Brett Erickson
In the modern context, sanctions are supposed to act as a line of defense, measures designed to dissuade adversaries before a conflict even begins. But for sanctions to carry weight, they must be seen as viable: not just in concept, but in execution.
At present, that foundation is unstable. While Western leaders continue to invoke unity and strength, the tools meant to apply real economic pressure are disjointed and prone to breakdown under strain. The mechanisms required to turn intent into credible action, coordinated enforcement, reliable escalation pathways, and the stamina to withstand domestic fallout, are either missing altogether or proving insufficient where they exist.
The recent response to Russia illustrates this point. Sanctions were rolled out quickly, but their impact has been diluted by inconsistent implementation, a patchwork of legal frameworks, and the absence of long-term political consensus. Instead of a sustained front, we’ve seen a series of measures that lack follow-through and coherence. Recent reporting by the New York Times highlighted a lack of new U.S. sanctions on Russia under the second Donald Trump administration.
What was meant to project strength has instead revealed systemic vulnerability: goods still move through loopholes, enforcement lags, and even allied governments backpedal when domestic costs begin to rise.
China, in watching all this unfold, is learning exactly where the West’s thresholds lie, and what the United States and its partners are willing to tolerate in practice. The New York Times found that more than 130 companies in mainland China and Hong Kong “are advertising immediate sales of restricted computer chips to Russia.” None of the companies found making such advertisements is under sanctions, illustrating the weakness of the existing sanctions regime.
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