Indian Strategic Studies: 11/28/25

28 November 2025

From drones to fighter jets: How AI is quietly reshaping India’s battlefield strategy

Subhadra Srivastava

India has moved beyond treating artificial intelligence as experimental research and is now embedding it as a core combat capability. AI is already driving battlefield decisions, logistics, aerial combat support and autonomous surveillance, with more than 300 defence-focused AI projects underway across DRDO, the services, defence PSUs and iDEX startups. According to an official announcement, the Defence Artificial Intelligence Council (DAIC) and Defence AI Project Agency (DAIPA) have been created to accelerate military adoption under a formal roadmap. The message is clear: future conflicts will be shaped not only by weapons, but by algorithms that decide faster than the enemy.

Battlefield intelligence and decision systems

In a press note issued in October 2025, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh had stated, 'The battlefield has changed. Wars of tomorrow will be fought with algorithms, autonomous systems and artificial intelligence.' One of the most significant changes lies in command-and-control. AI-enabled data-fusion tools now combine inputs from satellites, drones, UAVs, radars and electronic sensors to create real-time battlefield pictures. These systems assist commanders by recommending optimal responses to threats, significantly shortening decision loops. Early field deployment has shown that AI-supported battle management can reduce reaction time from minutes to seconds — a critical advantage in high-tempo mechanised or air-land engagements.

Autonomous aerial systems and combat assistance

AI is also altering the aerial domain. Unmanned and semi-autonomous aircraft, including TAPAS-BH UAV and the stealth UCAV programme Ghatak, rely on AI for navigation, target recognition and mission autonomy. The Tejas Mk1A, and future AMCA platform, incorporate AI-based pilot workload reduction, predictive flight diagnostics and mission-planning assistance. In parallel, swarm drone technology is being developed for co-ordinated attacks, with AI allocating targets across dozens of autonomous platforms simultaneously.

India's largest conglomerate stops Russian oil imports amid global pressure

Cherylann Mollan

Reliance Industries is India's largest importer of Russian oil

India's largest conglomerate Reliance Industries, owned by billionaire Mukesh Ambani, has stopped importing Russian crude oil for its export-only refining unit at Jamnagar in the western state of Gujarat.

The move aims to comply with an EU ban on fuel imports made from Russian oil through third countries, which takes effect next year. It also aligns with US sanctions on major Russian oil producers Rosneft and Lukoil, set to kick in on Friday.

"This transition has been completed ahead of schedule to ensure full compliance with product-import restrictions coming into force on 21 January 2026," Reliance said in a statement.

The White House has welcomed the move by Reliance.

"We welcome this shift and look forward to advancing meaningful progress on US-India trade talks," the White House press office said, in a statement to the Washington Post.

Delhi's purchase of Russian oil has been a major sticking point between India and the US. Trump slapped India with 50% tariffs in August, including a 25% penalty for buying Russian oil and arms, which he says was funding Moscow's war on Ukraine - a charge India has denied.

India's purchases of discounted Russian oil shot up from barely 2.5% of imports before the war began in 2022, to around 35.8% in 2024-25.

Reliance is India's largest importer of Russian oil, and accounts for around 50% of Russian oil flows into the country.

The Jamnagar refinery is the largest single-site refining complex in the world - with two separate units dedicated for exports and the domestic market.

Economic Deterrence in a China Contingency

Howard J. Shatz, Marco Hafner, Naoko Aoki, Peter Dortmans, Timothy R. Heath, Fiona Quimbre

Deterring China from launching an attack on Taiwan is a central focus of U.S. and allied security planning. This planning encompasses creation and revision of military strategies, the establishment of partnerships with like-minded nations, and the gaming and simulation of conflict scenarios. Restrictive economic measures, such as sanctions, are also part of the deterrence toolkit. However, the timing, effectiveness, and desirability of these measures remain uncertain.

In this report, the authors explore a scenario involving a strong perceived likelihood that China would blockade or invade Taiwan within an ensuing three to six months. The authors discuss what economic measures the United States, Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom (UK) might employ to deter such aggression, how such measures might influence China’s actions, and how such measures might affect the global economic system. The report concludes with policy implications for U.S. and allied policymakers as they navigate an increasingly complex relationship with China. While U.S. policymakers may well institute such preemptive economic measures, the chances of success will depend heavily on the specific scenario under which the measures are instituted, and allies are highly unlikely to join in such preemptive economic measures absent strong U.S. pressure and leadership.

Key Findings

The United States can institute a variety of measures. If it were well-supported that China were to invade Taiwan in an ensuing three to six months, it is possible, but uncertain, that the United States would institute preemptive sanctions.

Australia would seek to use other levels of national power before sanctions. Australia would embrace economic deterrence tools only if it believed the threat from China was existential or if it significantly and irreversibly threatened Australia’s immediate security interests. The United States would need to exert significant pressure on Australia to have it join meaningful, preemptive actions.

