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2 February 2015

What John Campbell Doesn’t Want You to Know About the Afghan Army

Gary Owen
Jan 30, 2015

This week, breaking coverage by the New York Times of a three month old Afghanistan story interrupted eulogies to the passing of the blog age just long enough for BuzzFeed to explain Matthew Rosenberg’s reporting in seven GIFs.

Per the Times, General John F. Campbell, the American commander of all foreign forces in Afghanistan, doesn’t want us to know how things are going in the graveyard of common sense. Which means we won’t know how the money gets spent anymore. But what he’s hiding isn’t money, it’s people.1

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), in his bid to stay relevant by telling everyone stuff they already know (Afghanistan sucks! We screwed up!) asked General “Full Disclosure” Campbell how the war was going. Apparently, since October, Campbell can’t answer that, because it’s classified. And the reasoning?

The military command’s explanation for making the change is that such information could endanger American and Afghan lives, even though the data had been released every quarter over the past six years, and Afghan officials do not consider the information secret.

The internet was outraged with the kind of outrage it usually reserves for the outrage over casting choice outrages for movie franchises that mean Hollywood never has to have an original thought because we’re all nostalgic saps and would shell out cash for a Look Who’s Talking reboot if we put Channing Tatum and Jennifer Lawrence in it somewhere.2 But since it was a slow news day what with the world peace and the end of poverty, the interwebs were ready to pounce on the fact that the United States appears to be hiding all the Afghan info from the general public.3

Since pretty much every piece of information that’s available to the SIGAR is suddenly being classified, what bothers us the most? That the military’s hiding something from us again. And we’re right: General Campbell’s hiding something. But it’s not money.
Moving the Deadline

For months now, General Campbell has been saying that he’s looking at the current timeline for the complete US withdrawal from Afghanistan. He’s not just looking at the timeline, he’s looking at numbers. Afghan troop numbers. And what those numbers show is an army that’s disappearing faster than Bruce Jenner’s Adam’s apple.

Based on the numbers publicly reported last fall, there won’t be an army left to fight the insurgency by the end of 2015. That’s not a metaphor or commentary on their professionalism. I mean there won’t be an army at all.

You remember 2014, right? The year when the Americans pulled back from being on the front lines and stopped (for the most part) patrolling with the Afghans? That’s when things started going…wrong…is I think the technical term for it.

This chart shows the monthly end strength goal (red) for the Afghan National Army (ANA). That means that’s the number of soldiers NATO and the Americans determined would ensure that the army could keep doing army things. In green is the ANA end strength. We’re doing pretty well…up until January.

Note the rapid change starting at the first of last year. Beginning in January of 2014, the ANA started missing end strength goals at an exponential rate. Up until that point, things were relatively fine by intervention standards.

Here’s the chart showing how much they’re missing on a percentage basis, which goes up through August of this last year. They started missing end strength goals by double digit percentage points, with a high of 16% in August. Granted, NATO for some reason increased the desired end strength goal, but they still missed the previous month’s goal by a whopping 11%.

Missing your sales goals is one thing: there’s TPS reports, and the two Bobs will probably want to talk to you before making you the chai boy at their new call center in Mumbai, but you can’t miss projections this badly when you’re the Afghan army. Some attrition is going to be acceptable and possible: it’s a war after all, and no matter who you are at some point you’re going to lose troops who just don’t want to play anymore.

Because we’re Americans and we see the world in shades of red, white and taxpayer green, the outrage has been about the money. We’re worried that now we won’t know what we’re getting for all that blood and treasure we invested in a country that never asked us to show up in the first place. So we jump all over this like Miley Cyrus on a little person at a Christmas concert, and with good cause, given the damage America has done to Afghanistan. Case in point: right now Kerry von Frankenstein’s National Unity Government (NUG) is moving Afghanistan forward at a pace that makes the buffet line at the Boca Raton Ponderosa look like a lap at Talladega.

But what Campbell’s trying to hide is a disappearing army. The issue isn’t that he doesn’t want us to know where the money’s going: he doesn’t want us to know that all the money, which was supposed to go toward an army that would be ready to stand on its own, went to an army that’s rapidly going full Cartman.

Attrition and the ANA

Attrition is an ongoing challenge in Afghanistan. The ANA regularly loses almost 1/3 of its personnel every year to attrition, something I pointed out back in 2013.

Based on the 1230 report’s figures, the ANA lost 27 per cent of its fighting force to attrition from October 2011 to September 2012. For the same period the previous year, the ANA lost 30 per cent of its personnel due to attrition, which means that 57 per cent of the ANA has been lost to attrition over the last two years. It gets worse: if the time period from March 2010 until September 2012 is considered, that number climbs to 72 per cent. So nearly three quarters of the ANA’s total force over the course of 31 months was lost.

That hasn’t improved with time, and in fact has gotten worse. A lot worse. From the Department of Defense in October of 2014:

The ANA averaged approximately 2.2 percent attrition for the past 12 months with a low of 1.8 percent in March 2014 and a peak of 3.3 percent in December 2013 and April 2014. In the first quarter of 2014, ANA average monthly attrition rate was 2.6 percent.

Although the overall attrition rate is higher than optimal, it is not directly affecting operations in the short-term, as the ANSF remains sustainable numerically due to robust recruitment.

