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24 April 2017

Russia’s cyberwarfare operations are built on the back of their cybercriminal networks. Can the US and its allies take them down?


By Michael Lucian


One of the greatest parts about attending Inform[ED] was being introduced to the different perspectives and aspects that go into cybersecurity. You realize very quickly how cybersecurity isn’t as simple as firewalls and computer viruses, but is truly an ongoing evolutionary battle between cybercriminals and security entities that are fighting to get one step ahead of the other. One of the panel speakers I was fortunate to interview was Brian Rexroad, Vice President of security platforms at AT&T. Mr. Rexroad took some time and offered his insight on the techniques cybersecurity firms use to detect impending or active threats, how they manage around “gray areas” involving customer privacy, and more.

WDD: From your experiences, what (if any) are some for the early recognizable signs of an attempted or impending large-scale network attack (think Mirai, Ukraine, Finland incidents)?

Rexroad: The early indications we try to pick up on for something like Mirai (which propagates by scanning for targetable devices), involve trying to find in the flow activity of the network—characteristics that point to devices scanning the Internet for vulnerabilities. We’ll try to determine if the reasons another device is scanning an Internet network are legitimate, since there are multiple companies that scan for security, consumer, and other service-related purposes. Statistically speaking, when you start to see increases in a number of sources that are doing scanning with particular patterns, it’s probably an indication that a botnet is building up. So that’s what we try to look for, which is a network-level indicator.

There are other ways to build botnets. You can use search engine services like Google to research devices that have specific vulnerabilities rather than search the Internet for them. We also try to look for characteristics or behaviors are coming from something we’ve identified as a building botnet. The most obvious ones are indications of DDoS attacks, which you can see in a network’s behavioral activities. We have tooling to be able to detect anomalies on the network. For something like DDoS attacks, we use arbor networks, which we’ve equipped to analyze full data and use to the capabilities they have. We’ve supplemented that with some of our own capabilities we’ve built from the ground up like an internally-developed platform we used to try and find early indications of security-related events.

WDD: What different approaches do ISPs make in mitigating and preventing cyberattacks on IoT devices compared to conventional desktop/laptop computers?

Rexroad: I tend to go back and determine what defines an IoT device. I like to make a distinction more in terms of the problems it (the IoT device) creates or solves from a networking point of view, and to what extent they’ve taken security into account. A real problematic IoT device is one that gets flooded out into the market without updating capabilities, one that you plug it into the network and has default a password that could easily be compromised, and also uses universal plug-and-play to expose itself to the Internet because it’s convenient. The categories you put these IoT devices into really make a big difference. When we see a customer with a problem for example, we try to give them helpful information. Part of the problem with some of these devices winds up being that the device shouldn’t be connected to the network in the first place.

WDD: In the ISP field with AT&T, what are some particular types of malware and cyberattacks you look out for that aren’t necessarily a threat in other industry fields?

Rexroad: I don’t know if I really have a clear answer to this question, but I will start by saying that AT&T’s branches and services expand beyond ISP. The first order of business for anything we provide, is to make sure the infrastructure supporting those services has good integrity from a security standpoint. We try to provide a quality service, and what things might impact the service we provide to customers is something we determine. The first thing that comes to mind is something that might clog the network and have a derogatory impact on customers. How that manifests in a mobility environment might not be the same as how it manifests in the Internet backbone environment.

We focus on these factors because if we have customers that are impacted by attacks like Mirai or DDoS, it’s more than likely going to have an impact on their status as a subscriber to our service, and misconstrue their experience and opinion of the company. We’re clearly motivated to do things that are right by our customers. From a global perspective, we have programs like ThreatTrack, which enables us to share information on what we know about some of these things (cyber threats) that are developing with people who have an interest or opportunity to try and do something about that. We’ll even share some of our information (to a certain extent because of customer privacy laws) with law enforcement agencies like the FBI, who in turn will look into looming threats we perceive as concerning like they did with the Mirai incident.

WDD: How do you navigate through some of the “gray areas” where security conflicts with instances like privacy issues for customers?

