Chinese Premier Li Qiang, on 19 July, presided over the groundbreaking of what is set to become the world’s largest hydropower dam, on the so-called ‘Yarlung Zangbo’, as China refers to the Brahmaputra River. Within hours, Chinese online platforms erupted in celebration. A Weibo hashtag marking the occasion—#Construction begins on lower Yarlung Zangbo Hydropower Project—amassed over 73 million views.Beyond the spectacle of scale, the Chinese online discourse quickly turned the project into a symbol of strategic ascendancy. India, the downstream neighbour, is cast as anxious and reactive. China, in contrast, is portrayed as visionary and unyielding—a master of its geography and architect of a new regional order.
In contemporary geopolitics, infrastructure has become a strategic language of its own, one that Beijing is speaking fluently.The Medog Hydropower Station is projected to cost $167 billion and boasts a planned capacity of 70 to 81 million kilowatts, roughly triple that of the Three Gorges Dam. Once completed, it is expected to generate 300 billion kilowatt-hours annually. The project will take a decade to build, but its signalling to the region, especially India, is immediate.
Hu Xijin, former editor-in-chief of the Global Times, a daily Chinese tabloid, criticised Western media for focusing on India’s ecological and geopolitical concerns while ignoring what he called an “engineering miracle”. For Hu, the dam is not just about electricity; it is also a declaration of China’s ability to tame the Himalayas and reshape geography.One Chinese commentator claimed that India’s objections stem not from technical concerns, but from its deeply entrenched “security-first” mindset. New Delhi, the commentator argued, has long prioritised control over collaboration, building its own dams while accusing others of weaponising water. “India’s alarmism,” another wrote, “comes from its own guilty conscience.”
China’s dual narrative
Officially, Beijing is presenting the dam as a developmental initiative, aimed at energy security, poverty alleviation, regional integration, and transforming Nyingchi into the “Little Sichuan” or “Jiangnan of Tibet.” Talk of water weaponisation is being brushed aside as paranoia. Commentators invoke “non-zero-sum” logic and portray China as a responsible upstream actor.
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