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8 October 2023

Zelenskyy’s race against geopolitics

John Raine

As summer moves into autumn, Ukraine’s spring offensive continues to be absorbed by entrenched and heavily mined Russian defences. In Europe and the United States, support for Ukraine and the containment of Russia continues, but the form and duration of that support are being called into question. The expected timeline of the war not only stretches out further than initially expected but also beyond what fiscal and military provisions can easily accommodate. In Russia, neither sanctions nor isolations have weakened President Vladimir Putin’s position or shaken his base. Only Yevgeny Prigozhin, a renegade radical more committed to the war than Putin himself, has threatened him. The liberal elite have mostly left the country, with their assets if possible. Neither Kyiv or Moscow is ready to give up or cut a deal. The fighting is set to be vicious and prolonged. But the outcome may not be decided by military power or even by events inside Russia, but instead by the pace of geopolitical trends unconnected with the war – and many of these are developing in Putin’s favour.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and possibly because of it, certain mutually enhancing trends have intensified: a rise in the strategic assertiveness of small and middle powers; the strengthening of like-minded groups of countries who feel disempowered under the post-Second World War dispensations; the promotion of nationalist agendas; and a revalorisation of authoritarian government. All of these favour Putin’s Russia, more by coincidence than design. Many of the states at the forefront of these trends also seek amicable relations with the US, but that gives complexity to the diplomatic landscape rather than reassurance to the West.

Against this rapidly shifting backdrop, the war itself has changed. What was initially a war of resistance for Ukraine is now one to recapture lost territory and, for some, of reparation. The Ukrainian and Russian military responses have modulated in scale and intensity to the point where they are now consuming record quantities of ammunition and forging new operating procedures and doctrine, but neither side is able to develop momentum. It is a conflict unlikely either to produce a sudden victory or release as much political energy and emotional support externally as when Ukrainian civilians resisted Russian tank columns. Narratives have shifted too. Russia’s argument that the war was caused by Western aggression has been internalised in Russia and by many of its allies. Military positions and public messaging are equally entrenched. With the conflict in a static, attritional phase, neither side can readily adapt to evolving geopolitics without making concessions. But the disadvantages are unequal. Moscow can make geopolitical gains by being passive; Ukraine must work for them, even among countries supporting its war effort. Russia can reinforce relations with states such as China that feel similarly constrained by the West. Ukraine, however, stands to lose from geopolitical realignments motivated in large part by anti-US sentiment.

Since the start of the war there have been changes of government and policy in important third-party states. Whereas previously the United Kingdom was led by Boris Johnson, among the most forward-leaning European leaders in supporting Ukraine, its prime minister is now the more measured Rishi Sunak, who is focusing on domestic issues ahead of a probable 2024 general election. Poland, until now Ukraine’s firmest supporter, has fallen out with Ukraine over weapons supply and grain imports, and Germany is struggling to implement its ambitious defence-spending uplift. There have, however, been positive developments from Kyiv’s perspective. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has been openly supportive of Ukraine despite her previous leanings towards Russia before she took office. The extension of NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s tenure has given valuable top-level continuity. But the biggest political change may come next year in the US presidential elections. The return of Donald Trump to the White House would inject a potent, randomising stimulant into the geopolitical mix. Outside NATO, however, the Gulf is settling into a strategic relationship both with Putin and with Russian assets. In Asia, India’s nationalist leader Narendra Modi served as host of the September G20 Summit and confidently steered the Leaders’ Declaration in directions favourable to Russia, despite India’s neutral position towards the war in Ukraine. Volodymyr Zelenskyy was not invited.

Therefore, despite the war’s immense significance for the international community, its course has desynchronised from geopolitical developments. It remains on the global-security agenda, but for an increasing number of states it is seen as a subset of other issues and is being increasingly instrumentalised. At the darker end of the spectrum, Iran and North Korea, two regimes intensely focused on perpetuating their rule, have used the war to leverage a deeper relationship with Russia. States such as Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkiye and the United Arab Emirates have taken the opportunity to align with Russia to promote their own credentials as negotiators, bridge builders or, more ambitiously, as candidates for regional or even global leadership roles. For them, who wins the war is a less important than how they might benefit from the new geopolitics.

Secondary effects of moves made in the first phase of the war are now manifesting. NATO and the European Union are under stress. While their policy-level commitment to Ukraine is holding, there are differences within both organisations when it comes to the form and timing of support for Ukraine, and on what for Kyiv is the biggest issue of all: membership. As a defensive alliance, NATO can more readily remain cohesive around a core mission powerfully stated in its renewed Strategic Concept, but for the EU the risk of internal friction over divergent political objectives is likely to rise. It seems the new government in Slovakia, following the 30 September election, will be pro-Russian. EU member states with competing visions of the purpose and future of the organisation are now coalescing around power centres in Eastern and Western Europe. Any deterioration in cohesion will turn the EU’s focus inwards, generating opportunities for Russian influence and interference.

There are also other factors fuelling the geopolitical ferment. Divisions over climate are deepening as oil-producing states, many enjoying continuing relations with Moscow, assert themselves on pricing and the energy transition, and as domestic factors are forcing some Western governments to moderate the pace of transition. ‘Challenger’ multilateral groupings, most notably the BRICS, have expanded their memberships and provided platforms and embryonic coalitions for rising and established powers. In the Middle East an extraordinary series of de-escalations has resulted in a new equilibrium that has been fostered as much by the regional powers themselves, and China, as by the US. In a further complication, India, Indonesia and South Africa, among others, have general or presidential elections in 2024, when campaigning is likely to further fuel the trends of nationalism and strategic assertiveness.

While there is interplay between these dynamics and the war in Ukraine, they are independent of the course and probably the outcome of the conflict. Zelenskyy’s race is not just against the policies of individual states but against these geopolitical trends that are indulging Putin and that risk downgrading the war to a regional conflict. The difficult task for Ukraine will be to fight the required diplomatic war as hard as it is fighting to reclaim each square mile of territory. Before he could even consider negotiations, Zelenskyy needs NATO countries and other partners to serve as force multipliers by committing to the diplomatic battles required and continuing and ideally increasing the flow of lethal aid. Some will continue to argue that the coalition of Ukraine’s supporters has limited capacity and appetite, given the pressures and constraints of democratic politics, and that Zelenskyy must at some point reconcile himself to the new order. It is likely that Kyiv will continue fiercely to reject this idea, with Zelenskyy arguing that Ukraine should receive the military capabilities that would enable it to achieve its war aims. He may yet get them, but geopolitical changes are accelerating beyond the control of any single actor and will inevitably impact on his international support. His window for decisive action is shrinking.

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