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13 December 2022

Does China Have the Military Wherewithal to Match its Ambitions?

WALTER PINCUS

OPINION — Last Tuesday’s Pentagon released 2022 Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China deserves a closer look on subjects such as; the threat to invade Taiwan; Beijing’s increase in nuclear weaponry; China’s vulnerability because of the need to import oil and gas and growth of the Chinese military exchanges, that in many ways, appears to imitate a pattern set by the U.S. military.

Two weeks ago, I wrote that Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Mark Milley said the Chinese would be playing “a very, very dangerous game to cross the [110-mile wide] strait and invade the island of Taiwan. They don’t have the experience, the background to do it. They haven’t trained to do it yet. They do piece-part training. We watch it very, very closely, how many — how much amphibious capability they have, how much airborne capability they have.”

Last week’s Pentagon analysis provided some details to back up Milley’s statements.

For example, the report said, “The PLA [People’s Liberation Army] is capable of various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan,” and supported that by saying, “Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support.”

The report claimed, “An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain PRC’s [People’s Republic of China’s] armed forces and invite international intervention. Combined with inevitable force attrition, complexity of urban warfare, and potential insurgency, these factors make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk for [Chinese President] Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party, even assuming a successful landing and breakout.”

While the Chinese continue “to build and exercise capabilities that would likely contribute to a full-scale invasion,” according to the Pentagon report, the PLA also “could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-occupied islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas or Itu Aba,” with the report finding that the “invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island such as Matsu or Kinmen is within the PLA’s capabilities.”

But the report also warned that “this kind of operation [invasion of Matsu or Kinmen] involves significant, and possibly prohibitive, political risk because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate powerful international opposition.”

Dealing with another possible weakness, the report notes the Chinese Navy “has not invested in the large number of landing ships and medium landing craft that outsiders believe the PLA would need for a large-scale assault on Taiwan.” But the report adds, there may be “sufficient amphibious capacity…through investment in other operational capabilities—such as civilian lift vessels and rotary-wing assets— to address this gap,” or Chinese shipbuilding industry’s massive capacity could “produce the necessary ship-to-shore connectors relatively quickly.”

One reminder of how far China might need to go: In 2021, the PLA completed construction of its third LHA – a helicopter carrier with a 28-helicopter capacity. It provides the Chinese with vertical amphibious assault capability with the very mountainous East Coast of Taiwan in mind. It can also carry landing craft, armored vehicles and hundreds of troops at the same time.

Reportedly, the Chinese eventually plan to have eight of these LHAs. For comparison, the most modern U.S. LHA is larger than that and there are already eight such ships in service with 14 older versions currently operational within the U.S. Navy. The newer American LHAs can carry a mix of: F-35B Joint Strike Fighters that are direct lift aircraft, plus a variety of helicopters along with land elements (1,000 personnel) of a Marine expeditionary unit or Marine expeditionary brigade.

In the nuclear weapons field, the Pentagon report says, “The PLA plans to ‘basically complete modernization’ of its national defense and armed forces by 2035,” adding, “If China continues the pace of its nuclear expansion, it will likely field a stockpile of about 1,500 warheads by that time.”

Last year, that projection was 1,000 warheads by 2030. Reminder: The U.S. has 1,550 warheads currently deployed and another roughly 4,000 stockpiled.

The report describes the ambitious Chinese nuclear project of building at least 300 new, fixed silos in three separate fields, capable of holding either the DF-31 or D-41 solid-fueled ICBMs that are currently based on mobile carriers. In addition, the Chinese are building more silos for the older DF-5, liquid-fueled ICBMs.

The Pentagon report states, “This [new silo] project and the expansion of China’s DF-5 class silo force suggests that the PRC intends to increase the peacetime readiness of its nuclear force by moving to a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture.”

To back up that idea, the report says, “In recent years, the PRC has been able to make advances in early warning needed to support a LOW posture. China has several ground-based large phased- array radars—similar in appearance to U.S. PAVE PAWS radars—that could support a missile early warning role. There has likely been progress made in space-based early warning as well.”

