From Patron to Primary Victim: Pakistan and the Security Fallout of Taliban Governance

Khurram Abbas

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Pakistan was one of the first and most vocal supporters of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan after the Taliban retook Kabul in August 2021. Islamabad saw the fall of the Ashraf Ghani-led Republic as a chance to enhance its strategic influence in Afghanistan after two decades of war. Islamabad’s strategic calculus considered that a friendly government in Kabul could lessen India’s growing influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan kept its embassy open when most countries left, helped people leave during the chaotic NATO exit, and worked hard to get other countries to help with humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan.

But four and a half years later, Pakistan has reaped few benefits from its early support. Instead, Pakistan is the most directly and severely affected by the Taliban’s inability – or unwillingness – to prevent Afghan soil from being used for terrorism.

Why the Taliban Wants to Talk with the US

James D. Durso

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Before Afghanistan in 2021, America was last defeated by a national liberation movement in Vietnam in 1975. After the fall of Saigon, the “domino theory” assured Americans that Asia would quickly fall to Communism. That didn’t happen, and the ensuing violence (Vietnam’s 1979 invasion of Cambodia and China’s attack on Vietnam) didn’t affect American security. But Eurasia in 2026 is another situation entirely. While Washington waited 19 years to establish diplomatic relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, it shouldn’t delay diplomatic recognition of the new regime in Afghanistan.

There is a lot going on: Nuclear-armed India and Pakistan fought a short war in May 2025; relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan are tense over the activities of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban) and the Baluchistan Liberation Army; Iran has been accused of developing nuclear weapons and was recently attacked by Israel and America; the region is host to several nascent connectivity networks, and may possess abundant rare earth elements; the Central Asian republics’ economies are rapidly growing; and, everyone depends on Afghanistan for water.

The Quiet War With China

Paul F. Renda

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When most of us think of war, we picture bombs, soldiers, and fighter jets. The biggest fear in many people’s minds, especially during election seasons, is a nuclear war. But there is another kind of war happening right now, one that doesn’t use missiles but is just as important. It’s an economic war. In today’s world, the country that controls the global economy is the most powerful. And right now, the United States is in a serious long-term struggle with China for that top spot.

To understand this competition, we need to look at history. China has a civilization that goes back over 5,000 years. The United States, in comparison, is a young nation—only about 250 years old. America has been an incredible experiment in democracy and freedom. However, China’s long history has taught its people some hard lessons. Over thousands of years, China has been both the richest empire in the world and the poorest. That experience taught them how to survive when times are tough, how to be patient, and how to plan for the long term. It’s like the difference between a kid who grows up with every advantage and a kid who has to work hard for everything. The one who struggles often learns more about how the world really works.

From behind bars, Aung San Suu Kyi casts a long shadow over Myanmar

Jonathan Head

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As of Wednesday the Burmese democracy campaigner Aung San Suu Kyi will have spent a total of 20 years in detention in Myanmar, five of them since her government was overthrown by a military coup in February 2021.

Almost nothing is known about her state of health, or the conditions she is living in, although she is presumed to be held in a military prison in the capital Nay Pyi Taw. "For all I know she could be dead," her son Kim Aris said last month, although a spokesman for the ruling military junta insisted she is in good health.

She has not seen her lawyers for at least two years, nor is she known to have seen anyone else except prison personnel. After the coup she was given jail sentences totalling 27 years on what are widely viewed as fabricated charges.

Exclusive: Beijing tells Chinese firms to stop using US and Israeli cybersecurity software, sources say

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The U.S. companies whose cybersecurity software has been banned include Broadcom-owned (AVGO.O), opens new tab VMware, Palo Alto Networks (PANW.O), opens new tab and Fortinet (FTNT.O), opens new tab, while the Israeli companies include Check Point Software Technologies (CHKP.O), opens new tab, two of the sources said.

The third source said other companies whose software was banned included Alphabet (GOOGL.O), opens new tab-owned Mandiant and Wiz, whose purchase Alphabet announced last year, as well as U.S. firms CrowdStrike (CRWD.O), opens new tab, SentinelOne (S.N), opens new tab, Recorded Future, McAfee, Claroty, and Rapid7 (RPD.O)

Chinese military says it is developing over 10 quantum warfare weapons

Holly Chik

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China’s military says it is using quantum technology to gather high-value military intelligence from public cyberspace. The People’s Liberation Army said more than 10 experimental quantum cyber warfare tools were “under development”, many of which were being “tested in front-line missions”, according to the official newspaper Science and Technology Daily.

