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5 February 2023

Russia Versus Ukraine and the Role of Software-Defined Radios

TAMARA MOSKALIUK AND BRANDON MALATEST

With the current war in Ukraine, it’s clear that Russia’s modernization program has involved electronic warfare and signals intelligence and played a huge part in Russia’s combat advances and overall positioning leading up to the actual invasion.

Electronic warfare is now at the heart of modern warfare, a complementary component or even a replacement to traditional combat. Battles and wars can be won or lost based on defeating the opponent’s technological advantage in the radio frequency spectrum and can also be used to infiltrate communications during times of peace. Radio frequency technologies—tactical radios, radar, positioning and navigation signals, weapons systems and various detectors to coordinate operations and find the enemy—are pivotal to military forces and have become increasingly important to disrupt, detect and deceive these adversarial capabilities. Electronic warfare can be broken down into three components: electronic attack, electronic protection or countermeasures, and electronic support.

The most well-known of these is electronic attack, which includes jamming of various systems or signal deception and usually involves a transmitter overpowering the waveform and signals of a hostile radar or radio. Jamming ensures that important signals and messages are unable to go through, while deception can relay incorrect messages and traps. Electronic protection and countermeasures involve techniques used to protect the integrity of signals and prevent them from being intercepted or jammed in the first place.

Electronic support is used to understand and expose vulnerabilities in the enemy’s radar and communications systems, usually conducted through passive listening of radio frequency electromagnetic radiations. The goal is to detect, intercept, identify, locate, record/play back, and/or analyze sources of radiated electromagnetic energy for immediate threat recognition and aiding in overall intelligence and strategic decision-making. The findings circle back into the decision-making process and influence protection and attack actions. Signals intelligence often uses electronic support data to extract further information to determine other aspects of the signal in question and the source of an emitter by characterizing it. Due to the sheer level of analysis needed, the broad radio frequency spectrum being occupied by various signals and the coordination of land, sea and air communications, technology has had to advance rapidly to keep up with these demands.

Software-defined radios (SDRs) have proven critical to electronic warfare, signals intelligence countermeasures and counter-unmanned aerial vehicles. SDRs receive and transmit functionality over a wide tuning range, using multiple channels, high bandwidth and networking capabilities. The use of SDRs in various signals intelligence/electronic warfare receivers stems from their design flexibility, especially in terms of frequency configurability as well as interoperability with legacy equipment and waveforms.

For instance, they can be developed for various parts of the spectrum required for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance or embedded into a high-powered amplifier and antenna array receiver system. Therefore, they can be optimized more for multiple-input, multiple-output operation over a wide range. Their ability to monitor the spectrum, intercept signals and record and store data for further signal analysis, especially in near-real time, is imperative in having the upper hand in a battle. There have been instances of Ukrainian hackers using HackRF and RTL-SDR to jam Russian signals, according to a report on Hackers-Arise.com.

As radio frequency communications are integral for civilian, military and overall general operations, radio-electronic warfare has been an integral part of breaking down or degrading enemy combat systems—or even regular systems. Take, for example, the R-330Zh Zhitel jammer, which can reportedly shut down all GPS, satellite communications and cellphone networks in the very high frequency and ultra-high frequency bands within a 25-kilometer radius. Within the command and control truck, it has signals intelligence equipment for detection, direction finding and analysis of radio signals by using SDR-based technology.

According to a report by Thomas Withington on TheDrive.com, Russian forces in Ukraine have grounded Ukrainian unmanned aerial systems by jamming or spoofing GPS or other signals required for the SDRs in these systems. This effectively rendered the Ukrainians incapable of providing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance from the air. Moreover, the Russians were effective at jamming air defense radars and nullifying command and control efforts. Russian troops jammed Ukrainian radars and radio communications in support of the Russian airborne operation at Hostomel Airport near Kyiv, also known as the Battle of Antonov Airport.

On the battlefield, it’s also become essential for SDR to be implemented into tactical radios for the ground soldiers and command and control communication. Russian company NPO Angstrem has developed a radio communications system with an R-187-P1E Azart multimode portable SDR providing much of the system functionality. The SDR-based radio makes it possible to establish a tactical communications subsystem between commanding officers, ground forces and various other forces, all while ensuring a protected data exchange under many conditions, including in an electronic attack and countermeasures environment.