China’s innovation paradox

George Magnus

On the day of Donald Trump’s presidential inauguration, a small Chinese tech company founded in only 2023, DeepSeek, shocked the AI industry, rattled US financial markets, and created a truly global stir. Notwithstanding controversies about cost and intellectual property surrounding what is still a genuine and significant accomplishment, it is fair to say that DeepSeek’s commoditisation of AI is exactly how transformational technology happens. Innovation and competition drive down costs, leading to the technology becoming embedded in the whole economy, not just the narrower, innovative parts.

These AI industry implications are centre-stage for now. It has also been argued that DeepSeek’s model represents not so much a ‘Sputnik’ moment as a case of hyperbole, and that the consequences of the AI arms race will throw up many surprises. Not the least of these is China’s persistent dependency on semiconductor technology developed by the US and its close allies, heightened by tariffs and export controls, which Trump’s administration looks set to tighten. American tech companies will want to exploit this in developing artificial general intelligence themselves.

Wider economic and geopolitical considerations are equally important. DeepSeek is, after all, part of China’s dichotomous economic state. On the one hand, China has many dynamic, modern sectors. Several firms and industries are in the vanguard of scientific and technological development in clean energy, electric vehicles, and batteries, as well as other so-called strategic emerging industries in which China seeks to dominate and become self-reliant. These include industrial machinery, semiconductors and computing, artificial intelligence and robotics, life-science industries, biotechnology, and pharmaceuticals. These industries, which, in Xi Jinping’s Marxist framing are called ‘new productive forces’, accounted for about 13 per cent of GDP in 2022. Beijing’s heavy emphasis on industrial policy and exports, and its uniquely large state-assistance programmes aim to push this proportion up.

At the same time, over 80 per cent of China’s economy is in the doldrums. The lion’s share of this part of the economy, roughly two fifths, comprises real estate and infrastructure, both of which feature over-expansion, excess supply, shrinking demand as the working age population falls, and severe financial problems among heavily indebted local and provincial governments. In this part of China’s economy, the principal features are slowing economic growth, stagnating productivity, and the misallocation and inefficient use of capital, as well as weak household income, consumer demand and employment.

A Cold War with Chinese characteristics

Rana Mitter

The Cold War, in its classic sense, did not start or end in East Asia in 1989. There was an uprising against the Communist Party in China in the spring of that year, but it was suppressed at the cost of many deaths as the army was sent in to crack down on protesters in Tiananmen Square on 4 June 1989. We now know that the inner circles of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were dismayed not only by the events of that year, but also two years later in 1991, at the fall of the USSR. Yet the liberalisers within the CCP, who were more reformers of the existing system than pluralist democrats, were purged from the leadership in 1989. China’s leadership made the bet, which turned out to be a cynical if valid one, that there was a way of combining economic reform with political continuity.

One of the great moments of possibility was symbolised by the Chinese television show River Elegy, broadcast to hundreds of millions in summer 1988. More than three decades after it was broadcast, this six-part programme remains one of the most important shows ever to be broadcast in any country. Part documentary, part polemic, the show advocated democratisation, made a condemnation of Mao, and embraced closeness to the West. It is probably the most liberal statement of values ever seen in the Chinese public sphere. It mixed interviews with intellectuals, archive footage, and shots of top CCP leader Zhao Ziyang. After 1989, both Zhao and River Elegy were locked away, unmentionable in the new, harsher atmosphere. In China, the show has never been seen again; for the rest of the world, though, much of it has now reappeared on YouTube. Watch it. It’s worth it.

Despite the political chill after 1989, however, there was also real political liberalisation in China, albeit not on the scale seen in Eastern Europe, or indeed in South Korea or Taiwan: the 1990s and early 2000s saw a move toward a limited civil society as well as more openness of political discussion. The overall pattern of post-1989 political discourse in China is more complex than it appears on the surface: post-Tiananmen crackdown and freezing of discussion (1989-92); cautious openness influenced by the desire to re-enter the global community (1992-2008); shock at the global financial crisis and turn toward a more authoritarian rule, underpinned by the Bo Xilai political scandal (2008-12); and then the steady narrowing of political discourse under Xi Jinping (2012-). Xi’s rise was not the cause of the new authoritarian turn – it was a symptom of it.

How Solar Energy Could Transform Geopolitics

Ravi Agrawal

In the month of May this year, China created more new wind and solar capacity than the electricity, from all sources, that Poland installed in the entirety of 2024. While part of the outlandishness of this statistic is because of companies racing to take advantage of expiring subsidies, it shouldn’t obscure the bigger picture that the sheer scale of Chinese industrial policy has made the mass global proliferation of clean energy a very real possibility. Could it eventually save the planet?

On the latest episode of FP Live, I spoke with the longtime journalist and environmentalist Bill McKibben, whose 1989 book The End of Nature is widely seen as one of the first to bring the idea of climate change into public consciousness. His latest book, Here Comes the Sun, is altogether more hopeful, exploring how solar energy is already transforming energy markets.

