Jay Pasquarette
Operation Rising Lion represents a significant moment in the ongoing confrontation between Israel and Iran. The consequences wrought by Iran’s persistent destabilization of the region through proxy groups for years and insistence on advancing their nuclear program – despite repeated warnings from the United States and Israel – are already severe.
Although it is early, there are three elements of Rising Lion to pay close attention to: (1) how escalation progresses and where it may lead, (2) what Israel’s true strategic objectives are given the means it has already committed and the risk it appears willing to assume, and (3) how the logic of targeting can shape an adversary’s decision-making. Each of these dynamics may influence not only the outcome of this conflagration but the possibility for a better peace when the fighting stops.
Escalation Ladders and Thresholds
The fundamental question of how far this conflict could escalate may be a function of degraded Iranian capabilities and limited means available to Tehran. Iran’s ability to respond convincingly and in a way which preserves the legitimacy of the Ayatollahs is likely to be materially constrained. Years of sanctions, the degradation of military infrastructure at the hands of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and Mossad, and the weakened state of Tehran’s proxy network has done much to weaken Iranian strategy. However, a cornered Iran with limited options may escalate asymmetrically or worse. Tehran might feel forced to make unpredictable, drastic actions that are unforeseen by Israel and the United States.
This begs the question of off-ramps for both sides – and the degree to which they are already narrowing based on actions already taken. For Israel, an off-ramp could follow decisive operational success – such as the destruction of key Iranian nuclear infrastructure. A decisive military achievement paired with U.S. diplomatic assurances to maintain pressure on Iran through non-kinetic approaches might provide the opportunity to off-ramp and de-escalate the conflict. Alternatively, for Iran, a plausible off-ramp may include symbolic retaliation which seeks to preserve what little credibility Iranian leadership has left followed by a return to the negotiating table with the United States. However, in the absence of meaningful options, Iran’s leadership may perceive that de-escalation means capitulation – which further reinforces the increased risk that Iran may lash out in unpredictable ways.
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