The project is being led by a supercomputing laboratory at the National University of Defence Technology, according to the report, with a focus on cloud computing, artificial intelligence and quantum technology. Commanders hope that quantum computing will allow them to process large amounts of battlefield data within seconds, helping them to make decisions and allocate resources.

The Dragon and the Clock—2027 as the Turning Point Year Between China and Taiwan

Edan Morag

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Many regard 2027 as the year in which the Chinese military could attack Taiwan—especially after former CIA Director William Burns said in 2023 that “as a matter of intelligence, we know that he [Xi Jinping] has instructed the People’s Liberation Army to be ready by 2027 to conduct a successful invasion of Taiwan.” Western research institutes, including Brookings, have used 2027 as a reference point in their analyses. 

Likewise, in regional assessments by countries close to China and Taiwan—such as Japan and India—2027 repeatedly emerges as a point of departure. This is despite the fact that no official Chinese authority has publicly declared 2027 to be the target year for unification with Taiwan. US intelligence may be correct, or it may not be; therefore, it cannot be stated with certainty that this is indeed Beijing’s target year. Nevertheless, this article analyzes possible reasons for this assessment and discusses what a 2027 contingency would mean for Israel’s security, foreign policy, and economic systems.

Can China’s Military Actually Fight?

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In 2024, U.S. intelligence reported something that sounds like a dark comedy: up to half of China’s ballistic missiles may have been filled with water instead of fuel.

The money that should have bought rocket propellant had vanished – apparently siphoned off by corrupt officers who pocketed the funds. That year, China purged nine senior officers from its Rocket Force. And in 2025, for the first time in history, Beijing sacked a sitting vice chair of its Central Military Commission – the body that controls China’s entire military.

Something is deeply wrong inside the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA. And Xi Jinping knows it.

The stakes could not be higher. China is menacing Taiwan, which makes over 90 percent of the world’s most advanced semiconductors – the chips in your phone, your car, your laptop. Roughly a third of global trade passes through waters off China. A war, especially one that involves both China and the United States, would trigger a global economic crisis.

Rift at top of the Taliban: BBC reveals clash of wills behind internet shutdown

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It was a piece of audio obtained by the BBC that revealed what worries the Taliban's leader most. Not an external danger, but one from within Afghanistan, which the Taliban seized control of as the previous government collapsed and the US withdrew in 2021. He warned of "insiders in the government" pitted against each other in the Islamic Emirate the Taliban set up to govern the country.

In the leaked clip, the supreme leader Hibatullah Akhundzada can be heard giving a speech saying that internal disagreements could eventually bring them all down. "As a result of these divisions, the emirate will collapse and end," he warned. Supreme leader Hibatullah Akhundzada (centre) has "absolute power", his spokesman said - but ministers including Sirajuddin Haqqani (left) and Mohammad Yaqoob (right) have questioned decisions

How Greenland Falls Imagining a Bloodless Trump Takeover

Jeremy Shapiro

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What follows is a work of speculative fiction. Any resemblances to actual future events are purely coincidental. This scenario is plausible, but certainly not inevitable. It is offered in the modest hope that it will inspire and inform efforts to prevent the disastrous outcome described here.

It is January 2028. Looking back, the Americans did not “take” Greenland—not in any concrete sense. There was no invasion, no purchase, not even a plebiscite. But in the shadowy corridors of Arctic politics, Washington moved deliberately to confound its opponents. The Americanization of Greenland transcended brute imperial force in the Russian mold.

U.S. Weighs Expanding Private Companies’ Role in Cyberwarfare

Adam Sella

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The Trump administration is weighing a substantial shift in its cyberstrategy, including by enlisting private companies to assist with offensive cyberattacks, according to four former senior U.S. officials familiar with the administration’s thinking.

The proposals have been included in drafts of the administration’s coming National Cybersecurity Strategy, which will set out general priorities and be accompanied by a plan to carry out the policies, said the former officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a document that was not yet public.

