Pages

12 June 2018

Developing a Containment Strategy in Syria


Some U.S. policymakers have argued that the United States should withdraw its military forces from Syria. But the United States has several interests in Syria:  Balancing against Iran, including deterring Iranian forces and militias from pushing close to the Israeli border, disrupting Iranian lines of communication through Syria, preventing substantial military escalation between Israel and Iran, and weakening Shia proxy forces.  Balancing against Russia, including deterring further Russian expansion in the Middle East from Syrian territory and raising the costs—including political costs—of Russian operations in Syria. Preventing a terrorist resurgence, including targeting Salafi-jihadist groups like the Islamic State and al Qaeda that threaten the United States and its allies. 


Our Recommendations:

Based on U.S. interests in Syria, Washington should establish a containment strategy that includes the following components: 

Retain a small military and intelligence footprint that includes working with—and providing limited training, funding, and equipment to—groups in eastern, northern, and southern Syria, such as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). 

Coordinate with regional allies such as Jordan and Israel to balance against Iran and Russia and to prevent the resurgence of Salafi-jihadists. 

Pressure outside states to end support to Salafi-jihadists, including Turkey and several Gulf states. 

As the war in Syria moves into its seventh year, U.S. policymakers have struggled to agree on a clear Syria strategy. Some U.S. policymakers have argued that the United States needs to withdraw its military forces from Syria. “I want to get out,” President Trump said of the United States’ military engagement in Syria. “I want to bring our troops back home.”1 Others have urged caution, warning that a precipitous withdrawal could contribute to a resurgence of terrorism or allow U.S. competitors like Iran and Russia—along with their proxies—to fill the vacuum.2 In addition, some administration officials have argued that the Islamic State has been decimated in Syria and Iraq. The National Security Strategy notes that “we crushed Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) terrorists on the battlefields of Syria and Iraq.”3 But between 5,000 and 12,000 Islamic State fighters remain in Syria and continue to conduct guerrilla attacks, along with between 40,000 and 70,000 Salafi-jihadist fighters in Syria overall.4

The U.S. goal should be to provide limited funding, training, and assistance to sub-state actors in areas like eastern Syria; contain Russian and Iranian attempts to expand their influence; and conduct strikes against terrorist and other targets.

These debates raise several questions. What are U.S. interests in Syria? And what should a U.S. strategy consist of moving forward? In answering these questions, this report makes two main arguments.

First, U.S. interests in Syria are limited. They include preventing Syria from becoming a sanctuary for Salafi-jihadist groups like the Islamic State and al Qaeda that could threaten the United States and its allies, as well as balancing against Russian and Iranian expansion. Second, based on these interests, the United States should establish a containment strategy in Syria that keeps between several dozen and several hundred military and intelligence personnel in the country—or, at the very least, in neighboring countries like Jordan or Iraq—as well as air and naval assets in the region. Their goal should be to provide limited funding, training, and assistance to sub-state actors in areas like eastern Syria; contain Russian and Iranian attempts to expand their influence; and conduct strikes against terrorist and other targets. A precipitous U.S. withdrawal from Syria in the near term—including an abdication of Washington’s role in the de-confliction zone agreement along the Syrian-Jordanian border, abandonment of U.S. military bases in areas like al-Tanf and Manbij, and desertion of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—would unnecessarily undermine U.S. interests. Russia and Iran would move into the vacuum, as they have already started to do, just as Washington pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal. The United States would also take an unnecessary risk by weakening its collection capabilities and ability to respond to an al Qaeda or Islamic State resurgence.

Confusing and contradictory policies and statements under the current and past U.S. administrations have tarnished U.S. credibility in the region. A containment strategy that recognizes the current balance-of-power competition in the region would go a long way toward a more consistent and sustainable U.S. approach to Syria and the region.

Balancing against Iran and Russia

U.S. interests in Syria need to be weighed against U.S. interests elsewhere, such as balancing an increasingly powerful China, deterring Russian belligerence in areas like the Baltics, and preventing North Korean nuclear and conventional aggression. In Syria, the United States has limited interests, which should be grounded in a broader regional strategy.

One interest is countering against Iranian and Russian power.5 Both countries are competitors of the United States, and their actions in Syria and the Middle East are often directly at odds with U.S. interests in the region. U.S. actions in Syria should be viewed, in part, through the lens of realist balance-of-power competition with Moscow and Tehran. Balancing includes efforts to check the expansion of states through military, economic, political, and other means.6 But the United States needs to be pragmatic. Russia and Iran have significant interests in Syria, a historical relationship with Damascus, and a determination to keep their own forces and proxies in Syria for the foreseeable future.7 While Moscow and Tehran have cooperated to prevent the overthrow of the Assad regime, they are not strong allies. Figure 1 highlights the Russian, Iranian, and U.S. footprint in Syria. Most of Russia’s military and intelligence units are located in western governorates like Latakia and Tartus, though Russia also has a presence in such eastern governorates as Deir Azzour. Iran and its proxies are located primarily in Syria’s west, northwest, and southwest.