The New Soft-Power Imbalance

Maria Repnikova

Since the start of his second term, U.S. President Donald Trump has been dismantling the traditional channels of American soft power. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is no longer operational, and Voice of America is tied up in legislative and court battles. The State Department has significantly reduced its staff and programming. Restrictive new visa and immigration policies have made the United States less accessible and less attractive to potential visitors, and Washington’s coercive and transactional dealings with U.S. allies have damaged trust abroad. In The New York Times, Jamie Shea, a former NATO

The prohibition on the use of force: what its erosion tells us about the international system

Benjamin Petrini

The erosion of the norm prohibiting the use of force is the result of shifting conflict dynamics and a changing international order. With multilateralism in crisis, there are questions as to whether the international legal framework on peace and security may be outdated.

Marked by geopolitical competition, trade wars and the highest number of conflicts since 1945, the current international disorder has sparked a debate over the applicability of and respect for international law both during armed conflict and what justifies waging it. This, in turn, has led to questions over the implications for the international system. Recent outright violations of the ius in bello (i.e., international humanitarian law (IHL) or the law of armed conflict, which disciplines conflict parties’ conduct in war) by Israel, Russia and Sudan’s warring parties, for example, have taken place together with increasingly diverging interpretations of the ius ad bellum (i.e., the law that regulates states’ right to wage war). More recently there have been actions taken outside the law, like the United States’ strikes against Venezuela-based organised criminal groups.

The prohibition on the use of force and its resilience over time

Today, both great and middle powers are challenging the prohibition on the use of force, pushing it to the brink of collapse. A core pillar of the post-Second World War international architecture, the prohibition on the use of force as an instrument of national policy was first introduced in 1928 with the Kellogg–Briand Pact. However, it was short-lived as it was not a universal norm and lacked an enforcing institution like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). After 1945, to wage war was no longer among states’ rights. The UN Charter outlawed the ‘use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State’, including the threat of such use (Article 2(4)), with the exclusion of self-defence (Article 51).

Overall, for nearly 80 years, the prohibition on the use of force has been exceptionally effective, given that no inter-state war between great powers has occurred. Furthermore, the number of sovereign states more than tripled as small states became less subject to rule or untoward influence from powerful ones. The UN Charter’s recognition of the right to self-determination, which partially ushered in decolonisation, also helped achieve this outcome. Banning the use of force was thus instrumental to a new era of cooperation, trade and interdependence that led to unprecedented levels of global prosperity – albeit highly uneven ones.

The Persian Gulf’s geopolitical flexibility is a useful revelation

Gilead Sher

The Middle East has thrown out the old rulebook.

Gone are the days of rigid alliances and permanent enemies. In their place, the wealthy Gulf states — led by Saudi Arabia and Qatar — are taking a new approach: Cutting flexible, case-by-case deals to buy stability while keeping every option on the table. This is very useful: It helped end, or at least pause, the ruinous Gaza war.

Nevertheless, there are more than a few quid pro quos. A proposed sale of up to 48 cutting-edge F-35 stealth fighters to Saudi Arabia by President Trump cuts directly to the core of American foreign policy in the Middle East.

For decades, the qualitative military edge — a statutory commitment guaranteeing Israel’s technological superiority over any regional coalition — has served as the unshakeable bedrock of U.S. defense strategy.

Can Washington reconcile this massive arms deal with its strategic obligation to protect Israel’s qualitative military edge, or is this sale a direct and fundamental breach of the commitment that underpins regional stability?

June’s 12-day Iran-Israel war was a gear shifting point towards easing the region into a new way of behaving. When U.S. airstrikes hit Iran’s nuclear facilities this summer, there was great confusion about the results. One preliminary assessment suggested the strikes delayed Iran’s program by mere months; the Pentagon claimed up to two years.

That gap matters. It is why Gulf capitals are hedging their bets, refusing to choose a permanent side.

The new architecture is one of two loose, opposing alignments — Iran-China-Russia-Turkey on one side, and Saudi Arabia-United States-European Union-Egypt-Israel on the other. But critically, the Gulf states function as indispensable intermediaries.

Google is soaring toward a $4 trillion market cap as Nvidia stock slumps

Catherine Baab

Over the past six weeks alone, Alphabet stock has shot up almost 35%, adding about $1 trillion in market value and putting the Google parent on track to cross the $4 trillion threshold for the first time.

Google would be just the third company in U.S. stock market history to hit a $4 trillion market cap, one step behind Apple and AI chip powerhouse Nvidia. Nvidia hit a $5 trillion market cap last month before retreating. Nvidia's market cap was all the way back to less than $4.2 trillion on Tuesday morning.

Investors were already warming to Google stock after the disclosure earlier this month that Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway has quietly built a multibillion-dollar position in Alphabet during the third-quarter — its first-ever stake in the tech giant. For a famously value-seeking shop, that amounts to an endorsement. It signals that Alphabet’s AI strategy is more legit than hype, and that the stock valuation offers room for the sort of significant upside that Buffett’s team looks for.

