Michael Petersen Paul Schwartz Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez
This report examines the evolution of Russian thinking about military strategy and conventional military operations after three years of conflict in Ukraine. It assesses Russian elite military thought on combined arms operations, naval surface warfare, and air dominance operations (including long-range precision strike). It probes the thinking of Russian military elites on how the country’s military strategy and operational concepts should evolve to address emerging changes in the character of armed conflict in anticipation of future wars.
The study begins with an analysis of Russian strategic thought, which forms the foundation for Russian warfighting concepts. It then discusses three main operational areas: combined arms operations, naval surface warfare, and air dominance operations. In each of these areas, the Russian military has encountered major unexpected challenges during the war, including the inability to wage effective combined arms offensives, maintain control of the Black Sea, and achieve air dominance. The study team drew primarily from leading Russian military journals, such as Voennaia Mysl’ (Military Thought), which are widely read by Russian political and military elites. We also consulted materials published by leading Russian think tanks and central newspapers providing expert coverage of Russian military affairs as well as Russian official doctrine.
Key findings
The report finds that despite significant technological advances, which in turn have led to major tactical changes in the character of armed conflict (especially widespread use of uncrewed systems), Russian strategic and operational thinking on conventional military operations remains largely unchanged from approaches adopted before the war. Instead, for most Russian military elites, the war appears to confirm prewar conclusions regarding the character of armed conflict, despite the unexpected setbacks incurred by Russian forces during the war. Consequently, Russian views on the character of armed conflict have evolved little since the war, and there are no signs of any fundamental shifts in Russian strategic concepts or operational doctrine.
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