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6 August 2014

CHINA-VIETNAM: RECENT CRISES AS FALLOUT OF GREAT POWER RIVALRY – ANALYSIS


By Tam Chien Eurasia Review

In Europe, the Ukrainian crisis has led to waves of “economic sanctions” on Russia imposed by the US and European Union countries. Meanwhile in Asia, China sent a giant oil rig into Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf, which threatened the Vietnam-China relations as well as peace and stability in the region. These occurrences proved that this “super-flat” world is likely to be a more troubled playground.
China’s recent oil rig move

It is notable that China’s placement of the oil rig is just the latest in a series of aggressive actions calculated by Beijing, dating back to 1956 when China began occupying the eastern part of the Hoang Sa Islands (the Paracels) of Vietnam. This has been part of China’s design to make Vietnam’s East Sea (usually referred to as the South China Sea) a Chinese lake. History shows that China saw wars or conflicts as the wisest way to reach its goal. In 1974, China took advantage of the occasion when the US withdrew from Vietnam to take the western part of the Paracels from South Vietnam. In 1979, China waged a border war against Vietnam. In 1988, China moved to occupy some reefs of the Trường Sa Islands (the Spratlys). In 2011, three Chinese maritime surveillance ships maneuvered to cut the survey cable of the Vietnam’s oil exploration ship, Binh Minh 02, in Vietnam’s EEZ.

China’s justifications for all these incidents were largely made up. The current oil rig crisis is no exception. Beijing asserted that the rig was just 17 nautical miles from the Tri Ton Island of the Paracels and assumed that it is situated obviously within Chinese “contiguous zone”. China blatantly considered the Paracels as its own while ignoring historical and legal facts that Vietnamese states effectively and continuously administered these islands since at least the seventeenth century. Meanwhile, Beijing failed to mention that oil rig lay just 120 nautical miles off Vietnam’s shore, completely within Vietnam’s 200-nautical-mile EEZ authorized by UNCLOS.
Chinese calculations

China’s oil rig game always has many purposes. First, it is China’s long-standing scheme to change the status quo to eventually gain exclusive control of the South China Sea. Second, it was a well-calculated move to test how some powers, especially the US and Japan, will respond to its activities at a sensitive time when President Obama had just finished his visit to Asia, as well as how far the US pivot would go. Third, the oil rig incident constituted a direct challenge to ASEAN whether its members were ready to stay united in the period of developing a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. Fourth, it was a Chinese tactic of “killing chickens to scare monkeys”. It meant China sent a signal that it would not make any concessions on disputed waters with Japan and other ASEAN countries. Fifth, as happening in the past, China tried use civilian vessels to provoke Vietnam into military actions, which enabled China to accuse Vietnam of “attacking the Chinese first” or “invading China”. If it happened again, China would then take advantage of the situation to escalate the conflict to materialize its dream of controlling the South China Sea. Last but not least, the Chinese leaders wanted to raise nationalism in order to divert attention out of unfavorable internal circumstances, such as more sluggish economy and widespread anti-corruption campaign.

China carefully chose the moment to pick up a quarrel in the South China Sea to attract attention. China’s oil rig was illegally planted in Vietnam’s EEZ and infringed on Vietnam’s sovereignty right after US President Obama’s visits to America’s allies, specifically Japan, Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines. In Chinese strategic thinking, capitalizing on timing is a must. China clearly saw time was favorable for China because the US is facing tremendous difficulties. In particular, America’s economic recovery continues at a slow pace. Yet the Obama administration has little time left to take actions and Obama’s legacy depends on economic achievements. Besides, with regards to foreign affairs, Barrack Obama’s visits to allies seemed unlikely to fulfill their purposes as expected since negotiations on Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) are left incomplete. Evidently, Japan and Malaysia had not made up their mind on the TPP compromises. They are weighing the pros and cons of economic benefits between their relations with China and with America, causing considerable delay in the TPP bargaining. Meanwhile, the US’ leadership in Asia and the Pacific is distracted by Russia and the Ukraine crisis. Also, Sino-Russian relations rises to a new peak of warmth, featured by joint military exercises and President Vladimir Putin’s visit to China, which consolidated China’s position in the grand chessboard. Lastly, China certainly has some degree of influence on ASEAN nations, and hoped to have impacts on the ASEAN agenda in Myanmar this year. Its main rival in the South China Sea, Vietnam has relatively modest economic and defense capabilities and China can rely vaingloriously on its power to bully its neighbor.
Implications to politics and security in Asia and the Pacific

The recent crises bode ill to Asia-Pacific’s politics and security.

Firstly, the US has more incentives to “pivot” or “rebalancing”. The US’ “pivot” is mostly to prevent and restrain China and naturally, China opposes it. The “pivot” began at Southeast Asia and on ASEAN platforms. In July 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the former US Secretary of State, announced the US pivot to Asia-Pacific during her attendance at ARF meetings in Thailand. At that time, Asians did not take the message seriously. The US subscribed to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) which marked the beginning of a new involvement process in this region that was partly neglected by the previous American administrations. Not until the next ARF meetings in Hanoi did Asians really pay attention to the message. There, Hillary Clinton stated that the United States “has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to […] the South China Sea.” This statement was a response to China’s demand that the US recognizes the South China Sea as one of China’s “core interests” a few months ago.

Secondly, Chinese had launched its trial responses. A new question has been raised. First, will the US keep its long-standing stance to remain an outsider off territorial disputes between East Asian nations when China steps forward in invading waters and violating ASEAN countries’ sovereignty? The US and Asian countries clearly recognized the importance of maritime and airline communication through the South China Sea as well as peace and stability of the region. China announced that the South China Sea was its “core interest area” while paying no notices to others’ core interests. If powers do not corporate toward a win-win solution and if they prefer to use power unilaterally in defiance of international law and other countries’ sovereignty, the final outcome will be very bad for all. These crises may remind people of gunboat diplomacy in the nineteenth century.

Thirdly, many people recently raised concerns about an arms race in East Asia. Continuing arms race put the region in a newfound security dilemma that endangers regional peace and stability. Civil wars and armed conflicts still occur uninterruptedly around the world with a higher chance of nuclear weapon leaks. The struggle to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is also a seed of tension in Asia. In short, it seems that the Cold War with the two poles in the past between the US and the Soviet Union has not ended here. That sort of power politics is continuing in other ways and in other places.

Finally, prospects for US-China cooperation are also affected by these crises. The US attitude toward China’s recent behavior illuminated economic symbiosis and interdependence in other fields between the US and China, and the scope and limitations of this relationship. Chinese and American leaders often claim that China-US relations will be able to govern global and Asian political trends throughout the 21st century. If so, there are enormous responsibilities on the shoulders of these powers, including maintenance of regional peace and stability, and establishment of a rule-based order that respect interests and sovereignty of all countries regardless of their sizes. Great power politics, manifest in China’s bullying behavior and the US’ pivot, is a challenge to modern international relations. The crisis caused by China’s encroachments into Vietnam’s waters represented a new step by the Chinese to contest the US for regional and global domination.

it is hoped that the new world order is a multi-centered network of interdependent states and players, in which they play a win-win game firmly based on international law, not on power as was the old Cold War.

The author is the President of Vietnam-US Friendship Society, Hanoi.

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