However, attrition is always a concern, especially NCO attrition, given the loss of key military experience this represents. Urgent action is therefore being taken to address the root causes of attrition beyond combat casualties and to develop a culture of leadership accountability in the ANSF. Attrition management is focused on balancing the force at tashkil authorization levels for the targeted mix of officers, NCOs, and soldiers in authorized military occupational specialties.

Note the emphasis on “short-term.” That’s true: if you lose a small percentage each month, that might be survivable. What’s not survivable is that over the course of a year, nearly 27% of the of the ANA walks off the job, or otherwise just doesn’t show up. In this case, attrition is defined as: “killed in action, death, dropped from rolls, retirements, and separations.” “Dropped from rolls” means “he quit showing up, we don’t really know why, but he’s not here anymore.”

Attrition’s something every army has to deal with, no matter how professional your fighting force. The key is mitigating those losses so they don’t impact your ability to fight a war. For the Americans, that’s 1.4% for the ANA, a monthly attrition percentage they feel is survivable.

Attrition continues to challenge the force with monthly attrition rates averaging above the acceptable rate of 1.4 percent.

So your acceptable rate is 1.4%. Your actual rate is 2.2% over the year. Which means attrition rates are off by .8 percent a month. Or 9.6% on the year. For a difference of…157%. So: 
Acceptable: 16.8% 
Actual: 26.4% 
Difference: 157% 

I’m not good at math. There’s a reason I like spreadsheets and calculators. But I can state with some certainty that a 157% difference in your acceptable vs. actual levels of attrition means you’re losing people faster than they’re being replaced.

General Campbell doesn’t care about literacy. Or how many planes are in the Afghan Air Force. What General Campbell doesn’t want us to know is that the army that’s supposed to be taking over for the US to fight all the terrorist things? It’s disappearing. Even faster than usual.

So people quit. Big deal. We’ll keep hiring new recruits, and things will be just fine. Which is what was happening for the last several years. Even though the ANA wasn’t hitting its actual goals each month, it was adding a little more, or at least maintaining the number of people in the military.
Going Full Cartman

So why is the Afghan Army quitting in droves? According to the Americans, it’s because…

…high operational tempo, sustained risk, soldier care and quality of life, and leave issues. Afghan casualties increased since the ANSF took the lead for security in June 2013. Although combat losses comprise a relatively small percentage of total ANSF attrition numbers, reducing ANSF casualties remains both a top morale and operational priority for ISAF and ANSF leaders.

But what’s underlying that is the uncertainty the Afghan forces feel after only a few years of existence. They haven’t been around long enough to know what it means to fight on their own. For most of those years they had their hands held by the most powerful military in the world. And by holding hands I mean we brought death from above in the form of all the A-10s and the B-1s and the F-16s and all the exploding things in the air over Afghanistan.

The steep slope we’re seeing in ANA attrition means a few things: 
Dead Afghans: they’re just flat out getting jacked up on the battlefield 
Desertions: the ones that are still alive aren’t seeing the “win” in sticking around when their colleagues keep getting dead 
No new recruits: you’re an Afghan “military aged male,” and seeing what’s happening with your friends that joined up? You’re giving serious thought to another career. Probably in Germany. 

Even though young Afghan males have got few options for employment, the Afghan Army hasn’t been in existence long enough for anyone to really see it as a career option. The most attractive part of joining the army for new recruits? Used to be how much the Americans were going to be around, lending a hand and keeping all the things going.

But that’s not happening anymore. It doesn’t necessarily mean that they’re joining the insurgency, but people like Rashid Dostum don’t suggest increasing paramilitary forces in a vacuum. Forces like that and sure, some insurgent groups, are going to do a few things: pay better, probably get you better guns, and you know if you pick a fight it’s for the local team, and not some Pashtun you don’t like very much in the first place.

Yes, it’s disappointing that the SIGAR can’t get the info he needs so he can point out how great the SIGAR is and how everyone else pretty much sucks COINdinista balls. But what’s even more disappointing is what Campbell’s hiding: an army that’s fading faster than Leo’s Oscar hopes.

There’s a reason Campbell’s been reticent to commit to timelines for withdrawal, and it’s not just because the Pentagon and the White House don’t get along. It’s because he knows what’s coming: soon there won’t be an army left to defend Afghanistan. That’s what he’s hiding: that the grand plans put together by the military to make the political plan work are a frightening failure.

And who’s paying for the hubris? Sure, we as taxpayers get our piece of that: we’re going to foot the bills for this stuff for a long time to come. But beyond that it’s the Afghan people, specifically the Afghan army.

Because of our unrealistic timelines, which meant that we’re trying to take a military from zero to hero in a little over five years, they’re now paying the price. And that’s what’s really behind the curtain: misery for an army full of people dumb enough to believe that we’d make all of this right.

From the article: 

The United States has spent about $65 billion to build Afghanistan’s army and police forces, and until this month the American-led coalition regularly shared details on how the money was being put to use and on the Afghan forces’ progress.

But as of this month, ask a question as seemingly straightforward as the number of Afghan soldiers and police officers in uniform, and the military coalition offers a singularly unrevealing answer: The information is now considered classified.

The American outlay for weapons and gear for Afghan forces? Classified. The cost of teaching Afghan soldiers to read and write? Even that is now a secret.

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