The New Democracy Defenders

Oliver Stuenkel and Adrian Feinberg

The Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program is a leading source of independent policy research, writing, and outreach on global democracy, conflict, and governance. It analyzes and seeks to improve international efforts to reduce democratic backsliding, mitigate conflict and violence, overcome political polarization, promote gender equality, and advance pro-democratic uses of new technologies.Learn More

As U.S. President Donald Trump and his administration have dismantled international democracy support over the past ten months—gutting aid programs, withdrawing from multilateral agreements, and transforming the U.S. from a standard-bearer of global democracy into a case study in democratic backsliding—world democracies have struggled to formulate a collective response. Reports have been authored, statements issued, and joint letters signed—but real action remains limited. Of these efforts, the most organized so far is In Defense of Democracy: Fighting Against Extremism, a bloc of “like-minded democratic states” convened by the progressive leaders of Spain, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay to “advance an active democratic diplomacy” in the face of institutional erosion.

In Defense of Democracy has met three times since Brazilian President Lula da Silva and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez launched the initiative at the 2024 UN General Assembly, citing the 2021 U.S. Capitol attack and the 2023 Brasília attacks as their catalyst. That inaugural summit featured an array of democratic leaders—including progressives from Norway, Timor-Leste, and Senegal, as well as centrist and center-left figures such as Emmanuel Macron and Justin Trudeau—and touched on themes familiar to democracy watchers everywhere: ideological extremism, institutional distrust, and affective polarization, among others. Mostly, participants seemed preoccupied with making sense of the crisis at hand. “Where,” Lula asked in his final remarks, “did democracy go so wrong?”

MBS Want.ed Status. Trump Wanted Deals

Andrew Leber

The Middle East Program in Washington combines in-depth regional knowledge with incisive comparative analysis to provide deeply informed recommendations. With expertise in the Gulf, North Africa, Iran, and Israel/Palestine, we examine crosscutting themes of political, economic, and social change in both English and Arabic.Learn More

“That’s another point you won today,” President Donald Trump said to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), announcing Saudi Arabia’s new status as a major non-NATO ally (MNNA) at a state dinner on Tuesday in honor of the kingdom’s de facto ruler.

The prince and the president touted several new U.S.-Saudi agreements during MBS’s two-day Washington visit this week. In addition to MNNA status, the deals included new AI partnerships with U.S. tech giants and the release of advanced Nvidia chips to Saudi AI firms, the potential sale of F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia, a nominal commitment from MBS to invest almost $1 trillion in the U.S. economy, and a nominal commitment from Trump to look into resolving the civil war in Sudan.

Many of these deals are less than meets the eye—either huge numbers announced solely to grab headlines or initial agreements that will take further negotiations to lock in. Still, the reputational gains for MBS in making it back to the White House are significant—not simply rehabilitating the crown prince as an essential part of the U.S.-Saudi relationship, but reinforcing his claims to domestic and regional leadership.

Ukraine: Between a Rock and a Hard Place

Gwendolyn Sasse

A tangible sense of despair hangs over Ukraine as it tries to negotiate with the United States on a flawed peace plan with an extremely tight deadline, while European partners scramble just to find a place at the table.

Ukraine finds itself in an impossible position, faced with a twenty-eight point plan presented in the form of a U.S. ultimatum. Kyiv must somehow continue cooperating with Washington in order not to lose American support, including shared intelligence data—knowing that it remains unable to adopt basic parts of an agreement that would prove unacceptable at home.

Yet, leaders there have no choice but to engage seriously with some of the unpalatable ideas on offer. The very fact of the U.S.-Ukraine talks in Geneva already sends a signal to Russian President Vladimir Putin that the invaded country is willing to engage on several points in a plan that may as well have been co-authored by the invader.

Don’t Hype the Disinformation Threat

Olga Belogolova, Lee Foster, Thomas Rid and Gavin Wilde

“Russian propaganda has made its way into the United States, unfortunately, and it’s infected a good chunk of my party’s base,” Representative Michael McCaul, the Texas Republican who chairs the House Foreign Affairs Committee, told the news platform Puck in March.

Nancy Pelosi, the California Democrat and former House Speaker, made a related claim earlier this year when commenting on protesters who were demanding a cease-fire in Israel’s war with Hamas in the Gaza Strip. “For them to call for a cease-fire is Mr. Putin’s message,” Pelosi told CNN, invoking the Russian president. She added: “Make

The Gaza Plan Just Hit a Crucial Juncture. Egypt Is Critical for Its Success.

Amr Hamzawy

The Middle East Program in Washington combines in-depth regional knowledge with incisive comparative analysis to provide deeply informed recommendations. With expertise in the Gulf, North Africa, Iran, and Israel/Palestine, we examine crosscutting themes of political, economic, and social change in both English and Arabic.Learn More

On Monday, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2803, which endorses U.S. President Donald Trump’s peace plan for Gaza. The resolution features a framework that seeks to link a permanent ceasefire with transitional arrangements for governing the Gaza Strip, gradual steps toward an Israeli military withdrawal, and mechanisms to address Hamas’s disarmament. It also contains an important—albeit unclear—reference to the Palestinians’ right to an independent state in the final outcome. This reference provides the resolution with a strategic dimension that calls upon regional actors—chief among them Egypt—to play an active role in moving Gaza along a viable political trajectory, rather than allowing it to dissolve into administrative, security, and service-delivery details.

