Kunal Singh
The recent air strikes by Israel and the United States on nuclear infrastructure in Iran have revived disputes over intelligence on the imminence of a nuclear breakout—that is, how long it would take Iran to build its first nuclear weapon.
In March, US Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard reiterated the longstanding view in the American intelligence community that Iran had not yet decided to weaponize its nuclear capabilities. Israeli intelligence, on the other hand
indicated that Iran was not only accelerating its weaponization program but also planning for how to mate an explosive uranium core to a missile. It seems that President Donald Trump found the Israeli intelligence more convincing and decided that the United States would join in the air campaign started by Israel.
Much of the controversy over how close Iran was to breakout stems from the fact that intelligence reports tend to feed into a narrative justifying, or denying the grounds for, a preventive war on nuclear programs.
This much is clear: No matter what the intelligence says about a potential nuclear breakout, the global nonproliferation architecture is harmed by preventive attacks. Rafael Mariano Grossi, the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has stated, as have former directors-general Mohamed ElBaradei and Hans Blix, that nuclear facilities should not be attacked under any circumstances.
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