Optimal Deterrence How the United States Can Preserve Peace and Prevent a Nuclear Arms Race with China and Russia

James M. Acton

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The United States faces growing dangers of nuclear escalation, a new arms race, and proliferation. These risks stem, in part, from its strategy of using its nuclear forces to target opponents’ nuclear forces. Such “counterforce” targeting is justified primarily as a way to limit the damage the United States would suffer in a nuclear war. However, adversaries’ nuclear forces are too difficult to destroy for this strategy to yield meaningful benefits, while its risks are high.

A new arms race. China is building up its nuclear forces. Russia may do so too. To meet counterforce targeting requirements, potentially against both adversaries simultaneously, the United States will need a larger nuclear force. Such a build-up, however, would motivate China and Russia to further increase their force requirements, thus stimulating an expensive, tension-generating, and futile three-way arms race in which the United States is poorly positioned to compete given the limitations of its defense industrial base.

Escalation. Counterforce targeting increases the likelihood that, in a conflict, an adversary could escalate the conflict because it feared its nuclear forces were vulnerable. It could, for example, engage in limited nuclear use or take actions, such as dispersing its nuclear forces, that risked catalyzing further escalation.

Proliferation. U.S. allies fear being abandoned by the United States, and some have begun to openly contemplate acquiring nuclear weapons. However, if Washington decides to rebuild its alliances, it may try to “assure” allies by augmenting its nuclear capabilities in a way that risks accelerating a new arms race.

As part of an improved strategy of “optimal deterrence,” the United States shouldcease, and declare it has ceased, the targeting of adversaries’ nuclear forces, command control systems, and leadership, and instead focus exclusively on conventional military forces and war supporting industry, which it already targets;

weigh the pros and cons, in war planning, of not conducting conventional or nuclear operations that could convince an adversary that the United States was planning to attack its nuclear forces; and continue critical ongoing nuclear modernization programs.