The liberal international order is dying, and its transatlantic backers are grieving. During the first Trump administration, many were in denial, but few are now. Some are angry, denouncing a villain—usually U.S. President Donald Trump—for having unnecessarily destroyed what they hold dear and vowing to step forward to bolster global institutions: in March, for instance, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock declared that “a ruthless time has begun in which we must defend the rules-based international order and the strength of law more than ever against the power of the strongest.
Others, such as NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, hope they can bargain—that by coming on bended knee to the White House and flattering Trump, they can persuade the United States to reinvest in its historic alliances and defend key principles such as territorial sovereignty. Still others are depressed, resigned to the order’s demise but unable to imagine an alternative future.
Few of these mourners seem truly ready to accept the order’s passing. But they should. Praying for its resurrection is not just naive; it is counterproductive. All these responses misdiagnose the order’s deepest illness and thus prescribe the wrong remedy. The liberal international order’s crisis cannot be blamed on Trump’s peculiar brand of nihilistic politics, nor on the hard neoliberal turn that the order took in the 1990s, nor on the rise of revisionist, illiberal powers such as China and Russia.
These factors did play a role, but the postwar order ultimately decayed because what many saw as its greatest strength—how its institutions, norms, and rules were grounded in liberal principles—was actually a source of weakness. By providing universally acknowledged public goods, creating inclusive institutions, and committing to the rule of law, its backers believed that the order would prove particularly hardy.
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