oil into your car instead of gasoline. Data pipelines can refine raw data into insights. These pipelines can and should be supported by AI and ML to increase efficiency and accuracy.

Kremlin Shifts Focus to Information Warfare

Yuri Lapaiev

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Executive Summary:Russia’s draft 2026 budget cuts military spending by $2.4 billion compared to 2025 while boosting funding for state-run media by 54 percent, signaling a potential pivot toward intensified information warfare.

The Kremlin’s informational tactics are tailored to domestic, Western, and Ukrainian audiences, seeking to sustain public support at home, undermine Western aid to Ukraine, and erode Ukrainian morale.

Facing limited battlefield gains and economic strain, Moscow increasingly relies on propaganda to achieve its aims, exaggerating weapon tests, spreading false narratives, and combining disinformation with physical attacks to influence perceptions and sustain its war against Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin shows no sign of giving up on his war against Ukraine despite limited battlefield gains. As Russia begins to experience a shortage of certain types of military equipment, its propaganda machine continues unabated and may have even expanded. Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrii Sybiha, stated that Russia’s draft budget for 2026 would reduce military spending by approximately $2.4 billion compared to 2025, while increasing funding for state-run media by 54 percent, an additional $458 million. In Sybiha’s opinion, this draft budget realignment shows that the Kremlin is prioritizing informational warfare going forward (The New Voice of Ukraine, September 30; Telegram/@Ukraine_MFA, October 19). The target audience—including the population of the Russian Federation, citizens of Ukraine, and residents of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries and allies—dictates Moscow’s strategy.

The Kremlin’s domestic propaganda machine is designed to sustain public support for the regime and its war against Ukraine. It is designed to convince Russians that the so-called “special military operation (SVO)” has been successful and needs to continue (Lenta, October 26; President of Russia, October 29). Other narratives try to create a positive perception of the Russian economy and portray Western sanctions as ineffective (RIA Novosti, June 19, July 6; The Moscow Times, August 8). Domestic propaganda also downplays the scale and consequences of Ukrainian attacks inside Russia, for example, by falsely stating that the military shot down all Ukrainian strike drones and that only debris reached targets during a September attack (Regnum, September 12; Russian Ministry of Defense, November 1).