JOHN S. VAN OUDENAREN and PETER W. SINGER
On June 6, President Trump signed two executive orders designed to build back up the U.S. civilian drone industry: one orders various agencies to promote American drone exports, and the other limits government purchases of drones linked to the Chinese government. Whether these measures are too little, too late to turn around a global market that has been dominated by China for over a decade remains to be seen. But what it does miss is that China’s drone industry is not merely a story of civilian systems, but of military ones as well—and a strategic plan that yokes multiple parts of government and industry to a central goal.
The PLA’s interest in drones is extensive, as is often observed around Taiwan. Drones participated in joint exercises around the island in August 2022, April 2023, May 2024, October 2024, and April 2025. UAVs are a regular presence in PLA incursions around Taiwan’s periphery, indicating that they would likely factor heavily in any Taiwan Strait conflict. And high- and low-end UAVs reportedly figure in its simulations of Strait scenarios.
Nevertheless, the PLA is apparently still determining what kind of UAVs it needs—perhaps long-endurance drones operating alone on strike or ISR missions, autonomous drone swarms of different types (including “mothership warfare”), or manned-unmanned teams like larger drones as “loyal wingmen” for piloted fighter jets.
To this end, China is closely monitoring the role of drones in contemporary military conflict, especially in the Russia-Ukraine War. In particular, the PLA is drawing extensive lessons from its partnership with Russia, including concerning the use of swarms of expendable, ultra-low-cost drones that China could use its enormous industrial capacity to manufacture in large quantities.
No comments:
Post a Comment