The resolution treats Trump’s plan as a binding roadmap that would shift Gaza from a state of conflict and humanitarian collapse to an interim phase led by the International Stabilization Force (ISF) and the Board of Peace, a multiparty supervisory body. The text notes that this phase is a transitional, organizational channel for reconstruction and the provision of basic services. The board and ISF would guarantee the flow of humanitarian assistance, manage border crossings, and implement security measures to prevent a relapse into violence.

The danger, however, lies in the possibility that this interim stage could easily evolve into a long-term trusteeship. To avoid this fate, the phase’s mechanisms and components must be designed in a manner that ensures meaningful Palestinian participation in day-to-day governance. It should set clear timeframes for every transitional step—including Israeli military withdrawal without partitioning the Gaza Strip and addressing the weapons of Hamas and other factions. And it must ensure that any necessary extension is not solely an Israeli request or a U.S. decision, but also receives Palestinian and regional consent.

This is where Egypt’s role becomes critical.

‘Good Enough’ Drones Have Become Geopolitical Chips

Steven Feldstein

In Sudan, which has been engulfed in a ruinous civil war since 2023, drones have been devastating instruments of destruction. The conflict has killed as many as 400,000 people and displaced more than 12 million from their homes. Deployed indiscriminately against both civilian and military targets, the unconstrained use of drones by both sides has contributed to the war’s growing death toll and also inflicted heavy damage against vital infrastructure such as hospitals, airports, military bases, and ports.

The world is entering a new era of drone warfare. Drones are proliferating on the battlefield in both small and large conflicts. They are making warfare deadlier and easier to wage, granting increased firepower to nonstate actors and insurgent movements, in addition to enhancing the capacity of regular militaries. Fundamentally, drones offer several advantages. Unmanned systems allow militaries to conduct operations without risk to their own personnel; the human cost of deploying a drone is minimal. They are also effective weapons, enabling strikes against targets from remote distances. Compared with other types of weapons systems such as precision-guided missiles, drones have low acquisition and operating costs. Moreover, few states possess the requisite weaponry (at least at present) to defend against drones. Finally, drones are multifunctional. Not only are they adept at conducting kinetic strikes, but they can perform other critical functions, such as carrying out battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance.

The Dire Need for International Pressure to End the War in Sudan

John Haltiwanger

The brutal civil war in Sudan between the country’s military and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group has catalyzed one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises as millions contend with displacement and acute food insecurity. What’s happening in Sudan is widely considered to be a genocide, including by the United States, and it’s fueling regional instability.

To get a clearer picture of the scale of the dire humanitarian crisis, Foreign Policy spoke with Charlotte Slente, the secretary-general of the Danish Refugee Council, who recently traveled to eastern Chad and met with Sudanese refugees—including families who fled the city of El Fasher. The RSF has been accused of perpetrating a massacre in El Fasher, which it captured in October. The mass killings in the area were so extensive that what appeared to be piles of bodies and blood could reportedly be seen on satellite imagery.

Can Russia Win in Ukraine on its Current Trajectory: Assessing Russia’s 2025 War Effort

Mick Ryan

Russian advances on the ground in Ukraine this year, while limited compared to the resources expended to secure them, provide an insight into the mindset of the Russian military leadership and importantly, President Putin. This war is much less about territorial gain than it is about political gain. That should not be a surprise. But too much of the reporting on the war is reduced to square kilometres gained or lost, and numbers of drones used in Russia’s nightly, continuous aerial assaults against Ukrainian infrastructure, defence industry and civilian targets.

Throughout the course of this war, I have proposed measures of success and failure to provide more illumination about how Russia, and Ukraine, are going in this war, and to inform debate on its trajectory. These measures are also important because, if used consistently, they can also yield political and military lessons about Russia and Ukraine for western military and civilian analysts of the war.

Over the past year, Russia has built strategic momentum with its ground and aerial assaults on Ukraine. While this has been insufficient to deliver a decisive military victory for Russia, it has underpinned its diplomacy to gain limited support from the Trump administration for forcing a ceasefire on Ukraine that is advantageous to Russia. While Putin’s efforts in this regard have stalled of late, they have not been entirely wasted.

Russia retains has the strategic initiative in this war. And, over the past three years, it has learned to learn better, to adapt systemically and harness its relationships with Iran, China and North Korea to support its war effort. And, as I wrote in a just-published white paper for the Center for Strategic and International Studies: “It is very likely that Russian efforts to “learn how to learn better” in the past three years have achieved critical mass and are now paying dividends at the tactical and strategic levels.”

But what does that really mean for Russia’s prospects in the war? And what is the possibility of President Putin achieving his political and strategic objectives of subjugating Ukraine, keeping Ukraine militarily neutral and ensuring Ukraine is not able to provide a democratic model of governance visible to the repressed Russian people? To that end, this essay examines Russia’s likely measures of success for its 2025 war efforts, and assesses the degree to which it may have achieved its objectives.

Russia’s Strategic Objectives: No Change

Germany’s False Generation War: How Boomer-Bashing Masks Political Failure

Igor Ovsyannykov

Romania’s‍‌‍‍‌ New Mega-Cathedral Reminds Us That Civilisational Rebirth Is Always Possible

The People’s Salvation Cathedral affirms that modernisation can only occur in harmony with a people’s spiritual roots.

