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26 February 2023

A year into Ukraine, looking back at 5 prewar predictions

MARK CANCIAN

On Feb. 15 2022, as the world watched to see if Russia would invade Ukraine, Mark Cancian of CSIS wrote an article looking at some of the lessons that could be learned from such a conflict. A year later, he has returned to see what assessments came true, and which surprised him.

Last February, as war became imminent, I wrote an article for Breaking Defense that asked five questions that had been bouncing around the defense community for years — and which the looming conflict in Ukraine would potentially answer.

Are tanks obsolete? Is cyber a game changer? Are helicopter operations viable? Are amphibious assaults still possible? Will artillery dominate the modern battlefield? At the war’s one-year point, some answers are emerging. While some of these answers came as expected, others are surprising, even uncomfortable. All have major implications on how future conflicts — as well as the ongoing war in Ukraine — will be conducted.

1. Are tanks still viable on the modern battlefield? Answer: Yes

Analysts have been predicting the end of tanks since the introduction of long-range precision antitank missiles in the early 1970s. Events in the Nagorno-Karabakh War of 2020 seemed to show that drones dominate tanks. The Marine Corps dumped all its tanks in 2021 and deemed its antitank weapons capable of handling any armored threats it might face.

Early operations in Ukraine seemed to support the notion that tanks were obsolete. Ukrainian teams with sophisticated antitank munitions like Javelin or NLOS destroyed hundreds of Russian armored vehicles. The Russian advance collapsed despite having overwhelming armored superiority.

However, later commentary assessed that the Russians had abandoned combined arms, expecting a rapid advance that would meet little resistance and quickly end the war. That strategic decision left their tanks highly vulnerable to infantry attack — less a referendum on heavy vehicles and more one of Russia’s misjudgments.

Tank losses have been high — the best open-source tracking shows Russia has lost 1,748, Ukraine 467 ― but both sides continue to use tanks extensively. The Russians continue to replace their tank losses, while Ukraine has stepped up its demands for tanks from NATO. From the perspective of the combatants, then, tanks still play a central role on the battlefield. The experience of upcoming offensives combined with postwar analysis may indicate whether this role has changed or been reduced. Nevertheless, the US Army has made its judgment: As Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville stated, “You don’t need armor if you don’t want to win.”

2. Is cyber a game-changer? Answer: No

What impact modern cyber capabilities would have in a major war has been a great unknown for military planners. Many proponents looked for a “cyber Pearl Harbor” that crippled an adversary at the start of the conflict. The recent book, 2034: a Novel of the Next World War by James Stavridis and Elliot Ackerman, envisioned Chinese cyber capabilities crippling the US Pacific Fleet and allowing its destruction.

But despite years of buildup around the cyber threat, thus far, cyber has had no discernible effect on military operations. Cyber attacks apparently degraded some command-and-control in the first days of the war but, as far as is known, have been unable to affect weapons and munitions performance or seriously degrade Ukraine’s ability to direct its forces. Even the most obvious and expected use of cyber attacks — the degradation of civilian infrastructure like the electrical grid — has come entirely from kinetic effects.

The problem with cyber weapons is that they are generally one-time use. When targets become aware of an attack, they close the vulnerability. Thus, Russian cyber attacks have tapered off over time. And while it is possible that Russia still has some unused capabilities, that seems unlikely since the Russian strategic situation has become desperate with no new capabilities becoming evident. That likely means they do not exist.

This does not mean that cyber has been irrelevant. Behind the scenes, there has been a pitched battle between Russian attacks and Ukrainian defense. Private companies have greatly aided these defenses, a novel situation where civilian organizations are, in effect, on the front line. What this does mean, however, is that effective defenses are possible, and the scariest cyber scenarios are unlikely to occur.

3. Are helicopter operations viable when the adversary has strong air defenses? Answer: Maybe, but circumstances must be right, and casualties may still be high.

Helicopters are integral to the operations of US military forces, with a total US inventory of about 4,500. However, helicopters are extremely vulnerable since they fly low and slow: In Vietnam, the United States lost 5,600 helicopters.

