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28 April 2023

Are Petro and Biden Syncing? Key Takeaways from the Bilateral Meeting

Ryan C. Berg , Christopher Hernandez-Roy , Juliana Rubio , Rubi Bledsoe , and Henry Ziemer

In what seemed like a spur-of-the-moment decision, President Biden invited Colombian president Gustavo Petro to meet last Thursday, April 20. The White House joint statement highlighted similarities between the two presidents, including their commitments to climate change, migration, economic prosperity, the promotion of peace, and holistic counternarcotics strategies, as well as the roles of their respective countries as the two oldest democracies in the hemisphere.

Q1: What is Petro’s conservation and climate change agenda?

A1: Climate change is easily the issue where both presidents share the most common ground. The issue has been at the forefront of Petro’s agenda from the beginning of his term in 2022. A few recent actions help demonstrate Petro’s commitment to climate, including his pick for vice president, climate activist Francia Marquez, his consistent emphasis on creating a green economy, and the coast-to-coast trip that he scheduled amid his short U.S. visit to speak at Stanford University about climate change.

In his ambitious National Development Plan, Petro seeks for Colombia to become a world power in conservation and decarbonization. One of the key differentiators of this plan is the deep commitment to involve local communities, giving them back the power to make decisions about their own protection strategy and develop mechanisms to resolve socio-environmental clashes. The ambition of his plan is not unprecedented; his predecessor, President Iván Duque, had committed to laudable goals, but Duque’s militaristic approach led to serious human rights violations and to greater deforestation in 2021 and 2022 compared to 2019 and 2020.

A second key aspect of the National Development Plan revolves around the energy transition. For the energy transition to occur, it is essential for the world to reduce its consumption, and therefore exploration and exploitation, of fossil fuels. The Petro administration has shown that it is still committed to keeping current exploitation agreements, but it says it will stop giving exploration permits. This is a painful economic decision that global energy producers dependent on fossil fuel will need to make at some point, and when it comes to climate change, there is no better time than now.

Colombia is well known for its excellent legislation but also its lack of implementation, or at times, will. Hence, Petro will face enormous challenges—both from the opposition and the oil and gas industries—in his efforts to execute this plan. He will likewise need to figure out how to fill the gigantic financial vacuum that will be created if fossil fuel exploration ends. Here is where the United States and allies will play a key role. There needs to be a regional plan to balance the economic burden that oil-producing countries such as Colombia will bear as they partake in the energy transition. Part of the solution will be developing scalable and financially attainable alternative sources of energy, such as wind, solar, and geothermal energy, as well as developing supplements such as green hydrogen.

The Petro administration recognizes that climate change, social justice, and the economy are deeply intertwined, which is why the high-level bilateral conversation also emphasized the importance of economic prosperity.

Q2: Where do Petro and Biden agree regarding economic reform and the new Alliance for Progress?

A2: Besides security, economic reforms will likely be Petro’s greatest challenge. His tax reform passed with important changes from the original proposal, but it is doubtful that Petro was naive enough to expect it to pass without significant concessions. Strategically, it would have made sense to provide an initial draft that was considered “extreme.” However, land reform—an essential component of Colombia’s peace accords with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and one of Petro’s main campaign promises—will surely face steeper opposition, particularly from wealthy landowners who benefit greatly from inequality. According to a 2017 study by Oxfam, 1 percent of Colombia’s largest farms occupy 81 percent of productive land, with the remaining 19 percent of land distributed among the remaining 99 percent of farms. This level of inequality in land ownership has been the root of Colombia’s historical conflict and undeniably needs to be addressed.

The reform, however, must be methodically planned and executed. Every party will need to give some concessions—and some more than others—but hasty moves, or words, will scare foreign investment, shock the Colombian economy, and fuel internal conflict. Innovative ideas can form key parts of a robust economic reform strategy, such as exchanging foreign debt for climate action, developing public-private partnerships for infrastructure investment and general human development, and using public funds to buy land from wealthy landowners, particularly from those that have economic activities that are harmful for the environment. Unsurprisingly, the White House did not mention “land reform” explicitly, even as Petro did several times.

