Yu-cheng Chen, K. Tristan Tang
In June 2025, the Liaoning and Shandong carrier strike groups conducted operations in the Western Pacific, achieving three major milestones with significant strategic implications for the U.S. military and Indo-Pacific regional states. The three key milestones include the first simultaneous deployment of two carrier strike groups beyond the First Island Chain; the first time a Chinese carrier has operated beyond the Second Island Chain; and a record-breaking duration for carrier operations outside the First Island Chain. These military actions were part of far-seas mobile operations training, conducted within the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s annual routine training program.
This indicates that the Chinese Navy has begun to regularize far-seas mobile operations training, which may require the United States to adjust its force posture in the region. Together with the large-scale PLA military operations around Taiwan that have taken place since 2022, these developments suggest that the Central Military Commission likely assesses that the Chinese military possesses comprehensive near-seas combat capabilities, implying that the PLA Navy could believe it has secured operational dominance in nearby waters and may adopt more assertive actions against foreign naval vessels in these areas.
On May 27, the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) Liaoning aircraft carrier crossed the first island chain and entered the Western Pacific. On June 7, the Shandong carrier group followed suit, transiting from the South China Sea into the Philippine Sea. While in the Western Pacific, the carrier groups engaged in a round of far-sea realistic combat training (远海实战化训练) and adversarial drills (对抗演练). The drills included reconnaissance and early warning, counter-strike operations, anti-surface assaults, air defense, and round-the-clock tactical flights by carrier-based aircraft; achieving new milestones for the PLA Navy (PLA Daily, July 1). By June 22, both groups had returned to the East and South China Seas, respectively.
The drills constitute a shift in the PLAN’s focus toward long-range operations. This likely stems from an assessment by the PLA’s Central Military Commission (CMC) that the navy has achieved sufficient combat capability in the country’s near seas (近海). This is something that could have important implications for U.S. force posture in the region. The PLA has begun to cross the Second Island Chain, which includes Guam, in the Western Pacific. This shift brings Chinese forces closer to Hawaii. As a result, the United States may need to adjust its force deployments and rotation schedules accordingly.
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