What Are the Limits of U.S.-India Security Burden-Sharing in the Indian Ocean?

Nilanthi Samaranayake

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When viewing U.S. partnerships in the maritime domain, relations with India, in particular, have thrived — especially over the past decade. Moreover, the partnership enjoys bipartisan support in the United States. Indications after Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the White House in February 2025 are that U.S.-India security relations will continue to be strong in the second Trump administration.

The U.S. approach for roughly 25 years toward the wider Indo-Pacific has been to cultivate India as a critical, non-allied partner to serve as a counterweight to the rise of the People’s Republic of China. Security burden-sharing with India, from low-end maritime capacity-building in smaller Indian Ocean countries to high-end anti-submarine tracking of China, has been a long-term goal of deepening bilateral ties.

A logical extension of this military cooperation during peacetime would be seeking India’s support during a crisis involving China. At the upper limits of security burden-sharing, U.S. officials could request India’s assistance in combat along the lines of a treaty ally. Many experts believe such a request solely to assist the United States in a crisis against China would likely be rejected. Yet, there are many other options for advancing defense technological and operational cooperation in service of greater interoperability.

Another possible future, however, is one in which India as a rising Indo-Pacific and global power does not welcome the U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean, or even actively undermines U.S. interests. This less likely scenario at present is rarely discussed but should at a minimum be considered as a thought exercise, alongside other scenarios, as the Trump administration develops its strategy toward a critical Indian Ocean partner.

U.S. History in the Indian Ocean: Past as Prologue?

Although the United States does not have territory in the Indian Ocean, it historically has held clear interests in the region’s security. Due to distance and military requirements in Europe and East Asia, the United States adopted a different approach for the Indian Ocean in the Cold War era, relying on regional pillars of strength for stability and access. The UK was the main pillar for the United States in the region after World War II. Yet, the UK’s withdrawal of costly overseas basing in the late 1960s and early 1970s forced Washington to look for other regional pillars of strength.