Figure 1: U.S., Russian, and Iranian Force Posture in Syria

Source: Open source data compiled by the CSIS Transnational Threats Project

Iran: Tehran’s interests in Syria are tied to the broader goals of Iranian leaders, led by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini, to expand their influence in the region and balance against countries like the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia.8 Iran hopes to maintain military bases and corridors—or lines of communication—from Iran through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.9 To achieve its interests, Iran has adopted a strategy of “forward defense,” which involves supporting sub-state proxies in countries like Syria.10 Iran possesses formidable unconventional capabilities led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Of particular note is the IRGC-Quds Force (IRGC-QF), a special operations unit of the IRGC responsible for clandestine activities overseas.11

Since 2011, Iran has supplied money, weapons, equipment, development assistance, and other aid to the Assad regime. Tehran has deployed between several hundred and several thousand soldiers on the ground—from IRGC operatives to regular Iranian army forces—and utilizes locations like Tiyas air base (or T-4) in Homs, Al-Shayrat airfield in Homs, and Al-Kiswah base south of Damascus.12 Iran also supports a variety of pro-regime militias like Hezbollah, which has roughly 6,000 to 8,000 fighters in Damascus, Homs, Aleppo, Hama, and other areas.13 The Hezbollah presence in Syria has been controversial among some Hezbollah supporters because of the high costs in blood and money, as well as concerns that the war in Syria has taken away its focus from priorities in Lebanon.14 In addition, there are perhaps 8,000 to 12,000 other Shia foreign fighters in Iran from countries like Afghanistan, Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon.15 The IRGC-QF’s external operations department, or Department 400 (also known as the Misaq Unit), has been critical in organizing these militias.

U.S. interests should include balancing against Russian efforts to expand power and influence, including into such countries as Iraq, Lebanon, and Egypt; raising the costs of Russian operations in Syria; and potentially cooperating when Washington and Moscow share common interests, such as targeting some terrorist groups.

U.S. interests should include preventing Iranian forces or militias from pushing too close to the Israeli border, especially with heavy weapons in Al Qunaytirah and Daraa governorates; disrupting Iranian lines of communication through Syria; preventing a significant escalation in the Iranian-Israeli conflict that could trigger broader regional destabilization; and weakening Tehran’s Shia proxy forces that can be used for power projection around the region. It would be a deeply contradictory policy for Washington to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal and, at the same time, to hand Syria to Tehran and Moscow. In addition, the Israeli air strikes against Iranian military targets in Syria in early May highlight the potential for escalation between Israel and Iran.

Russia: Moscow seeks to expand its power and influence in the region, preserve Damascus as a major ally, balance against U.S. power in the region, and target terrorist groups that threaten Russian security.16 To this end, Moscow will likely continue to push for a decisive victory in Syria through military force and, where necessary, limited political negotiations. Russia has provided substantial military, intelligence, and political support to Assad. There are over a dozen Russian military bases or installations, such as at Hmeimim airbase and the port of Tartus (where Moscow signed a 49-year lease in 2017), and approximately 6,000 soldiers and military advisers.17 Russia has also leveraged several private military companies that carry out special missions in Syria, including the paramilitary group ChVK Wagner.18

Though Moscow has used a relatively light footprint compared to past campaigns like Afghanistan in the 1980s, its participation in the Syrian war is its most expansive military operation outside of Europe since the end of the Cold War. Russian forces have been given an unparalleled opportunity to improve their strike, intelligence, combined arms, and training capabilities. Moscow deployed significant military capabilities—such as Su-30SM heavy multirole fighters, Su-25SM/UB attack aircraft, Su-24M2 bombers, Su-34 medium-range bombers, Il-20M1 reconnaissance planes, long-range Tu-22MD bombers, Mi-24P attack helicopters, and Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile systems—which could be used for longer-term power projection in the region. Russia also deployed ships and submarines in the Caspian Sea and Mediterranean Sea from units like the Black Sea Fleet, equipped with Kalibr land-attack cruise missiles and other weapons and systems to strike targets in Syria.19

U.S. interests should include balancing against Russian efforts to expand power and influence, including into such countries as Iraq, Lebanon, and Egypt; raising the costs of Russian operations in Syria; and potentially cooperating when Washington and Moscow share common interests, such as targeting some terrorist groups. Moscow’s involvement in Syria is a sensitive subject in Russia because of the financial costs and casualties of Russian soldiers and private contractors, which the United States should try to better exploit.

Preventing Terrorist Resurgence

Another major U.S. interest is to prevent Syria from becoming a sanctuary for Salafi-jihadist groups like the Islamic State and al Qaeda that threaten the United States and its allies. In 2013 and 2014, the al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusrah gave sanctuary to terrorists like Muhsin al-Fadli and Abdul Mohsen Abdullah Ibrahim al-Sharikh, which U.S. officials referred to as the “Khorasan Group,” to plot attacks in the West.20 In response, the United States and its allies conducted a series of air strikes against Khorasan targets in northwestern Syria, killing al-Fadli and others.

Preventing Syria from becoming a terrorist sanctuary will be a challenge since Syria is currently a haven for Salafi-jihadist and other groups, even with the Islamic State’s loss of territory. As Figure 2 shows, there are roughly 40,000 to 70,000 Salafi-jihadist fighters today in the country with competing aims and objectives.21 The high estimate of Salafi-jihadists has come down slightly from peak levels in 2015 and 2016, but the numbers are still substantial. Many are concentrated in the Idlib area near the Turkish border, though there are also pockets of fighters along Syria’s southern borders with Jordan, around Jarabalus, along the Euphrates River Valley between al-Mayadin and Abu Kamal, and around the Syrian-Iraqi border. There is substantial fluidity within and among these groups. The constant rebranding, fissures between jihadists, splintering, defections, and creation of new groups suggest that there is a pool of jihadists willing to alter their affiliations and organizational structures based on changing leaders, popular support, foreign assistance, and the state of local wars—all of which may rapidly evolve. This fluidity makes it important for the United States to be flexible in responding to a rapidly changing series of terrorist groups and networks.

Figure 2: High and Low Estimates of Salafi-Jihadists in Syria, 2011–2018



Source: Open source estimates compiled by the CSIS Transnational Threats Project. 

Some of the most prominent groups include Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham / Jabhat al-Nusrah, Jabhat Tahrir al-Souria, Jaysh al-Islam, and the Islamic State.

No comments:

Post a Comment