Benjamin Fernandes and Benjamin Jensen
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth gave the Army a clear directive—design a leaner and more lethal force with better long-range precision fires, air and missile defenses, cyber capabilities, electronic warfare, and counter-space capabilities. These are expensive priorities requiring significant changes to the Army’s force structure. The Army cancelled the M10 Booker and procurement of older attack helicopters (AH-64D Apache) but plans to develop a new manned tank; however, Army leaders should consider substantial divestment of manned attack aviation and manned tanks. Generals and soldiers, including the authors, love Apache attack helicopters and M1 Abrams tanks, which represent raw combat power and U.S. technological dominance of the twentieth century. However, today’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats, proliferating advanced air defenses, and other threats in every domain demand rethinking the Army’s force structure at every level. Winning modern combat requires lethal, relatively cheap, strategically agile (i.e., between continents), and tactically agile (i.e., on the battlefield) weapon systems that industry can quickly produce in large numbers. Agility becomes especially important in an unpredictable world where threats and the president determine where the Army operates, not the Army’s desire or force structure. The next adversary could be cartels, China, or something else.
Abrams and Apaches Lack Strategic Mobility
While the Abrams tanks and Apache helicopters provide tremendous lethality on the battlefield, their slow movement between continents overly burdens the force with poor strategic mobility. A C-17 cargo aircraft can only carry one Abrams tank because it weighs more than 30 Ford F-150 trucks. Apache helicopters are easier to carry; three fit on a C-17, but loading and unloading remain relatively slow and cumbersome due to the disassembly and reassembly required. These physical requirements force the Army to rely on sealift, which easily requires 30 or more days to transport equipment to Europe, Asia, or the Middle East. Chinese, Russian, Iranian, and North Korean investment in cyber (e.g., Volt Typhoon), long-range fires (e.g., Oreshnik), and anti-ship capabilities (e.g., DF-21 anti-ship missile) could substantially lengthen this strategic transportation timeline and attrit forces in transit under wartime conditions. Compounding this problem are some tactical, intra-continental mobility concerns for the Abrams, such as its ability to cross most bridges due to its weight and massive logistics requirements—around a half-mile per gallon of fuel. Ultimately, adversaries could achieve a fait accompli or, more likely, substantial gains before a critical mass of Abrams or Apaches arrive on the battlefield.
No comments:
Post a Comment