How do countries cope when wars meant to be short and decisive turn out to be protracted and inconclusive? In such situations strategy needs to rethought to bring military means and political objectives into a new alignment – more appropriate means and more realistic objectives. The more a war drags on the harder this becomes for added to the original objectives comes an additional one, the need to avoid the humiliation of defeat.
This additional factor helps explain why Vladimir Putin persists with a war that he is not winning and cannot win. Limited territorial acquisitions do not mean that Putin is winning. Victory depends on achieving his political objectives and here he is not even close.
Putin has made no secret of his objectives. They were first set out as the full-scale invasion was launched in February 2022. Then he focused on the ‘denazification’ and ‘demilitarisation’ of Ukraine, along with constitutional changes to protect Russian speakers. In September 2022 he added to these the claimed annexation of four oblasts (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kerson, and Zaporizhzhia) in addition to Crimea, taken in 2014.
These objectives have been reaffirmed regularly, and since December in every statement describing what Russia wants from peace negotiations. The demand is for a subjugated, neutralised, disarmed Ukraine, not only resigned to some of its territory being under Russian occupation but also obliged to hand over extra that Russia has thus far failed to obtain through military action.
For Russia this is what winning means. That is why Russia would not accept Trump’s offer –Russia keeping what it holds and no NATO membership for Ukraine. Trump made his offer under the misapprehension that this would satisfy Putin sufficiently for him to agree a ceasefire. This was despite Putin and his foreign minister Sergey Lavrov insisting that they had no interest in a ceasefire until all their political objectives had been met.
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