Mark J. Massa and Alyxandra Marine
To achieve the likely objectives of the National Defense Strategy—defending the US homeland and deterring China—the United States must address the risk of strategic attacks on the homeland. This imperative includes preventing such attacks and ensuring that the Department of Defense has both the strategy and capabilities to restore deterrence at the lowest possible level of damage if prevention fails.
This is essential because a strategic attack could coerce the United States into halting its support for allies and partners, or cause military disruption severe enough to prevent such support altogether—thus undermining the objective of deterring China. Moreover, adversaries could inflict damage on US society that far outweighs the benefits the United States seeks through its foreign policy, further weakening homeland defense.
An effective strategy to address the risk of strategic attack on the US homeland must rest on several overlapping pillars. These include deterring a large-scale nuclear attack on the United States; preventing nuclear escalation during conventional regional conflicts; fielding US and allied forces sufficient to deter the outbreak of major-power conventional war; maintaining a flexible declaratory policy and adaptable strategic forces; and enhancing the nation’s ability to sustain warfighting capacity—even while under strategic attack.
No comments:
Post a Comment