Called “early warning counterstrike” by the Chinese, the LOW strategy means a country’s ICBMs are launched upon confirmed warning that enemy ICBMs are on their way, but before those enemy warheads can detonate.

The Pentagon description of the Chinese LOW strategy raises the old question of “hair trigger” responses. The Pentagon does admit, “this posture is broadly similar to the U.S. and Russian LOW posture.”

In short, the Chinese more than a decade from now, could have a strategic nuclear posture for its land-based ICBMs, similar to what the U.S. has had for at least three decades for its 400 land-based ICBMs.

The Pentagon report also describes the PLA seeking lower-yield, precision nuclear weapons, again much like those already in U.S. and Russian stockpiles. “PRC strategists,” the report says, “have highlighted the need for lower-yield nuclear weapons in order to increase the deterrence value of the PRC’s nuclear force, though they have not defined specific nuclear yield values.”

The Pentagon spends only four paragraphs on page 140 of its 196-page report on a real Chinese defense weakness – Beijing’s dependence on imported oil and gas.

“Approximately 76 percent of China’s oil imports and 23 percent of its total natural gas imports transit the South China Sea and Strait of Malacca,” the report says, adding “China relies on maritime routes that transit the South China Sea and Strait of Malacca for most of its hydrocarbon deliveries.”

What the report does not say is that up to now, it has been the U.S. Navy that has provided security that guaranteed delivery of that oil and gas. The report does say China realizes this weakness and has continued to build up a “crude oil emergency petroleum reserve (EPR) capacity to safeguard against supply disruptions with a goal to have the equivalent of 90 days’ worth of imports—about 1.25 billion barrels—in storage.” China’s current EPR storage capacity is approximately 600 million barrels, according to industry data.

China is also trying to increase overland fuel supplies from Russia and Kazakhstan via pipelines, according to the report, in order to “reduce dependency on strategic chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca.”

“Despite China’s efforts to diversify energy suppliers, the sheer volume of oil and natural gas imported from Africa and the Middle East will make securing strategic maritime routes a priority for Beijing for at least the next 15 years,” the report adds.

I think it’s worthwhile to point out some minor elements of the Pentagon report that show some sophistication by the Chinese that imitates U.S. military activities.

For example, the PRC has increased its military exchange programs, something the U.S. Defense Department has done for years to build relationships with military officers around the world.

The PLA has particularly attracted junior foreign officers, to a point where the Pentagon report finds that “nearly half of the 70 military academies operating in China admit foreign students, but only a few offer senior-level education.”

However, the College of Defense Studies of the PLA National Defense University that trains foreign senior military officers has hosted participants from 100 nations and “pursued relationships with Latin American and African militaries,” according to the report.

The Chinese military (like the American military) continues to cultivate foreign military thorough short-term security seminars which aim to foster relationships and if possible, cooperation and common approaches to issues.

“The PLA NDU has received thousands of students from over 90 countries; it also maintains regular contacts with military academies in more than 10 countries in addition to over 140 countries’ militaries,” according to the Pentagon report.

In one area, the Chinese military has outdone the U.S.

So far this year, the PLA has contributed the largest number of troops to United Nations peacekeeping operations (2,222) from among the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. The U.S. in the same period, contributed 32.

The Pentagon authors describe that as an action that “supports the PRC’s objectives of highlighting its role as a global actor and obtaining operational experience for the PLA.”

On the more cynical side, the Pentagon authors also say the Chinese could be using their role in U.N. peacekeeping operations “to collect intelligence on other U.N. units, and [by] supporting these missions, demonstrate the PLA’s ability to operate outside of China’s borders.” PLA and other personnel are involved in peacekeeping in Mali, Moroccan Sahara, Sudan and South Sudan, Cyprus, and Lebanon.

In addition, Beijing funded 15 percent of the total $6.38 billion 2021-2022 U.N. peacekeeping budget while the U.S. supplied 28 percent of the U.N. peacekeeping costs that year.

All are important data points in understanding China’s military capabilities today and into the near future.

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