The radio also has a mode for frequency hopping—up to 20,000 hops per second—and thus severely hindering the possibility of communications countermeasures or signal intercept or direction finding by adversaries in this mode. On the Ukrainian side—nearly every Ukrainian ground unit was supplied with and trained on the NATO Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System, which provides over 2,000 channels to choose from and replaces previous Russian-built radios that would be a liability due to espionage.

As with most military technology, the equipment deployed remains highly classified to ensure adversaries can’t exploit weaknesses. Several electronic warfare and signals intelligence systems developed by Russia have been uncovered because Russian troops attempted to lighten their load as they advanced or retreated. For instance, Ukrainian troops discovered a nondescript shipping container at an abandoned command and control post outside Kyiv a month into Russia’s invasion. They found it inside one of Russia’s most sophisticated electronic warfare systems, the Krasukha-4 jammer developed by Russian state-owned company KRET.

NATO analysts report that Krasukha-4 is primarily designed to jam airborne or satellite-based fire control radars in the Ka and Ku bands, which is important for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance programs, such as the U.S. E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System. Another system captured by Ukraine forces is the more advanced Borisoglebsk-2, which can jam drone guidance systems in the air and radio-controlled land mines on the ground.

While Russia was originally expected to have the upper hand in electronic warfare and military capabilities, Ukraine has been viciously fighting back with equipment supplied by allied forces, including SDR-based technologies. For example, Ukraine has been conducting electronic attack and countermeasures operations using counter-drone systems containing SDR transceivers provided by the United States. It has downed hundreds of Russian drones by jamming their GPS signals and, reportedly, even by damaging their electronics with high-power microwave beams.

Ukrainian forces have also leveraged United States-supplied jamming systems to defeat Russian tactical radio communications. It is reported that Russia does not have a system like Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System and has relied on cellphones or unencrypted radios, making them susceptible to Ukrainian geolocation and jamming. Many supposedly secure Russian cellphones have failed because they depend on third- and fourth-generation data channels, and the Russians destroyed many of those towers. General incompetence and lack of adherence to or knowledge of communication discipline has led to many Russian combatants, including generals, using regular cellphones and the ability of Ukrainian forces to quickly take the appropriate action based on the specific location.

Ukrainian forces have also exploited weaknesses of the large and powerful Russian electronic warfare systems, including their large size and the high-power transmission responsible for allowing jamming over a huge area. By using U.S. electronic support gear, Ukrainian troops have intercepted and detected transmissions from electronic warfare systems like the Leer-3 or Krasukha-4, reports Global Defence Technology. Ukraine also has directed rockets, artillery and drone counterattacks against the truck-borne Russian systems. It’s often been the case that Russia’s electronic warfare systems have been interfering with their own radio frequency technologies, possibly alluding to why many of Russia’s electronic warfare systems were left behind as their forces advanced into the Ukrainian interior.

Elon Musk’s Starlink proved to be an asset in combating jamming attacks on Ukrainian forces. Its constellation of low-orbiting satellites has provided broadband internet to more than 150,000 Ukrainian ground stations, including many of the Starlink ground station terminals, according to hackaday.com. At the heart of these terminals is an SDR of sorts for various means of steering the phased array antenna, tuning to near-microwave frequencies, as well as sending and receiving the data packets during use. As a further blow to Russia, it is very challenging to jam these connections, as it is a far more difficult challenge to jam low-earth-orbiting satellites than geostationary ones.

This war is far from over, especially as Vladimir Putin has initiated the “partial” mobilization of “reservists” and threatened nuclear war in an ambiguous enough proclamation that could result in the war taking another turn. War is fought on many fronts, so taking in the external military pressures and internal institutions, and understanding Russian ideology, military mindset and psyche can shape electronic warfare strategy.

