Jianli Yang
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin shake hands at a meeting on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit at Kazan, Russia, Oct. 22, 2024.Credit: X/Narendra Modi
When Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine on February 22, 2022, the world was confronted not only with a brutal war of aggression but also with a dramatic reshaping of global oil flows. As Washington and its allies implemented sweeping sanctions aimed at crippling Moscow’s war chest, two Asian economic powerhouses – India and China – emerged as vital lifelines for Russia’s energy exports. What happened next has become one of the more puzzling episodes in recent U.S. foreign policy: the Trump administration has sharply penalized India for its expanding purchases of Russian crude – culminating in a 50 percent tariff on select exports – while allowing China – an even greater consumer of that very oil – to escape similar direct punishment.
The disparity is so marked that it demands examination. It cannot be explained by reference to oil volumes alone, nor is it a simple matter of how international law is applied. Instead, it reflects a confluence of cold political calculation, relative economic leverage, and the subtle but consequential difference between how U.S. policymakers view India and China. What makes this story more complex still is the Trump administration’s belief – one that shapes much of its strategic posture – that China might play a decisive role in brokering an end to the Ukraine war.
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