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20 April 2014

INDIA’S CHINESE UNEASE

Sunday, 20 April 2014 | 
G Parthasarathy | 

India can bring itself to face the multi-faceted challenges posed by China across the border and across Asia if, apart from developing its own economic and military strength, it also attempts to understand the complexities of the Chinese mind

The disastrous 1962 conflict with China still haunts public memory in India, and painful memories of the conflict have been revived recently. Author Neville Maxwell, though known to carry an anti-Indian bias, has made public what are undoubtedly the authentic contents of the report prepared by the late General Henderson Brookes on the 1962 military/political debacle. Lt General Brookes and Lt General (then Brigadier) Bhagat were asked by the then Army Chief in 1963, to analyse the causes for the debacle that traumatised the nation. Their report is a direct indictment of both the political and military leadership of the time. It focuses on the follies of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s “Forward Policy” in the years and days preceding the conflict.

This ill-advised policy involved forward deployment of an inadequately armed and underequipped Indian army, with tenuous lines of communications, to face a treacherous enemy, which had posed as a friend. While the years since the disastrous conflict have witnessed an upgrading of our military capabilities, are we, even now, economically and psychologically, prepared to meet the multi-faceted challenges that China poses today? What exactly are these challenges? More importantly, have we at all studied Chinese behavioural patterns and what constitutes the basis of their strategic thinking? These are issues that have been comprehensively addressed in the book Uneasy Neighbours authored by Ram Madhav Varanasi, who is the Director of the Delhi-based Strategic Affairs Think Tank ‘India Foundation.’ He is also a member of the Central Executive of the RSS.

Dealing with Chinese strategy during and in the days preceding the 1962 conflict, the author draws attention to the plaintive statements by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that he had been “deceived” by the Chinese. The “Forward Policy” after all involved moving Indian forces into areas the Chinese had laid claim to and even held periodically. Mr Nehru often alluded to the assurance that Chinese Defence Minister Marshal Chen Yi gave to his Indian counterpart VK Krishna Menon in July 1962. Marshal Chen Yi had then averred that: “There may be skirmishes between the two countries along the border, but full scale hostilities were unthinkable”. The redoubtable Krishna Menon, in turn, told the media at the UN, that there was absolutely no trouble along the India-China border!!

Why did India’s Prime Minster and Defence Minister go totally wrong in taking what Chen Yi had said at face value? The only answer is that, despite being reputed as the most well-informed and brilliant minds in the conduct of India’s foreign policy, both Nehru and Krishna Menon had a romanticised view of China’s communist leaders. This was especially of Chairman Mao, who had fought long wars against both the Japanese and his own opponents, led by General Chiang Kai-shek.

Ram Madhav dwells at length in explaining the basis of Chinese strategic thinking from the days of Sun Tzu (544-496 BC). Even today, Sun Tzu’s “Art of war” constitutes the core of Chinese strategic thinking. Mao was, after all, following Sun Tzu’s advice: “The Way of War is a way of Deception. Feign inability when deploying troops. When far, appear near. If the enemy is strong avoid him. Attack when he is unprepared. Appear when you are unexpected”.

Uneasy Neighbours carries a detailed account of how five decades after the 1962 conflict, the roads and rail communications on our borders with China remain abysmal, or non-existent. China, on the other hand, has built massive road and rail communications networks from its heartland, to Tibet. It is now carrying this infrastructure development forward to the very borders of India. The high Himalayas are no longer impregnable barriers to foreign invaders, as they were in the past. Weak and tenuous communications and infrastructural links to our borders with China will naturally raise concerns about how this asymmetry in economic and infrastructure development, will affect the morale of people in Ladakh, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. Will it not adversely undermine their confidence in India being able to protect their security and well-being?

The author very clearly recognises that India’s ability to challenge or balance Chinese power lies predominantly in its economic strength and resilience. He notes how China has surged ahead in meeting its own defence needs and is emerging as a significant exporter of weapons and defence equipment. India has, however, earned the dubious distinction of becoming the largest importer of arms in the world. This is a development, which is disastrous economically and dangerous strategically. While the DRDO has done a splendid job in the sphere of development of India’s missile capabilities, India cannot today claim to possess even a rudimentary ability to produce rifles, mortars, tanks, fighter aircraft, or warships, in significant numbers, let alone have any worthwhile capabilities for exports of arms and military equipment. We, unlike the Chinese, are in no position to help friends in dire need of defence equipment. Ram Madhav draws attention to the dangers arising from our overdependence on imports from China in crucial strategic sectors like telecommunications and power. He stresses the need for developing a high-tech industrial base in India, particularly in key strategic sectors, if we are to really obtain a measure of strategic autonomy.

Uneasy Neighbours also focuses attention on the attempts by China to strategically “contain” India, by massive aid in developing Pakistan’s conventional capabilities through supplies of tanks, fighter aircraft and frigates. This is, more dangerously, being accompanied by it providing the materials and ‘know-how’ to Pakistan, to develop an ever growing nuclear weapons arsenal, together with a wide variety of ballistic and cruise missiles.

What Ram Madhav inadvertently misses out is the fact that countries like the United States, which makes a song and dance about nuclear proliferation, turns silent, when it comes to censuring China for its violations of the NPT and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), by its reckless and dangerous transfers of nuclear weapons and missile technology to Pakistan. There is also reference to the efforts by China to seek an increasing presence in shipping lanes vital for India’s security in the Indian Ocean. China’s involvement in building ports and establishing its presence in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Pakistan naturally require close attention, as Indian develops its maritime capabilities.

Spiritually and culturally, India’s influence, particularly across its entire eastern neighbourhood, lies in the fact that it is the country that gave the message of Lord Buddha to the world. I recall that when I spoke to a former Myanmar Foreign Minister about our concerns at growing Chinese arms supplies to his country, he replied saying that India should never forget that while China may acquire some goodwill by supplying arms, every devotee in Myanmar knew that his path to salvation, lay in offering worship in the holiest places of Buddhism, in Bodh Gaya and elsewhere in India. Yet, even in winning hearts and minds of Buddhists in Myanmar and elsewhere, India has failed to capitalise on its spiritual heritage, by developing and interconnecting Buddhist holy sites in the country and making them friendly and conducive to spiritual tourism. The Chinese, on the other hand, are moving to outflank us even in this respect, by making Buddhist shrines in their country attractive for tourism. They are even moving to invest billions of dollars in the development of Lumbini in Nepal.

Uneasy Neighbours is an essential reading for all those who wish to understand the multi-faceted challenges that China poses to us not only across our borders, but indeed across Asia. Moreover, we can meet these challenges not merely by developing our own economic and military strength, but also, and more importantly, by understanding the complexities of the Chinese mind.

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