Does Russia have the capability to arm and mobilize 300,000+ conscripts, many of whom are unwilling and untrained, when there are confirmed supply chain issues, lack of useful equipment and cognitive dissonance? Are we to take Russia’s word for anything, given their impressive track record of propaganda, “alternative facts” and attempts to rewrite history (notably, “Ukraine is not a country” even though its existence predated Russia for over a millennia)? Probably not. Is Russia still dangerous? Yes.

Exploiting Russia’s weaknesses on the battlefield, which include bouts of incompetence and disillusionment of the war after contrasting the propaganda with active combat, through electronic warfare and signals intelligence will prove valuable in ensuring the following outcomes are achieved:

1. Russia cannot launch an offensive. Intelligence and moves will be tracked, unmanned aerial vehicles will be disarmed and communications will be intercepted.

2. Russian disinformation cannot be spread. Ukrainians have already been hacking Russian channels to broadcast the real outcomes of war and destruction.

3. Other countries must be protected, both from physical invasion and cyber attacks.

This is why the constant stream of supplies for Ukraine is necessary, including the addition of missiles for their counteroffensive. Electronic warfare can stop additional death and destruction when used effectively. This, coupled with the weapons provided by the United States, the United Kingdom and numerous other countries, may prove to give Ukraine an upper hand in beating Russia on the electromagnetic spectrum.

Tamara Moskaliuk, former marketing director at Per Vices, specializes in business strategy and technological innovation. Moskaliuk possesses H.B. Commerce and B.A in economics and wrote her thesis on the economic and political development in post-Soviet Ukraine and the history and impact of war.

Brandon Malatest is a chief operating officer at Per Vices, a manufacturer of high-performance software-defined radios for integration into radar, electronic warfare and signals intelligence systems. Contact the authors at solutions@pervices.com.


According to a report by Thomas Withington on TheDrive.com, Russian forces in Ukraine have grounded Ukrainian unmanned aerial systems by jamming or spoofing GPS or other signals required for the SDRs in these systems. This effectively rendered the Ukrainians incapable of providing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance from the air. Moreover, the Russians were effective at jamming air defense radars and nullifying command and control efforts. Russian troops jammed Ukrainian radars and radio communications in support of the Russian airborne operation at Hostomel Airport near Kyiv, also known as the Battle of Antonov Airport.

On the battlefield, it’s also become essential for SDR to be implemented into tactical radios for the ground soldiers and command and control communication. Russian company NPO Angstrem has developed a radio communications system with an R-187-P1E Azart multimode portable SDR providing much of the system functionality. The SDR-based radio makes it possible to establish a tactical communications subsystem between commanding officers, ground forces and various other forces, all while ensuring a protected data exchange under many conditions, including in an electronic attack and countermeasures environment.

The radio also has a mode for frequency hopping—up to 20,000 hops per second—and thus severely hindering the possibility of communications countermeasures or signal intercept or direction finding by adversaries in this mode. On the Ukrainian side—nearly every Ukrainian ground unit was supplied with and trained on the NATO Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System, which provides over 2,000 channels to choose from and replaces previous Russian-built radios that would be a liability due to espionage.

As with most military technology, the equipment deployed remains highly classified to ensure adversaries can’t exploit weaknesses. Several electronic warfare and signals intelligence systems developed by Russia have been uncovered because Russian troops attempted to lighten their load as they advanced or retreated. For instance, Ukrainian troops discovered a nondescript shipping container at an abandoned command and control post outside Kyiv a month into Russia’s invasion. They found it inside one of Russia’s most sophisticated electronic warfare systems, the Krasukha-4 jammer developed by Russian state-owned company KRET.

NATO analysts report that Krasukha-4 is primarily designed to jam airborne or satellite-based fire control radars in the Ka and Ku bands, which is important for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance programs, such as the U.S. E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System. Another system captured by Ukraine forces is the more advanced Borisoglebsk-2, which can jam drone guidance systems in the air and radio-controlled land mines on the ground.

While Russia was originally expected to have the upper hand in electronic warfare and military capabilities, Ukraine has been viciously fighting back with equipment supplied by allied forces, including SDR-based technologies. For example, Ukraine has been conducting electronic attack and countermeasures operations using counter-drone systems containing SDR transceivers provided by the United States. It has downed hundreds of Russian drones by jamming their GPS signals and, reportedly, even by damaging their electronics with high-power microwave beams.

