Joel Wuthnow
I n April 2024, Xi Jinping announced a new military restructuring focused on improving the ability of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to achieve information dominance and conduct integrated joint operations in wartime. Continuing a process of reform that Xi initiated nearly a decade ago,1 the latest reform included three parts: eliminating the Strategic Support Force (SSF), establishing a new Information Support Force (ISF) responsible for network defense and communications support,
and placing the ISF and three other support forces under Xi’s direct control.2 This reform constituted the most significant structural overhaul of the PLA in the last 5 years, and the first since Russia’s failed attempt to topple the government in Ukraine signaled to Xi and other Chinese leaders the difficulties of offensive warfare, especially as Russian troops struggled to dominate the information environment and fight effectively as a joint force.3 Joel Wuthnow is a Senior Research Fellow in the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University. Chinese President Xi Jinping inspects Hong Kong Garrison of Chinese People’s Liberation Army at Shek Kong Barracks, in Hong Kong,
June 30, 2024 (Xinhua/Pictorial Press, Ltd./Alamy) JFQ 117, 2nd Quarter 2025 Wuthnow 5 Xi’s reorganization seeks to continue to improve the PLA so that it can succeed where Russia stalled. A new round of structural improvements has been regarded internally as a positive step in the PLA’s ability to meet its 2027 modernization timeline, which reportedly has a focus on preparations for a Taiwan contingency.4 This article traces the origins of Xi’s latest reform, analyzing each of the three major components in turn.
It then discusses the implications for the PLA’s operational effectiveness and the challenges that remain. The conclusion is that the reforms could improve the Chinese leadership’s confidence in the PLA’s combat potential and thus shape leadership views on the costs and risks of aggression. Refinements to the U.S. Joint Warfighting Concept should take this revised institutional context into account.
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