Rexroad: The first thing we try to do is minimize how invasive our analyses are. Most of our analysis reviews the flow level in the network, which looks at a detailed record of the source and destination addresses, port protocol, account of how many bytes and packets are conveyed, along with the times these transactions start and end. Our analytical methods contain some information about the fact that a transaction occurred but it doesn’t give you any content associated with those transactions. Doing that level of flow analysis reveals behavioral patterns in the network. Those are good starting points for being able to analyze any anomalies and use that as a means to help direct efforts to very specific areas where activity looks suspicious. The second is that a lot of data is collected exclusively and specifically for security analysis. It’s a matter of making sure what we’re doing is for the good of the customers.

WDD: Considering how the methodology of cybercriminals continuously evolves, what are some previously-effective cybersecurity defenses and methods that new cybercriminal evolution has made irrelevant or obsolete?

Rexroad: One of the things I’m very thankful for is when Microsoft went from voluntary to automatic updates. If you look at the big security issues back in the early-mid 2000s, they all trace back to Windows computers. Not because they were the only ones around (they were predominant but not the exclusive model), but because Microsoft reverted to automatic software updates. You have to basically change the configuration so you will give it (computer) permission to do updates. That has made a tremendous improvement in the security of computers. That’s why I keep emphasizing you won’t be able to anticipate what all the problems are on these IoT devices, but if you can change and fix them upon discovery, you can move on in a happier way.


One of the greatest parts about attending Inform[ED] was being introduced to the different perspectives and aspects that go into cybersecurity. You realize very quickly how cybersecurity isn’t as simple as firewalls and computer viruses, but is truly an ongoing evolutionary battle between cybercriminals and security entities that are fighting to get one step ahead of the other. One of the panel speakers I was fortunate to interview was Brian Rexroad, Vice President of security platforms at AT&T. Mr. Rexroad took some time and offered his insight on the techniques cybersecurity firms use to detect impending or active threats, how they manage around “gray areas” involving customer privacy, and more.

WDD: From your experiences, what (if any) are some for the early recognizable signs of an attempted or impending large-scale network attack (think Mirai, Ukraine, Finland incidents)?

Rexroad: The early indications we try to pick up on for something like Mirai (which propagates by scanning for targetable devices), involve trying to find in the flow activity of the network—characteristics that point to devices scanning the Internet for vulnerabilities. We’ll try to determine if the reasons another device is scanning an Internet network are legitimate, since there are multiple companies that scan for security, consumer, and other service-related purposes. Statistically speaking, when you start to see increases in a number of sources that are doing scanning with particular patterns, it’s probably an indication that a botnet is building up. So that’s what we try to look for, which is a network-level indicator.

There are other ways to build botnets. You can use search engine services like Google to research devices that have specific vulnerabilities rather than search the Internet for them. We also try to look for characteristics or behaviors are coming from something we’ve identified as a building botnet. The most obvious ones are indications of DDoS attacks, which you can see in a network’s behavioral activities. We have tooling to be able to detect anomalies on the network. For something like DDoS attacks, we use arbor networks, which we’ve equipped to analyze full data and use to the capabilities they have. We’ve supplemented that with some of our own capabilities we’ve built from the ground up like an internally-developed platform we used to try and find early indications of security-related events.

WDD: What different approaches do ISPs make in mitigating and preventing cyberattacks on IoT devices compared to conventional desktop/laptop computers?

Rexroad: I tend to go back and determine what defines an IoT device. I like to make a distinction more in terms of the problems it (the IoT device) creates or solves from a networking point of view, and to what extent they’ve taken security into account. A real problematic IoT device is one that gets flooded out into the market without updating capabilities, one that you plug it into the network and has default a password that could easily be compromised, and also uses universal plug-and-play to expose itself to the Internet because it’s convenient. The categories you put these IoT devices into really make a big difference. When we see a customer with a problem for example, we try to give them helpful information. Part of the problem with some of these devices winds up being that the device shouldn’t be connected to the network in the first place.

WDD: In the ISP field with AT&T, what are some particular types of malware and cyberattacks you look out for that aren’t necessarily a threat in other industry fields?