Ukrainian forces have also leveraged United States-supplied jamming systems to defeat Russian tactical radio communications. It is reported that Russia does not have a system like Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System and has relied on cellphones or unencrypted radios, making them susceptible to Ukrainian geolocation and jamming. Many supposedly secure Russian cellphones have failed because they depend on third- and fourth-generation data channels, and the Russians destroyed many of those towers. General incompetence and lack of adherence to or knowledge of communication discipline has led to many Russian combatants, including generals, using regular cellphones and the ability of Ukrainian forces to quickly take the appropriate action based on the specific location.

Ukrainian forces have also exploited weaknesses of the large and powerful Russian electronic warfare systems, including their large size and the high-power transmission responsible for allowing jamming over a huge area. By using U.S. electronic support gear, Ukrainian troops have intercepted and detected transmissions from electronic warfare systems like the Leer-3 or Krasukha-4, reports Global Defence Technology. Ukraine also has directed rockets, artillery and drone counterattacks against the truck-borne Russian systems. It’s often been the case that Russia’s electronic warfare systems have been interfering with their own radio frequency technologies, possibly alluding to why many of Russia’s electronic warfare systems were left behind as their forces advanced into the Ukrainian interior.

When used effectively, electronic warfare can prevent death and destruction. Credit: Shutterstock/zef art


Elon Musk’s Starlink proved to be an asset in combating jamming attacks on Ukrainian forces. Its constellation of low-orbiting satellites has provided broadband internet to more than 150,000 Ukrainian ground stations, including many of the Starlink ground station terminals, according to hackaday.com. At the heart of these terminals is an SDR of sorts for various means of steering the phased array antenna, tuning to near-microwave frequencies, as well as sending and receiving the data packets during use. As a further blow to Russia, it is very challenging to jam these connections, as it is a far more difficult challenge to jam low-earth-orbiting satellites than geostationary ones.

This war is far from over, especially as Vladimir Putin has initiated the “partial” mobilization of “reservists” and threatened nuclear war in an ambiguous enough proclamation that could result in the war taking another turn. War is fought on many fronts, so taking in the external military pressures and internal institutions, and understanding Russian ideology, military mindset and psyche can shape electronic warfare strategy.

Does Russia have the capability to arm and mobilize 300,000+ conscripts, many of whom are unwilling and untrained, when there are confirmed supply chain issues, lack of useful equipment and cognitive dissonance? Are we to take Russia’s word for anything, given their impressive track record of propaganda, “alternative facts” and attempts to rewrite history (notably, “Ukraine is not a country” even though its existence predated Russia for over a millennia)? Probably not. Is Russia still dangerous? Yes.

Exploiting Russia’s weaknesses on the battlefield, which include bouts of incompetence and disillusionment of the war after contrasting the propaganda with active combat, through electronic warfare and signals intelligence will prove valuable in ensuring the following outcomes are achieved:

1. Russia cannot launch an offensive. Intelligence and moves will be tracked, unmanned aerial vehicles will be disarmed and communications will be intercepted.

2. Russian disinformation cannot be spread. Ukrainians have already been hacking Russian channels to broadcast the real outcomes of war and destruction.

3. Other countries must be protected, both from physical invasion and cyber attacks.

This is why the constant stream of supplies for Ukraine is necessary, including the addition of missiles for their counteroffensive. Electronic warfare can stop additional death and destruction when used effectively. This, coupled with the weapons provided by the United States, the United Kingdom and numerous other countries, may prove to give Ukraine an upper hand in beating Russia on the electromagnetic spectrum.

Tamara Moskaliuk, former marketing director at Per Vices, specializes in business strategy and technological innovation. Moskaliuk possesses H.B. Commerce and B.A in economics and wrote her thesis on the economic and political development in post-Soviet Ukraine and the history and impact of war.

Brandon Malatest is a chief operating officer at Per Vices, a manufacturer of high-performance software-defined radios for integration into radar, electronic warfare and signals intelligence systems. Contact the authors at solutions@pervices.com.

The opinions expressed in this article are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of AFCEA International.

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