Sidharth Raimedhi
Since the Pahalgam terror attack of 22 April, there have been expectations of an Indian ‘retaliatory’ attack against Pakistan—making the present situation an acute crisis between two nuclear states. However, a cost-benefit calculation reveals that India’s response could be somewhat unexpected. India could stop short of an escalatory military assault similar to the Balakot airstrike of 2019.
India could instead be increasingly drawn toward a response that stacks up coercive pressure while constructing a form of crisis termination that is mostly political and emphasises the bigger picture.
There are three primary reasons for this—military dynamics, international stakes, as well as a political off-ramp that has the potential to be satisfactory. Let us explain.
Military dynamics and brinkmanship
There are three ways in which 2025 is not 2019. First, and the most regrettable aspect—Pakistan has modernised, equipped and integrated its ground and air forces, which leaves India with high-risk choices in terms of escalation control/management. Marked by a crisis of legitimacy and resultant siege mentality, Pakistan’s posture has also been one of greater desperation—giving it some psychological advantage in a twisted sense.
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