Rexroad: I don’t know if I really have a clear answer to this question, but I will start by saying that AT&T’s branches and services expand beyond ISP. The first order of business for anything we provide, is to make sure the infrastructure supporting those services has good integrity from a security standpoint. We try to provide a quality service, and what things might impact the service we provide to customers is something we determine. The first thing that comes to mind is something that might clog the network and have a derogatory impact on customers. How that manifests in a mobility environment might not be the same as how it manifests in the Internet backbone environment.

We focus on these factors because if we have customers that are impacted by attacks like Mirai or DDoS, it’s more than likely going to have an impact on their status as a subscriber to our service, and misconstrue their experience and opinion of the company. We’re clearly motivated to do things that are right by our customers. From a global perspective, we have programs like ThreatTrack, which enables us to share information on what we know about some of these things (cyber threats) that are developing with people who have an interest or opportunity to try and do something about that. We’ll even share some of our information (to a certain extent because of customer privacy laws) with law enforcement agencies like the FBI, who in turn will look into looming threats we perceive as concerning like they did with the Mirai incident.

WDD: How do you navigate through some of the “gray areas” where security conflicts with instances like privacy issues for customers?

Rexroad: The first thing we try to do is minimize how invasive our analyses are. Most of our analysis reviews the flow level in the network, which looks at a detailed record of the source and destination addresses, port protocol, account of how many bytes and packets are conveyed, along with the times these transactions start and end. Our analytical methods contain some information about the fact that a transaction occurred but it doesn’t give you any content associated with those transactions. Doing that level of flow analysis reveals behavioral patterns in the network. Those are good starting points for being able to analyze any anomalies and use that as a means to help direct efforts to very specific areas where activity looks suspicious. The second is that a lot of data is collected exclusively and specifically for security analysis. It’s a matter of making sure what we’re doing is for the good of the customers.

WDD: Considering how the methodology of cybercriminals continuously evolves, what are some previously-effective cybersecurity defenses and methods that new cybercriminal evolution has made irrelevant or obsolete?

Rexroad: One of the things I’m very thankful for is when Microsoft went from voluntary to automatic updates. If you look at the big security issues back in the early-mid 2000s, they all trace back to Windows computers. Not because they were the only ones around (they were predominant but not the exclusive model), but because Microsoft reverted to automatic software updates. You have to basically change the configuration so you will give it (computer) permission to do updates. That has made a tremendous improvement in the security of computers. That’s why I keep emphasizing you won’t be able to anticipate what all the problems are on these IoT devices, but if you can change and fix them upon discovery, you can move on in a happier way. 

SAN FRANCISCO — Just past 8 a.m. on March 14, police trod quietly through the snow to the double-fronted doors of Karim Baratov’s lavish home in Ancaster, Ontario. The officers passed by the garage where Baratov’s jet-black Mercedes Benz and Aston Martin DBS were parked, two of the only outward indications that the 22-year-old had money to spend. Minutes later, they took the Canadian-Kazakh hacker away into custody — a subdued end to an international cyber drama that involved the highest levels of the US government, Russian spies, a global cybercrime syndicate, and hundreds of millions of unsuspecting Americans.

The baby-faced Baratov is currently awaiting trial in the US on charges that he helped hack into half a billion Yahoo accounts — the largest known hack in history. His co-conspirators are Alexsey Belan, 29, a notorious Russian hacker still at large, and two Russian intelligence officers, Dmitry Aleksandrovich Dokuchaev, 33, and Igor Anatolyevich Sushchin, 43. The case against them is the starkest public example of the ways in which the Russian government works with cybercriminals to achieve its global agenda through cyberwarfare, and why those attacks have proven so difficult for governments around the world to track, let alone prosecute. 

Courtesy FBI

Left to right: Baratov, Dokuchaev, and Sushchin. 

Baratov, according to accounts given by US law enforcement, was a hacker for hire. It appears he simply took the wrong job.

“The Yahoo hack is a great example of the US government coming forward and saying we know what you are doing and we can prove it,” said Milan Patel, the former chief technology officer of the FBI’s cyber division and now managing director at the K2 Intelligence cybersecurity firm. “In the past the US and Russia engaged in a lot of tit-for-tat covert operations. But with Russia now, a lot is coming to the forefront and being made public about how they run their cyberactivities.” 

“We would tip them off about a person we were looking for, and they would mysteriously disappear, only to appear later on working for the Russian government.”