Mercenarism Reborn: Drone Operators, Coders, and the Post-Ukraine Market for Force - Modern War Institute

Raphael Parens

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Ukraine has emerged as the world’s most intense proving ground for modern warfare. Yet, these lethal advances in technology and tactics will not remain confined to Ukrainian battlefields. While wars typically end with questions about security guarantees and postwar reconstruction, the end of the war in Ukraine will force an additional question: What happens to the people who acquired the technical know-how to fight the next war? The conflict has already reshaped debates about the future of armed conflict. Many analysts argue that the war marks the maturation of technological trends that now define contemporary warfare, pointing to the diffusion of new technologies that now underpin military operations on both sides. 

Aerial and maritime drones, AI-enabled targeting systems, and algorithmic tools for logistics and battlefield management are no longer theoretical; they are central tools to how war is fought. Networked drones, commercial sensors, and data-driven targeting have closed the distance from target identification to destruction. In short, kill chains that once took days to unfold now close in hours, even minutes. Equally important, operators have adapted and integrated these technologies in real time. Improvisation and experimentation have become essential for competition and survival on the modern battlefield.

Strategic Importance of Greenland

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Greenland is located at the northern edge of the Arctic Circle and occupies a highly strategic geographic location. Its high latitude provides for early warning of missile launches from adversaries like Russia. Greenland forms the western component of the Greenland-Iceland-United-Kingdom (GUIK) Gap, a critical maritime chokepoint for monitoring surface and sub-surface naval activities in the North Atlantic. Its position in the Arctic Circle gives it access to the Arctic passages of commercial shipping and military vessels. With the continued change in the earth’s climate the Arctic region is providing more access to potential natural resources – minerals, natural gas, and oil. These geographic and environmental factors contribute to Greenland’s strategic relevance in the competition involving the major powers of the United States, Russia, and China.

About Greenland. The world’s largest island, Greenland covers more than 836,000 square miles. Located off the northeastern coast of Canada, Greenland lies between the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans. 80% of Greenland lies above the Arctic Circle. Greenland is a self-governing territory within the Kingdom of Denmark. It gained home rule in 1979 and expanded self-government in 2009. There are about 56,000 inhabitants of Greenland; mostly Inuit people (Wikipedia).

Strategic Disruption from Orbit: Space-Based Capabilities for Irregular Warfare in the Indo-Pacific

Trent Keipour

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During World War II, U.S. forces in the Pacific faced a vast and challenging expanse. Islands were isolated, supply lines were stretched thin, and intelligence was limited to the speed of ships, aircraft, or radios. Today, although the geography and the challenges that come with it remain unchanged, technological capabilities have advanced significantly. Warfighters now look beyond the horizon for an advantage; in fact, they look to orbit, where space has become the ultimate high ground. From that vantage point, modern forces gain essential capabilities in communication, navigation, intelligence, and targeting—capabilities that increasingly influence outcomes in conflict and require new strategic approaches for future operations.

This technological evolution is unfolding as the character of competition in the Indo-Pacific continues to shift. The region is increasingly shaped by irregular forms of competition including coercive infrastructure development through China’s Belt and Road Initiative, illegal fishing, gray-zone maritime pressure from state-affiliated militias, and malign operations designed to undermine democratic institutions. Yet many frontline partners, small island states, and midsized regional powers lack the surveillance, communication, and intelligence infrastructure to compete in this space.

Drone Warfare in Ukraine: A Window onto the Red Army’s Doctrinal Concepts

Samson Aboulkheir

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Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov was major figure of the Soviet military; he was promoted to Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1977 and was Chief of the General Staff of the USSR between 1977 and 1984. Ogarkov’s concept of nonlinear warfare (очаговый бой) is rooted in the acknowledgment that surveillance and long-range strike capabilities have become sophisticated enough to make ground troops’ concentration obsolete. In the early cold war, the growing development of the nuclear tactical arsenal endangered the resort to the concentration of troops. Initially, the Red Army’s response was to increase the mobility of its forces to address this challenge – this was one of the core goals of Georgy Zhukov’s reforms in the 1950s. However, innovations in the 1970s in surveillance, targeting, and deep-strike capabilities ultimately rendered troop concentrations obsolete. 

A modern army equipped with such sophisticated weapons and devices could target and destroy an enemy’s concentration of troops even before it reached the frontline. Furthermore, the long-range strike weapons became so precise and deadly that the mobility factor wasn’t enough to keep a great number of forces, concentrated on the ground, still relevant. The concept of nonlinear sought to address this growing challenge between the 1970s and the 1980s, by proposing an overhaul of the Red Army’s structures and doctrinal thinking.

