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4 September 2025

Staff Processes in Large-Scale Combat Operations Part 1: The Rhythm of the Battle

John R. Harrell, James Villanueva, Peter Farese, Joe Hammond 

Imagine a scenario where a division executing a wet gap crossing has just lost 50 percent of its bridging assets. The division commander is with the division’s tactical command post and is trying to pull his brigade commanders and staff up on the net to discuss options. He needs information and a plan now. Glancing at the division battle rhythm, the next division course of action development working group is not for another three hours and the fragmentary order and other fighting products will not be published for another 14 hours. This timeline does not support the commander or the staff.

For the past two decades the operational environment afforded divisions the luxury of not having to move their command posts. An enduring mission allowed large numbers of staff officers and noncommissioned officers to conduct a multitude of meetings, working groups, and boards, along with the time and talent to execute these types of battle rhythms. As the Army continues to shift its focus and adapt to fight and win in multidomain, large-scale combat we must change our processes so that commanders are able to make informed decisions any time of day. A robust, rigid, and highly structured battle rhythm with many boards, bureaus, cells, centers and working groups (B2C2WGs) and other staff events may support staff processes in a static environment. However, operations in competition and large-scale combat demand a battle rhythm less reliant on a full suite of meetings on a rigid schedule. A robust battle rhythm may support staff processes, but a battle has a rhythm of its own that ebbs and flows between offensive and defensive operations, periods of high and low intensity, and a relentlessly changing situation across every domain. Even doctrine acknowledges that battle rhythms change during operations.

The battle rhythm changes during execution as operations progress. For example, early in the operation a commander may require a daily “plans” update briefing. As the situation changes, the commander may only require “plans” update every three days.

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