Nonetheless, Petro’s proposal to revive the Alliance for Progress is an idea that could be entertained by the Biden-Harris administration. Colombia could be a key piece of the puzzle for moving this initiative forward in the region, showing that the Petro administration is eager to work with the United States to promote common goals such as equity, interconnectedness, and democracy. Among U.S. presidents, President Biden has shown some of the most knowledge and appreciation for Latin America. For example, his decision to invite President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and President Petro within their respective first years in office shows that different democratic political ideologies do not define the relationship between Washington and the region.

Q3: What does security and counternarcotics cooperation look like under Petro?

A3: The June 2022 election of Petro, a former M-19 guerrilla and former senator and mayor of Bogotá, has some in Washington questioning how solid the U.S.-Colombia relationship will be moving forward. At its heart, the U.S.-Colombia relationship has been based on a mutual security partnership stemming from the onetime prospect that the FARC might be able to topple the Colombian government, or that the country could become a narco-state. Either possibility posed national security threats to the United States, which responded in 2000 by offering Plan Colombia, a 15-year military assistance plan which allowed the Colombian state to prevail in the internal armed conflict. Since 2000, the country has received more than $13 billion in foreign assistance from the United States. This developed into a deep security, economic, and political partnership, unique among the United States’ relationships with countries in Latin America, that turned Colombia into a leading country in the region. This support has helped further Colombia’s democratization—even enabling the peaceful transfer of power to the country’s first leftist president in its history.

Regarding the long-standing cooperation on counternarcotics, Petro’s leadership got off to a provocative start. In a speech before the UN General Assembly only a few months after he was elected, he asked “What is more poisonous for humanity, cocaine, coal or oil?” He then further described the failure of the war on drugs, saying that a million Latin Americans have been murdered for destroying or possessing coca leaf. He later walked these statements back, saying they were simply rhetorical, and added that he had no intention to legalize all drugs. Petro is advancing these ideas right when coca cultivation in Colombia is increasing rapidly by 43 percent in 2021, the highest level ever registered, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Both Presidents Biden and Petro, in principle, seem to agree that going after the criminal groups instead of the small farmers and focusing more on interdiction are sensible steps forward. The logistics and financial costs of this approach, however, are yet to be determined.

Two of the key issues that will shape the success of a holistic approach to counternarcotics are the future of Paz Total and the implementation of the peace accords with the FARC.

Q4: What’s going on with Paz Total?

A4: Unfortunately, internal security remains elusive for Colombia, as Petro’s ambitious plan to negotiate with the country’s disparate armed groups, known as Paz Total, seems to be in flux. Upon its announcement, Paz Total garnered interest from more than two dozen armed organizations, running the gamut from active insurgent groups to former self-defense militias and drug-trafficking cartels. This announcement was accompanied by a reduction in clashes between the Colombian armed forces and non-state groups, and the government was able to broker ceasefires with several prominent insurgent and militia actors by December 2022.

More recent developments seem to have poured cold water on these successes. The Petro government’s policy toward the National Liberation Army (ELN)—Colombia’s largest active insurgency—has moved in fits and starts, as the group first rejected a ceasefire in January 2023 before making progress in March on peace talks in Mexico City. Also in March, the Colombian government suspended its ceasefire with the Gulf Clan, citing attacks on civilians and police and the group’s failure to adhere to the ceasefire terms. These developments suggest that the government may be recalibrating its approach to Paz Total, focusing on eroding the capabilities of armed groups who have demonstrated an unwillingness to negotiate in good faith as a precursor to genuine negotiations.

Peace negotiations are a persistent problem that have plagued successive administrations in Colombia. Even the historic agreement with the FARC did not provide a final resolution, as dissident members splintered to form new factions, some of whom, such as the Second Marquetalia and Central General Staff, have returned to the table for negotiations as part of Paz Total.

Paz Total appears to be stumbling upon a collective-action problem when it comes to negotiations with so many armed groups. There are strong incentives for these groups to deal with the Colombian government to avoid persecution by the state and rebuild their strength. At the same time, groups with a political agenda, such as the ELN, do not want to be bundled with others such as the Gulf Clan—a criminal group that now, with the option to take part in Paz Total, is conveniently renaming itself Auto Defensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, or AGC). Negotiations are further complicated by Colombia’s partnership with the United States. Many of the concessions needed to bring about peace with armed groups will likely require amnesty for individuals with standing U.S. arrest warrants, a source of potential tension which could undercut security cooperation between the two long-standing allies. The word “extradition,” however, was never mentioned during the Biden-Petro meeting, at least not publicly.