Successive left-wing governments have empowered gender-ideology NGOs in classrooms, giving them legal cover to influence children without parental oversight.

Can we blame Germany’s problems on the baby boomers? That’s the unfortunate—and dangerous—tenor of Germany’s latest crisis discussion, triggered by a massive row between Chancellor Friedrich Merz (CDU) and his party’s youth wing (Junge Union).

At last week’s Junge Union gathering, Merz was visibly humiliated when delegates refused to support a pension agreement he’d made with coalition partner SPD. Some outlets suggest the government could collapse over the dispute. But while there’s much to criticize about this inept government, there’s nothing to celebrate about this pension fight.

The debate masquerades as centered on ‘intergenerational justice,’ but it really reflects a toxic mix of anxieties: fear of population aging, public spending concerns, and a general terror of taking responsibility for the future. Germany’s deepest political and moral confusions, it seems, are being refracted through the prism of an artificial ‘generation war.’

Germany’s pension system, introduced in 1957 by conservative chancellor Konrad Adenauer, lifted millions of elderly Germans out of poverty after enduring two world wars. Funded by current contributions and indexed to wage growth, it guarantees retirees 48% of past gross income. Adenauer’s optimistic dictum—”people will always have children”—assumed continued economic growth.

However, with the economy contracting and millions of baby boomers retiring, optimism has turned to pessimism. Germany has the ninth-highest median age in the world and is set to lose around 5 million workers by 2035. The system requires over €100 billion in taxpayer subsidies each year, in addition to pension contributions paid by employees. While six workers financed one pensioner in the 1960s, today it’s only two, and this ratio is set to fall further still.

Parroting elite rhetoric

RECKLESS PEACEMAKER?

Jonathan Guyer, Lucas Robinson, Eloise Cassier, Ransom Miller

The Institute for Global Affairs (IGA) at Eurasia Group asked a nationally representative sample of 1,000 Americans to evaluate US foreign policy nine months into the second Trump administration. Conducted between October 6–14 during a feverish news cycle — marked by a government shutdown expected to become the longest in US history; a ceasefire in Gaza and the exchange of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners after two years of war; and the staging of American forces off the coast of Venezuela — our survey finds a fractured electorate with little consensus on America’s power and purpose.

We chose to title this report Reckless Peacemaker? because it gets at the paradoxes of Trump’s foreign policy and polarized views of him. When offered a dozen adjectives, half positive and half negative, Republicans more frequently chose the words tough, intelligent, and peacemaker. Pluralities of Democrats and independents selected destructive, erratic, and reckless to describe Trump’s leadership.

Executive Summary

President Trump’s performance on key foreign policy issues receives mixed reviews from AmericansHalf of Americans think Trump is performing poorly (50%). Many key players in his cabinet fare only a little better.

More Americans think the Trump administration is making things worse — not better — on a range of foreign policy issues, from relations with allies (-23%), America’s international standing (-22%), and immigration (-5%) to Iran’s nuclear program (-13%), the war in Ukraine (-19%), and nuclear risk (-21%). Only on the issue of international drug trafficking do more Americans think Trump is making things better than worse (+7%)

Republicans are more likely than Democrats to break with party lines — nearly a quarter of Republicans say Trump is handling US-China relations (24%) and international trade (21%) poorly — and a sizable minority of Democrats think America’s handling of drug trafficking (26%) and the Israel-Gaza conflict (21%) is no better or worse than before his return to office.

Many Americans are skeptical of Trump’s claim of being a peacemakerMost Americans believe Trump does not deserve a Nobel Peace Prize (64%), including the vast majority of Democrats (95%) and most independents (71%). Republicans hold mixed views on Trump’s merits: A slim majority say he deserves the prize (56%), while 25% disagree and 19% are unsure.

Trump's growing impatience to end Ukraine war is a concern for Kyiv

Jonathan Beale

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has been careful not to criticise or reject a US draft peace deal to end the Ukraine war - even though it appears to heavily reflect many of Moscow's demands.

On Thursday, the White House pushed back on claims Ukraine was not involved in the drafting of the plan, which emerged after meetings between the US and Russia.

In his nightly address, Zelensky said Ukraine needed peace and would engage in diplomacy and issue no rash statements. He said Ukraine was "ready for constructive, honest and efficient work".

But there is deep concern about some of the reported proposals, including giving up the entire Donbas region, reducing the size of Ukraine's military, and ruling out the presence of international troops in the country - concessions which Ukraine has rejected in the past.

Ukrainian MP Yaroslav Yurchyshyn told the Kyiv Independent that Washington wanted a "quick peace at the expense of one side, which they consider weaker".

Recent events may have further weakened Ukraine's position. Russia has made further advances in the east of the country. Moscow's long-range strikes on Ukraine's grid has left most of the country facing power cuts. Allegations of serious corruption in Ukraine's government have also led to political infighting and diverted attention from the war.

All these issues are impossible to ignore in both Washington and Moscow.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said that peace will require difficult decisions on both sides. A draft published in the media does include a promise of "reliable security guarantees" for Ukraine.