That’s not always how it was. In the mid-2000s, FBI agents tried to work with their counterparts in the FSB, Russia's Federal Security Service, to investigate hackers, with regular bilateral meetings featuring US and Russian agents working together in the hope that the two countries could stem the growing tide of online crime. At least that’s how the Americans saw it.

“We would tip them off about a person we were looking for, and they would mysteriously disappear, only to appear later on working for the Russian government,” Patel said. “We basically helped the FSB identify talent and recruit by telling them who we were after.”

The arrest of Baratov and his co-conspirators signals a broader US government crackdown on Russian cybercriminals. For years, cybersecurity researchers and US authorities have traced the ties between cybercriminals and the Russian state, including how malware first developed for criminal enterprises has made its way into state-sponsored cyberattacks on Russia’s neighbors, and how botnet armies created by hackers have been repurposed to launch attacks on Russian targets. Now, they appear ready to strike. Earlier this month, Spanish authorities acting on behalf of the US arrested Pyotr Levashov, long known to authorities as one of the world’s most prolific spam kingpins. Five months ago, the US named a number of well-known Russian hackers as being behind the hacks on the Democratic National Committee, which they say were aimed at influencing the US elections. For those following the murky dealings of the world’s top hackers, the names did not come as a surprise. What was new was the willingness of US officials to publicly name the hackers, and to aggressively pursue Russian cybercriminals who aid Russia’s increasingly aggressive strides into cyberwarfare. 

"Russia is playing with different rules — or maybe just without rules."

Three Russian hackers told BuzzFeed News over the last month that there was “panic” about how far the arrests would go, and for how long hackers would be pursued by US authorities. US security officials told BuzzFeed News that they would do well to be scared, as “the gloves were coming off” with Russian hackers.

“We’ve reached a boiling point with Russia. They are the closest competitor to the US when it comes to cyberespionage and cyberattacks,” Patel said. “But Russia is playing with different rules — or maybe just without rules.” 

Ask Americans to describe a typical Russian hacker who targets the US and they will likely describe a scruffy Russian teenager in a dimly lit basement, or a chiseled military figure in a warehouse-like room filled with hundreds of hackers, pounding away at their keyboards as they plot to take down the US. The truth is that Russian cyber operations are far more complex than either of those scenarios, with the Russian state relying on a network of hackers it hires within its military and intelligence divisions, as well as cybercriminal networks and hackers for hire it can recruit or co-opt as it needs.

“It’s a multilayered system, and it is very flexible. That’s what makes it so hard to track,” said one FBI agent who currently works within the bureau’s cyber division. He asked to speak off the record so that he could discuss open cases with BuzzFeed News. “Let’s say, for instance that Russian intelligence decide they want to hack into eBay to try and find information about a certain person. They might do that through an existing team they have in place, or they might go to a hacker, who has already infected a computer they want compromised and tell him to give them access or else … or they might just pay a guy who has previously hacked eBay to do it for them again.”

That flexibility makes it very difficult for the FBI, or any other law enforcement agency, to track what is being hacked, and why, the FBI agent said.

“They will use whatever method they need to use to get in, and they have no lines between criminals who are hacking for profit and those who are hacking for the government,” he said. “They might be going into eBay to steal credit cards, or they might be doing it as part of a covert op to target a US member of Congress. They might be doing both, really. It makes it hard to know when a hack is a matter of national security and when it is not.”

The hack on Yahoo that compromised the information of more than 500 million people lays out the complex relationship between the hackers and their targets. The accounts were hacked in 2014, with Yahoo only discovering the compromised accounts in September 2016. Just a few months later, Yahoo announced it had discovered a second, earlier breach, which had affected an additional 500 million people in 2013. Together, the hacks cost the company roughly $350 million, as users fled from the platform amid security concerns. It was, cybersecurity experts said, a death blow for Yahoo.

A spokesman for Yahoo did not answer a request for comment from BuzzFeed News. In a public statement published soon after the indictment was issued, Yahoo wrote: "The indictment unequivocally shows the attacks on Yahoo were state-sponsored. We are deeply grateful to the FBI for investigating these crimes and the DOJ for bringing charges against those responsible."

