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30 January 2020

Russia Takes a Hard Approach to Soft Power

Kseniya Kirillova
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In exerting its soft power, Russia is not only trying to portray itself in a good light but also spread illusory fears, phobias and hatred in countries it sees as a threat.

Moscow, however, cannot sow discord out of thin air; instead, it seeks to exploit existing divisions in Western countries.

If Western nations are going to try and popularize their values in Russia, they would do well to consider whether their efforts will be immediately discredited by Kremlin propaganda.

For all its prodigious hard power, Russia's soft power is no trifling matter. In recent years, the Kremlin has resorted to plenty of channels to undermine Western democracies by spreading propaganda — including false-flag operations and other "information operations" — bribing officials and politicians, cultivating corrupt ties through business lobbies and immigrant organizations, targeting specific (often radical) segments of the population with carefully tailored ideologies and making special attempts to sow friction, disagreement and conflict.


Russian President Vladimir Putin and his propaganda machine have successfully convinced the population that any intimidation and crimes by authorities are justified by the unprecedented "external threat" facing Russia. They claim that the United States is to blame for all that Russia does today because they have organized color revolutions along the Russian border, developed fifth columns and so on. Russia, accordingly, is merely trying to prove that its actions are a "mirror image" of Western foreign policy. But how does Russia go about projecting its soft power, and how might Western states respond — all while avoiding taking the same path as Moscow? 
A Different Type of 'Soft Power'

To one degree or another, all major states naturally use "soft power" to cultivate a positive image abroad. But if Joseph S. Nye Jr., a professor at Harvard University who introduced the term, implied soft power to mean the popularization of a certain value system and lifestyle, Moscow's actions abroad typically have little to do with positive advertising.

First, the difference lies in the goals of "soft power." Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States did not make any effort to destroy either Russia or the countries that emerged in Eastern Europe. On the contrary, the United States attempted to introduce democratic institutions — including anti-corruption bodies, a transparent and independent judiciary, fair elections and more — into the post-Soviet space. Had they taken root, these countries would have enjoyed notable improvements in their development and standard of living.

Today, it's a very different story with Moscow. Russia does not conceal its view of the United States as its primary and irreconcilable enemy, the instigator of international terrorism and the primary threat to its very existence. The Kremlin, accordingly, is seeking to weaken the United States and Europe to the greatest possible extent, undermine faith in Western democracy, destroy existing institutions and, above all, render these countries dependent, one way or another, on Moscow, making them incapable of resisting Russian aggression in Eastern Europe.

Russia does not cultivate values for those it takes under its wing but rather instills illusory fears, phobias and hatred toward the things Moscow's propaganda identifies as a threat.

But while Russia, as well as its opponents, are good at inconspicuously supporting movements in other countries, the United States typically refrains from distorting the facts, spreading outright disinformation and engaging in slander. Such an approach makes the West more vulnerable to Russia's actions while simultaneously giving Moscow reason to claim that Washington "organizes" coups in other countries.

The way the United States uses "soft power" is generally more transparent and consistent with its stated goals. This means openly transmitting American values via the mass media, nongovernmental organization activities (including grants for foreign organizations), offering foreign internships, organizing educational programs and the like. Russian political scientists use almost the same channels to spread their influence in Western societies, albeit with one major difference: Russia does not cultivate values for those it takes under its wing but rather instills illusory fears, phobias and hatred toward the things Moscow's propaganda identifies as a threat.

To achieve its desired effect, the Kremlin largely uses lies, slander, mishmashed facts, conspiracy theories and a multitude of contradictory versions of reality to destroy the notion of truth and exploit the slightest contradictions within Western societies. To work with certain groups of people abroad, the Kremlin creates special "ideologies for export" — individual worldview systems aimed at specific social groups.

But along with this activity, "information operations" of a destructive nature are also inevitable. As the results of U.S. special prosecutor Robert Mueller's investigation about Russian influence in the 2016 U.S. presidential election have shown, such operations are often conducted under a false flag; in the U.S. case, this included fake accounts on social networks established on behalf of American citizens.

The crux of the matter is that it's often very difficult to determine the line between "positive propaganda" — in Russia's case, some of the more benign educational and cultural activities that Moscow sponsors abroad — and the beginning of "information operations." These two forms of Russian soft power coexist at the same time, sometimes merging and flowing into one another, which gives the Kremlin an opportunity to occasionally transform even innocuous cultural events into a platform for "information operations."
Moscow's 'Interceptions'

Since Russia's information operations clearly don't engage in "fair play," it's extremely difficult to oppose such activity. Aggravating the situation is Russia's recent success in both discrediting Western forms of soft power at home and "intercepting" them using the channels the West created to spread its own influence.