Trump Presents Ukraine With a ‘Very Tough Choice’

Sam Skove, John Haltiwanger

Ukraine faces a difficult decision in the days ahead as the Trump administration pushes the country to embrace a 28-point peace plan that would see it make major concessions to Russia—including relinquishing control of territory that Russian forces don’t currently occupy.

“Right now, Ukraine is under some of the heaviest pressure yet,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on Friday in an address to his nation. “Right now, Ukraine may find itself facing a very tough choice. Either the loss of our dignity or the risk of losing a key partner. Either the difficult 28 points, or an extremely hard winter—the hardest yet—and the dangers that follow,” he said.

Ep 249: Mick Ryan on the Ukrainian Way of War

School of War

Major General Mick Ryan, Australian Army (retired), Senior Fellow for Military Studies the Lowy Institute and author of the Futura Doctrina substack, joins the show to discuss the current state of the Ukraine war. We cover tactical innovations, the challenges of operations and strategy, the structure of the Ukrainian military, the political landscape under Zelensky, and the industrial capabilities of both Ukraine and Russia.

Times

00:00 State of Play

02:28 Tactical Innovations and Challenges in Ukraine

05:38 The Role of Drones

08:36 Russian Tactical Innovations and the Rubikon Units

11:45 Historical Parallels: Lessons from World War I

14:37 The Thousand Bites Approach: Russian Strategy Explained

17:46 Ukrainian Brigade Composition and Organizational Changes

23:19 Understanding the Ukrainian Military Structure

29:47 Challenges in Casualty Ratios and Manpower

37:37 Long-Range Strike Capabilities and Adaptation

40:29 Strategic Thinking in the Ukrainian Military

46:18 Industrial Base and Support Dynamics

Strategic Snapshot: Assessing Threats & Challenges to NATO’s Eastern Flank

Eurasia Daily Monitor

Strategic Snapshot: Assessing Threats & Challenges to NATO’s Eastern Flank

Russia’s strategy for challenging the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has evolved into a sophisticated hybrid-warfare doctrine that combines conventional military maneuvers in Ukraine with covert, disruptive operations across Europe’s frontlines. Moscow seeks to probe defenses, exploit ambiguity, and sow discord among allies. These campaigns encompass espionage, sabotage, cyber-warfare, and information operations, including concerted efforts to dominate digital spaces and foment Eurosceptic, disruptive politics. Most strikingly, Russia has waged an undercover war on European communications infrastructure, from cyber-terrorism to physical sabotage of undersea fiber-optic cables in the Baltic and Arctic.

In the Arctic, Russia’s twenty-first-century geopolitical maneuvering poses a formidable challenge to NATO containment. Its Project 22220 nuclear icebreakers and expansive logistics network, bolstered by deepening collaboration with the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—self-styled as a “near-Arctic power”—aim to secure control over the emerging Northern Sea Route—a critical artery for global trade and strategic mobility.

On the European mainland, Moscow’s influence-peddling and political subversion have achieved worrying, if uneven, success in pulling NATO members or aspirant states away from the West. Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party continues to steer the country away from the West into Russia’s orbit, particularly after the highly controversial parliamentary elections in October 2024 and the suspension of discussions on EU accession. Romania and Moldova narrowly resisted similar pressures during their most recent elections. Meanwhile, Russia’s sway over Hungary, Slovakia, and Serbia remains firmly entrenched.

Finally, despite its setbacks and humiliations on the battlefield in Ukraine, Russia continues to innovate technologically, particularly in drone warfare, cybersecurity, and nuclear energy, while forging critical economic ties across the southern hemisphere and with strategic partners such as Iran and the PRC.

Russia’s Hybrid Warfare Russia has escalated and innovated its use of hybrid warfare against NATO countries. This comprises espionage, sabotage, cyber-warfare, and information-warfare activities geared toward manipulating political narratives.

Germany bolsters defenses amid Russian hybrid warfare

Hans Pfeifer

When do we call it a "war"? How does "war" begin? Especially nowadays, in the digital age of cyberattacks?

"If a German corvette ship is attacked and sunk by a Russian submarine, you would call that war," Sönke Marahrens, a colonel in the German Armed Forces and a military strategist, said at a recent meeting of German security forces. "But what if metal shavings were thrown into the ship's gears and it is then no longer operational: Is that war?"

Marahrens is an expert on hybrid threats. At the autumn conference of the German National Criminal Police Office (BKA), he discussed future challenges with German and international security experts in Wiesbaden.

Russia, Europe and drones — a new hybrid war?

Marahrens' example of sabotage affecting the operational capability of a German warship is a real incident which occurred in January on the corvette Emden, shortly before its delivery to the German navy.

Europe is experiencing a steady increase in hybrid attacks. Military personnel, police officers, politicians and scientists have warned that the situation is serious.

"We are experiencing cyberattacks, the circumvention of sanctions and arson attacks on a scale we have never seen before," said Silke Willems of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Germany's domestic intelligence agency.

Russia relying on cost-effective agents

Identifying the perpetrators is extremely difficult. For the police and intelligence services, it's often not clear whether they're dealing with a Russian attack, a criminal act or just a case of dilapidated infrastructure breaking down.

