On 12 June 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran was in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement, citing undeclared material and a history of activities suggesting a pursuit of weaponisation. The next day, Israel began its strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure. Nine days later, the United States joined the targeting campaign.
While the damage to individual facilities is still being assessed through secret and open intelligence, the big picture of Iran’s remaining nuclear-weapons-relevant capability is coming into focus.
The strikes have significantly disrupted its nuclear programme and potential weaponisation options but not eliminated them. This analysis surveys the infrastructure and materials available to Iran, were it to decide to rebuild its latent nuclear-weapons capability, or ‘sprint to the bomb’.
Hunting the hexafluorideBefore the strikes, international concerns focused on Iran’s stockpile of around 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% U-235, a few steps from weapons-grade. Stored as uranium hexafluoride (UF6),
the highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile, if further enriched to around 90%, is enough for roughly ten nuclear weapons. While IAEA inspectors had inventoried the stockpile, they have lost track of it since the start of the conflict.
Trucks observed outside Fordow and Isfahan before and after the strikes suggest that Iran may have moved the material. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi confirmed that Iran had announced that it would take protective measures for its nuclear material prior to any attacks.
The ‘hunt for the hex’ remains significant because, even at lower enrichment levels, UF6 stockpiles can theoretically be fed directly into any remaining centrifuges for further enrichment. Iran’s domestic supply chain – including 14 uranium mines left untouched by the strikes – adds an extra layer of resilience by means of securing the material needed for both civilian and military programmes.
No comments:
Post a Comment