‘As Long as it Takes': What does it mean to commit to Ukraine’s security?

Lawrence Freedman

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Any long war leads to innovations in military technology and tactics and shakes up the established political order. The war in Ukraine is no exception. There has been much commentary on what it means for the character of modern war, especially because of the saturation of the front-lines with cheap and expendable drones. But there has been less on its impact on the conceptual framework with which we think about questions of alliance and security guarantees.

In 2008 the door was opened to eventual NATO membership for Ukraine though without any mechanism to allow it to walk through the door. Yet the possibility that one day Ukraine might join the alliance was used by Moscow to justify the invasion and occupation of its neighbour, and some in the West believe it had a point. Because Moscow has put so much stress on this issue it is now taken for granted, including by Ukraine, that when and if a peace deal is agreed to end this war, NATO membership will be precluded.

This has left Kyiv and its supporters scrambling around to find an acceptable alternative that will guarantee Ukraine’s security should there be a deal. One problem is that the old model of NATO, the model Ukraine wanted to join, has been subverted if not quite done away with by Donald Trump. In this post I will assess the impact on both our thinking and practice of this combination of the US administration’s expectation that European countries will do more to look after not only their own security but also Ukraine’s, and the persistent challenge posed by Russian aggression.

Backing Ukraine

When Russia annexed Crimea and carved out enclaves in eastern Ukraine in 2014, NATO countries backed Ukraine, with sanctions against Russia and some arms supplies, though these were limited in both numbers and type. Western countries sought to show their displeasure with Rusia while limiting their own liabilities. That remained the case even after the full-scale invasion of February 2022. The sanctions became more severe and more weapons were delivered, but liabilities were kept limited. The weapons supplied were notionally defensive. Putin made sure, when he announced the ‘special military operation’ that any direct engagement by NATO troops would involve the highest risks: