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7 November 2020

Geopolitics and Neglected Arctic Spaces

Rachel Ellehuus, Colin Wall

The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy takes its point of departure in the growing political, economic, and military competition the United States is facing around the world, to include from Russia and China—and aims to prevent any region of the world from becoming dominated by a single power. While the Arctic has been characterized more by cooperation than competition, recent events indicate that the tides may be turning. As attention turns north and the Arctic reenters the strategic calculations of great powers, spaces that have been largely neglected are suddenly assuming a position of significance, forcing countries in the region to consider how to balance competing interests from outside powers.

The essays below illustrate how it looks when three such places—Svalbard, Norway; Greenland; and Iceland—find themselves caught between competing powers. While this attention has taken different forms, there are similarities between the cases. All three, for example, have received economic interest from China and are beginning to feel the pressure of Russia’s military build-up in the Arctic. All three are also part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and anchor their defense policies in that alliance.

At the same time, each of these places faces unique conditions that limit their ability to pursue truly independent security and defense policies. In the case of Svalbard, the 1957 Svalbard Treaty grants Norway sovereignty over the island but also affords third countries certain rights. In the case of Greenland, an autonomous region that is part of the Kingdom of Denmark, it has control over domestic issues, but the Danish government retains control of foreign affairs and defense. Finally, in the case of Iceland, the absence of its own standing military makes it reliant on the United States and NATO for its defense. Such conditions are an increasing challenge as these three places struggle to respond to the interest of external actors while also maintaining their sovereignty.

In this edition of Northern Connections, CSIS brings you three experienced and distinguished experts on the topic of “Geopolitics and Neglected Arctic Spaces.”

The first is Andreas Østhagen, a senior research fellow at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute and a senior fellow at the High North Center for Business and Governance at Nord University. In his essay on Svalbard, he lays out how Norway has sought to manage the interest of third parties in this archipelago. He highlights three main areas where tensions are possible. The first stems from Russian and Chinese complaints about local business regulations. The second has to do with the contested legal status of the maritime and fisheries zones that surround the archipelago. The third concerns Svalbard’s significant geostrategic location vis-à-vis the headquarters of Russia’s Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula, which raises concern that the archipelago itself may become a target. Mr. Østhagen argues that Norway is committed to striking a balance whereby it secures its own interests and asserts its sovereignty while simultaneously maintaining low levels of tension in the region.

The next contributor is Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen, a former visiting fellow with the CSIS Europe Program and an associate professor at the Royal Danish Defence College’s Center for Arctic Security Studies. In his essay, he illustrates the complex web of relationships between Greenland, Denmark, and the United States—and how these are complicated by Russia and China. Driven by extensive Chinese investment in Greenland and a recognition of Russia’s ability to use Greenlandic airspace as a corridor to the North Atlantic, the United States has sought to increase its diplomatic and economic presence in Greenland. It has also encouraged Denmark to increase its own military capacities and act to minimize Chinese influence. This leaves Denmark in the difficult position of balancing the security expectations of the United States against its limited ability to influence Greenland’s internal economic policy. Mr. Rahbek-Clemmensen recommends the United States work with the Kingdom of Denmark to provide alternative sources of investment in Greenland, make U.S. military presence economically beneficial to Greenland’s residents, and support confidence-building measures in the region.

Our final essay comes from Margrét Cela and Pia Hansson of the Institute of International Affairs at the University of Iceland, where Ms. Hansson is the institute’s director, and Ms. Cela is the project manager for the Centre for Arctic Studies. As with the other cases, Iceland has expanded its diplomatic and economic relationship with China in recent years on matters ranging from geothermal energy to free trade to scientific cooperation. Although Iceland joined in the U.S. and EU sanctions on Russia in 2014, it maintains a historically good relationship with Moscow. These dynamics, combined with the general friction in the region, has prompted the United States to take a renewed interest in Iceland, sending both Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on official visits in 2019. However, as Ms. Cela and Ms. Hansson argue, while Iceland considers its relationship with the United States to be the core of its national defense strategy, it is nonetheless determined to chart its own course on foreign and security policy.

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