Flying Artillery: A Time-Dominance Fire Support Model

Masayuki Sasaki 

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Fire-support systems are struggling to keep pace with modern maneuver. Ground forces move quickly to survive, but artillery and aviation often cannot reposition fast enough to match that speed. Artillery delivers strong effects, yet its firing signatures are detected quickly, and counter-battery fire often arrives before guns can relocate.

Attack helicopters were once expected to provide mobile firepower. Still, conflicts like Ukraine show that low-altitude helicopters are routinely engaged by Man-Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) and drone-enabled targeting. Several Russian Ka-52 helicopters were shot down while operating at low altitude, demonstrating that even advanced platforms cannot survive if they stay visible too long.

Small drones help identify targets, but they cannot carry significant payloads or operate reliably in harsh weather or mitigate the effects of electronic warfare. These limitations leave a structural gap between what ground forces need—fast, mobile fire—and what current systems can safely deliver. Flying Artillery (FA) focuses on time advantage rather than platform sophistication to close that gap.

Information Warfare: The Army’s Continuous Transformation in Action

Ryan Walters

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A military unit deploys overseas. When they arrive, the enemy has already set the stage. Fake GPS signals push civilian traffic and some convoys onto the wrong roads. Decoy radios and corrupted apps fool their sensors into thinking certain routes are safe. Phone and app data leaks reveal where their forces are moving. Enemy-backed lawsuits close air transportation corridors and block access to key areas. Small armed drones circle and strike along the obvious, well-known routes, and fake directions steer vehicles into planned ambushes. 

Online rumors and deep-fake videos turn the local populace against them, so permits and cooperation are delayed or denied altogether. Soldiers are attacked, equipment is destroyed, and the mission falls apart. The enemy won the important fight in courts, online, and on phones before soldiers faced each other. They were too late to challenge it and paid the price. Is the U.S. setting the conditions, or letting them be set against it?

How Venezuela Grew Poor With More Oil Than Saudi Arabia

John P. Ruehl

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Donald Trump has been clear about framing oil as a central part of Washington’s interests in Venezuela, but whether the country’s vast reserves can translate into real prosperity is unclear.

Following the dramatic seizure of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on January 3, 2026, Trump’s comments about taking control of Venezuela’s oil industry quickly triggered accusations of “neo-imperialism”. Critics argued that pledges to share profits with Venezuela were little more than cover to protect the interests of America’s major oil companies. Yet despite the allure of Venezuela’s reserves, many of those major oil firms have been notably cautious, citing uncertainty over the country’s political trajectory and the durability of legal and financial protections.

Venezuela sits atop more than 300 billion barrels of proven crude reserves, constituting roughly 17 percent of the global total. This is more than Saudi Arabia’s reserves, which is the world’s most recognizable oil power. The two countries have comparable population sizes, yet Saudi citizens rank among the wealthiest in the world, while Venezuela has become one of the poorestcountries in the Americas.

Trump And The Special Operations Panacea

Tim Ball

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(FPRI) — The recent raid to capture Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro appears to have been a nearly flawlessly executed special operation. Conducted by the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) with interagency support, the raid demonstrated the professionalism and expertise of America’s special operations community and will likely be used as a case study in the training of future special operators. 

While the raid’s tactical success is unquestioned, its aftermath raises the same historical issues with not only the use of special operations forces, but US-sponsored regime change as well. Even in the hands of disciplined civilian policymakers, competent special operations forces can appear as a tempting panacea, available to solve national security woes without the full commitment of the US military.

A Nuclear Power Perspective for 2026

Kenneth Luongo

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The United States’ approach to nuclear energy in 2025 was characterized by typical Trumpian bravado. It offered expansive executive orders, a dose of new reactor rugged individualism, and a warm embrace of government-financed projects. But the cold reality is that the American nuclear build-out is not building much so far.

In 2026, President Donald Trump needs to demonstrate results. The administration is entering lame-duck territory with a mid-term election next November and a term-limited president. It now has to manage a populist political backlash to the growing energy demands for data centers while forging ahead in the artificial intelligence (AI) race with China. All these factors can dilute the focus on complicated and multifaceted nuclear energy objectives and present the administration with some serious challenges. That makes this year pivotal for achieving progress and anchoring success for the future.