The recent case of Maria Butina, a Russian who was convicted of failing to register herself as foreign agent in the United States, vividly demonstrates such "interceptions" by way of evangelical churches and student exchange programs — even though Russian media and officials formerly termed the influx of American missionaries into Russia in the 1990s and the development of educational exchange programs as an American "attempt at the creeping occupation" of Russia. Ultimately, it was the National Prayer Breakfast, an event organized by evangelical churches, where Butina sought to invite Russian officials so as to create informal channels of communication between them and American politicians.

The Butina case also showed U.S. law enforcement and the media how the Russian government works with foreign universities and organizes work with young people abroad. In particular, the American historian and publicist Yuri Felshtinsky noted that in October 2013, the FBI accused a Russian diplomat and head of the Washington-based Russian Cultural Center, Yury Zaytsev, of recruiting Americans as potential intelligence assets.

Revolutions will occur where there are societal sentiments conducive to their success; without them, it would be impossible to organize a revolution from outside without widespread support inside.

The FBI alleged that part of Zaytsev's mission was "sending young professionals from the United States to Russia as part of a cultural program wherein participants are evaluated and/or assessed for Russian counterintelligence purposes." In 2014, Zaytsev left the United States, but his successor in the same post, Oleg Zhiganov, was deported from the United States for the same reason in March 2018 as part of a group of 60 Russian diplomats who were accused of espionage.

Money laundering is another channel of influence that Moscow has successfully used. A few years ago, many believed that Russian oligarchs' propensity for keeping money in European and U.S. bank accounts and retaining real estate abroad made the Russian elite dependent on the West. On the contrary, it turned out that Moscow was using "dirty money" to spread corruption in the West and bribe European politicians.

Moreover, the Kremlin successfully "intercepts" projects and initiatives created by the Russians themselves, both domestically and abroad. The Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots (KSORS), which represents branches of the World Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots Living Abroad, were formally established to foster "the interaction of compatriots with Russian Federation government bodies." According to members of these organizations, the diaspora directly determined the leaders of these councils until 2014. Then, however, Russian authorities placed KSORS under the Foreign Ministry's control.

A former head of the Russian American Coordination Council from New York, Igor Baboshkin, claimed in the media that his organization "had been seized by the Russian embassy, ​​which today appoints leaders who are exceptionally favored by the Kremlin." Likewise, Russian authorities are trying to exert control over independent Russian-language media and any overseas cultural organizations through the distribution of grants and, where possible, direct administrative pressure.
Lessons to Learn 

For most of this century, Moscow has accused Washington of organizing color revolutions along its borders — and not without a kernel of truth. The global reality, however, is that there are no saints: Every country supports movements in other countries that are close to them. In the end, revolutions will occur where there are societal sentiments conducive to their success; without them, it would be impossible to organize a revolution from outside without widespread support inside, as evidenced by the failure of Western-backed opposition rallies in Belarus in 2011 or pro-Kosovo rallies in Serbia in 2013.

Based on all of the above, Western governments would be wise to take note. First, before Western states make any attempts to popularize their values ​​in Russia, they might determine whether Russian propaganda has discredited the method of delivery — to say nothing of asking what, exactly, Russians want. Equally important is recognizing the "counterintelligence" aspect of certain events, as that could help the West minimize Moscow's use of bilateral communication channels for its subversive operations.

No matter how effective Russia's 'soft power' tactics may be, the Kremlin can't create problems in Western countries out of thin air. Moscow, instead, simply takes advantage of the contradictions and conflicts that are already present in Western societies.

Second, the creation of cultural and educational initiatives independent of the Kremlin among the Russian diaspora is critical. The emergence of an "alternative culture" created in Russian, but free from the influence of Kremlin propaganda, is one of Putin's greatest fears. That's why it's important to pay special attention to the Russian-language media existing in the diaspora. After all, the Russian-speaking community in places like the United States is often starved for information in Russian, allowing structures affiliated with the Russian embassy to make inroads among such people.

Meanwhile, independent Russian-language media in the United States, or the creation of such media, could help convey American values ​​to the diaspora and, potentially, refute Moscow's official propaganda. What's more, it could contribute to the effective assimilation of Russian-speaking immigrants and create an alternative culture that preserves the best in Russian cultural heritage and language — all while avoiding becoming another cog in Moscow's unceasing "information operations."

In the end, no matter how effective Russia's "soft power" tactics may be, the Kremlin can't create problems in Western countries out of thin air. Moscow, instead, simply takes advantage of the contradictions and conflicts that are already present in Western societies. That leaves the West having to prepare itself to repel foreign interference at the same time it works to solve the real problems that Russia is exploiting. If not, Western democracies might come to resemble Moscow, sharply reducing the prospect for self-criticism as the powers that be dismiss internal problems as mere "intrigues of an external enemy."

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