William F. Wechsler
There is much we still don’t know about Israel’s strikes on Iran, including exactly what triggered Israel’s action at this particular time, the full scope of their target list so far, their effectiveness against those targets, Israel’s current plans for future phases of this campaign, and its decision matrix for further campaign expansions and escalations.
We will all learn these answers soon enough. In the meantime, we shouldn’t lose sight of what we already do know—or at least what we already can surmise with high confidence.
We know that given the nature of its regime, Iran cannot be allowed to possess a nuclear weapon or to continue to blackmail the world with its capacity to break out and acquire such weapons. This should not be a controversial position, as it has been the consistent policy of every U.S. president for decades, all of whom have threatened to use military force to enforce that policy if other options failed. Indeed, the argument for such a strike has become much stronger over the past year. Four years ago, U.S. President Joe Biden took office prioritizing negotiations with Iran, and four months ago U.S. President Donald Trump decided to do the same. But in each case, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei chose not to effectively reciprocate, an unpardonable strategic miscalculation no matter how frustrated he was by Trump’s first-term decision to withdraw from the nuclear deal negotiated by U.S. President Barack Obama. Instead, Iran chose to ignore previously established red lines and directly attack Israel with hundreds of projectiles—twice. It also tried to assassinate Trump and many former members of his administration after they left office—actions that never received the serious attention and response that they deserved. An Iranian regime that makes these decisions can never be allowed to be a nuclear power.
We should assume that Israeli leaders would have interpreted the absence of an American red light as a de facto green light.
We know as well that Iran will respond militarily to Israel’s strikes, notwithstanding the diminishment of its proxies and the likely disruption of key elements of its command-and-control mechanisms. Iran typically prefers to wait to retaliate at the time and place of its choosing. But as Israel’s campaign continues, Tehran will feel pressure to respond quickly, as evidenced already by its initial volley of drones last night. The Israelis know this, so they will try to preemptively eliminate Iranian capabilities to respond militarily. Iran’s reaction likely will include both direct attacks on Israel and retaliation via its remaining proxy groups. However, the obedience of some of those proxies is in question given current circumstances. This conclusion is reinforced by early reports that Hezbollah may be reluctant to follow Iran into another war with Israel.
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