The European Union Is Considering a United Army—Again

Stavros Atlamazoglou

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European Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius observed that the United States had one army, not 50—and was far stronger for it. Should the European Union establish its own armed forces? According to European Union Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius, it is urgent for the international organization to do so as quickly as possible.

Can the EU Build a True “European” Army?

Kubilius, the most senior defense official in the European bloc, said that the EU should consider establishing a standing force of 100,000 troops to protect the continent from current and emerging threats. He also suggested that the EU needed to overhaul the political processes that are currently controlling defense and military expenditure in the bloc.

How WhatsApp Took Over the Global Conversation

Sam Knight

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The first WhatsApps weren’t WhatsApps. In the spring of 2009, Jan Koum, a thirty-three-year-old computer programmer, was trying to get people interested in a product he had developed for Apple’s App Store, which had opened the previous summer. Koum tweaked his app’s name every few days—from Status App to Smartphone Status to iPhone Status—so that it would appear among the newest releases. The idea was that the app would show people what their contacts were doing before they called or messaged them. Maybe they were available, or at the gym, or sleeping. Between five and ten thousand people downloaded Koum’s app, but hardly anyone used it. They just called whomever they were going to call. Koum has a dry, somewhat brooding sensibility. “The app had no usability or functionality that was useful,” he said. He wondered what he was doing with his life.

Agentic Artificial Intelligence And Cyberattacks

Catherine A. Theohary and Kelley M. Sayler

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Agentic means autonomous, or independent. Agentic artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities are of increasing interest to the U.S. military and to Congress. According to an IBM definition, “Agentic AI is an artificial intelligence system that can accomplish a specific goal with limited supervision. It consists of AI agents—machine learning models that mimic human decision-making to solve problems in real time…. Unlike traditional AI models, which operate within predefined constraints and require human intervention, agentic AI exhibits autonomy, goal-driven behavior and adaptability.” For an explanation of AI- and machine learning-related terms, see CRS Infographic IG10077, Artificial Intelligence (AI) Taxonomy, by Laurie Harris and Nora Wells. According to the Department of Defense (DOD)—which is “using a secondary Department of War designation” under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025—Cybersecurity and Information Systems Information Analysis Center, there are “no known official government guidance or policies yet specifically on agentic AI.”

“We Will Export Data Instead of Oil”: The Rise of the Gulf States as Artificial Intelligence Powers and Its Geopolitical Implications

Ilan Zalayat

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Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and, to a more limited extent, Qatar bet on artificial intelligence as capable of replacing oil and gas in the future as a source of economic growth, regime stability, global power, and security relevance. By establishing computing infrastructure, forming partnerships with global technology giants, and developing large-scale human capital, the Gulf states aspire to control a significant share of global AI production and deployment alongside the major powers while acquiring independent capabilities. 

Gulf dependence on US-made chips, alongside the growing need of the United States and China for electricity that the Gulf states can supply, places the Gulf states at the heart of the Great Power Competition for technology and energy. Alongside their advantages in capital, energy, and political concentration, Gulf ambitions in AI face environmental risks, may be undermined by Western concerns over unethical uses and the formation of an investment bubble, and could shake the sensitive internal transformation their societies are undergoing. For Israel, Gulf technological empowerment rapidly erodes historical advantages but also opens the door to cooperation—requiring a national AI strategy and substantial investment in human capital.

The Army Built an AI Talent Pipeline—But It’s Filled with Career-Killing Roadblocks

Nathaniel Fairbank

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The Army is losing exactly the kind of artificial intelligence talent it insists it needs to win the next war. Only four of the seven Army Artificial Intelligence Scholars recently considered for on-time promotion to major were selected. That sub-60 percent promotion rate stands in sharp contrast to a population in which more than 80 percent of captains normally promote on time, with additional officers selected early. Not one of these scholars, nor any of the thirteen in the year group immediately behind them, was selected early. The three officers the Army declined to promote were not marginal performers: Collectively educated at West Point, Princeton, MIT, and Carnegie Mellon, one was among only three officers selected in 2021 for the program’s most technically rigorous track.

In practical terms, the Army chose not to promote officers—barely three years after finishing graduate school—in whom it had invested more than $350,000 each (counting tuition and the cost of pay and benefits while in school). In its first measurable test, the Army’s flagship AI talent pipeline produced worse promotion outcomes than the force at large, despite drawing some of the service’s most academically and technically competitive officers.