Brian YS Wong and Sebastian Contin Trillo-Figueroa
The 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin was by no means a game-changer, but it was a useful bellwether for close observers of China’s shifting foreign policy strategy.
Over the past decade, Beijing’s understanding and interaction with the so-called “global order” has undergone a significant transformation — from a historically deferential approach rooted in compliance with Western-led institutions, to now tentatively attempting to convene a coalition of the “aggrieved.”
For many SCO members, abstention costs more than participation. Central Asian states treat it as insurance against great power rivalry, while India stays engaged to prevent China from monopolizing regional leadership.
Belarus joined in 2024 less for benefits than to avoid isolation. Iran uses membership to counter diplomatic marginalization despite crippling sanctions. Whatever their motives, most members conclude that exclusion means forfeiting influence over conversations that will happen with or without them.
The recent summit confirmed this pattern across multiple domains. On security, the new Universal Center for Countering Security Challenges and Threats will not reconcile India and Pakistan, but it will extend the SCO’s reach.
On economics, Chinese President Xi Jinping highlighted trade with SCO members that has surpassed US$500 billion and recast selective bilateral deals as signs of multilateral progress. Even the Belt and Road Initiative, still contested by India, folds easily into SCO bilateral discussions – giving Chinese projects Eurasian branding.
On governance, Beijing advanced its Global Governance Initiative, rejecting bloc politics and “Cold War mentality” while affirming loyalty to the UN and WTO – signaling opposition to US dominance without naming it. None of these commitments is enforceable, but their repetition may subtly shape, and eventually foster, new conceptions of legitimacy.
All the world’s a stage
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