Comparing it to similar incidents usually provides a clearer picture. Russia is deliberately operating in a gray area, investigators say, which complicates the response of the affected countries.

Breaking the Final Frontier: Cyber Operations Against the Space Sector

This CSS Cyberdefense Report "Breaking the Final Frontier: Cyber operations against the space sector. Evidence from the Gaza War and beyond" by Clémence Poirier examines 237 cyber operations that targeted the space sector amidst the Gaza War.

24.11.2025 by Clémence Poiriervolume_upRead

Space systems are an integral part of modern war fighting. Militaries use them to conduct everything from reconnaissance to communications and data transfers, mission planning, and maintain situational awareness on the battlefield. Over the past decades, malicious cyber campaigns targeting space systems were both rare and limited in their effects. February 2022 marked a turning point in that regard.

Given the evolution of cyber threats and attacks against the space sector in the context of the Russia-Ukraine War, the research question that remained unanswered was whether this dynamic was specific to this conflict, or whether the targeting of the space sector represents an evolution likely to appear in future conflicts as well.

The First Large-Scale Cyberattack by AI

Nury Turkel

A state-backed threat group, likely Chinese, crossed a threshold in September that cybersecurity experts have warned about for years. According to a report by Anthropic, attackers manipulated its AI system, Claude Code, to conduct what appears to be the first large-scale espionage operation executed primarily by artificial intelligence. The report states “with high confidence” that China was behind the attack.

AI carried out 80% to 90% of the tactical operations independently, from reconnaissance to data extraction. This espionage campaign targeted roughly 30 entities across the U.S. and allied nations, with Anthropic validating “a handful of successful intrusions” into “major technology corporations and government agencies.”

Transition Period Warfare: How the US Army Should Organize to Fight in a Time of Rapid Change

Joshua Suthoff

Military leaders and analysts consistently highlight the importance of predicting what the future formation should look like to win the next war. Current conflict areas and the rise of drones highlight the need for professional militaries to adapt to remain relevant against evolving threats. The Army Transformation Initiative and its transformation in contact efforts continue to expedite changes in organization and equipping. However, key to the US Army maintaining relevancy is how it adapts the division, as the unit of action, along with its subordinate brigades. Although the division formation has seen some recent organizational changes with artillery, engineers, and sustainment, key and most critical is the lethality of the division headquarters and assigned combat brigades. The speed of drone evolution, supported by AI, is uncomfortable for professional armies. This discomfort is exacerbated when considering procurement times and reliance on traditional combat-tested formations or tactics. This fear is reinforced by the idea that professional Western armies, like that of the United States, will successfully execute maneuver warfare in the new drone-infested operating environment. The sheer size and mass of US Army divisions and brigades is considerable, making them inviting targets for an enemy commander’s kill web. One combat principle remains true: Making contact with the smallest element possible limits vulnerability, and this applies from the squad to the division level. Today, a corollary to that imperative has emerged: That smallest element must be a drone-enhanced unit.

Assuming divisions will be able to rapidly transition from movement to maneuver under contact for the first time in decades without significant friction and casualties is unrealistic. Division-level maneuver is never rehearsed outside of a combined arms rehearsal or digital warfighter exercise. Current exercise design and training environments do not adequately recreate the enemy kill web possible on the modern battlefield. Attempts at innovation at the division level are capability focused, without deep thought on the organizational structures that most effectively employ new capabilities. Despite these shortcomings, there is an opportunity to experiment and learn across formations now.

Getting the next formation right for the future battle requires leaders to be comfortable with the uncomfortable. Understanding what is prioritized for adaptation and what must be kept to execute successful maneuver warfare is critical. The challenge is to develop a framework to find this balance of proven concepts and the uncomfortable but necessary changes the US Army must undertake. The framework should be used to inform the design and task organization for the US Army division. Getting the design and doctrinal template of a US Army division right is critical for winning the next war.

Robotic Transition Period Warfare

AI Is Supercharging Disinformation Warfare

James P. Rubin and Darjan Vujica

In June, the secure Signal account of a European foreign minister pinged with a text message. The sender claimed to be U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio with an urgent request. A short time later, two other foreign ministers, a U.S. governor, and a member of Congress received the same message, this time accompanied by a sophisticated voice memo impersonating Rubio. Although the communication appeared to be authentic, its tone matching what would be expected from a senior official, it was actually a malicious forgery—a deepfake, engineered with artificial intelligence by unknown actors. Had the lie not

A World Divided Over Artificial Intelligence

Aziz Huq

In November 2023, a number of countries issued a joint communiqué promising strong international cooperation in reckoning with the challenges of artificial intelligence. Startlingly for states often at odds on regulatory matters, China, the United States, and the European Union all signed the document, which offered a sensible, wide-ranging view on how to address the risks of “frontier” AI—the most advanced species of generative models exemplified by ChatGPT. The communiqué identified the potential for the misuse of AI for “disinformation” and for the kindling of “serious, even catastrophic” risks in cybersecurity and biotechnology. The same month, U.S. and Chinese