Peter Wilcox
In the 1990s, Andrew Grove introduced the phrase strategic inflection point to describe a decisive juncture in an organization’s life, when subtle yet cumulative shifts in the environment converge that demand transformation. Institutions must either adapt to these emerging realities or risk drifting toward irrelevance. The most capable of leaders accept the risks required to guide the organization toward renewal, while those who resist change often preside over stagnation and decline. Grove’s concept finds parallel in Carl von Clausewitz’s coup d’œil—that intuitive “glance” which cuts through the fog of war. For Clausewitz, “resolution, presence of mind, and the lessons of history” were indispensable for any commander striving for clarity amid the most difficult circumstances. Likewise, institutions at inflection points require this type of discernment.
The Problem
Today, the Army’s information dominance community stands at a strategic inflection point—a moment demanding a reexamination of how it defines the role for Information Operations (IO) officers. Since Field Manual 100-6’s publication in 1996, each doctrinal revision—including Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-13, Information—has cast IO officers chiefly as “synchronizers” and “integrators” (S&I) of information capabilities and organizations, subordinated to the lethal arc of combat power while neglecting the non-lethal. The result, even after five iterations, is a doctrine still groping for coherence. As U.S. Army Colonel Sarah White observes:
The service has cycled and recycled through numerous attempts at doctrinal codification, and yet it seems to be in much the same place in 2023 [and I would argue 2025] as it was in the early 1990s: aware that the information revolution means something for warfare, yet unsure of what that something is, what it should be called, and what is the appropriate doctrinal response.
This essay contends that the Army should reconceive IO officers primarily as a unit’s chief military deception officer (CMDO)—responsible for deception at the core, while secondarily supporting lethal operations. Such a shift would restore military deception (MILDEC) to its rightful place as a significant combat power enabler in large-scale, joint, and multi-domain operations. It would also bring much-needed clarity as to what exactly the task and purpose of Army IO officers are.
Combat Power and Information’s Perceived Role in Warfare
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