András Rácz and Alina Hrytsenko
Executive Summary:Before 2014, military cooperation between Russia and China was characterized by pragmatic, practical considerations: Russia contributed to the modernization of China’s armed forces by selling various types of weaponry, while Beijing was a lucrative market for Russia’s military-industrial complex.
Since the illegal annexation of Crimea, Russia has lost access both to Ukraine’s defense industry and to its Western military-industrial partners. This has left Russia with China as the sole remaining major source of much-needed imported military technology and components. In exchange, China has received access to advanced Russian missile, air defense, and electronic warfare technology. Deepening cooperation has also been demonstrated by the growing frequency of joint military exercises. As of early 2025, Beijing was a crucial, irreplaceable enabler of Russia’s sustained war efforts against Ukraine.
Meanwhile, despite declarations about a “no-limits” partnership, the cooperation is indeed limited. While Russia and China share a strong anti-US stance, Beijing is unwilling to limit its own strategic autonomy and freedom of maneuver by making any commitment to Russia that would lead to an open conflict with the West or the introduction of sanctions.
A prime example of the limits of Sino-Russian relations is Beijing’s refusal to officially recognize any Russian territorial gains since 2014. Limited trust is also reflected in the joint Russian-Sino military exercises, as these maneuvers are more about demonstrating the will of cooperation to the outside world than improving interoperability between Russian and Chinese armed forces.
Due to these limitations, while military cooperation along shared interests will continue, it is extremely unlikely that it will develop into any functioning, institutionalized alliance.
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