Even if Paz Total proves to be less total in scope, the achievement of durable peace agreements with even a handful of armed groups would be a profound step forward. It remains to be seen, however, whether Petro can carry forth the spirit of Paz Total as an integrated framework for long-term peace while implementing the pragmatic steps and securing the international partnerships needed to provide security for the present.

Q5: How has the Petro administration handled the implementation of the Peace Accords?

A5: According to Gloria Cuartas, the director of the newly created Unit for the Implementation of the Peace Accords, the Peace Accords’ implementation rate is below 50 percent, contradicting the government’s online tracker, which shows a 67 percent implementation rate.

The Petro administration’s biggest hurdle is arguably a lack of funds to finance implementation. After taking office, Petro consolidated several government entities, with the goal of reducing government spending and avoiding redundancies in their efforts. Only six months later, however, he created a new post to deconflict the implementation of the Peace Accords from other peace negotiations, such as with the ELN, a cornerstone of his Paz Total policy. Bimonthly reports on progress show an initial sluggish effort, but that is expected to accelerate once funding is made available. Just this March, the president assigned $1.7 billion to support the Peace Accords’ implementation throughout 2023, with the majority of the funds going toward illicit crop substitution.

To achieve full implementation of the accords, the Petro administration must invest large amounts of additional funding and spearhead a complex intergovernmental coordination effort. Countries such as Norway and Germany have shown willingness to support implementation, including through investment. But if Colombia is to completely live up to the promises of the Peace Accords and remain a credible party to demobilize more armed groups, it will need to rally its partners and allies around the globe and act fast to meet commitments with the FARC.

Q6: What role will President Petro play in the talks with Venezuela?

A6: Presidents Petro and Biden did not mention Venezuela publicly, but several outlets confirmed that the country was a large part of their private conversations. President Petro has established a more conciliatory approach toward the Maduro regime than his predecessor, former president Iván Duque. Petro has met with Maduro in Caracas several times, opened the Colombian-Venezuelan border to greater trade, and sought Venezuela’s inclusion in regional organizations, such as its return to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

Specifically, Petro aims to “reactivate” the long-stalled negotiations between the opposition’s Unitary Platform and the Maduro regime. Previously, these talks have been held in Mexico City under the auspices of Norway, though talks are currently frozen.

Petro has established a closer working relationship with Maduro than Mexico’s Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Simply put, Colombia has more of a stake in Venezuela’s future—and in the country returning to a democratic path—than Mexico. Colombia has borne the brunt of Venezuela’s migration crisis, which as of October 2022 included more than seven million Venezuelans who had left the country. Additionally, Venezuela’s harboring of the FARC and ELN has been a source of perpetual violence and instability for Colombia, especially in border regions. Without a crackdown on these safe havens, President Petro cannot hope to achieve a durable peace through Paz Total.

Through “triangulation” between Bogotá’s, Caracas’, and Washington’s interests in seeing a resolution to the Venezuelan crisis, President Petro aims to inject renewed energy into the moribund talks, hoping they will result in tangible concessions that bring better electoral conditions for the opposition in 2024. In return, the Maduro regime could earn a partial lifting of U.S. sanctions.

Petro’s intervention is likely the last chance to boost Venezuela talks. Both Petro and Biden agreed on next steps: sanctions will be lifted only when Maduro sets an electoral calendar, provides a registry of voters, validates opposing political parties, and accepts a reputable electoral observation mission.

In the historic absence of political will on the part of Maduro, Petro will need to be extremely cautious. At best, he may jumpstart talks that could result in concessions; at worst, Petro’s gambit risks providing cover for the Maduro regime’s delays. There will likely be fallout as well from the recent trip of former interim president Juan Guaido to Colombia (he subsequently flew to Miami). After all, Maduro is a wily dictator who has emerged ever stronger from nearly a dozen negotiations processes.

Ryan C. Berg is director of the Americas Program and head of the Future of Venezuela Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Christopher Hernandez-Roy is the deputy director and a senior fellow with the Americas Program at CSIS. Juliana Rubio is a program manager with the Americas Program at CSIS. Rubi Bledsoe is a program coordinator with the Americas Program at CSIS. Henry Ziemer is a program coordinator and research assistant with the Americas Program at CSIS.

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