Pages

26 January 2024

Deterrence Gap: Avoiding War in the Taiwan Strait

Jared M. McKinney & Peter Harris


Introduction It has become the conventional wisdom in the United States— among military, diplomatic, and intelligence officials, as well as political commentators—that the People’s Republic of China is growing ever more likely to invade Taiwan.1 For some, this view is rooted in an assessment of Xi Jinping as reckless and risk acceptant in comparison to his recent predecessors. Whereas China’s past leaders were content to defer cross-Strait unification, the argument goes, Xi has staked his political legacy on the promise of reclaiming Taiwan; if he does not deliver in his third or fourth term as paramount leader, he will sacrifice his chance of making an indelible mark on Chinese history and might even be overthrown.2 In a slight variation, Admiral Philip Davidson, US Navy retired, has stated the choice to use force “becomes much more probable within the next six years because of the potential for Xi Jinping’s transition in 2027, as his political future is determined principally by himself, and his ability to garner some support for that may depend on that 2027 timeline.”3 

Another popular view is the balance of military power across the Taiwan Strait is making a Chinese invasion more likely. According to proponents of this argument, decades of investment and strategic planning have made People’s Liberation Army leaders more optimistic than ever that a successful assault on Taiwan will be possible by 2027 or thereabouts; an invasion is becoming more likely simply because it is becoming more practicable.4 One version of this narrative is that People’s Republic of China leaders learned from Russia’s failure to conquer Ukraine that invading powers must show no remorse when launching lightning assaults. From this view, Vladimir Putin’s mistake was that he did not hit Ukraine hard enough in the first few days of the Russia-Ukraine War. Having witnessed this apparent shortcoming, Chinese leaders should not be expected to make the same mistake as Putin; they now know to strike Taiwan hard, fast, and sooner rather than later, before Taipei can fortify itself against invasion and while American arms transfers remain focused on Ukraine.5 

Other theories about Taiwanese vulnerability abound and are united by an augury that the risk of an armed attack on Taiwan is mounting, the implication being that Taipei and its sympathizers abroad must quickly find ways to bolster deterrence across the Strait. Especially in US outlets, the discussion often focuses on how the United States can play its part in deterring China.6 One common proposal is for Washington to exchange its long-standing policy of “strategic ambiguity,” which leaves both China and Taiwan guessing whether the US military would intervene in a war over the island, for a firm US commitment to defend Taiwan against an armed attack (“strategic clarity”).7 The logic is simple; no rational Chinese leader would invade Taiwan if doing so was certain to mean a confrontation with the world’s sole superpower. Proponents of strategic clarity acknowledge that a war with China over Taiwan would be “disastrous” even if the United States emerged victorious.8 These proponents insist that only the credible threat to fight such a ruinous war is now enough to maintain peace across the Strait. In effect, the proponents of strategic clarity offer a new version of mutually assured destruction meant to convince China that an invasion of Taiwan would be tantamount to declaring World War III. To be sure, it is also common for analysts in the United States to argue that Taiwan must develop a more powerful conventional military to deter a Chinese invasion. Most of these policy recommendations take some form of the “porcupine” model of national defense.9 Even so, few in the United States believe that Taiwan can defend itself.10 For deterrence to be restored, it is assumed, Washington must threaten war with China to some degree.

In this monograph, we agree that the likelihood of a war over Taiwan’s political status has increased in recent years. Like others, we attribute the increasing odds of an invasion to a weakening of deterrence across the Strait. We take issue, however, with the causal logics that underpin most analyses of the issue and, as a result, are led to disagree with the usual policy recommendations that focus on what the United States and (to a lesser extent) Taiwan can do militarily to deter China. Our point of departure is that repairing deterrence across the Taiwan Strait requires a clear understanding of why deterrence is failing at the present time and what can realistically be expected to alter Beijing’s prospective decision-making calculus. This understanding means avoiding the presumption that the solution to Taiwan’s current predicament can only be found in the military realm. Instead, successful instruments of deterrence can be rooted in other elements of national power, too. What matters is the political interests of the adversary being deterred—in this case, the leaders of the People’s Republic of China. In sum, we submit that analysts of Taiwanese security have done too little to probe precisely why Taiwan has become more vulnerable to a Chinese invasion and how China’s leaders might be returned to the position of believing that an armed attack on Taiwan is incompatible with other core national interests. As a consequence, analysts have erred in their conclusions about what might deter China in the future.

No comments:

Post a Comment