Jon Hoffman
Great power competition is rapidly becoming the new justification for US involvement in the Middle East. Citing efforts by Moscow and Beijing to “challenge American power, influence, and interests,” Washington formally placed competition with Russia and China at the center of the National Security Strategy in 2017.1 Washington views great power competition—particularly with China—in strictly zero-sum terms, extending to a broad swath of issue areas and regional theaters. This approach encourages an already counterproductive foreign policy driven by an indefinite—and expansive—struggle to maintain American global primacy.
Many in the defense and foreign policy establishment view the Middle East as a major theater for US–China competition.2 Washington has come to view Chinese encroachment in the Middle East as a serious national security threat to the United States. According to this logic, China is driven by grand ambitions in the region: If the United States were to lessen its regional involvement, Beijing stands ready to fill a US vacuum in the Middle East, to the detriment of US interests.3
According to such thinking, China filling this vacuum would jeopardize Washington’s freedom to maneuver throughout the Middle East or could result in Beijing weaponizing the region’s resources against the United States.4 Others have gone so far as to claim that China actively seeks to oust the United States from the Middle East because it desires regional supremacy.5 Fearing Chinese inroads in the Middle East, Washington has increasingly issued warnings to its regional partners cautioning against ties with Beijing, claiming this could jeopardize their relationships with the United States.6 Such concerns are some of the most commonly cited justifications for continued deep engagement in the Middle East.
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