The US and its allies aren’t ready for a war on two fronts, but we’re acting like we are.
A recent Atlantic Council report, A Rising Nuclear Double-Threat in East Asia, has rightly sparked debate on how to prepare for simultaneous conflicts with China and North Korea.
Based on tabletop exercises known as Guardian Tiger I and II, the report urges a sweeping overhaul of US command arrangements and alliance coordination. These are welcome discussions.
But as someone who’s interviewed more than 60 Japanese, American, and South Korean defense officials during my doctoral research, I believe the report’s prescriptions often rest on overly optimistic assumptions — about industrial capacity, alliance cohesion, and the feasibility of truly “integrated” responses.
Wishful Planning Meets Wartime Reality
Chief among the report’s recommendations is a call to revise the Unified Command Plan so the US can effectively coordinate simultaneous wars in Korea and around Taiwan.
But this assumes a level of military readiness that simply does not exist.
The US defense industrial base cannot currently replenish critical munitions — such as JASSMs, GMLRS, and Patriot interceptors — at rates needed to sustain even one prolonged, high-intensity conflict.
In a war with North Korea alone, stocks would be depleted rapidly. Add China to the equation, and the US risks an operational collapse.
Rather than assuming we can fight and win two wars at once, the US should adopt a more realistic strategy of sequenced escalation dominance: prioritizing one theater for immediate, full-spectrum support, while holding the line in the other until reinforcements or coalition partners can surge.
No comments:
Post a Comment