Russia’s major heliborne operation, the assault on Hostomel airfield outside Kyiv, failed in the first days of the war. Although the Russian units could land, Ukrainian counterattacks drove them off. While a later Russian ground/air mobile attack succeeded, many videos showed helicopters being shot down. Since then, there have been few reports about helicopter operations. For example, the heliborne SOF raids that the United States employed continuously during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars appear to be absent in this war. This absence suggests that it is too dangerous to operate helicopters over the front lines.

That does not mean the helicopters are useless. They have tremendous applications for medevac and transport of troops and equipment. In regional wars, where adversaries have weak air defenses, the heliborne assault may still have a role; a heliborne attack against adversaries with robust air defenses might still be successful if able to suppress air defenses and land at less defended spots.

Nevertheless, losses would be high during both transit and landing. Russian losses at Hostomel likely exceeded what the United States would be willing to accept in a similar operation. Postwar analysis may shed additional light on the role of helicopters going forward — and as the US Army is in the process of spending billions to revamp its helicopter fleets for modern combat, getting that analysis right will be crucial.

4. Is it still possible to launch an amphibious assault on a hostile shore? Answer: Not with traditional tactics, but maybe using different concepts.

In the modern era, the Marines have never faced a truly opposed landing, but the British have. In May 1982, the British landed on the Falkland Islands to drive out the Argentinian forces that had seized the islands the month before. The assault was a success, though with high casualties among the ships. Since then, the existence of antiship missiles has led many to question whether such assaults are still viable, in an era when surface ships are most vulnerable near coastlines. That belief was underscored by the sinking of the Moskva by antiship missiles early in the conflict.

The traditional Marine Corps landing with fleets of ships near a hostile shore is, therefore, not viable against well-armed adversaries. The Marine Corps has known this for some time and developed a variety of doctrinal adaptations, such as operational maneuver from the sea. With its V-22 tiltrotor aircraft, the Marine Corps can stay outside missile range, at least for the initial assaults.

The Marine Corps’ new concept, Force Design 2030, gives up entirely on opposed landings, opting for small units inserted by light amphibious warships. Whether this will succeed is hotly debated within Marine Corps circles. Expect proponents to point to the Ukraine experience as proof Force Design 2030 is on the right track while opponents argue that operational maneuver is still possible.

5. Has the artillery come to dominate the modern battlefield? Answer: Under certain circumstances, yes.

Artillery dominated World War I. As the French used to say, the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies. However, World War II gave tanks and aircraft the dominant role. Subsequent wars, particularly in the Middle East, continued to give armor and airpower the major role, while insurgencies focused on infantry. Artillery always had a role, but a supporting one.

Ukraine, in a surprise, has become a war heavily reliant on artillery. With fairly stable lines established, every day the two sides fire thousands, in some cases tens of thousands, of unguided artillery projectiles at each other. The frontlines look like World War I with infantry sheltering in trenches and massive artillery shell fire. Production of artillery projectiles has become a vital warfighting function. In an age of long-range precision strike, this has been a surprise.

The usefulness of precision munitions, such as Excalibur and GMLRS, has also been proven on the battlefield, although that was expected. Ukraine has successfully targeted Russian headquarters and supply depots, forcing the Russians, after substantial losses, to disperse. One suspects that artillery sniping goes on every day, though the data are not clear. However, these capabilities have not, by themselves, been a war winner. The Russians are still on the field and fighting effectively.

It is important to note that the primacy of artillery occurred when the frontlines stabilized. With the infantry dug in, maneuver became difficult. A stable front also meant that supply lines could be built to move thousands of shells every day. If the Russian or Ukrainian spring offensives break into the open, then armor and infantry will become relatively more important. Until that day, however, artillery rules as the king of battle.

The need for caution: There is an old military saying that first reports are always wrong. The same might be true of lessons learned. Ukraine has tightly controlled information, so it is difficult to judge what is happening on the battlefield and the effectiveness of weapons. Short videos and tweets are suggestive, but the plural of anecdote is not data.

Nevertheless, the shortage of crystal balls being what it is, a Russia-Ukraine war is proving to be the best insight available into the dynamics of the future battlefield. When the war ends and military analysts can walk the ground, make objective counts, and interview all the relevant players, then definitive insights can be drawn. Until that day, these interim assessments must suffice.

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