For weeks, cybersecurity researchers investigating the hacks believed they were looking at a case of corporate espionage. But as the scope of the breach was discovered, researchers began to fear that an enemy of the US was compiling a massive database of all US nationals, complete with personal details and email accounts they could mine for vulnerable information. The indictments issued last month against Baratov, Belan, and the FSB officers revealed that the group had breached Yahoo looking for both political targets and financial targets. The hundreds of millions of other people who had been caught up in the breach were just collateral damage. 

The hundreds of millions of other people who had been caught up in the breach were just collateral damage.

“The guys who did this to Yahoo, they were criminals. They could have turned around and sold the entire database to the highest bidder,” the FBI agent said. “We are lucky they didn’t.”

Enough is known about the four men to sketch a rough timeline of how they came together to carry out the hack. Dokuchaev was once known in hacker circles as “Forb,” and he spoke openly about hiring out his services until he was recruited into government work, as the Russian newspaper RBC has reported. At the FSB, Dokuchaev was partnered with Sushchin, and the two recruited Belan, a Latvian-born hacker who had been on a list of the FBI’s most wanted since 2012.

“This is the way it goes: They trap one hacker and then they get him to trap his friends,” said one Russian hacker, who agreed to speak to BuzzFeed News via an encrypted app on condition of anonymity. The hacker, who recently served time in a Russian prison and had fled the country once he was released, said the “pressure was intense” to do work on behalf of Russian intelligence officers. “They press on you. It’s not, like, a nice request. It’s a knock on your door and maybe a knock on your ass. If they can’t threaten you they threaten your family.” 

Robert Gillies / AP

Amedeo DiCarlo, lawyer for Karim Baratov, arrives at the courthouse in a chauffeured Rolls-Royce in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada, on Wednesday, April 5. 

It’s unclear how the men were connected to Baratov, who immigrated to Canada from Kazakhstan with his family in 2007. Investigators say Baratov was a hacker for hire. In a July 14, 2016, post on his Facebook page, Baratov wrote that he first discovered how profitable hacking could be when he was expelled from his high school for "threatening to kill my ex-friend as a joke." The time off school "allowed me to work on my online projects 24/7, and really move my businesses to the next level." The post, which included photos of a BMW, Audi, and Lamborghini, claims he made “triple and even quadruple the normal amount” of income. He ended the post with "Taking shortcuts doesn't mean shortcutting the end result."

Once the group had gained access to Yahoo, its targets included an economic development minister of a country bordering Russia, an investigative reporter who worked for Russian newspaper Kommersant, and a managing director of a US private equity firm, court documents show. FBI investigators believe that in addition to searching for the political targets requested by the FSB, Belan also used the Yahoo database to line his own pockets by searching for credit card information and devising various schemes to target Yahoo users. In November 2014, he began tampering with the Yahoo database so that anyone interested in erectile dysfunction treatments was redirected to his own online pharmacy store, from which he got a commission for driving traffic to the site. 

"It’s a knock on your door and maybe a knock on your ass. If they can’t threaten you they threaten your family."

“When you look at this case, you realize it has national security and criminal elements. It doesn’t fit neatly into one box or the other,” the FBI agent involved in the case said.

Patel said that the FBI often had difficulty distinguishing between cyber cases that were criminal in nature, versus those which were politically motivated, or had ties to the Russian state. “The government is making an effort to bridge the gap between investigations that involve classified national security issues, and those which are criminal because those worlds aren’t separate anymore,” he said, explaining that departments were trying to form more joint task forces and share classified information when possible.

It’s unclear who within the FSB was responsible for the group, or if their orders ultimately came from another arm of Russia’s government. In December 2016, Dokuchaev was arrested in Russia and accused of treason. His arrest appeared to be part of a roundup of Russian military and cybersecurity figures, though little information has emerged since their arrests.

Andrei Soldatov, a Russian investigative journalist and co-author of The Red Web, a book about the Kremlin’s online activities, said that while the Russian government’s tactic of outsourcing cyber operations to various groups is helpful in distancing themselves (and ultimately providing deniability), it also left them vulnerable to hackers running amuck.

“Hackers are not people who are traditionally easy to control,” said Soldatov. “They might disobey you sometimes.”

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